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Abstract 
This thesis examines the experience of a group of long-distance, wholesale 
merchants from the Hanseatic city-republic of Bremen who dominated American-German 
trade during the nineteenth century. It places their history in the context of the emergence 
of bourgeois conservatism, and of the dialectical tension between modernization and 
tradition that characterized this transnational political current. As members of a trans-
Atlantic community, Hanseats mediated in their ideas and practices the influences of 
German home-town traditions, of an Anglo-American critique of liberalism and 
democracy, and of the Hamiltonian idea of improvement that inspired United States 
conservatives. 
American Whigs, in their cooperation with Hanseats, are cast in a new light as 
promoters of international improvement, and as driven by ideas and concerns that 
represented a transnational bourgeois response to the French Revolution that rejected 
democracy but embraced technology in an attempt to make capitalism safe for Protestant 
Christian traditions. While unique at the time, democratic suffrage in the United States 
did not create an exceptional ideological landscape. From Hanseats’ vantage point, the 
Second Party System appeared as a specifically American variant of a familiar political 
division between elite politics and mob rule, allowing them to adopt ideas and emulate 
practices that they found in America. 
This dissertation is based on extensive family and business correspondence, 
newspapers, and parliamentary, diplomatic, and court records from multiple archives in 
Baltimore, Bremen, and New York. It combines family and gender history, the history of 
political ideas and institutions, and political economy in a transnational approach to 
 ii
social history that reconstructs the life-world of historical actors in all its facets and 
relates it to their political and economic activities. 
This work comes to the conclusion that the history of modern conservatism 
presents an irony. Conservatives pursued policies intended to safeguard traditional values 
and practices from the challenges of capitalism and democracy. These policies, in turn, 
contributed to the consolidation of an industrial-capitalist world economy and of the 
power of nation-states, both of which undermined the very values and practices 
conservatives hoped to preserve. 
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 It would have been impossible to write this thesis without the help of many 
friends and colleagues who generously gave their time and thoughts to make this a better 
work. To all of them I feel the deepest gratitude. Some particular individuals, whose 
efforts have left more of a trace on the following pages than those of others, should not 
remain unmentioned. 
 My advisor, Ronald G. Walters, supported me with invaluable advice and infinite 
patience. His rare gift of knowing at every point when to leave the candidate alone, and 
when to nudge him into producing work, laid the foundation of an efficient and 
productive cooperation. His stringent editorial help and his conscientious engagement 
with the often idiosyncratic arguments advanced by this author are largely responsible for 
what little clarity might emerge from this product. Ron Walters went beyond what one 
can reasonably expect from an academic advisor not just in his care for this candidate’s 
intellectual development, but also in that for his physical well-being: frequent trips to 
Binkert’s butcher-shop ensured that his advisee’s fridge remained well-stocked with 
essential German meat products. 
 Other members of the History Department of Johns Hopkins University have in 
similar ways left an impression on the work of this author. Vernon Lidtke introduced me 
to the world of German nineteenth-century thinkers whom I had thus far ignored in my 
pursuit of American History. Michael Johnson opened to me the strange country that is 
the antebellum South. Peter Jelavich, Paul Kramer, Lou Galambos, and Toby Ditz gave 
their time for discussing with me several key segments of this thesis. Even where my 
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Northern German stubbornness rejected their constructive criticism, I hope that they will 
nonetheless discover on these pages the traces of my engagement with their objections 
and suggestions. 
Among the scholars who influenced this work, David Harvey had an early and 
formative impact on my thinking. His assistance in guiding me towards an understanding 
of the role of merchant capital in the nineteenth century gave a decisive impulse for the 
direction my further research and writing took. Giovanni Arrighi, as a teacher, and Erica 
Schoenberger and Siba Grovogui as members of my committee, likewise inspired me to 
think through the material rendered here in clearer and more thorough ways. 
 Christine Weideman, Assistant Head Archivist of the Manuscripts and Archives 
Division of Yale University Library, generously allowed me to have photocopies made of 
substantial portions of the letters contained in MSS 434, the John Christopher Schwab 
Family Papers. As a result, I was able to complete much of my research in the comfort of 
my own study. Without the active help of many other archivists and their staff in Bremen, 
Baltimore, and New York, much of the source material that was indispensable for the 
completion of this project would have remained out of my reach. I am particularly 
indebted to Dorothea Breitenfeldt, curator for family and business papers at the 
Staatsarchiv Bremen, who not only pointed me to the papers of obscure merchants that 
turned out to be mother-loads of evidence, but who also was a confidence-inspiring guide 
through the maze of the ancient and archaic structure of this venerable institution. 
Catherine Molineux and Dirk Bönker sacrificed valuable time in reading and 
criticizing the entire draft of this thesis. Even more importantly, their true and loyal 
friendship of many years sustained me through the trials and tribulations of graduate 
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student life. Without them, it is safe to say that I would have thrown in the towel at some 
point. Other colleagues have read several chapters in various stages of completion. 
Caroline Domenghino and David Marshal, in particular, provided me with invaluable 
criticism during a crucial phase of this project. Patryk Babiracki and Caleb McDaniel 
likewise contributed their insights on key passages of my argument. The discussions with 
these and many other colleagues represented to me the best of what a scholarly 
community can be. 
 Among scholars of the Hanseatic world, Heide Gerstenberger’s work has been an 
inspiring example to my own. Her criticism of my own attempts at writing maritime 
history has disabused me of many a received idea that had kept me from seeing the forest 
for the trees. Lydia Niehoff, Jan Oberg, and Jan Martin Lemnitzer have selflessly shared 
with me their insights on Bremen’s merchants, and have allowed me to cite the evidence 
that their own labors had excavated from the archives. Without their help, this 
Americanist would often have been lost in the bewildering landscape of a nineteenth-
century German home-town. 
 No dissertation is exclusively an academic achievement. Domestic conditions at 
all times have shaped the pace and quality of my work. As a sometime 
Lebensabschnittsgefährtin, Aimée Pohl left an imprint on the totality of this thesis. 
Miami, the cat, has reminded me of the importance of getting enough food and sleep as 
she tolerated my presence in her apartment. Finally, my parents, Ursula and Uwe 
Maischak, have each in their own way enabled me to accomplish what little in this work 
is not attributable to some other mind. To them I dedicate this thesis. Naturally, any 
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See  Bürgerschaft 
Bürgerkonvent Name of the  Bürgerschaft until 1848. 
Bürgerschaft “Citizenry,” legislative organ of Bremen. 
corporation 1. In the context of Bremish politics: a public organ, often enjoying 
political and juridical privileges, representing a group the 
membership of which is defined by status and/or economic activity. 
For example, a guild. 
2. In the context of German and American law: a private business 
enterprise enjoying the legal status of a natural person. 
corporatism The ideas and institutions that uphold an economic order based on 
 corporations (1). 
estate A body of people defined by their function in the general division of 
labor of a society, often enjoying political and juridical privileges, 
membership in which may be inherited (for example, in the case of 
the Prussian nobility) or granted by the sovereign (for example, in 
the case of the Bremish mercantile estate). 
estatism The ideas and institutions that uphold a political order based on 
 estates. 
Handelskammer “Chamber of Commerce,” corporate body representing Bremen’s 
mercantile estate. 
Last “Load,” a Bremish volume measure for a ship’s loading capacity. 
1 Last = ca. 1.5 Register-Tons 
Nationalverein “National Association,” movement organization of German 
nationalism founded in 1859 by bourgeois notables. 
Rat Name of the  Senat until 1822. 
Senat Executive organ of Bremen. All italicized derivations (Senator, etc.) 
refer to this organ. 
Senate American legislative body. All derivations in regular type (Senator, 
etc.) refer to this organ. 
















Globalization and its Enemies 
 The end of the Cold War brought the spread of free trade and globalization at the 
same time that it reinvigorated nationalism.1 Rather than seeing a universal victory of 
liberal, western democracy, we find ourselves bracing for the attacks of fundamentalists 
who advocate an authoritarian social order. In one narrative, this fundamentalist attack is 
a matter of an anti-modernist rebellion by those who lost in the process of 
modernization.2 From the mountainous heartlands of Afghanistan and Appalachia, 
Chechnya and Thuringia, self-styled defenders of the authenticity and purity of the 
people and its beliefs set out to battle the incursions of modernization. In the minds of 
these crusaders, global commerce is the conduit for the seed of corrosion that threatens a 
local morality and way of life. In their view, the city and its archetypical representative, 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Barber, Benjamin, Jihad vs. McWorld - how Globalism and Tribalism are reshaping the 
World, New York 1995. 
2 While this term will be used on the pages of this thesis, to describe the political program of actors who 
perceived a need for their respective societies to ‘catch up’ to the leading industrial and commercial 
powers, it is treated with caution. Following the argument made by Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn in 
The Peculiarities of German History (Oxford, UK and New York 1984), we should be aware that 
democratization, or even a liberal political stance, are not necessarily contained in a ‘package’ of 
modernization. For example, Eric Hobsbawm (The Age of Capital, London 1975) has shown that 
modernizers’ political and social views varied, in a continuum ranging from a full embrace of ‘Western 
freedom’ to authoritarianism. 
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the merchant, bear responsibility for the subjection of the simple farmers and workers to 
the dictates of the market and the subversion of their ethos by a commercial culture 
devoid of a higher calling.3
 The longer we live under these conditions of global strife, however, the clearer it 
becomes that a fundamentalist critique of western liberalism is just as attractive to urban 
professionals as it is to disgruntled provincials. The biographies of recent suicide 
attackers are replete with university degrees and urban lifestyles. Likewise, a closer look 
at the presumed backwoodsmen reveals a high degree of participation in global 
commerce. Whether we consider opiates from Afghanistan or auto parts from 
Appalachia, we find that even the remotest regions of the world are tied into the world- 
market. There are no authentic places left that have been untouched by the incursions of 
modernization. Local, particularist traditions that pose as deeply-rooted customs are 
really inventions already suffused with an engagement with the outside world. In either 
case, global liberalism and fundamentalism appear not as ideologies that respectively 
promote and oppose modernity, but as ideological poles within modernity. 
 Since the 1990s, intellectuals in the United States have perceived the newly 
globalized world as presenting both dangers and opportunities. Transnational history has 
been one reflex to the epochal changes at the turn of our century. This new branch of 
historical scholarship has been mining the past for traces of our direct ancestors: men and 
women who lived through periods of intense changes that affected the entire world, and 
who went beyond their local origins to craft a world-view from the experiences collected 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations, New York 1996; Buruma, Ian, and 
Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism. The West in the Eyes of its Enemies, New York 2004; and Sardar, 
Ziauddin, Postmodernism and the Other. The New Imperialism of Western Culture, London and Chicago, 
Ill. 1998. The latter is an example of the views criticized here. 
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in exchanges with other countries. Transnational historians have discovered a variety of 
such ancestors, mostly in the Progressive Age at the turn of the twentieth century. Here, 
they found reformers who, knowing that their local intellectual traditions and political 
institutions inadequately equipped them to respond to rapid industrialization and 
urbanization, turned abroad to look for better answers. Here, they also found conquerors 
and colonizers who went to foreign shores as rulers, looking to spread their own, local 
ideas and practices in the guise of a universal civilization, an American Empire.4
 No matter the intent of those who were driven abroad by local concerns, 
transnational exchange is always a two-way street. In formulating this insight, 
transnational historians stand in the tradition of scholarship on the Atlantic World of the 
eighteenth century. The subculture of sailors and merchants who built the European 
colonial Empires of that era, as well as the novel commodities they introduced into the 
societies along the Atlantic’s shores, remade the every-day life and the world-view of the 
colonizer and the colonized, even if neither ever left his home.5
 Thanks to Atlantic and transnational history, we know that at the beginning of the 
modern era, there was a world in which identities were in flux; and that by the end of the 
nineteenth century it had been replaced by a world of nation states imagined as self-
                                                 
4 Rogers, Daniel, Atlantic Crossings. Social Politics in a Progressive Age, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 
Uk 1998; Howe, Daniel W., American History in an Atlantic Context. An Inaugural Lecture delivered 
before the University of Oxford on June 3 1993, Oxford 1993; Tyrrell, Ian, “American Exceptionalism in 
an Age of International History” (p. 1031-1055) and “Ian Tyrell Responds” (p. 1068-1072), and McGerr, 
Michael, “The Price of the ‘New Transnational History’” (p. 1056-1067), in: Journal of American History, 
vol. 96, no. 4 (1991), pages as given in brackets. 
5 Rediker, Marcus B., and Peter Linebaugh, The many-headed Hydra. Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the 
hidden History of the revolutionary Atlantic, Boston 2000; Gilroy, Paul, The Black Atlantic. Modernity and 
Double Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass. 1993; Idem, There ain’t no Black in the Union Jack. The 
Cultural Politics of Race and Nation, London 1987; Bolster, W. Jeffrey, Black Jacks. African American 
Seamen in the Age of Sail, Cambridge, Mass. and London, UK 1997; Kelly, Robin D. G., “How the West 
Was One: The African Diaspora and the Re-Mapping of U.S. History,” in: Bender, Thomas, ed., Rethinking 
American History in a Global Age, Berkeley, CA 2002, p. 123-147; Molineux, Catherine, The Peripheries 
Within: Race, Slavery, and Empire in Early Modern England, PhD diss, Johns Hopkins University, 2005. 
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contained units, albeit one permeated by – friendly and competitive – transnational 
connections. One hope of transnational history has been to break nation states’ hold on 
peoples’ political imagination. As history is always a narrative that defines the self-image 
of contemporaries, transnational history has been offering the adequate narrative for an 
American population that can no longer afford to ignore the rest of the world. It could 
become an updated national history of America, just as it could become a critique of 
American Imperial ambition, now and in the past. 
So far, the historical period that most resembled our own, and in which the 
persistent dichotomies of our own era were first fully formed, has evaded close attention 
from transnational historians. The decades between the Congress of Vienna and the Paris 
Commune were the formative years for the world we know. They saw the rise of industry 
outside of Britain, and the acceleration of global communication by steam-power and 
telegraphs on land and across oceans. By 1871, these processes had resulted in the 
creation of a modern, industrial world-market, and of the strengthened, increasingly 
unitary, territorial states that based their legitimacy on nationality and their fiscal and 
military might on industry; and that mediated competition and cooperation on the world-
market. 
The new ease of communication and the opportunities and disruptions caused by 
industrialization, set in motion an unprecedented number of migrants. Never before had 
such a high percentage of the world’s population had the chance to form an image of 
foreign countries from first-hand experience. For those who lacked this chance, the 
proliferation of print media exploded the amount of information about the world available 
even in its farthest provincial corners. At the same time as they acquainted them with 
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foreign events, newspapers made citizens into armchair participants in a bloody game of 
geopolitics whose logic culminated in the First World War. The smaller and the more 
interdependent the world became, the more people’s habits of perception were shaped by 
categories like nation and race. 
 Our world, with its dialectic of world-market and nation-state, cosmopolitanism 
and parochialism, universalism and particularism, liberalism and fundamentalism, 
technological progress and barbarian regression, has its roots in the nineteenth century. It 
is for this reason that Marx’s and Engels’ account of globalization and creative 
destruction in the Communist Manifesto rings so contemporary to our ears: 
The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world-market given a cosmopolitan 
character to production and consumption in every country. All old-established national 
industries (…) are dislodged by new industries whose introduction becomes a life and 
death question for all civilized nations; (…) industries whose products are consumed, not 
only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. (…) In place of the old local and national 
seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal 
interdependence of nations.6
 
 Yet, the Communists’ hope that “national one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness 
become more and more impossible,” has not borne out. From the outset, this ever-
shrinking, ever-accelerating, ever-changing world has bred a wish to recapture the 
“feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations” Marx and Engels had hoped were forever lost to it. 
Modernity has been constantly shadowed by its dark sibling, reactionary anti-modernism. 
More often than not, its rejection of the political and philosophical foundations of 
modernity has been accompanied by an enthusiasm for its material blessings. Bin Laden 
would be impossible to conceive without his satellite phone.7
                                                 
6 Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in: Tucker, ed., Marx-Engels 
Reader, p. 473-500, here: p. 476. 
7 Ibid, p. 475 and 477. 
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 In the shadow of recent events the deep historical roots of the dialectic of modern 
world-society, and America’s entanglement with this dialectic, are more clearly visible 
than in the spotlight of national history. In America itself, and not just among its enemies, 
the march of technological progress and the course of Empire were from the beginning 
accompanied by a wish to hold back the clock of democracy, liberalism, and individual 
rights. Between America and Europe, some of the most active promoters of a capitalist 




America and Bremen 
 The German merchants who dominated trade between the United States and 
Germany through much of the nineteenth century shared the sense that the boundaries 
between land and ocean were being blurred by modern commerce. America and the 
ocean appeared as metaphors for commodity exchange in the words of Johann Georg 
Kohl, a merchant from Bremen: 
Poseidon is, most of all, a shaker of the Earth. (…) Like mighty springs, America and the 
Ocean drive and spur the whole great machinery of our modern life. America grows 
abundantly in all our gardens and fields; and the Ocean pushes with its currents and tides 
into the most secluded channels of the hinterland.8
 
As a cosmopolitan community equally rooted on both sides of the ocean, and 
equally engaged in the political and economic life of multiple societies, Bremen’s 
merchants allow us to place the antebellum United States in its international context. 
                                                 
8 Cited by Engelsing, Rolf, “England und die USA in der bremischen Sicht des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in: 
Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen, vol. 1, 1957, p. 33-65, here p. 55-56 (1861). 
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Their history illuminates the essential contribution to the making of an industrial-
capitalist world-market, and of American participation in it, of men and women deeply 
committed to tradition, and fiercely opposed to liberalism and democracy. 
 Acknowledging the importance of these cosmopolitan conservatives and their 
American collaborators for bringing the U.S. into the world-market, means to question 
the account of America as the undisputed domain of liberalism. Trading with America, 
these German merchants found in the new world like-minded men and women whose 
qualms about the dangers of unfettered market-relations matched their own, yet with 
whom they also shared a wish to “improve” the world through the blessings of global 
communication and commerce. 
 Together, these German merchants and their American friends represent, not an 
alternative path to capitalism, but its main stream. If their exertions resulted in a world 
increasingly characterized by liberal-democratic nation-states, it was not what they had 
envisioned or desired when they had set out to improve the older world they knew. 
 
The group of merchants who are the subject of this thesis were based in the Free 
Hanseatic City of Bremen, an independent city-republic that today is a part of Germany. 
In 1852, this group included 776 adult men in Bremen, in a population of 80,000.9 
Between the centers of their activities – Bremen, New York, and Baltimore – these 
Hanseats formed one transatlantic community. They remained linked to each other 
through trade, intermarriage, friendship, shared religious and political beliefs, and a 
reliance on the infrastructure of consulates and trade treaties that rested on Bremen’s 
                                                 
9 Schwarzwälder, Herbert, Geschichte der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, 4 vols., Hamburg 1987, is the 
standard general history of Bremen. See vol. 2, p. 217-218, for demographic data. 
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sovereignty. The boundaries that defined the group under consideration here crossed 
through cities, nations, and oceans. At the same time, Hanseats helped level boundaries 
between continents through their trade. 
Within Bremen, inclusion in this group was defined by economic activity and 
legal status. Only holders of the Greater Privilege, the highest rank of citizenship in 
Bremen, were legally entitled to conduct long-distance trade there.10 As a self-conscious 
elite, these merchants saw themselves in the tradition of the mediaeval Hanseatic League. 
Bremen was one of three cities appointed to represent the Hansa after its decline in the 
seventeenth century, hence its official designation as a state as the “Free Hanseatic City 
of Bremen”.11
 
To approach the antebellum period through a foreign port, the German city of 
Bremen, opens a different gaze on the American past than could be gained from a 
vantage point on the shore. Without America, Bremen would have remained a provincial 
backwater. With America, it became a center of world-trade. But what did Bremen do for 
America? 
 During the mid-third of the nineteenth century, when the United States was 
presumably busy finding its national identity, we find strong traces of both an earlier, 
                                                 
10 The Bürgerrecht in Großes Bremisches Bürgerrecht appears best translated as privilege, rather than 
citizenship, since the concept of citizenship implies a single status of citizen. Both the Großes Bürgerrecht 
– allowing its holder to engage in foreign trade – and the Kleines Bürgerrecht – required for many other 
occupations – had to be bought. Marschalek, Peter, “Der Erwerb des bremischen Bürgerrechts und die 
Zuwanderung nach Bremen um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in: Bremisches Jahrbuch, vol. 66 (1988), 
p. 295-305. 
11 The others were Hamburg and Lübeck, whose merchants likewise could refer to themselves as Hanseats. 
As I am dealing exclusively with Bremish merchants, I use the term ‘Hanseat’ synonymously with 
‘Bremish merchant’, unless specifically noted. – The Hanseatic League received international recognition 
as a state-like entity with the Peace of Westphalia, at a moment when its economic and political importance 
was all but gone. 
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Atlantic world, and of a later, transnational world. The American economy depended on 
the exportation of cotton and other staples of slave labor, and on the importation of 
immigrants, who provided manpower and capital for the market revolution and capitalist 
production. Without an armada of merchant vessels, and an army of merchants in the 
commercial centers, King Cotton would have been about as powerful as your average 
Polish country squire. These merchants and mariners, however, were largely foreigners. 
 Sven Beckert has found that in mid-1850s New York, 26% of the elite were 
foreign-born. By 1870, this share had risen to 44%.12 The political influence of this 
particular ‘foreign element’ in America has long been ignored. We know the economic 
history of foreign trade and foreign traders. We also know the history of immigrants, and 
of the ethnic politicians who spoke in their name. But we do not know the names of the 
foreign merchants and bankers who spoke for themselves when they advocated their 
commercial and political interests in clubrooms and legislative lobbies. We know the 
process by which immigrants discovered their ‘national’ identity after they had come to 
the U.S. – for example, of Württembergers and Bavarians becoming ‘Germans’ only in 
their adoptive country. But we know very little about the politics of the cosmopolitan 
elites whose trade interests linked them with peers on both sides of the Atlantic.13
                                                 
12 Beckert, Sven, The Monied Metropolis. New York City and the Consolidation of the American 
Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896, Cambridge, Mass. et. al. 2001, p. 31 and 147. The share of Germans was 6% in 
1855, and 23% in 1870. Beckert included in his samples taxpayers assessed on real and personal wealth of 
$10,000 or more in 1855, and of $15,000 or more in 1870. 
13 Archdeacon, Thomas, Becoming American. An Ethnic History, New York and London 1983; Hidy, 
Ralph W., The House of Baring in American Trade. English Merchant Bankers at Work, 1763-1861 
(=Harvard Studies in Business History, vol. 14), Cambridge, Mass. 1949; Perkins, Edwin J., Financing 
Anglo-American Trade: The House of Brown, 1800-1880, Cambridge, MA 1975; Porter, P. Glenn, and 
Harold C. Livesay, Merchants and Manufacturers. Studies in the Changing Structure of Nineteenth-
Century Marketing, Baltimore 1971; Echternkamp, Jörg, “Emerging Ethnicity: The German Experience in 
Antebellum Baltimore”, in: Maryland Historical Magazine (MdHM), vol. 86, no. 1 (Spring 1991), p. 1-22; 
Trefousse, Hans L., Carl Schurz, a Biography, Knoxville, TN 1982; Hoerder, Dirk, and Jörg Nagler, eds., 
People in Transit. German Migrations in Comparative Perspective, 1820-1930, Washington, D.C. 1995; 
 9
Economically, Hanseats were essential for facilitating the commerce on which the 
growing nation depended. Politically, they served as conduits for ideas between the old 
and new worlds. Their engagement with political and cultural ideas across the Atlantic 
World shows the essentially transnational character of the central political debates of the 
time. The related challenges of capitalist modernization and democracy were not limited 
to America. Hence, it is not surprising that here as elsewhere, elites responded to both 
processes in similar ways.  In engaging with Whigs, Democrats, and Republicans, these 
merchants reveal that elites on all shores of the Atlantic shared political idioms that made 
possible a recognition of shared interests and concerns. Socially, Hanseats partook in a 
global, Victorian culture, at the same time that they were rooted in local, German 
traditions, and as they absorbed the aesthetic of romantic nationalism in both its 
American and German formulations. In all these ways, they resembled their American 
and German contemporaries, while forming a group self-consciously apart from both. 
Ultimately, if we give proper weight to the transnational influences on the United States 
during the antebellum era, we find that the country looks a lot less exceptional than we 
might assume, and was tied into the international flow of people, ideas and commodities 
to a much greater extent than we might have expected.14
  
 In North America, especially in New York and Baltimore, Hanseats settled to 
facilitate trade with their home town. After humble beginnings in the 1790s, there was a 
boom in the trade relations between Bremen and the U.S. until 1810. This first golden age 
                                                                                                                                                 
Trommler, Frank, and Joseph McVeigh, eds., America and the Germans. An Assessment of a Three-
Hundred-Year History, Philadelphia 1985. 
14 For parallels to the English world of merchant capitalists, cf. Chapman, Stanley D., The Rise of Merchant 
Banking, London et. al. 1984; Idem, Merchant Enterprise in Britain From the Industrial Revolution to 
World War I, Cambridge, UK et. al. 1992. 
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of transatlantic trade was cut off by the Napoleonic Wars and the continental blockade.15 
After peace had returned in 1815, Hanseats slowly but steadily rebuilt their connections 
to America. Hanseatic historians have identified 1831 as the take-off point, after which 
Bremen became an ever more serious presence in the United States. By the time the Civil 
War began, Bremen’s merchants were carrying an impressive share of the U.S.’s export 
trade, and brought an ever greater share of European immigrants to New York, 
Baltimore, New Orleans, and Galveston.16
In Baltimore and New York, Hanseats were part of a larger mercantile class that 
was characterized by a cosmopolitan composition. Hanseats were linked to other 
members of this class through joint membership in clubs, as neighbors in the same 
upscale parts of town, as fellow board members of banks, as business partners, and 
sometimes as spouses. Hanseats resembled that larger mercantile class in many of their 
business practices. The ethos of ‘honor’ and ‘credibility’ was common to all merchants, 
whether they were from Bremen, from the United States, or from other foreign countries. 
The way in which Hanseats organized their business partnerships was not exceptional, 
either. A tight cooperation between different firms, often tied to each other by blood 
relations or intermarriage, was just as common among American or British merchants, as 
it was for Hanseats; though the rapid expansion of the American business world probably 
                                                 
15 Mustafa, Sam A., Merchants and Migrations. Germans and Americans in Connection, 1776-1835 
(=Aldcroft, Derek H., ed., Modern Economic and Social History Series, unnumbered vol.), Aldershot, UK 
et. al. 2001. 
16 Engelsing, Rolf, Bremen als Auswandererhafen, 1683-1880 (=Karl H. Schwebel, ed., Veröffentlichungen 
aus dem Staatsarchiv der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, Bd. 29), Bremen 1961; Beutin, Ludwig, Bremen und 
Amerika. Zur Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft und der Beziehungen Deutschlands zu den Vereinigten 
Staaten, Bremen 1953; Struve, Walter, Germans & Texans. Commerce, Migration and Culture in the Days 
of the Lone Star Republic, Austin, Tx. 1996. 
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resulted in a higher number of firms not tied into pre-existing networks of old money and 
old names.17
In spite of these many similarities, Bremish merchants formed a distinct group 
within this broader class. Those qualities that set them apart were also factors 
contributing to the extraordinary stability and success of their group. First, Hanseats 
maintained a conservative approach to business, eschewing ‘speculation’, and putting the 
welfare of the family and the estate above a logic of pure profit-maximization (chapter 1). 
Second, dense ties of intermarriage, and the financial and ideological commitment they 
entailed, connected Hanseats in Bremen, Baltimore, and New York with each other, 
establishing in a transnational space a degree of mutual obligations comparable to those 
found among elites in ‘home towns’ like Bremen (chapter 2). Third, the political ideology 
that Hanseats had constructed for themselves in Bremen gave them a shared world-view. 
Their agreement on fundamental political values further bound the members of the 
network to each other. The content of this ideology, a selective embrace of liberalism 
paired with an insistence of maintaining social hierarchy and a politics of deference, 
placed them in a peculiar position on one side of an ideological divide. Running across 
the Atlantic and the countries that bordered it, it parted the proponents of a capitalist 
social order in two camps: radicals, who believed in democracy and the Enlightenment; 
and modern conservatives, who wished to uphold social distinctions and Christian 
morality (chapters 3-5).  Fourth, Bremen was an independent state, with a foreign policy 
                                                 
17 Beckert, Monied Metropolis; Idem, “Merchants and Manufacturers in the Antebellum North,” in: Gerstle, 
Gary and Steve Fraser, eds., Ruling America. A History of Wealth and Power in a Democracy, Cambridge, 
Mass 2005, p. 92-122; Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875, London 1975, p. 241. The latter 
lists examples of family- and clan-based businesses in both the industrial and mercantile sectors. See also 
note 14. The broader, emerging middle class took many cultural clues from the mercantile elite of the 
Atlantic World. Hence, it is not surprising to find that both groups shared many features. See for example 
Davidoff, Leonore and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes. Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 
1780-1850. Revised Edition, London and New York 2002. 
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of its own. The network of consulates and trade treaties that rested on the city’s status 
formed the groundwork of Hanseats’ business enterprise. It further tied their interests to 
the city; and through it, to each other. The state of Bremen was the agent through which 
Hanseats shaped the development of world trade by extending the infrastructure that 
intensified and regularized exchange relations across the ocean (chapters 4-6).18
Hence, economically, socially, culturally, and politically, Hanseats had things in 
common that they did not share with their non-Hanseatic mercantile peers in Germany or 
the United States. At the same time, their engagement in trade, and their commitment to 
conservative religious and political values, gave them manifold occasions to cooperate 
with other groups in the United States and Germany. 
 
The distinctness of Hanseats within the larger, American mercantile class was not 
a function of ethnicity. Bremish merchants mingled with other elite Germans in German 
Societies, or in Baltimore’s Germania Club, just as they socialized with merchants of 
American and foreign backgrounds in Chambers of Commerce, merchants’ reading 
rooms, stock exchanges and corporate boardrooms. Still, non-Hanseatic elite Germans 
whom Hanseats encountered in the U.S. had not much more in common with them than 
the shared written language. The same peculiarities that set Hanseats apart from 
American merchants also distinguished them from other German merchants.19
                                                 
18 Following the definition of the term by Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, Hanseats formed a 
network. Osterhammel and Petersson list as criteria for considering a social formation a network: 1.) the 
“social interaction between more than two people,” 2.) the “longevity” of these interactions, and 3.) their 
reinforcement by institutions. The availability of “new information technology” lends to networks “the 
same stability [that characterizes] hierarchical organizations.” Osterhammel, Jürgen and Niels P. Petersson, 
Globalization. A Short History, Princeton, N.J. and Oxford, UK 2005, especially p. 21-27; quotes on p. 22-
23. Hanseats met these criteria. The specific, shared ideologies they held added a further dimension to their 
interactions, and gave an additional source of stability to their network. 
19 The spoken languages among many Hanseats seem to have been English and Lower German, while 
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Hanseats had even less in common with the mass of German immigrants than they 
had with elite Germans in the United States. While they were bringing increasing 
numbers of them to the country, Hanseats did not see themselves as part of the German 
immigrant community in America. As the common folk of German extraction discovered 
their shared ethnicity in the emigration,20 Bremen’s merchants behaved as the members of 
a privileged estate, not of a Volk. Political refugees from the liberal German middle-class 
became ethnic politicians in the United States. Here, they could build the democratic 
polity they had striven in vain to create in Germany.21 Hanseats, by contrast, maintained 
an attitude towards the many that demanded deference towards one’s social betters. As 
they did in Bremen, Hanseats in the U.S. related to the mass of Germans through charity; 
maintaining the same stance of “patronage and protection” that they assumed in the old 
country.22
 
 In reconstructing the world Hanseats made, we can recover the quintessentially 
transnational character of the United States during a time in its history that on the surface 
appears as one of its most inward-looking periods. Consider Emanuel Leutze’s 
monumental history painting, Washington Crossing the Delaware (1851). An icon of 
                                                                                                                                                 
merchants from the Rhineland or Southern Germany would have spoken in different dialects of German. 
While educated Germans would have been able to communicate in High German, modulations owed to the 
habits of speaking dialect, or, as in the case of Lower German, a different language altogether, can render 
smooth conversation among Germans of different regional backgrounds hard to achieve, even today. See 
Engelsing, Rolf, “Bremisches Unternehmertum. Sozialgeschichte 1780/1870”, in: Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu 
Bremen, vol. 2 (1958), p. 7-112; Idem, “England und die USA,” for the social distance between Bremen’s 
merchants and German hinterland elites. 
20 See, for example, Echternkamp, “Emerging Ethnicity.” 
21 Nadel, Stanley, Little Germany. Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in New York City, 1845-80, Urbana, Ill. 
1990; Wittke, Carl F., Refugees of Revolution. The German Forty-Eighters in America, Philadelphia 1952; 
Levine, Bruce, The Spirit of 1848. German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and the Coming of the Civil War, 
Urbana, Ill. 1992; Trefousse, Carl Schurz. 
22 Schulz, Andreas, Vormundschaft und Protektion. Eliten und Bürger in Bremen, 1750-1880 (=Gall, 
Lothar, ed., Stadt und Bürgertum, vol. 13), München 2002 / Habilitationsschrift, Universität Frankfurt 
(Main), 2000. 
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American national identity, the original of this work hung in Bremen’s Art Museum 
(Kunsthalle), after it had been bought in 1863 with donations from Bremen’s mercantile 
elite. Here, it served as a reminder to Bremen’s cordial relations with the United States. 
From within their cosmopolitan community, Hanseats actively engaged in politics 
and trade on both sides of the Atlantic. Regarded from a Hanseatic vantage point, the 
Whigs show themselves as promoters of international exchange, not just builders of a 
national, industrial market-society; and Democrats as economic isolationists, in spite of 
their desire to export the American Revolution. Politicians from both parties applied their 
basic convictions, founded in the fundamental conflicts of the Second Party System, to 
international politics. In doing so, they betrayed the indebtedness of these convictions to 
broader, transnational intellectual currents. The protracted struggle between Jeffersonians 
and Hamiltonians was not exceptional to the United States, it merely was the specifically 
American manifestation of a conflict common to all industrializing countries, pitting 
liberal against conservative bourgeois politics. Hanseats recognized themselves in this 
political landscape, and took sides accordingly. 
Thanks to the monumental work of Daniel Rodgers, in present U.S. 
historiography transnationality almost has a default association with progressivism in its 
broadest sense. From the point of view of German post-war historiography, likewise, an 
“Atlantic orientation” is coterminous with democratic politics, and opposition to 
monarchical reaction in the nineteenth, or to Fascism in the twentieth century. In 
Hanseats, however, we see the emergence of a transnational, modern Conservatism that is 
the specific product of a German-American exchange. In the light of this exchange, 
Whigs begin to look like members of a Conservative International, who joined forces 
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with like-minded foreigners in a transnational struggle against the threat of democracy 
and mob rule, and for an ‘improvement’ of a fundamentally good social order. Shared by 
Hanseats and Whigs, the politics of notables who strove to modernize society while 
shoring up morality and deference to dampen the disruptive effects of change was a 
transnational phenomenon. Processing both German and American intellectual 
influences, Hanseats formed an important link within this trans-Atlantic current of 
conservative modernizers who advocated international improvement. On this solid 
foundation of a fundamental agreement on politics and values, Whigs and Hanseats were 
able to find common ground even when their immediate interests conflicted. Thus, 
Whigs’ advocacy of a high tariff and the enmity towards immigrants among some party 
members did little to alienate Hanseats from their American allies (see chapter 5). 
 
 By knowing the people who mattered, Hanseats’ may have had a more enduring 
influence on American politics than ethnic politicians could ever hope for. In Baltimore 
and New York, Hanseats played leading roles in the local chambers of commerce, which, 
in turn, helped shape local and national politics. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney lived next 
door to Bremish consul Albert Schumacher in Baltimore’s upscale Mount Vernon 
neighborhood.23 Abraham Lincoln’s only visit to a diplomat’s residence took place on the 
eve of his inauguration, when Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen’s minister-resident in 
Washington, hosted a small dinner party for the president-elect.24 And Bremen’s leading 
                                                 
23 Justice John A. Campbell, later Confederate States of America assistant secretary of war, in his 
concurring opinion to Taney’s majority opinion in the Dred Scott case, pointed specifically to Bremen in 
stressing the contrast between German Law that confers freedom to a person by virtue of his presence in a 
specific territory, and the American legal situation. See Dred Scott v Sandford, U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. 
Justice Campbell concurring, in: http://www.tourolaw.edu/patch/Scott/Campbell.asp. (Touro College Law 
Center, Project P.A.T.C.H.). 
24 See chapter 8. 
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newspaper, the Weserzeitung, served as the official organ for notifications by the U.S. 
federal government in Germany.25
On the local and state levels, Hanseats’ influence followed the same pattern of 
gentlemanly lobbying. It depended on a mode of politics that we associate with a pre-
democratic era. But even in an age of popular suffrage, when the masses no longer 
deferred to their social betters in political matters, deals among men of standing did not 
cease to be important. In some jurisdictions, decision-making power was delegated to 
notables, outright. For example, New York gave a private club dominated by Hanseats, 
the German Society, some power over immigration policies.26
Until the late 1850s, Hanseats never became ethnic politicians who rallied their 
compatriots to gain office. Even then, few chose that career path. Mostly, they remained 
notables who expected their voice to be weighed, not counted. This was the way of doing 
politics and business they were used to at home, and they were not ready to abandon their 
ways simply because they lived in a different country; especially since it served them so 
well. 
 Elite politics, while relegated to the back of our historical consciousness by three 
decades of social and cultural history, was not dead in the nineteenth-century United 
States. In recent years, historians like John Ashworth, Sven Beckert, and Eugene 
Genovese have shown that anti-democratic sentiment in upper-class circles survived the 
challenges of Jacksonian Democracy and the Civil War surprisingly intact. If anything, 
decades of popular participation in politics strengthened Conservatives’ disdain for the 
                                                 
25 Engelsing, “England und die USA,” p. 53. 
26 Engelsing, “England und die USA,” p. 45; Beckert, Monied Metropolis, p. 65; Wätjen, Hermann, Aus der 
Frühzeit des Nordatlantikverkehrs. Studien zur Geschichte der deutschen Schiffahrt und deutschen 
Auswanderung nach den Vereinigten Staaten bis zum Ende des amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges, Leipzig 
1932, p. 180-181. 
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aspirations of the masses. Unlike Genovese, who idealizes slave-holders as anti-capitalist 
intellectuals, Beckert and Ashworth have shown that bourgeois Americans were capable 
of embracing capitalist development, while at the same time seeking to limit the 
subversion of the republic by democratic influence.27
 Hanseats listened to their Conservative American counterparts, and engaged their 
ideas both in their American homes, and in their old home, Bremen. As citizens of a 
republic, the reactionary politics of Old Regime, legitimist Conservatism were distasteful 
to Hanseats. As notables who reigned Bremen in a constitutional framework designed to 
guarantee mercantile dominance, they were just as unwilling to embrace democracy. As 
global merchants, whose capital depended on ever-accelerated circulation, they were 
eager to embrace technological advances and a legal order that removed just enough of 
the traditional fetters of privilege to create a free market for commodities and wage-labor, 
while leaving in place their own privileges. In American Conservatism, they found an 
ideology ideally suited to these specific interests. Thus, political ideas flowed both ways 
across the Atlantic, and Hanseats served as an important conduit. 
 
Hanseats were centrally involved in creating and maintaining the arteries and 
veins of the rise of American industrial capitalism. While the transnational exchange of 
ideas, and the proliferation of institutions and practices, are the stuff of transnational 
history, Hanseats remind us that transnationality had concrete sociological conditions. 
Hanseats’ success as a group of merchants active on both shores of the Atlantic depended 
                                                 
27 Sellers, Charles, The Market Revolution. Jacksonian America. 1815-1846, New York and Oxford 1991; 
Ashworth, John, ‘Agrarians’ and ‘Aristocrats’. Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837-1846, 
London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ 1983; Idem, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum 
Republic, 2 vol., vol. 1: Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850, Cambridge, UK 1995; Genovese, 
Eugene, The World the Slaveholders Made, New York 1969; Beckert, Metropolis. 
 18




Transnational Social History 
 The standard tools of social history may need some recalibration if they are to be 
applied to the task of grasping the essence of Hanseats as a group of historical actors. 
Today, most works of social history frame their accounts of nineteenth-century life in 
cultural terms. Social classes appear as entities that owe their emergence to shared 
beliefs, and shared practices that spring from those beliefs at the same time as they serve 
to reinforce them. A group forms its identity, or class-consciousness, in relation to others, 
as well as in interactions between the genders within one’s own group. This approach is 
informed by a wish to avoid two pitfalls associated with an older, Marxist school of 
social history. This school presumably was guilty, first, of essentializing classes as 
groups primarily bounded by static economic factors, and second, of holding up such 
classes to the normative standard of a class-consciousness that conformed to Marx’s 
scheme. Rather than asking when and how a class that was a ‘class in itself’ became a 
‘class for itself’, current social history wants to restore to historical actors an active part 
in the making of their social group.28
This cultural approach has two major shortcomings. First, it tends to 
underemphasize the importance of economic activities, and the concrete ways in which 
                                                 
28 Bushman, Richard, The Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities, New York 1992; Grier, 
Katherine C., Culture and Comfort. Parlor Making and Middle-Class Identity, 1850-1930, Washington, 
DC 1997; Nelson, Elizabeth White, Market Sentiments. Middle-Class Market Culture in Nineteenth-
Century America, Washington, DC 2004. 
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historical actors made their living. This is a particular problem for the study of elites: to 
lead a lifestyle that culturally signals distinction, one has to be able to afford it. Second, it 
is almost entirely local in scope, since it depends for its main categories on face-to-face 
contacts between members of different groups. 
Recently, Andreas Schulz has added to our understanding of the world of 
Hanseats in his seminal work, Vormundschaft und Protektion.29 His study is mainly 
driven by a relational view on class-formation on the local level. Schulz explains the 
political and social behavior of different local groups as a function of the relations 
between these groups. Bremen's mercantile elite strove for hegemony over other social 
groups in the city of Bremen. For Schulz, merchants made their political and social 
identity through the resulting confrontation with the urban lower middle-class, artisans, 
and the emerging proletariat in Bremen. 
While a definitive social history of Bremen, Schulz’s work cannot claim to be a 
complete account of the history of the city’s mercantile elite during the nineteenth 
century. He acknowledges that young men and women from the Hanseatic elite went 
abroad on business, yet these actors drop off his analytical map at the point of their 
departure. Arguably, however, Hanseats’ ties with their peers abroad were at least as 
important as their relations with other, local social groups in shaping their world-view. 
Moreover, Hanseats related to New York artisans and merchants, London bankers, 
Southern planters, and Indian princes just as much as they did to Bremish shopkeepers 
and stevedores. To understand Bremish History, we have to follow its mercantile elite as 
it journeys from Bremen for American shores. Through their eyes, we will likewise gain 
a clearer perspective on American History. 
                                                 
29 Schulz, Vormundschaft und Protektion. The title translates as ‘paternalism and protection.’ 
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Any trans-local social category, such as that of a 'national bourgeoisie' or even an 
‘American middle-class’, is difficult to theorize in a work of social history that rests on a 
local case study. Sven Beckert, in his The Monied Metropolis, offers a solution to this 
problem.30 He tells the story of the “consolidation of the American bourgeoisie” by 
declaring his findings on New York for universally applicable. The plausible basis for 
this claim is New York's dominance over all lesser communities, as the center of culture, 
fashion, manufacturing, and finance in the United States. 
In the political realm, Beckert argues that the nation-state formed a common 
frame of reference for local elites. It is to that nation-state that they turned to implement 
policies that benefited them as a class. Thus, New York's elites exerted political influence 
to move state governments and the federal government not to pay for public works or 
relief for the unemployed, to discourage strikes, to uphold the sanctity of contracts, and to 
maintain monetary and foreign trade policies beneficial to their business interests. These 
policies bound them to their lesser counterparts in the provinces, who shared these 
political goals and economic interests. The sensibilities acquired by the middle-class on 
the local level guided their approach to national policies. It was the same defense of their 
business interests, often mixed with a moral vision for the masses, that manifested itself 
in the program of national middle-class politics. Class as an economic category thus 
becomes a foundation for explaining the dissemination of middle-class values and 
politics, without reducing the latter to a mere reflex to economic structure. 
What baffles the Hanseatic historian who reads Beckert’s work is the conspicuous 
absence of Bremish merchants from this account. Beckert found that in 1855, 6% of New 
                                                 
30 Beckert, Metropolis. 
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York’s elite were German-born, a share that rose to 23% by 1870.31 One Hanseat – 
Gustav F. Schwab – makes a few token appearances, but Beckert does not point out 
Schwab’s specific background. Beckert is no doubt correct in characterizing the story of 
New York’s elite in the decades following the Civil War as that of the homogenization of 
a ruling class formerly divided into merchants and manufacturers who did not mingle. 
Likewise, his interpretation that the nation-state, national politics, and national economic 
interdependence played central roles in effecting that homogenization is convincing. For 
the 1850s and even the 1860s, however, he misses a major part of the story by excluding 
transnational connections from his account. Where, if not from the Hanseatic Cities, did 
Mayor Fernando Wood get the idea to break New York City away from the Union to 
make it into an independent city-republic?32 To understand the history of the United 
States, we have to follow the traces that link it to foreign shores. 
 
While politics and economic interest drove local elites to make themselves into 
national bourgeoisies, contemporaries and historians alike have perceived the nineteenth 
century as the heyday of a Western, bourgeois culture of virtually global reach. Learning, 
political rights, and technology were supposed to liberate all of mankind from the 
narrowness of an earlier age. World exhibitions celebrated progress as a universal 
phenomenon. Revolutionaries and nationalists hailed their counterparts in foreign 
countries as participants in the same world-wide struggle. Literature and music – both 
                                                 
31 Beckert, Metropolis, p. 31 and 147. 
32 Anbinder, Tyler G., “Fernando Wood and New York City’s Secession from the Union: A Political 
Reappraisal,” in: New York History, vol. 68 (January, 1987), p. 67-92, explains the secession plan as a 
response to a long history of attempts by New York State politicians to gain control over crucial municipal 
institutions. Still, if Wood contemplated in earnest the founding of a new city-republic, he would not have 
found many modern examples besides the Hanseatic Cities. 
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classical and modern – helped shape a shared sense of aesthetics across national 
boundaries and language barriers, and galvanized a sense of national identity in different 
countries. Thus, a local elite can with as much justification be conceived as part of a 
national bourgeoisie, as it can be considered as part of a class-specific, Victorian culture 
that had an international, if not global, character. Hanseats, like many of their 
contemporaries, partook of this culture.33
 
If culture was an essential ingredient in the making of classes, and if culture was 
an essentially global phenomenon, then any social history would have to look beyond 
national boundaries to explain the beliefs and actions of its subjects. Moreover, Victorian 
culture was consumer culture, whose tastes were inextricably intertwined with the 
commodities that entered the household and the clothes that marked the respectable. 
Belgian bonnets, German linens, and Steinway pianos from New York were not just 
signifiers of the lifestyle of a better sort; they were also materializations of value and 
objects set in motion by capital in search of valorization. As such, they were the artifacts 
of global capital circulation and capitalist production that were visible to a larger public, 
but that required for their availability infinitely larger amounts of capital invested in raw 
materials, ships, and factories; put in circulation as credit or transferred as bills of 
exchange; and transformed by wage-labor into commodities. The objects of consumer 
culture are the tip of the iceberg of the world market. Thus, to take culture seriously as a 
decisive element in the making of social groups would mean to take equally seriously its 
global dimensions, including those of political economy. 
                                                 
33 Cf. Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Capital, 1848-1875, London 1975, p. 230-248, 277-302, 317. 
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Community, Society, and Commerce 
To do full justice to Hanseats, we have to turn to theorists who derived their 
concepts from a world that preceded a liberal, market society. The German sociologist 
Ferdinand Tönnies was just such a theorist. Indeed, we find that his work expresses the 
same notion of an organic unity of different moments of social life that was held by 
Hanseats, themselves.34
 The tenacity of Hanseats’ attitudes and way of life rested on the intertwining of 
the principles that governed their economic, domestic, and political existence. For 
Ferdinand Tönnies, the essence of community – as opposed to society – was the organic 
unity of all spheres of life. Work, authority, and love were not relegated to separate 
spheres, each with a different set of rules; but formed aspects of the same substance, a life 
based on “reciprocal sentiments of affection and reverence” shaped in the family. While 
Tönnies believed that the most stable community depended on its roots in a particular 
place, he granted that those “knowing one another like members of a craft or professional 
group, will feel themselves united everywhere,” not unlike “comrades in faith.” Bremen 
constituted such a particular place, and the merchants who had grown up there remained 
connected to it in manifold ways even when they went abroad. They continued to 
correspond with and visit each other across the ocean. Hence, even absent face-to-face 
interaction, Hanseats indeed continued to “feel themselves united everywhere.”35
Past and present anti-modernists and others who bemoan the loss of community 
and its “feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations” might find Hanseats kindred spirits whose 
                                                 
34 Tönnies, Ferdinand, Community and Civil Society, trns. José Harris and Margaret Hollis (=Cambridge 
texts in the history of political thought, unnumbered vol.), Cambridge, UK et. al. 2001 (1887). 
35 Tönnies, Community, especially p. 17-91, quotes on p. 27 and 29. 
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life represented the ideal of an organic whole.36 Inconveniently, however, Hanseats were 
also merchants, and their community was itself cosmopolitan in its geographical extent 
and in its prevalent ideology. Thus, Wilhelm Kießelbach, an organic intellectual of 
Bremen’s elite, gave voice to a corporatist vision of social order, while at the same time 
promoting capitalist exchange relations (see chapter 3). Indeed, a moral economy based 
on reciprocity, and exchange relations embedded in a Calvinist ethos supported by 
mutual social control, characterized the internal life of the Hanseatic community, but less 
and less of its external interactions. 
Unlike Kießelbach and other theorists of organicism, Tönnies was aware that 
trade and industry, while evolving from within traditional community, carry with them 
the seeds of its dissolution, or its evolution into a liberal Gesellschaft. Throughout this 
study, we will therefore trace the elements of Hanseatic community life that represented 
such seeds of dissolution. Most importantly, global commerce came with an imperative 
of competitiveness, eventually forcing Hanseats to adapt their business practices, there 
values, and the social and political order of their home town, thus undermining the 
foundations of community life. While these seeds of dissolution were sown, they did not 
begin to reduce Hanseats’ ability to practice their accustomed ways of a cosmopolitan 
community engaged in trans-Atlantic commerce until the 1860s. Until then, they were 
able to use their very rootedness in a stable network as a resource for furthering their 
political and social interests. 
 
To understand the role of merchants in the world economy, this study makes use 
of the work of Karl Marx. In Capital, Marx describes “the history of the fall of Holland 
                                                 
36 Marx and Engels, “Manifesto,” p. 475. 
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as the dominant mercantile nation (...) [as] the history of the subsumption of merchant 
capital under industrial capital.”37 Sven Beckert uses this concept of the “subsumption of 
merchant capital under industrial capital” to theorize the sociological, political, and 
cultural processes that led to the formation of a national bourgeoisie in the United 
States.38 Here, we employ Marx’s concept to explain the economic changes in world trade 
that occurred in the nineteenth century. 
What, exactly, does this concept of “subsumption” entail? After all, merchants are 
the economic agents with the longest history, and their role can appear to have changed 
little from Renaissance Venice through twentieth-century New York to Postmodern 
Singapore. Marx argues that this appearance is deceiving. He regards modern, industrial 
capitalism as fundamentally distinct from earlier, commercial capitalism. In Capital, he is 
not concerned with the latter, but analyzes the former. 
By capitalism, Marx understands fully developed capitalist relations of production 
and exchange, where wage-labor is the universal form of commodity production. Earlier 
stages of commercial capitalism, and even early pockets of industrial production, do not 
satisfy all of these criteria. The distinguishing feature between the capitalist modes of 
production and earlier ones is the universality of the creation of surplus value in 
commodity production. 
For most of its history, merchant capital was capital par excellence. With the 
emergence of industrial capital, it lost this special place. In a fully developed capitalist 
society, merchant capital is a “distinct sphere of capital investment,” “externally 
                                                 
37 Marx, Karl, Capital, 3 vols., (=Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke [from hereon abbreviated as 
MEW], vol.  23-25), vol.  3, Berlin 1979 [1894], here vol. 3, p. 346. Translations by the author of this 
study. 
38 Beckert, Metropolis, throughout. 
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independent” from, yet “internally dependent” on industrial capital. At the heart of this 
“internal dependence” is the reliance of mercantile profit on surplus-value generated in 
production. The merchant sells his commodities at their value, i.e., at the price of 
production, and buys them from the producer below this price. In this manner, a share of 
surplus value “devolves on” merchant capital.39
The amount of mercantile profit, i.e., the difference between the price the 
merchant pays to the producer, and the price he receives from the buyer, is determined by 
an averaging-out of profits across all capitals in society, whether employed in production 
or circulation. Hence, on the one hand, the lower the share of merchant capital among all 
capital in a given society, the higher the average profit on any capital invested. On the 
other hand, a given productive capital requires for its reproduction a particular minimum 
of capital engaged in circulation.40
This requirement is a source of the “external independence” of modern merchant 
capital. The circulation of productive capital is never complete without realizing the 
surplus-value embodied in the commodity produced. The realization of surplus-value 
depends on circulation; the transformation into money of the commodity that exits the 
process of production (C’-M’), and the subsequent transformation of money back into 
commodities, namely, labor and means of production, for another cycle of production 
(M-C(MP/L)).41
The individual industrial capitalist will often have in interest in not concerning 
himself with the sale of the commodities produced by him. The turnover-time of capital 
equals the time of production plus the time of circulation. While the merchant is not 
                                                 
39 Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 316. 
40 Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 290-303. 
41 Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 161-170, vol. 2, p. 151-153, and vol. 3m p. 335-349. 
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concerned with the former, his service may shorten the latter on a social scale, or reduce 
it to zero for the individual capitalist, if he buys his finished product straight from the 
factory, and pays him in cash. In the latter case, for the individual industrial capitalist, the 
valorization of his capital is complete, and he can immediately replace his means of 
production (buy supplies, hire laborers, etc.).42
There is, however, no systematic necessity for the producer to rely on a merchant 
for the sale of his product. He could market it himself. In this sense, too, the merchant is 
“internally dependent” on the producer. Yet, the benefits of specialization have often 
enabled (externally) independent merchants to undertake the distribution of commodities 
more efficiently. Only at a large scale of production, the producer can dispose of the 
merchant and organize distribution himself, in a model of the “vertical integration” of 
production and distribution stretching from raw materials to retail trade. This was the 
case with the American oil industry since the 1890s, when Standard Oil enjoyed a near 
monopoly on petroleum. 
 
What, then, was the role of merchant capital in its heyday, before industrial 
commodity production became the universal norm? In these former times – say, in 
Renaissance Venice – mercantile profit was based on selling commodities above their 
value, and more often than not buying them below their value. Merchants could do this 
because their trade linked societies not yet, or not fully, capitalist.43
Merchant capital inaugurated the simple form of capital circulation, “buying in 
order to sell” (M-C-M’). Mercantile profit then - i.e., before industrial capital became the 
                                                 
42 Marx, Capital, vol. 2, p. 124-135 and vol. 3, p. 283-306. 
43 Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 336-342. 
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dominant form - sprang from differences in price between different locations. The 
merchant “bought cheap, and sold dear.” He bought goods that constituted a surplus for 
economies not yet capitalist in nature, and turned them into commodities.44
The existence of merchant capital was a necessary, but not a sufficient 
precondition for the emergence of capitalist production, for three reasons. First, the 
accumulation of capital necessary for investment in industrial production took place in 
the hands of merchants. Second, trade is presupposed for capitalist production. It is by 
definition production for exchange, rather than use, and requires at least a regional 
market for its output. Third, the mercantile view of the product as a commodity 
encourages producers to transform production into commodity-production. Fourth, by 
establishing continuous trading links, merchant capital first engendered the formation of 
an average rate of profit, albeit one that averaged-out merely mercantile profits, not yet 
capitalist profits across the board. Fifth, in a dialectic move, merchant capital, though 
operating on the basis of an exchange that is not the exchange of equivalents, established 
a measure of commensurability in the form of the price, and thus helped bring about a 
general exchange of equivalents.45
While in many ways merchant capital paved the way for modern capitalism, its 
former role differed decisively from its modern one. Yet, Marx observed, the notion that 
capital as such lived off fraud and plunder had survived into modern times. This notion 
he wished to dispel, mainly by emphasizing that modern, industrial capitalism relies on 
the exchange of equivalents at all stages of circulation and production.46
                                                 
44 Marx, Capital, vol. 2, p. 282-287. 
45 Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 339-343. 
46 Marx, Capital, vol. 1, p. 161-178. 
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For the purpose of exploring the relation between industrial and merchant capital, 
Bremen is a suitable example, since here, we find merchant capital as a distinct and self-
conscious class, firmly in power in a city state, taking issue with the larger political and 
economic development in the emerging ‘nation’ and in the larger world. We can 
understand this continuing independent role of German merchant capital as an expression 
of the otherwise underdeveloped state of the German economies, since “the independent 




Sections, Chapters, and Sources 
In its first section, this study reconstructs the world Hanseats had made, as a 
transnational community of merchants. Chapters 1 through 3 highlight different aspects 
of this world: its economic, cultural, and political dimensions, respectively. In all three 
spheres, Hanseats were guided by the same principles. A conservative spirit that 
emphasized prudence in business, Christian ethics in family life, and a hierarchical social 
order in politics permeated all aspects of Hanseats’ social existence. In Hanseats’ minds, 
and in practice, business, family and the state were mutually dependent on each other, 
each relying on the other two for upholding the moral economy of the whole. While, 
following Tönnies, we might think of such a communal, moral economy as essentially 
rooted in a particular place, Hanseats managed to maintain a tightly-knit network across 
the space of the Atlantic, uniting merchants in Bremen, Baltimore, and New York in the 
same community. 
                                                 
47 Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 340. 
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The second section explores Hanseatic engagement with a changing world. 
International competition and a wish to “improve” upon a fundamentally good, 
hierarchical social order combined in motivating Hanseats to transform social relations in 
Bremen (chapter 4), and to cooperate with American Whigs in modernizing international 
shipping and communication (chapter 5). Hanseats and Whigs hoped to preserve social 
hierarchy and firm Christian values in the face of the dangers of democracy and 
unfettered market relations. Ironically, the result of their efforts was to hasten along 
social processes that furthered both of the latter. Chapter 6 explores the tension in 
Hanseats’ ideas and politics between, on the one hand, a cosmopolitan elitism, and on the 
other hand, nationalism and racism. This chapter places them in the context of an Atlantic 
World dominated by the British Empire in which they encountered ‘others’ in various 
exchanges on their journeys. 
 The third and final section of this study examines the consequences for Hanseats 
of the dual processes of nation-making and the transformation of Germany and America 
into industrial-capitalist societies.  Successfully to compete in a world market based on 
industrial production, Bremen’s merchant elite was compelled to depart from its 
customary ways of doing business (chapter 7). The rise of consolidated, German and 
American nation-states in the wars of the 1860s diminished Hanseats ability to influence 
the political conditions under which they lived. This decline of Hanseatic political power 
culminated in the loss of Bremen’s independence to the Prussian-led Northern German 
Union in 1867 (chapter 8). Once the nexus of business, family, and politics that had held 
together Hanseats as a transnational community had been destroyed, the family networks 
that had defined the Bremish elite throughout the first two thirds of the nineteenth century 
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began to fray. By 1900, this past transnational world was but a memory for the 
descendants of the mid-century merchants who had lived in it (chapter 9). 
 
 This study draws on a wide range of sources, from the private and business 
correspondence of merchants to published records like parliamentary debates and printed 
recollections. The most important and extensive archival collection used in the writing of 
this thesis are the John Christopher Schwab Family Papers, held by Yale University, and 
previously untapped by historians. The interpretations brought forth in chapters 2 and 6 
rely especially heavily on this body of material that offers a richly textured impression of 
the mentality of one Hanseatic merchant, Gustav Friedrich Schwab (1822-1888). Born in 
Stuttgart, the capital of the Kingdom of Württemberg, but socialized from an early age 
into the Hanseatic network, he rose by 1860 to become the best-known and most 
successful Hanseat in New York. 
The son of a poet and minister, Gustav Benjamin Schwab, Gustav Friedrich 
Schwab had learned to express his views in writing perhaps beyond the extent of what 
was usual in Bremish circles. His family ties to the larger world of the German educated 
bourgeoisie (Bildungsbürgertum) did not make him an exceptional case for a Hanseat, as 
all Bremish merchants shared the spirit of this world in their education. Rather, his 
background enabled Schwab to express more eloquently what others in Bremen’s 
mercantile estate likewise believed.  
The sense that Schwab had indeed not only become a Hanseat, but also a worthy 
representative of the Hanseatic City, was explicitly voiced by Senator Heinrich Smidt, 
son of former Burgomaster Johann Smidt, in an 1861 letter to Rudolf Schleiden, 
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Bremen’s minister resident in Washington, DC. Smidt explained that Schwab’s foreign 
birth did not discourage the commission that had just appointed him as Bremish consul 
for New York from entrusting him with this important post: “In our circles, [Schwab’s] 
lacking autochtonous status could, in the light of his antecedents, by which he truly has 
become one of our own, not seriously have been considered a hindrance [to his 
appointment].” Hence, the Commission on Foreign Affairs had given Schwab its 
unanimous support.48
                                                 
48 Heinrich Smidt to Rudolf Schleiden (in Washington, DC), Bremen 1861/11/06, manuscript copy, 
Staatsarchiv Bremen (StAHB) 2,B,13,b,3, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten 
Staaten von Nordamerika. Hanseatische diplomatische Agenten, Konsuln usw. bei den Vereinigten Staaten 
von Nordamerika und Korrespondenz mit denselben. In New York, 1815-1868, file no. 10, “Acta betr. die 
Resignation des Consuls Keutgen zu Newyork und Ernennung des Kaufmanns Gustav Schwab daselbst zu 
















Chapter 1: Prudent Pioneers –  
 
Hanseats in Trans-Atlantic Trade, 1798 – 1860 
 
 
Bremen’s Merchant Capitalists in America 
Hanseats were classical merchant-capitalists: they bought cheap to sell dear.   
Mid-nineteenth century economists agreed that the way Hanseats did business was closer 
to Early Modern times than to the new era of an industrial world economy that dawned 
after the Napoleonic Wars.  Karl Marx saw cities like Bremen as an anachronism.  In 
Capital, he wrote that “where merchant capital dominates, anachronistic conditions 
dominate.  This is even true within a country, where, for example, the purely mercantile 
cities form quite different analogies with past conditions than the factory towns.”49 Marx 
specifically had Bremen in mind when he wrote this.  He and Engels were intimately 
familiar with the Hanseatic city.  Engels had received his mercantile education in 
Bremen, and had made fun of its antiquated ways in a series of newspaper articles in the 
1840s.50
                                                 
49 Marx, Karl, Capital, 3 vols., (=Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke [from hereon abbreviated as 
MEW], vol.  23-25), vol.  3, Berlin 1979 [1894], p.  339. The translation provided here is my own. All 
other translations from German, unless otherwise noted, are also mine. 
50 Engels, Friedrich, [Reports from Bremen], in: Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser, nos. 181-182, July 30-31, 
1840, and nos. 196-200, August 17-21, 1841. 
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Thus, it was not by accident that when Marx sought to illustrate his point that the 
‘purely mercantile cities’ live in their glorious past, and utterly lack all comprehension of 
modern capitalist times, he cited a work by Wilhelm Kiesselbach, a historian and 
economist from an old Bremish mercantile family.51 Kiesselbach was a prominent 
protagonist in the debates over Germany’s economic development, and particularly the 
tariff policy of the Zollverein (Customs Union).  The liberal public considered his 
positions as an expression of the point of view of Bremen’s merchant capital.52 Unlike 
Marx, Kiesselbach credited merchant capital with a civilizing mission, and attributed 
much of the social and political progress of the past few centuries to its beneficial 
influence. For Kiesselbach, Hanseats’ commitment to tradition was a strength.  No class 
was in a better position to drive forward the material and moral improvement of the 
world, while stemming the tide of the ‘corrosive’, modern political ideologies such as 
democracy, atheism, and nationalism.53  
 Indeed, the historical record offers support for both Marx’s and Kiesselbach’s 
takes on Hanseats.  While stubbornly wedded to tradition in business as well as politics, 
Bremen’s merchants yet extended the reach and density of transatlantic trade.  In doing 
so, they helped create the modern world market for industrial goods and raw materials 
that was one of the conditions for the take-off of industrialization across Europe and 
America.  Still, while capital poured into industrial production, Hanseats kept theirs 
mostly in commodity circulation.  Within that fairly narrow segment of the world 
                                                 
51 Wilhelm Kiesselbach, Der Gang des Welthandels im Mittelalter, Bremen 1860, cited by Marx in Capital, 
vol. 3, p. 327 and 339. 
52 Etges, Andreas, Wirtschaftsnationalismus.  USA und Deutschland im Vergleich (1815-1914), Frankfurt a. 
M. and New York 1999, p. 125, incl. n. 139. Wherever I write about ‘merchant capital’ in the context of 
Bremen, I refer to ‘overseas wholesale merchants’, unless otherwise stated. 
53 Cf. chapter 3. 
 36
economy, however, Hanseats enjoyed success far beyond what one might expect from a 
comparatively small city in an unfavorable geographical location in Northern Germany.  
One foundation of that success was their peculiar combination of tradition and innovation 
in their economic activities.  The strongest asset for this success was the closely-knit 
character of their group, which tied families and firms on both sides of the Atlantic into 
one network, infused with a shared commitment to customary ways of doing business.54
 Bremen’s merchants played a pioneering role in opening the United States to 
direct trade with the continent of Europe.  Before American independence had broken the 
United States out of the cage of the Navigation Act, Bremen’s rival sister city, Hamburg, 
had by far dominated the trade links between Germany and the Atlantic.  Hamburg’s 
Hanseats specialized on trade with England, and continued to do so after the turn of the 
nineteenth century.  Bremen, on the other hand, had discovered that direct trade with 
America was a profitable business.55
                                                 
54 There exists an extensive, though mostly rather dated body of literature on Hanseatic merchants and their 
business endeavors in the nineteenth century: Engelsing, Rolf, Bremen als Auswandererhafen, 1683-1880 
(=Karl H. Schwebel, ed., Veröffentlichungen aus dem Staatsarchiv der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, vol. 29), 
Bremen 1961; Hardegen, Friedrich and Käthi Smidt, H. H. Meier, der Gründer des Norddeutschen Lloyd. 
Lebensbild eines Bremer Kaufmanns 1809-1898, Berlin and Leipzig 1920; Schramm, Percy E., 
“Hamburg—Brasilien: Die Forderung einer Dampferverbindung, 1854 verwirklicht”, in: Vierteljahrschrift 
fur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte vol. 52 no. 1(1965), p. 86-90; Schulz, Andreas, “Weltbürger und 
Geldaristokraten. Hanseatisches Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert”, Historische Zeitschrift vol. 259 (1994), p. 
637-670; Schwebel, Karl H., Bremer Kaufleute in den Freihäfen der Karibik. Von den Anfängen des 
Bremer Überseehandels bis 1815 (=Adolf E. Hofmeister (Hg.), Veröffentlichungen aus dem Staatsarchiv 
der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, Bd. 59), Bremen 1995; Schwebel, Karl H., “Bremen Merchants Throughout 
the World”, in: Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung Bremen (ed.), Bremen – Bremerhaven. Häfen am 
Strom – River Weser Ports, Bremen 19667, p. 229-251; Struve, Walter, Germans & Texans. Commerce, 
Migration and Culture in the Days of the Lone Star Republic, Austin, Tx. 1996; Wätjen, Hermann, Aus der 
Frühzeit des Nordatlantikverkehrs. Studien zur Geschichte der deutschen Schiffahrt und deutschen 
Auswanderung nach den Vereinigten Staaten bis zum Ende des amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges, Leipzig 
1932. 
55 Beutin, Ludwig, Von 3 Ballen zum Weltmarkt. Kleine Bremer Baumwollchronik 1788 bis 1872, Bremen 
1934; Pitsch, Franz Josef, Die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen Bremens zu den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Amerika bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (=Karl H. Schwebel, ed., Veröffentlichungen aus dem 
Staatsarchiv der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, vol. 42), Bremen 1974; Mustafa, Sam A., Merchants and 
Migrations. Germans and Americans in Connection, 1776-1835, Aldershot, UK, et.al. 2001. The latter 
provides an account of the beginnings of Hanseatic trade with the United States.  
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As Hamburg remained a larger city and market throughout the 1800s, Bremen 
thrived by aggressively cultivating its niche.  The Napoleonic Wars had brought the 
liberation of formerly bound peasants from their feudal ties, opening the gates for a 
steadily increasing stream of migrants to North America. By attracting a growing share of 
German emigrants (Graphs 1 and 2), Bremen’s merchants were able to offer highly 
competitive cargo rates on American exports. Bremish historian Ludwig Beutin estimates 
that the cost of a new sailing vessel could be recouped in four to five years by the revenue 
from passages, alone. In 1820, only 10 of 54 vessels (19%) arriving in Bremen from the 
United States had belonged to Bremish firms. By 1830, Bremen’s share of such vessels 
had risen to 36% (32 of 92 vessels). By 1839, Bremen merchants had come to dominate 
this route, with 81% of vessels (72 of 89) arriving in the Hanseatic City from the United 
States flying the bacon flag.56
                                                 
56 Engelsing, Auswandererhafen, p. 64, 71-73; Pitsch, Beziehungen, p. 100-101, 192, and 196; Beutin, 
Ludwig, Bremen und Amerika. Zur Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft und der Beziehungen Deutschlands zu 
den Vereinigten Staaten, Bremen 1953, p. 47. Bremen’s flag shows a checker-board panel of red and white 
squares in its left fifth, and alternating red and white horizontal bars in the remaining space. This 
resemblance with strips of bacon has led to its popular moniker. 
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Graph 1 

























































































































































































































































Source for graphs 1-4: Wätjen, Hermann, Aus der Frühzeit des Nordatlantikverkehrs. Studien zur 
Geschichte der deutschen Schiffahrt und deutschen Auswanderung nach den Vereinigten Staaten bis zum 
Ende des amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges, Leipzig 1932, p. 87 and 190-193. There are no data on the 






















































Immigrants per vessel Number of vessels
Bremen's share of all immigrants (scaled x5) Immigrants from Bremen (scaled x0.1)
  
Source: based on graphs 1-4. 
 
From a comparison of graphs 1 through 4 (graph 5), a general pattern emerges. 
The ebb and flow of Bremish commerce went with the tides of German emigration. 
During the 1850s, Hanseats adjusted capacity to meet demand, while slowly increasing 
their share of the overall emigrant traffic. Between 1850 and 1852, Bremen lost some 
market share in an expanding market, but quickly caught up in 1853 and 1854, when its 
share rose while absolute demand continued to grow. In 1857, Bremish carrying capacity 
more than sufficed to meet demand, allowing Hanseats to increase their market share 
even as immigrant numbers peaked, once more. 
By the end of the decade, as steamers (not included in the graph) were making 
inroads into the emigrant business, the number of passengers on sailing vessels shrank. 
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Nonetheless, after a low in 1858 Bremen’s merchants began once more to increase the 
number of vessels sailing to the United States. In 1861 and 1862, the number of vessels 
sailing to New York grew in spite of shrinking numbers of emigrants. For better or 
worse, emigrants were no longer the main inducement for Bremish ventures to the United 
States. The growing Hanseatic share of American commodity exports merited regular 
voyages, even if fewer emigrants were aboard on the westbound journey. 
 
While British houses remained the dominant force in Euro-American trade, 
Hanseats made significant inroads in the markets for cotton and tobacco.  By 1860, 
Bremen’s merchants had cut Liverpool out of the direct American-German cotton trade, 
and came in a close second to Britain in the American export market for tobacco.57 In 
1860, Bremen’s share of all traffic in passengers, commodities, and migrants between 
Germany and North America left the main competitors – Hamburg, Antwerp, and Havre 
– behind (see Tables 1-3 and Graph 6). 
 
 
                                                 
57 Pitsch, Beziehungen, p. 148-164 and 237-253. 
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Table 1 
U.S. Tobacco Exports, 1855-1860 
Country  Value of Exports  Percentage 
Britain $  24,797,516 24%
Bremen $  19,199,320 19%
France (both coasts) $  13,607,603 13%
Holland  $    9,804,766 10%






U.S. Cotton Exports, 1855-1860 
Country  Value of Exports  Percentage 
Britain $     615,559,369 66%
France, Atlantic Coast (Havre) $     149,678,595 16%
Spain, Mediterranean Coast $       32,354,702 3%
Bremen $       30,079,116 3%
Russia, Baltic and North Sea  $       19,111,680 2%
Hamburg $         7,458,878 1%
Other $       82,150,564 9%
All $     936,392,904 100%
 
Tables 1 and 2 computed from the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Transmitting a Report 
from the Register of the Treasury, of the Commerce and Navigation of the United States for the Year 
Ending June 30, [1856-1860], Washington, D.C. [1856-1860], Congressional Serial Sets 886 [1856], 931 










per day 1860s 
average 
per day 
Liverpool 13,602 4.49 18,220 4.99
Cork 1,502 0.50 5,971 1.64
Bremen 3,391 1.12 5,562 1.52
Havre 4,060 1.34 4,434 1.21
Southampton 2,650 0.87 3,263 0.89
Hamburg 1,620 0.53 3,156 0.86
Antwerp 1,729 0.57 3,000 0.82
Rotterdam 771 0.25 1,339 0.37
Marseille 1,680 0.55 690 0.19
* - beginning with the first issue, September 1, 1851 
 
Source: New York Times archive, online search engine at 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/nytimes/advancedsearch.html, using the option "Search Articles, 



























































Bremen Liverpool Havre  
 
Source: New York Times archive, online search engine at 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/nytimes/advancedsearch.html, using the option "Search Articles, 
Advertisements and Listings," using the city name as the search term in year-by-year searches. The year 




Bremish trade mediated the relations between disparate, peripheral regions and 
the world market. Hanseats fed the staples of the American slave states to the emerging 
industrial districts of Germany, thus contributing to the ever-intensifying exploitation of 
slave-labor. Hence, it was not too much of a flight of fancy if A.  Dudley Mann, a 
diplomat and steamship promoter from the American South who had served as American 
consul to Bremen from 1842-1845, looked to the city as an ally for his plans to make the 
trade of the slave-holding states independent of Britain and the North.58
At the same time, however, Hanseats supplied free labor for the industrial and 
territorial expansion of the free American states by shipping west a German population 
displaced by an as yet incomplete transition from feudal to capitalist social relations that 
left idle thousands of people no longer bound to their craft or soil, but not yet absorbed 
into the wage-labor force. 
Unlike Britain, the center of the world economy, Germany and America had not 
yet been turned into fully capitalist, commodity-producing societies. Industrial 
commodity production and wage labor relations had not yet become the dominant source 
of income for the populations of Germany and America. Hence, Hanseats made their 
fortunes in the traditional manner of merchant-capital, by linking qualitatively different 
modes of production to each other; by exploiting the possibility for arbitrage profits that 
arise from that difference; and by making them commensurable through establishing 
commodity prices.59
In so doing, Bremen’s merchants helped create an industrial world market; and 
helped turn the societies they linked into modern capitalist societies. Up to around 1860, 
                                                 
58 Beutin, Bremen, p. 277 (note to p. 33), p. 284 (note to p. 57), and p. 290 (note to p. 81). Mann (1801-
1889) was made an honorary Bremish citizen in 1847. 
59 Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 342. 
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Hanseatic trade itself, however, was not entirely a modern capitalist endeavor. Trade 
between and within countries that have fully embraced capitalist commodity production 
becomes “a particular moment of capital investment in general.” By contrast, Bremish 
merchant-capital retained its independence, based on an early-modern way of doing 




Bremen as a Liberal, Free-Trading Port 
What was the secret of success that propelled Bremen to such prominence in the 
commercial centers of the United States? The economy of the Hanseatic cities of Bremen, 
Lübeck and Hamburg was based on long-distance, wholesale trade. The three cities each 
specialized in trade with different areas. Bremen held a virtual monopoly on the North 
American trade, Hamburg’s ships sailed to England and South America, and Lübeck’s 
merchants operated in the traditional core area of the mediaeval Hanse, the Baltic Sea. 
For Bremen, the entrepôt trade had special significance. Up to a third of the volume of 
imports was re-exported to Scandinavia and Russia. In spite of this specialization, the 
three cities had more in common with each other than with the rest of Germany.61
In an age when the German economy was still largely agricultural, and 
manufacturing was slow to start, Hanseats did provided the hinterland with some 
commercial services. Hamburg relied mostly on the import of English manufactured 
                                                 
60 Ibid., p. 339. 
61 Böhmert, Victor, “Die Stellung der Hansestädte zu Deutschland in den letzten 3 Jahrzehnten”, in: 
Vierteljahrsschrift für Volkswirthschaft und Cultur, vol. 1 (1863), pp. 73-115; Duckwitz, Arnold, 
Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem öffentlichen Leben von 1841 – 1866. Ein Beitrag zur bremischen und 
deutschen Geschichte, Bremen 1877. 
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goods into Germany, and the export of East Elbian wheat to Britain. Bremen merchants 
sold cotton to textile factories in Saxony, and tobacco to manufactures in Westphalia. Far 
fewer goods were exported, mostly fine textiles and other luxury craft products, like 
Solingen metalwares; making the search for a profitable westbound cargo imperative. 
Lübeck’s merchants served a local market, and mainly relied on coastal trade for their 
livelihood.62
Before railroads, the availability of river transportation defined the ‘natural’ 
hinterland for Bremen and Hamburg. Hamburg’s Elbe River connected the city to Anhalt, 
Brandenburg, and Saxony. Bremen’s Weser River ran north from Hesse, through 
Prussian Westphalia, Schaumburg-Lippe, and Hannover, before it reached the city. 
Southern Germany, from where most emigrants came, and the Rhineland with its 
growing textile industry, had more easy access to Belgian and Dutch ports via the Rhine, 
than to Bremen or Hamburg by land.63  
Only after the coming of the railroad in the late 1840s was Bremen able to draw 
more of the business from western and southern Germany into its port. A ‘national’ 
rhetoric by Bremen merchants, who advertised the city as ‘the German port’, was 
directed against prevalent dislike for the Hanseats in these areas of the federation. The 
popular economist, Friedrich List, considered one of the intellectual fathers of the 
customs union, contributed strongly to the spread of an argument that blamed the 
                                                 
62 Two works treating the economic development of the German states in the 19th century in terms of 
‘integration’ and ‘uneven development’ are: Abelshauser, Werner et.al., Wirtschaftliche Integration und 
Wandel von Raumstrukturen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Josef Wysocki (=Schriften des Vereins 
für Socialpolitik, Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften ; N.F., vol. 232), Berlin 1994; and 
Fremdling, Rainer and Richard H. Tilly (Eds.), Industrialisierung und Raum. Studien zur regionalen 
Differenzierung in Deutschland des 19. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart 1979. Unfortunately, both works are 
characterized by the Borusso-centric focus still common in the historical social sciences in Germany, and 
are thus of little value for the study of a Hanseatic city. 
63 Ludwig, Bremen, p. 34-68. 
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Hanseatic cities for destroying southern German manufactures by importing cheap British 
goods after 1815.64 Bremen’s publicists were able to deflect much of this anti-
commercialism onto its rival, Hamburg. Hamburg’s government played into the hands of 
Bremish merchants when it discouraged emigrants from using the city’s port, because it 
was afraid that paupers unable to pay their passage would remain in town. Only in the 
1850s, in the light of Bremen’s success in the emigrant trade and on the American export 
market, did Hamburg change its policy.65
In 1863, the economist Victor Böhmert, a lawyer (2. Syndicus) for the Bremish 
Handelskammer, offered an explanation for Bremen’s steep rise from a provincial center 
to a world city, in which he stressed a successful combination of dynamism and solid 
experience: 
 
Transatlantic trade requires large amounts of capital, years of experience, tried and true 
trade connections abroad, branch locations in the most important transatlantic places, 
significant ship-ownership; further, it requires that the place where a transatlantic trade is 
to be conducted be a great commodity-market, where many buyers and sellers, and the 
intermediaries of trade, converge; where extensive shipments find a ready market, where 
supply and demand in transatlantic products is plentiful and regular, and where a number 
of mercantile auxiliary services, institutions, and usages all serve to promote and facilitate 
the one great gainful pursuit – trade. These essential elements of flourishing commerce 
can be found nowhere in Germany in as extensive a degree, and in as fruitful a 
collaboration, as in Hamburg and Bremen.66
 
A reliance on serving the German hinterland, alone, could not have created the 
critical mass of supply and demand to sustain a market of this scope and scale in Bremen. 
Bremen’s Weser River has a much smaller drainage area than the Rhine or Hamburg’s 
                                                 
64 Apelt, Hermann, „Friedrich List und die Hanseaten“, in: Der Schlüssel, Bremer Beiträge zur Deutschen 
Kultur und Wirtschaft, vol. 6, no. 8, 1941, pp. 133-143. 
65 Engelsing, Rolf, Bremen als Auswandererhafen, 1683-1880 (=Karl H. Schwebel, ed., Veröffentlichungen 
aus dem Staatsarchiv der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, vol. 29), Bremen 1961; Wätjen, Frühzeit. 
66 Böhmert, Victor, “Die Stellung der Hansestädte zu Deutschland in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten,” in: 
Vierteljahrschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Politik und Kulturgeschichte, no. 1, 1863, p. 73-115, here: 
p. 109-110. 
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Elbe River. After 1848, railroads somewhat alleviated this natural disadvantage, but 
Bremen’s rise had begun before the first railroad had been opened in Germany. What 
made the difference was the strong re-export trade from Bremen to other European 
countries. Böhmert knew that because the city was “a commodity market and a trade 
emporium for all of Northern Europe; [and hence] a center of world trade, [Bremen] is 
capable of standing its ground in competition with the most powerful commercial peoples 
in neutral markets.” To illustrate his point, he cited the 1861 statistics for tobacco. 
Bremen imported 86,556,474 ponds of tobacco, and exported 67,612,579 pounds. More 
than half of that export did not go to countries of the German Zollverein (Customs 
Union), but to European countries stretching from Spain to Russia, and from Switzerland 
to Sweden. Even South America and Africa were supplied with Bremish tobacco. Based 
on the mass and variety of the commodities the city traded, Bremen had managed to 
dominate the transatlantic trade of many northeastern European countries. Russia, for 
example, received its tobacco largely through Bremen.67
Böhmert argued that political liberty was an essential ingredient of success on the 
world-market. The illiberal political climate of the interior states stifled the free flow of 
people, ideas and of commodities. Bremen did not discourage its young men from going 
abroad for their mercantile pursuits, while most German states kept their male subjects 
under close supervision to prevent them from evading the draft. The liberal spirit of the 
Hanseatic cities also invigorated markets, directly. Free trade meant that “the flags of the 
most diverse nations (…) fly in a joyful competition” in the Bremish ports. In this 
climate, the “private efforts of diligent merchants” produced prosperity and progress. 
Subjecting these same merchants to too much of the “solicitude of the state,” as the 
                                                 
67 Ibid, p. 88-89, 108; quote on p. 88. 
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interior German states were prone to do, was the safest way of squashing competition and 
stifling profitable exchange.68
 As a foreigner hired by Hanseats as an ideologist, or spokesman, Böhmert 
expressed a somewhat one-sided view of Bremish trade. While the truisms of political 
economy he cited may well have been applicable to the Bremish market, the free 
utilization of capital, labor, and nature was not all that there was to Hanseats’ success. 
There is overwhelming evidence that Hanseats did best where they did not act as purely 
self-interested individuals who come to market with a single-minded attitude of profit-
maximization; but where instead they acted in concert. 
One pay-off of close cooperation among Hanseats was an informational advantage 
over others. In what can only be understood as a kind of mysticism that evokes Marx’s 
commodity fetish, Hanseats believed in their ability to intuit market developments. But 
like the figure of thought described in Marx’s concept, this belief had a rational core: 
Böhmert pointed out that the regular exchange with foreign countries increased the 
knowledge available to Hanseats. Being well-informed about the political situation 
abroad, being able to discern qualities of commodities, and knowing the markets for 
imports and exports in foreign ports, were essential for success in a volatile business, 
where “often the price of an imported commodity can have fallen by 20, 30 or more per 
cent by the time it arrives at its destination.” In a large market-place that bundled streams 
of communication and commodities, an experienced merchant could hedge his bets by 
cultivating a sense for “that intangible something, which plays such a great role in 
                                                 
68 Ibid, p. 107, 109-110, 113; quote on p. 110. 
 50
commerce – the opinion.”69 The combined decades of experience assembled in Bremen’s 
counting-houses formed the substance of this ‘opinion’.  
The depth and range of the collective experience on which Hanseats could draw to 
gauge market developments, and which gave them a competitive edge over others, was a 
function of the extent and stability of their network, not of a special gift of divination. It 
was not a matter of individual knowledge and skill, but of the cooperation between the 
members of this elite that rested on a shared approach to business that had fairly little to 





Hanseats as Economic Conservatives 
 
According to Ludwig Beutin, an economic historian who, in the 1950s, wrote the 
most extensive survey of Bremen’s trade in the nineteenth century available to date, a 
distinctive characteristic of the way Hanseats did business up to 1860 was their economic 
conservatism. For example, the city’s merchants owned the commodities they traded, as 
well as the vessels on which they were transported.  Ship-ownership made sense for 
Hanseats, considering that their competitiveness as traders depended on the income from 
westbound emigrants.  With most of their capital tied up in goods and infrastructure, 
Hanseats derived a comparatively low share of their profits from commissions on the 
shipping of commodities owned by wholesalers, forwarders, or producers.  Instead, like 
the factors of the American South, Hanseats bought directly from producers, 
often extending to them long-term credit.  Until the tobacco or cotton was sold from their 
                                                 
69 Ibid, p.111-112; quote on p. 112. 
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store-houses in Bremen to merchants specializing in inland trade or to manufacturers, the 
commodities remained the property of the transatlantic merchant.70
As William Cronon has shown in his study of the rise of Chicago as the center of 
trade for the Great Plains, mercantile activity from the mid-nineteenth century on was 
characterized by a growing detachment of capital from commodity-ownership. 
Increasingly, merchants became money-trading and commodity-trading capitalists; 
dealing in futures and giving circulation credit, rather than acquiring commodities on 
their own account.71 Marx saw this movement away from ‘buying cheap to sell dear’ as 
part of the transformation by which merchant-capital was “reduced from its formerly 
independent existence to a particular moment of capital investment in general.” The 
                                                 
70 Beutin, Bremen, p. 48, 71-72, and 110-111. Beutin’s account is problematic in that he never tells us how 
he knows how individual Hanseats made their money. Few actual business records survive today, though 
Beutin conducted most of his research before the Second World War, and might have had access to family 
collections.  His reluctance to divulge detailed knowledge of balance sheets might hence be a function of 
Hanseatic discreteness. Hermann Wätjen, however, himself a historian from an old Hanseatic family, 
already complained in 1933 that too few business records are extant to write an economic history of 
individual firms (see his Aus der Frühzeit des Nordatlantikverkehrs, Introduction). Most likely, therefore, 
Beutin’s interpretation that ‘Hanseats did not engage in speculation’ is based on three sources: 1.) 
aggregate data, which do indeed suggest that Hanseats business practices were fairly conservative; 2.) 
qualitative sources, such as statements by nineteenth century merchants who state their conservative 
approach to business; 3.) a commitment to a specific anti-capitalist tradition. Ad 1.), the sources cited by 
Beutin confirm that Hanseats were indeed reluctant to embrace a modern capitalist business ethic. My own 
research supports the same interpretation, although not Beutin’s assertion that Hanseats completely 
eschewed all modern financial instruments or business practices. Hanseats did ‘speculate’, and they did 
trade on commission, but they might have done so to a lesser extent than others. The ease with which 
Bremen survived the crisis of 1857 remains the strongest indicator of the solidity of their enterprises. Ad 
2.), these first-hand accounts might have to be taken cum grano salis. Nineteenth-century Hanseats had a 
stake in demonstrating to their anti-commercialist critics that they were not ‘handmaidens of English 
manufacturers’. Ad 3.), Beutin wrote an essay in 1937 (Beutin, Ludwig, Bremisches Bank- und 
Börsenwesen seit dem 17. Jahrhundert. Von der Wirtschaftsgesinnung einer Hansestadt (=Abhandlungen 
und Vorträge herausgegeben von der Bremer Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, vol. 10, no. 4, December 
1937), Bremen 1937) in which he argued that nineteenth-century Hanseats conformed to National Socialist 
business ethics. The Nazis associated speculation with Jewish capital, and commodity production with 
Arian capital, where only the former was guilty of exploitation. In his 1937 essay, Beutin points to the 
exclusion of Jews from Bremen, and to the strained ties between Bremish businesses and Jewish banks, as 
evidence of the truly ‘German’ character of Bremen’s merchants. The same arguments reappear in his 1953 
book (Bremen und Amerika, see note 56), although purged from any direct reference to the Jewish 
character of financial capital and speculation. In summary, therefore, Beutin’s interpretations have to be 
treated with caution. 
71 Cronon, William, Nature’s Metropolis. Chicago and the Great West, New York and London 1991, 
especially p. 97-147. 
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result of this transformation was the “subsumption of merchant capital under industrial 
capital.” On a world-historical scale, Marx considered this subsumption completed by 
“the fall of Holland as the dominant mercantile nation.”72 The case of Bremen’s 
merchants suggests that the point in time when this subsumption was completed differed 
in individual countries. In the German states, with their relatively underdeveloped 
economies, merchant capital continued to play an independent role well into the 
nineteenth century.73
In a developed capitalist world-market, equivalents are exchanged, and the 
possibilities for individual capitalists to manipulate prices are minimized. Hanseats, 
however, enjoyed at least three possible sources of non-equivalent exchange: First, they 
were able to undersell their competitors on cargo rates, due to their profits from 
transporting emigrants; second, they enjoyed an informational advantage by virtue of the 
network character of their group, at a time when slow venues of communication meant 
that market reports were not yet universally available in ‘real time’; third, they indirectly 
benefited from slave labor, which involves a non-equivalent exchange in procuring labor-
power.74
Hanseatic business practices matched the early-modern nature of their role in the 
world market. Bremen’s capital, for the most part, appears to have been invested in 
tangible assets, such as ships, warehouses, wharfs, and commodities. Compared to the 
                                                 
72 Marx, Capital, vol. 3 (=MEW, vol. 25), p. 339 and 346. 
73 Ibid., p. 340. 
74 With an econometric approach, O’Rourke, Kevin H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson,  
Globalization and History. The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic 
Economy, Cambridge, Mass. and London, UK 1999, show that price differentials shrink, where tariffs and 
transportation costs sink. Their research confirms Marx’s assertion that the possibility for arbitrage profits 
is largely removed by the creation of a world market for industrial commodities and resources. See his 
Capital, vol. 3, p. 341. See also Beckert, Sven, The Monied Metropolis. New York City and the 
Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896, Cambridge, Mass. et. al. 2001, p. 151 and notes. 
 53
novel ways of facilitating trade described by Marx and Cronon, Hanseatic capital would 
have suffered from a much slower turnover, while being subjected to less volatility in 
times of crisis. Whether Hanseats’ reliance on tangible assets stemmed directly from 
distrust in ‘speculation’, as Beutin claims; whether it represented a certain inertia 
resulting from an ethos that stressed prudence and tradition; or whether it was a result of 
path dependency, in that capital committed to long-term investments cannot easily be 
liquidated; it appears that Hanseats did indeed stick to their conservative business 
practices up to 1860.75
Beutin’s interpretation of Hanseats as conservative businessmen is supported by 
Hanseats’ initial skepticism about stocks. In the Netherlands and in England, joint-stock 
companies had been in use as a form for long-distance trading concerns since the 
eighteenth century. Only in the mid-1850s were the first large-scale joint-stock 
companies founded in Bremen, a bank and a steamship company, the Northern German 
Lloyd. Both these concerns were immediately tied to the trading-interests of the city, and 
were led by the same, well-established Bremish merchant, Hermann Henrich (‘H. H.’) 
Meier.76 Meier had initially wanted to prevent the Lloyd’s shares from being traded 
publicly, in order to discourage speculation. This proved impractical, since the scale of 
the enterprises required involving the financial markets beyond the city. Bremen’s 
mercantile estate remained strongly represented among the stockholders of both firms, 
                                                 
75 Beutin, Bremen, p. 71-72. 
76 Meier’s Bremish acquaintances pronounced his nickname-initials in English, rather than German, 
reflecting the strong ties between the Hanseatic city and the United States. Engelsing, Rolf, "Bremisches 
Unternehmertum. Sozialgeschichte 1780/1870", in: Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen, vol. 2 (1958), p. 7-
112. 
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but was not able to keep all stock, as it were, in the family. Initially, about half the 
Lloyd’s shares were held by German investment banks in the hinterland.77
Furthermore, Hanseats displayed a reluctance to invest in industry. Cigar 
manufacturing made an exception, with Bremen cigars becoming a coveted article of 
importation in the United States. It reached its high point in the early 1850s, when almost 
10,000 out of an estimated 60,000 inhabitants of the city were involved in it. Cigar 
making was an industry of low capital-intensity, since it did not use machines. The 
merchant supplied the material to, and bought the finished product from, the owners of 
small workshops. This industry, however, was not financed by the long-distance 
merchants, but by merchants specializing in the hinterland trade. When Hannover and 
Oldenburg, which surrounded Bremen, joined the Zollverein in 1854, tobacco 
manufacturing in Bremen collapsed. Instead of paying high import dues on cigars, upland 
merchants now shipped raw tobacco to workshops outside of Bremen, mainly in 
Westphalia, where it was made into cigars for Zollvereinland consumption. For decades, 
Bremen remained a city with few industrial enterprises.78
Thus, Hanseats displayed a thorough economic conservatism. They stayed clear 
of the business practices that define modern, industrial and financial capitalism. Beutin 
argues that this conservatism explains why Bremen’s merchants on both sides of the 
                                                 
77 The response the Lloyd’s board of directors gave investors who complained about low dividends in 1873, 
quoted by Beutin, illuminates the persistence of an attitude that abhorred ‘speculation’: “In the interest of 
the public, which is served by this great enterprise, it is evident that its stock should stay in such hands as 
are not interested in a one-time payment of high dividends, or a temporary, high share price.” Beutin, 
Bremen, p. 82. Of the total capitalization of the Lloyd (4,000,000 Thaler Gold), Bremish merchants owned 
32.5% (1.3 Mio) via previous stockownership in four river-steamboat companies that had been merged into 
the Lloyd. 37.5% (1.5 Mio) were held by the Dessauer Creditanstalt für Industrie und Handel, located in 
Anhalt. Of the remaining 30% (1.2 Mio), some stock was held by Bremish merchants, but a large packet of 
this stock was held by another investment bank from the hinterland, the Darmstädter Bank. Before the 
Lloyd bought back the Darmstädter Bank’s shares in 1859, Hanseats had held just about half of the Lloyd’s 
stock. See [North German Lloyd Steamship Company, Bremen,] 70 Years North German Lloyd Bremen, 
1857-1927, Berlin 1927, p. 25-32. 
78 Beutin, Bremen, p. 53-54, 126-127. 
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Atlantic were left largely unscathed by the Panic of 1857. Those regions and individuals 
most involved in the world financial markets were the ones most affected by this first 
world-wide crisis of modern capitalism. Hanseats’ ability to emerge from the Panic of 
1857 with few losses was a function of Bremen’s comparative backwardness.79
The root of this backwardness, as well as the source of Hanseats’ success, was 
their reliance on tight cooperation between the individual firms that made up their 
network. This cooperation, in turn, rested on the close personal ties between the men who 
ran Hanseatic counting-houses, and on the families that backed, morally and financially, 




                                                 
79 Beutin, Bremen, p. 112-114. 
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Small Firms, Big Business 
The shared economic conservatism among Hanseats rested upon the close ties of 
familiarity and trust that extended across the Atlantic among the members of the network. 
When Hanseatic merchants arrived in America, they were not cast into an atomized 
marketplace where they had to succeed as individuals. They remained part of a group that 
cooperated locally and transatlantically. Bremen remained the pivotal point in these 
transnational relationships. Commonly, those who went abroad were the younger sons or 
clerks of older merchants who remained in Bremen. Once in the new world, they 
conducted trade with the firms of their fathers or former employers. When they formed 
business partnerships in foreign ports, they mostly chose their associates from the 
community of Hanseats. In the course of the nineteenth century, some of the older 
Hanseatic firms in the U.S. passed into the hands of the American-born descendants of 
their founders. Still, the second and third generations of Hanseatic-Americans remained 
tied into this same network. American Hanseats sent their foreign-born sons to Bremen 
for apprenticeships in the many merchant firms of that town; often in the counting-house 
of a relative.80
The extent of the capital brought into the firm by the associates limited the scale 
of a company’s activities. When H. H. Meier, as a junior agent in the 1830s, proposed 
expanding the business of his late father’s firm by trading on commission with South 
America, the head of the merchant-house, Johann H. Adami, told him not to: “We have 
                                                 
80 Fundamental for establishing the degree of intermarriage among Hanseats: Brandes, Erika, “Der Bremer 
Überseekaufmann in seiner gesellschaftsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung im ‘geschlossenen Heiratskreis’,” in: 
Genealogisches Jahrbuch, vol. 3 (1963), p. 25-48. See also Engelsing, Rolf, “England und die USA in der 
bremischen Sicht des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in: Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen, vol. 1, 1957, p. 33-65, 
especially p. 49. 
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enough business to feed everyone, there is no need for such an extension.”81 In a capitalist 
business, profits are largely reinvested in a quest for even more profits. Hanseats 
followed a different path. For them, the welfare of the family remained a fundamental 
source of legitimacy for profit, just as the family fortune laid the foundation of their 
business ventures. 
For the first quarter of the nineteenth century, most Hanseats preferred to invest 
their trading profits in real estate. For its long-term prospects, they preferred the steady 
income from a manor to the dangers of capital circulation in trade. The crisis of 
agriculture after the Napoleonic Wars increasingly rendered agriculture less profitable 
than trade. Hanseats still bought rural estates, but began using them as country homes 
rather than working farms. Until about 1850, these estates still functioned as safe, long-
term investments. Only in the second half of the century did country estates begin to 
become objects of a conspicuous enjoyment of wealth.82
As opportunities for trade increased in the second quarter of the century, Hanseats 
began reinvesting their profits in trade, keeping their growing capital stock permanently 
in circulation. Official statistics reflect this expansion of Bremish trade: The number of 
ships owned by the city’s merchants grew from 95 in 1826 to 225 in 1846.83  Between 
1840 and 1856, the value of Bremen’s imports from the U.S. multiplied by four, that of 
Bremen’s exports to the U.S. multiplied by five. Of all oversea imports to reach Bremen 
                                                 
81 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 22. 
82 Engelsing, Rolf, "Bremisches Unternehmertum. Sozialgeschichte 1780/1870", in: Jahrbuch der Wittheit 
zu Bremen, vol. 2 (1958), p. 7-112. See for examples: Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 151-152 
(Meier’s estate of Radau, bought 1860, sold 1891); Schleiden, Rudolph, Jugenderinnerungen eines 
Schleswig-Holsteiners, Wiesbaden 1886, p. 52 and 123 (Ascheberg manor, bought by Schleiden’s father in 
1811, sold in 1825). See also chapter 2. 
83 Beutin, Bremen, p. 21 and 23. Total tonnage increased from 14,500 Register-Tons in 1826 to 50,000 in 
1846. The tonnage of the average Bremish ship would hence have increased from 153 to 222 Register-
Tons. 
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in 1856, 39% came from the U.S.. In the same year, the share of Bremen’s oversea 
exports destined for the U.S. was 67%.84 The wealth of the city’s elite – full citizens who 
owed taxes on more than 3,000 Thaler – more than tripled between 1813 and 1848.85
Bremen’s rising prominence in transatlantic trade was evident in New York, the 
most important commercial center in North America. Americans took notice of the small 
German city. A survey of the New York Times for the years 1851 to 1869 shows a slow 
but steady increase in the number of times Bremen was mentioned on the pages of the 
paper. At least three quarters of the instances when a reader would have found the city’s 
name on the pages of the daily would have been in the context of market reports, or 
private advertisements for commodities or shipping. While admittedly more anecdotal 
than a thorough analysis of trade flows, this method nonetheless allows for conclusions 
on the relative commercial importance of certain foreign ports for New York business 
(Table 3 and graph 6). 
In the 1850s, Bremen held a steady third rank immediately behind Havre, and, 
unsurprisingly, far behind Liverpool; but ahead of Cork and Southampton. In the 1860s, 
Bremen moved ahead of Havre, with the exception of 1860 and 1866. The Hanseatic city 
also closed up on Liverpool. While Cork assumed the second rank during this decade, the 
Irish city would have been linked to most general news reports in the Times after 
becoming the eastern end of the transatlantic telegraph cable.86 Hence, the frequency with 
which Cork was mentioned is not an indicator of its commercial importance. It appears 
                                                 
84 Borries, Außenhandel, p. 134-135. Bremen’s oversea imports in 1856 were valued at 36 Mio. Taler Gold; 
overseas exports, 22.7 Mio. Taler Gold. 
85 The wealth of this group grew from 17.2 Mio Taler Gold in 1813 to 60.2 in 1848. The number of people 
in this category increased from 1,084 to 2,700 during that time, which means that each individual owned an 
average of 15,867 Taler Gold in 1813, and 22,296 in 1848. Beutin, Bremen, p. 72. 
86 Beutin, Bremen, p. 117. 
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that in the 1860s, Hanseatic trade with the United States kept growing, if perhaps at a 
slower pace (Table 3 and Graph 3). 
This expansion of trade, however, did not lead to a corresponding expansion of 
the scale of the activities of individual firms. In 1846, at a time when Hanseats had been 
keeping their capital permanently in circulation for two decades, the average German-
American firm still only had 1.5 associates and 1.6 clerks (Table 4). Associates 
conducted much of the business in person, and the firm, overall, continued not to take on 






















New York 35 27 64 132 1.03 2.13 2.06
Baltimore 14 9 28 42 1.22 1.83 1.50
Philadelphia 7 2 17 16 1.89 1.78 0.94
New Orleans 7 2 17 25 1.89 2.78 1.47
St. Louis 5 11 20 16 1.25 1.00 0.80
Cincinnati 3 2 7 5 1.40 1.00 0.71
Louisville 2 8 15 6 1.50 0.60 0.40
Others 27 14 n/a n/a    
TOTAL 100 75 168 242 1.45 1.59 1.13
 
Source: Weser Zeitung, 1846/02/10, quoted in: Beutin, Bremen und Amerika, p. 287. Apprentices are not 
counted here, but would roughly have matched the number of clerks. 
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While the statistic does not allow us to say precisely how the numbers of clerks 
and associates differed between Hanseatic and non-Hanseatic firms, it does indicate that 
the number of clerks per associate was higher where Hansetic firms dominated; and 
highest in the commercial seaports most important to the export of tobacco and cotton. 
Even in New York, however, each associate made do with an average of just two clerks. 
These numbers support the conclusion that Adami’s attitude of limiting business to what 
was needed for the livelihood of the associates and their families prevailed throughout 
Hanseatic circles even at this time. While statistics of this kind are unavailable for the 
1850s, an extensive survey of mercantile correspondence and biographies suggest that 
this pattern continued well into the 1860s.87
 Instead of keeping their profits in their own firms, Hanseats largely made them 
available to their descendants or in-laws for the establishment of new companies. In this 
way, the Bremish network expanded by spawning an ever-increasing number of 
mercantile houses, giving a livelihood to Hanseats’ sons and daughters and their spouses. 
Through childhood friendships, intermarriage, and business partnerships, the resulting 
multitude of companies were connected to each other, creating the trust and stability that 
supported both Hanseats’ conservative attitude to business, and their success in 
expanding the scale of their economic activities as a group. 
 
A closer look at the situation in Baltimore during the 1850s illuminates the extent, 
density and stability of the Hanseatic network. Bremish merchants in this city were a 
closely-knit group. Moreover, these mercantile houses were linked to those of their peers 
                                                 
87 I base this conclusion on the entirety of sources examined for this thesis. The subsequent chapters will 
support this point. For Adami, see p. 57. 
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in other centers of Hanseatic activity on both sides of the Atlantic. In Baltimore, Hanseats 
as a group were highly successful in drawing more and more business to Bremen. 
Overall, the number of Hanseatic firms grew at a pace that suggests that Bremish 
merchants in this city followed the conservative pattern of limiting the business of 
individual firms, while extending the network by forming new firms. This practice might 
explain the stability of Hanseatic firms; while the reach of Hanseats’ ties to other centers 
of trade might have been responsible for their overall success as a group. 
Hanseatic merchants in Baltimore numbered approximately 150 men in 1860.88  
German firms were among the most stable merchant houses in the city.  In 1849, four 
among a total of ten Commission and Shipping Merchant firms listed in the city directory 
had had German owners. In 1859, six of fifty Commission and Shipping Merchants were 
persons with German names.  Three of these six had already been active in 1849. These 
were Brothers Boninger, Oelrichs & Lurman, and A. Schumacher & Co..89 The first was a 
house connected to an importer in the Rhineland, Boninger & Co. of Duisburg; but the 
                                                 
88 Browne, Gary Larson, Baltimore in the Nation, 1789-1861, Chapel Hill, NC 1980, p. 179, counts 1,544 
merchants in Baltimore in 1850, 10% of whom were German. In 1846, the Weser Zeitung had counted 23 
German-owned firms in Baltimore. These 23 firms were run by 28 owners and 42 clerks. Retail firms were 
explicitly excluded from this tally (Table 4). Browne notes that the designation ‘merchant’ was ‘inflated’ 
by 1850. Hence, while the number of firms may have been 150, not all of them will have engaged in 
foreign, wholesale trade. On the other hand, the clerks of Baltimore’s German-owned merchant firms 
which had trading ties to Bremen, and would thus have shown up in the Weser Zeitung’s survey, may be 
included in the social group under discussion here. They often identified with their employers, and were 
often likely to become independent merchants, themselves. Many of them would have been relatives of the 
firms’ associates. My own estimate for 1860 is based on: Ferslew, Eugene, Baltimore City Directory, for 
1859-60, Baltimore 1859, as well as on membership numbers in the Germania Club, see below. 
89 Mitchett’s Baltimore City Director [sic] for 1849-50, Baltimore 1849, and –for 1855-56, Baltimore 1855; 
Ferslew, Baltimore City Directory, for 1859-60. Rather than signaling a relative decline of the importance 
of Hanseats for Baltimore’s mercantile community, the lower share of German firms in 1859 (12% of  all 
Commission and Shipping Merchants, after 40% in 1849) may well be a function of the inflated use of the 
term “Commission and Shipping Merchant”, as suggested by Browne (see previous note). – The Lürmans – 
including those born in the U.S. – consistently spelled their name with the Umlaut in private and business 
correspondence, while often using the letter ‘u’ in the name of the firm. Their English-speaking 
correspondents did not use the Umlaut. The Maryland Historical Society followed the anglicized spelling in 
titling the collection of Lürman’s papers (see note 95). In this study, I follow the original appearance of the 
name in the sources, unless when quoting the titles of documents or manuscript collections. Unfortunately, 
staying true to the sources will come at the expense of consistency in the spelling of this name. 
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latter two were Hanseatic firms. The Baltimore Boningers had two vessels sailing under 
their name to Bremen, which suggests that they, too, relied for their trade on the 
Hanseatic network.90
An analysis of the record of vessels entered and cleared at the port of Baltimore, 
kept at the Merchants’ Exchange reading room, paints a similar picture of continuity. In 
the spring of 1851, eight German firms had regularly consigned cargo to vessels leaving 
Baltimore. By 1860, the number of such firms had grown to thirteen. Six of these thirteen 
had been part of the original eight firms in 1851.91  In spite of the Panic of 1857, most 
firms existing at the beginning of the decade were still around at its end, and had been 
joined by roughly one new firm for each surviving old firm. This picture of stability is 
supported most strongly by the firm of Gieske & Niemann. Recruited from rural 
Oldenburg towns into the Hanseatic network, its owners started their business in the 
1850s. Owing to their connections to Bremen, their business thrived. By 1865, in the 
middle of the slow tobacco trade in the summer of that year, they sold 250 hogsheads of 
tobacco. This firm proved the longest-lived of those active in the 1850s. The last owner, 
                                                 
90 For the Boningers’ ties to Duisburg: New York Public Library, Research Library, Special Collections 
Department, Garrit F. Watson (attorney for Brothers Boninger) to U.S. Army, Army of the James, 
Quartermaster’s Department, Richmond, 1865/6/9, and F. W. Hanewinckel (Bremish Consul) to Idem, 
Richmond, 1865/6/9, in: U.S. Army – Quartermaster’s Department – Copy Book – Virginia Merchants – 
Tobacco Claims – 1865 May-June, p. 44-45. See p. 42-48 of this copy book for the Boningers’ request to 
restitute over 700 hogsheads of tobacco bought in 1861. For the Boningers’ vessels, see the record books 
cited in the following note. 
91 The six firms in question were Boninger Bros., F.L. Brauns & Co., F.W. Brune & Sons., von Kapff & 
Arens, Schaer & Kohler, and A. Schumacher & Co.. All but Boninger Bros. can be identified as Hanseatic 
firms. Baltimore. Merchants’ Exchange Reading Room, record books, 1832-1899, 72 vols., Manuscripts 
Department, Maryland Historical Society Library (from hereon abbreviated as MdHS), MS.610, box 41 and 
44. We know that Oelrichs & Lurman owned their own vessels, as well as a half share in a wharf in Fells 
Point. Their absence from port records might indicate simply that they did not sail during the period 
covered by the sample, or, more likely, that vessels loaded in Fells Point do not show up in the Baltimore 
records. For Schaer & Kohler [Köhler], see Heinrich to Julius Wilkens (in Bremen), Baltimore 1865/6/9, 
Wilkens, Julius, 1838?-1898, Papers, 1849-83, MdHS MS.439. 
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Edward Gieske, sold it in 1993. Quite possibly, it had been the last independently owned 
tobacco-merchant house in Maryland.92
Baltimore Hanseats engaged in a highly successful endeavor: while German firms 
freighted a share of only 4% of all vessels leaving this port, they consigned cargo to 
about half of those going to Europe. This high share, remarkable for a time when the 
United States conducted most of their transatlantic trade with Britain, can be explained by 
the high share of the tobacco trade that Bremen had drawn into its port.  From 1851 to 
1860, the German share of Baltimore’s foreign trade grew from 12% to 18%; the German 
share of the European trade grew from 45% to 50%.  During the 1850s, traffic to Bremen 
increased at a higher rate than that to any other destination, in spite of a decline of the 
overall share of ships that sailed from Baltimore to engage in foreign trade (Tables 5-7). 
                                                 
92 Heinrich to Julius Wilkens, 5.20.1865, Wilkens, Julius, 1838?-1898, Papers, 1849-83, MdHS MS.439; 
Gieske, Edward, in interview with the author of this thesis, 2001/2/23.  
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Table 5 
Vessels cleared at Baltimore port, March through July 1851 












to this destination 
Domestic 451 69% 449 100% 2 0%
non-U.S. 
America 
166 26% 156 94% 10 6%
Bremen* 8 1% 0 0% 8 100%
non-Bremen 
Europe # 
21 3% 16 76% 5 24%
Other 3 0% 3 100% 0 0%
Total 649 100% 624 96% 25 4%
 all Europe  29  4%  16  55%  13  45%
 all foreign  198  31%  175  88%  22  12%





Vessels cleared at Baltimore port, March through July 1860 













to this destination 
Domestic 908 79% 906 100% 2 0%
non-U.S. 
America 
189 16% 171 90% 18 10%
Bremen 17 1% 0 0% 17 100%
non-Bremen 
Europe # 
37 3% 27 § 73% 10 27%
Other 5 0% 5 100% 0 0%
Total 1156 100% 1109 96% 47 4%
 all Europe  54  4%  27  50%  27  50%
 all foreign  248  21%  203  82%  45  18%
#- includes Britain; §- includes at least two vessels under the flag of Bremen 
 
Source for tables 5 and 6: Baltimore. Merchants’ Exchange Reading Room, record books, 1832-1899, 72 
vols., MS 610, Manuscripts Department, Maryland Historical Society Library, box 41 (1851) and 44 
(1860). Small vessels serving the Chesapeake Bay were not included in these records. The nearest domestic 
ports listed are Georgetown, D.C. and Philadelphia, PA. The time-span from March to July was chosen 
because traffic increased with the end of winter.
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Table 7 
Destination of Vessels cleared at Baltimore Port, 1851 and 1860 
Destination absolute 
change 
percent increase of 
absolute numbers 
Domestic + 457 + 101%
non-U.S. America +   23 +   14%
Bremen +     9 + 113%
non-Bremen Europe # +   16 +   76%
Other +     2 +   66%
Total + 507 +   78%
 all Europe  +    25  +    86%
 all foreign  +    50  +    25%
#- includes Britain 
 





Comparing the increase in the number of vessels freighted by Germans with the 
increase in the number of German firms that consigned cargo to ships leaving Baltimore, 
we find that the overall volume of trade handled by all German firms grew 2.5 times as 
much as the volume of trade handled on average by each individual German firm. While 
the total amount of cargo shipped by Germans increased by 182%, the average amount of 
cargo shipped by each individual firm grew by 73.5%. Much of the growth in the volume 
of trade between Baltimore and Bremen was picked up by new companies. The number 
of German firms grew by 62.6% (Table 8). 
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Table 8 
Growth of Hanseatic Business in Baltimore over the Course of the 1850s 
 1851 1860 Increase
German merchants assigning cargo $ 8 13 62.6%
Vessels sailed, freighted by Germans $ 25 47 88%
Vessels sailed, freighted by Germans, weighted to account for 
increased size of vessels * 
25 70.5 182%




Sources: See notes 89 and 91, and tables 5 and 6. 
$ - In March-July, 1851, and March-July, 1860, respectively. 
* - Vessel size: 1851=100, 1860=150. Estimate based on Pitsch, Franz Josef, Die wirtschaftlichen 
Beziehungen Bremens zu den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (=Karl 
H. Schwebel (ed.), Veröffentlichungen aus dem Staatsarchiv der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, vol. 42), 
Bremen 1974, p. 92, who finds that the average Bremish vessel measured 142 Last in 1842, and 205 Last in 
1851; and Handelskammer Bremen, Berichte der Handelskammer in Bremen für die Jahre 1870-1873, 
erstattet an den Kaufmanns-Konvent, Bremen 1874, p. 71, according to which the average Bremish sailing 




In Table 8, the volume of trade is measured by weight, rather than value. Still, 
these numbers lend strong support to the conclusion that the Hanseatic network grew 
faster extensively, than it did intensively. It expanded by spawning new firms, increasing 
the capital turned over by each individual firm at a pace much slower than that of the 
growth of the business handled by the group, overall.93 The pattern of a network growing 
by spinning off new firms becomes even more clearly visible when we consider the 




                                                 
93 This pattern is further supported by Beutin’s evidence cited in note 85. The total wealth of Bremen’s 
wealthiest taxpayers grew by 250% between 1813 and 1848, while the wealth of the average individual in 
this group grew by 41%. Consider for comparison Table 8, which shows that the volume of trade handled 
by German merchants in Baltimore (most of whom were Hanseats), overall, grew by 182% over the course 
of the 1850s, while the volume of trade handled by the average individual German firm in Baltimore grew 
by 78% over the same time period. This comparison might suggest that the pace at which individual firms 
or families accumulated wealth increased considerably, but still lagged behind the rate at which the group, 
overall, accumulated wealth. 
 67
Old Boys’ Networks 
 The strong ties among Hanseats in Baltimore, as well as between Hanseats in 
Baltimore and those in Bremen and New York, were the foundation of the economic 
stability and success of their business ventures. The Baltimore Hanseatic merchant 
community of the 1850s encompassed three cohorts. Some firms had been established 
around 1800, and these were led by merchants born in the U.S.. The firm of F.W. Brune 
& Sons was one such enterprise.94 Another generation of merchants had come to the U.S. 
in the 1820s and 1830s. Among them were Heinrich Hermann Graue, Gustav Lürman, 
and Albert Schumacher. By the 1850s, their firms were well established.95  A third 
generation of merchants had come in the 1850s. The numerous brothers Wilkens, the 
Gieskes, Geyers and Niemanns were part of that last cohort.96
In every case, the reason for these men to move to the United States was their 
activities as part of the merchant community of Bremen. Once in the U.S., they did not 
cease to be part of that community. Hanseatic merchants arrived in Baltimore as young 
men who had just finished their apprenticeship, or had gathered a few years of experience 
in the merchant firms of their fathers or uncles. In Hanseatic merchant families, the 
practice of sending young men to America to found their own firms, join partnerships 
with relatives or acquaintances, or set up a branch location for their parent firm, dated 
                                                 
94 Mustafa, “Hanseatic Cities”; Brune, Frederick W., 1776-1860, Brune Family Papers, 1831-97, MdHS 
MS.1921.1; Brune, Emily Barton, 1826-1908, Papers, 1782-1972, MdHS MS.2004. 
95 Graue, Heinrich H., fl. 1834-1871, Papers, 1834-1871, MdHS MS.2826; Lurman, Gustavus W., 1809-
66, Papers and genealogy, 1833-1945, MdHS MS.541; Lurman, John S., Genealogy of the Lurman and 
Allied Families, Baltimore 1904. 
96 Wilkens Papers, MdHS MS.439. 
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back to the 1790s, and continues to this day. Older and younger merchants had shared 
this experience, only at different times.97
Much like the merchant class of Bremen, those from their ranks who settled 
abroad maintained close ties among each other. In Baltimore, the institutional 
embodiment of group cohesion was the exclusive Germania Club, founded by 13 men in 
1840. By 1844, membership had risen to 105, and growth continued at a slower pace 
from then on, to reach 156 members by 1860. The four-story club house on Lombard 
Street housed a bar and restaurant, a library holding the newest German literature and 
periodicals, a pool table, a lounge, and meeting rooms.98
In the letters and papers of Baltimore Hanseats, we find frequent reference to the 
Germania Club.  Among the few items other than letters Julius Wilkens kept is a dance 
card for the German Ball in 1862, and a hand-written invitation for a game of whist by 
Eduard Schumacher, a fellow mercantile clerk. “Niemann is in for it & I think Bolenius 
will take a hand”, Schumacher had scribbled down. “We might meet at ‘Germania’ 
between 7 ½ - 8 p.m.”99 Edward Niemann was one of the partners in the firm of Gieske & 
Niemann, and George Henry Bolenius was an agent at Geyer & Wilkens. While there 
was a clear status distinction between associates, agents, clerks and apprentices, these 
groups could mingle socially. After all, every associate had started out in a dependent 
                                                 
97 Bohner, Theodor, Der deutsche Kaufmann über See, Hamburg 1956; Müller, Karin, Die Freie 
Hansestadt Bremen - Zentrum des Baumwollhandels in Mitteleuropa, Nürnberg 1985 (Diplomarbeit, 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Fachbrereich Betriebswirtschaftslehre), especially p. 
37; Schwebel, “Bremen Merchants;” Schramm, Percy Ernst, Hamburg, Deutschland und die Welt. Leistung 
und Grenzen hanseatischen Bürgertums in der Zeit zwischen Napoelon I. und Bismarck. Ein Kapitel 
deutscher Geschichte, München 1943. 
98 Cunz, Dieter, A History of the Germania Club of Baltimore City, Maryland, 1840-1940, Baltimore, MD 
1940, p. 7, 10, 11, and 13. 
99 Dance card, New Assembly Room, 2.21.1862; Eduard Schumacher to Julius Wilkens, 9.27.1861, MdHS 
MS.439, English in the original. All quotes from German sources were translated by the author of this 
paper. If a German author used English in the source, the original language will be identified as such. 
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position, himself, and knew that those in the lower ranks were possible future partners, 
friends, or even in-laws. 
Club life brought merchants together across the generations. Albert Schumacher 
was the most prominent member of the Hanseatic merchant community in Baltimore. His 
ascent to wealth and moderate fame was probably the steepest among his peers. In the 
1850s, he moved into a new house, located on fashionable Mt. Vernon Square.100 In the 
1860s, 30 years after his arrival in America, he was still active in the life of the Germania 
Club. In 1863, Schumacher became its president. Younger men regularly frequented the 
club to drink, talk, or play billiards. One might imagine that they sought Schumacher’s 
company in the exclusive halls of the club house, to lay the groundwork of possible 
future patronage or credit.101
Schumacher also contributed financially to the German Society, a benevolent 
organization to aid needy German immigrants, founded in the 1760s. This philanthropic 
institution, led by the brothers Cohen from 1825 to 1875, followed a pattern of mercantile 
welfare activities that was well established in Bremen as well as Hamburg. It differed in 
one important respect, and that was the cooperation between Jews and gentiles, 
inconceivable in Bremen. While the funds of the society helped immigrants abroad, it 
reaffirmed patterns of social activity familiar from home. Giving to those in need was 
considered a duty of a successful merchant. Charity to insolent German immigrants was 
                                                 
100 Chalfant, Randolp W., “Calvert Station: Its Structure and Significance”, in: MHM v. 74, no. 1 (March, 
1979), p. 11-22, for Schumacher’s house, p. 14; Mayer, Brantz, Baltimore, as it was and as it is. A 
Historical Sketch of the Ancient Town and Modern City from the Foundation, in 1729, to 1870, Baltimore 
1871, p. 449-452; for Schumacher and Heineken as neighbors: Stein, Rudolf, Klassizismus und Romantik in 
der Baukunst Bremens, 2 vols. (=Senator für das Bildungswesen, ed., Forschungen zur Geschichte der 
Bau- und Kunstdenkmäler in Bremen, vols. 4 and 5), Bremen 1964/1965, vol. II (1965), Die Vorstädte und 
die Stadt-Landgüter Vegesack und Bremerhaven, p. 265-269. 
101 Cunz, “Maryland Germans in the Civil War”, p. 415. 
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also a wise investment. It helped maintain the respectable image of the population on 
whose continued transportation to America Hanseatic success was founded.102
Economically and politically, Hanseats’ ties extended beyond their core network. 
In addition to their mercantile activities, the owners of the older and larger Hanseatic 
houses often held consulships for German states and directorships of banks. The latter 
activity attests to their social connections with native members of the Baltimore elite, 
while the former indicates strong connections home. Albert Schumacher was a director of 
two banks, the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank, and the Savings Bank of Baltimore. He 
also served as the consul for Hamburg and Bremen. Henry Oelrichs likewise held a post 
as a consul, representing the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, just across the Weser River 
from Bremen. Oelrichs’ partner Gustav W. Lürman was a director of the Merchants’ 
Bank, and in this function, he was a colleague of Johns Hopkins.  Another person of 
Hanseatic descent on the board of the Merchants’ Bank was John C. Brune. He had 
joined his father’s firm in the 1840s, and managed the business on his own after his 
father’s death in 1854.  John C. Brune’s brother, Frederick William Brune II., a lawyer, 
and brother-in-law of George William Brown, who became mayor of Baltimore in 1860, 
joined Albert Schumacher for the board meetings of the Savings Bank of Baltimore.103
 
 
                                                 
102 Fein, Isaac M., “Baltimore Jews during the Civil War”, in: American Jewish History Quarterly vol. 51, 
no. 2 (1961/62), p. 67-96; Hennighausen, Louis P., History of the German Society of Maryland, Baltimore 
1909, p. 35-39 on date of foundation, and p. 174passim for lists of members and officers; Schwarzwälder, 
Geschichte, vol. 2, p. 244-249; Schulz, Andreas, Vormundschaft und Protektion. Eliten und Bürger in 
Bremen 1750-1880 (=Stadt und Bürgertum, vol. 13), Munich 2002 (also Habilitationsschrift, University 
Frankfurt/Main, 2000), p. 323-343. 
103 Browne, Baltimore, p. 214; Mitchett’s Baltimore City Director [sic] for 1849-50; Ferslew, Baltimore 




The “old boys’ networks” of clubs and counting-houses were not the only ties that 
bound Bremen’s merchants together. The bonds between Hanseatic men rested on family 
connections, often through multiple intermarriages, and sometimes dating back 
generations. When Albert Schumacher arrived in the U.S. in 1826, he joined Christian 
Abraham Heineken in a business partnership. Their families had been neighbors in 
Bremen, and they both had been apprentices with the merchant house of H. H. Meier of 
Bremen. After Heineken returned to Bremen in 1839, Schumacher ran their business 
alone, and took over the Bremish consulship previously held by Heineken.104 In the 
1860s, Schumacher became the Baltimore agent for the Northern German Lloyd steamer 
line. The chairman of the board of that company was the son of his former employer, like 
his father named Hermann Henrich Meier.105
Schumacher's reclusive nature, his lifelong status as a bachelor, and the loss of his 
personal papers, make it difficult to retrace his every-day interaction with other Hanseats. 
No personal correspondence is extant, even though we know that Schumacher and H. H. 
Meier had been playmates in their childhood in the 1810s. Summers during that decade 
brought together a group of boys who went on to become names in mercantile circles, as 
the Schumachers, Heinekens, and Meiers retreated from the city to their estates in 
                                                 
104 Chalfant, Randolp W., “Calvert Station: Its Structure and Significance”, in: MHM v. 74, no. 1 (March, 
1979), p. 11-22, for Schumacher’s house, p. 14; Mayer, Brantz, Baltimore, as it was and as it is. A 
Historical Sketch of the Ancient Town and Modern City from the Foundation, in 1729, to 1870, Baltimore 
1871, p. 449-452; for Schumacher and Heineken as neighbors: Stein, Rudolf, Klassizismus und Romantik in 
der Baukunst Bremens, 2 vols. (=Senator für das Bildungswesen, ed., Forschungen zur Geschichte der 
Bau- und Kunstdenkmäler in Bremen, vols. 4 and 5), Bremen 1964/1965, vol. II (1965), Die Vorstädte und 
die Stadt-Landgüter Vegesack und Bremerhaven, p. 265-269. 
105 Mayer, Baltimore; Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier. 
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Oberneuland, a village on Bremen’s rural territory.106 During the 1860s, Schumacher still 
socialized with men close to Meier. Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen’s minister-resident in 
Washington, mentions him in letters written during the summer months, when he met 
Schumacher at Saratoga or Newport. There, they would have been likely to encounter 
others from the New York mercantile world, like Meier’s trading partners Gustav F. 
Schwab and Hermann von Post. At another time, however, Schleiden expressed worry to 
Schwab because he had not heard from Schumacher in a while.107 In spite of his long-
standing personal and business ties with other Hanseats, Schumacher lacked one crucial 
requirement for the kind of close and cordial contact that existed between other men: a 
family.  Intermarriage provided the emotional bonds that invested business relations – 
even if founded on long personal acquaintance or even friendship – with a necessary 
element of higher purpose. Family ties also were an essential basis for the cooperation 
between firms, and a major source of capital. 
 
The Wilkens Family 
The Wilkens brothers were part of the third cohort of Hanseats to arrive in 
Baltimore, and family ties were no less important to them, than they were to the earlier 
generations of Bremish merchants in the United States. The several Wilkens brothers in 
Bremen and Baltimore were a typical case of the interlocking of family, friendship, and 
business in Hanseatic circles. Julius Wilkens left Bremen in 1858, when he was around 
20 years old. His brothers Friedrich and Heinrich were already in Baltimore. Heinrich 
                                                 
106 Stein, Klassizismus, vol. 2, p. 265-269; Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 9; map “Bremen, 1850.” 
107 Rudolf Schleiden to Gustav F. Schwab, Brattleboro 1860/08/29 and 1860/08/31; and Newport 
1860/09/19, MSS 434, John Christopher Schwab Family Papers. Manuscripts and Archives, Yale 
University Library, series I, box 2, folder 38.  
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Wilkens was partner with Eduard Geyer in a shipping merchant firm.108 In 1857, while 
still in Bremen, Julius Wilkens conducted business for Geyer & Wilkens in Bremen. He 
sold apples and tobacco from America, and was asked to give his opinion on the market 
for crackers.109 Friedrich worked for the recently founded tobacco-merchant firm of 
Gieske & Niemann, who had come to Baltimore from Dinklage in Oldenburg after 
1848.110
For most of the early 1860s, Friedrich Wilkens represented Gieske & Niemann in 
Demerara, British Guyana.111  Two more of his brothers, Wilhelm and Theodor, were still 
in Bremen when Julius Wilkens left. Of these, Wilhelm Wilkens joined his siblings in 
Baltimore around 1865. Apparently he had enough capital to engage in trade with a 
variety of articles. He wrote to his brother, Julius: “Do you think that something can be 
earned in dry goods sassafras etc. between here and Demerara.  I will write Fr[iedrich]. 
about that some time, I feel like earning or losing a few coppers on the side.”112 Theodor 
Wilkens stayed in Bremen, where he was an apprentice in a merchant firm. When his 
apprenticeship ended in late 1859, Theodor, too, toyed with the thought of going to 
America. The two Wilkens sisters, Margarethe and Eleonore, also stayed in their home 
                                                 
108 1859-60 directory; Geyer & Wilkens, Notice of partnership to F. A. Kly, Jan 1st 1855, Vertical File 
“Geyer & Wilkens”, MdHS. 
109 Friedrich to Julius Wilkens, n.d. [1857], MdHS MS.439. 
110 Friedrich to Julius Wilkens, 5.7.1859, for F.W.’s employment; Heinrich to Julius Wilkens, 5.20.1865, 
for Gieske & Niemann’s involvement in the tobacco trade; both MdHS MS.439; on Gieske & Niemann: 
Interview by the author with Edward Gieske, 2.23.2001. 
111 Friedrich to Julius Wilkens, 4.17.1859 and 5.7.1859, MdHS MS.439. 
112 Wilhelm Knoche to Julius Wilkens, 2.11.1865, MdHS MS.439, contains the first reference to Wilhelm 
Wilkens’ presence in Baltimore I found. Quote from Wilhelm to Julius Wilkens, 3.24.1865, MdHS 
MS.439. 
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town, where the latter continued to live with their parents, Auguste and Friedrich 
Wilkens.113
The Wilkens’ in Baltimore and Bremen were tied into a network that connected 
multiple Hanseatic families, through business partnerships and intermarriage. Julius 
Wilkens could rely on his friends and family on both sides of the Atlantic for help. When 
he planned to ‘establish himself’ in Baltimore in a firm of his own in 1864, his brother 
Friedrich offered him his support: “As I wrote in my last [letter], I would like to help you 
and assist you with a little flush.”114 After Julius Wilkens had founded the firm of 
Wilkens & Gieske, he received a letter from his friend Constantin Württemberger in 
Bremen, promising both spiritual and financial assistance: 
Be well assured that I look at your present enterprise with particular sympathy, and that I 
beg Heaven to bestow the richest blessings on it. Your diligence and integrity do not let 
me doubt a good success, even less so, since you have Geyer & Wilkens and Gieske and 
Niemann at your side. Whatever I can contribute on my part to the stimulation of your 
business, I will certainly be glad to do.115
 
The women of the Wilkens family likewise supplied Julius Wilkens with a crucial 
resource: the comfort in knowing that he had not been forgotten by his loved ones. Julius 
Wilkens’ sister, Eleonore, frequently wrote to Julius about the recent family news, such 
as the health or travels of relatives. His mother, Auguste Wilkens, mostly wrote to her 
son to discuss family events, such as the marriage of Julius’ brother, Heinrich, to Theresa 
Geyer – apparently a relative of Heinrich’s business partner – during one of Heinrich’s 
stays in Bremen. Owing to the large circle of relatives and friends, there was never a 
shortage of significant events to report.116
                                                 
113 Theodor to Julius Wilkens, 10.28.1859; Eleonore, Auguste and Friedrich Wilkens, sr., to Julius Wilkens, 
12.3.1858, both MdHS MS.439. 
114 Friedrich to Julius Wilkens, 1.18.1864, MdHS MS.439. 
115 Constantin Württemberger to Julius Wilkens, 12.29.1865, MdHS MS.439. 
116 Eleonore to Julius Wilkens, 2.4.1859; Auguste to Julius Wilkens, 3.15.1859; both: MdHS MS.439. 
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Wilhelm Knoche, Julius Wilkens’ long-time friend who remained in Bremen, was 
one of his most frequent correspondents. He demonstrated the seamless connections 
between ties of friendship and business. In Bremen, Knoche and Wilkens shared a wide 
circle of male acquaintances, both in the world of the counting-house, and that of the 
tavern. Knoche often updated Wilkens on the recent gossip and social events from that 
circle. In 1861, Wilhelm Knoche joined Theodor Wilkens, Julius’ brother, in forming a 
wine-trading company that also ran a tavern. In the same year, Knoche married Eleonore 
Wilkens, the sister of his associate. When Julius Wilkens first returned to his hometown 
in early 1865, it was in part to be present for the baptism of the couple’s second child. 
Another reason was to establish business connections for the firm of Wilkens & Gieske, 
which he was soon to found in Baltimore.117
With Julius Wilkens and Wilhelm Knoche, the old boys’ networks of tavern and 
counting-house seamlessly ran into the family ties that were so important for Hanseats. 
Indeed, the third reason for Julius Wilkens to travel to the old country was to find a wife. 
In the summer of 1865, he received a letter by Wilhelm Middendorf, the clerk of Geyer & 
Wilkens. Middendorf wrote: “I wonder if you have been successful in finding some 
young lady to adopt as your partner for life. If you have been unsuccessful in Bremen I 
hope that you will be successful at least in your travels, either on the Rhine or at some 
springs.”118
Apparently, Julius Wilkens would have preferred a Hanseatic wife over one he 
might meet elsewhere in Germany. When Hanseats in the U.S. found wives outside of 
                                                 
117 Wilhelm Knoche to Julius Wilkens, 2.3.1859, 01.19.1861, and 2.11.1865; Eleonore to Julius Wilkens, 
7.9.1861; Wilhelm to Julius Wilkens, 3.24.1865, all: MdHS MS.439. Knoche’s family owned the posh 
hotel “Lindenhof” on the Domshof, see Stein, Klassizismus, vol I. (1964), Das Gebiet der Altstadt und der 
Alten Neustadt, der Wall und die Contrescarpe, pp. 306-312. 
118 Wilhelm Middendorf to Julius Wilkens, 6.15. 1865, MdHS MS.439, English in the original. 
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Bremish networks, they preferred at least to marry within mercantile circles. Social 
events that brought together the mercantile elite served a match-making function. In 
1865, the Baltimore German Ball was held during Julius Wilkens’ absence. Wilhelm 
Wilkens’ account testifies to the bibulous character of the event, as well as to the 
attendance of other merchants: “Last night Schücking Dohme & Frisius were at the 
German Ball & today they revel in blissful memories and hang-over. (...) Frisius seems to 
court his gracious flower Emma Sutro quite a bit, [he] picks her up on Sundays after 
church etc., ‘De gustibus non est Disputandum’.”119 Emma Sutro had also signed her 
name on Julius Wilkens’ dance card in 1862, for a dance of “Sturm Gallopp,” another 
indicator of the closeness of the merchants’ circles.120
 
The Lürman Family 
Gustav Wilhelm Lürman’s vitae was exemplary for a Hanseat in the second third 
of the nineteenth century. Thirty years older than Julius Wilkens, he would have 
recognized his own experience in that of the younger man. Lürman arrived in Baltimore 
in late 1830, 21 years of age. He had a classically Hanseatic array of merchants, 
aldermen, and Reformed ministers among his ancestors. Lürman, too, had learned his 
profession in a Bremish counting-house, before embarking for the new world. En route to 
Baltimore through Britain, he had arranged to form a business partnership with a distant 
                                                 
119 Wilhelm to Julius Wilkens, 3.24.1865, MdHS MS.439. Wood’s Baltimore City Directory, 1867-68, 
identifies the Sutro family as the owners of a local retail firm, specializing in imported German textiles. In 
the twentieth century, there was a prominent family of the same name who owned an entertainment venue 
in San Francisco. J. Thomas Scharf identifies Emma Sutro’s brother, Otto, as an adventurer and musician 
who hosted “evenings (…) of music, pleasure, and entertainment [that] laid the foundation of the 
‘Wednesday Club,’ since become famous for musical and dramatic entertainments by non-professionals.” 
Since Otto Sutro had spent some time in California during the gold-rush, we could imagine a connection 
between the San Francisco and Baltimore Sutros. See Scharf, J. Thomas, History of Baltimore City & 
County, 2 vols., Philadelphia 1881, vol. 2, p. 673-674. 
120 The dance is apparently a variant of the quickstep. 
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cousin, E. G. Oelrichs, who lived in London. On November 1st, 1830, Lürman announced 
the foundation of the shipping and commission merchants’ firm of E.G. Oelrichs & 
Lurman to potential customers. As their two references, the new firm could cite Nicholas 
Biddle, president of the Bank of the United States, and the brothers Baring, the British 
merchant-bankers. Oelrichs & Lurman served as exchange agents for the latter, and 
frequently commissioned goods to them.121
Lürman’s subsequent life seems to demonstrate rapid assimilation. On September 
9, 1830, he announced his intention to become a citizen of the United States. In 1835, he 
married Frances Donnell, the daughter of a prominent Baltimore merchant of Scottish 
birth, John Donnell. The previous year, Donnell & Son had failed to meet their 
obligations towards Baring Bros.. It is likely that Oelrichs & Lurman were involved in 
the settlement that saved the Donnells. Furthermore, a shared Calvinist faith may have 
facilitated this union. Lürman had attended boarding school in Bückeburg, in the 
Principality of Schaumburg-Lippe, a hotbed of orthodoxy. The Oelrichs, too, were 
Reformed Protestants. An eighteenth-century ancestor had been the first Reformed 
minister in the city of Hannover.122
                                                 
121 Lurman, John S., Genealogy; Letter from Gustav Wilhelm Lurman to Col. Hesse, Manchester, 
8.12.1830, folder “1817-1865; n.d. Gustav[us] [W.] Lürman – Correspondence”, box 1, MdHS MS.541; 
“Notice of partnership” (11.1.1830) and hand-written account of the history of his firm by Gustav W. 
Lürman (1866), folder “1830-1867 E.G. Oelrichs and Lurman Company”, box 2, MdHS MS.541. Hidy, 
Ralph W., The House of Baring in American Trade. English Merchant Bankers at Work, 1763-1861  
(=Harvard Studies in Business History, vol. 14), Cambridge, Mass. 1949, contains frequent references to 
the business relation between Baring Bros. and the firm of Oelrichs & Lurman. Lürman’s activities clearly 
contradict Beutin’s generalization that Hanseats stayed completely clear of speculation: Lürman was a 
banker and active commission merchant. Still, Table 12 (Chapter 7) shows that as late as 1860, Lürman 
derived nearly half his profit from trade carried on his own vessels. 
122 Hidy, House of Baring, p. 180; Homepage of the Evangelische Landeskirche Schaumburg-Lippe, 
http://www.ekd.de/schaumburg/; Lurman, John, Genealogy. There is some indication that the connection 
between the Lürmans and Donnells might date back to 1823. When Louise Kalisky traveled in the United 
States in that year, she wrote in her diary that “in Baltimore, [on the night of December, 11th, 1823,] a very 
beautiful Mrs. O’Donnell came over for tea, and showered me with kind invitations.” Half a year later, 
Kalisky married Hermann Friedrich von Lengerke, whom she had met in Philadelphia. There, von 
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Even though he had settled in Baltimore, Lürman’s ties to Bremen remained 
strong. Alderman Theodor Gerhard Lürman in Bremen was Gustav W. Lürman’s half-
brother. This man’s sons grew up to become Senatoren and judges in Bremen.123 Through 
this side of his family, Gustav W. Lürman stayed connected to Bremish decision-makers. 
His mother’s family, the Oelrichs, likewise was a presence in all ports where Hanseats 
did business. Many of them would have recognized Lürman as part of their family 
network. Indeed, in 1838, Henry Oelrichs, a brother of E.G. Oelrichs, came to Baltimore 
to join the firm of E.G. Oelrichs & Lurman as an associate. When the older Oelrichs left 
Baltimore in 1842, Henry Oelrichs and Gustav W. Lürman founded a new firm, named 
Oelrichs & Lurman.124
The further development of the firm of Oelrichs & Lurman continued to follow 
this pattern. In the mid-1850s, Lürman’s son John Stephen, and the firm’s clerk, J. Emil 
Hirschfeld, joined the firm. Hirschfeld, too, was family: the grandson of a daughter from 
Lürman’s father’s first marriage.125 Henry Oelrichs relocated to New York in 1860, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lengerke, who had received his mercantile education in Bremen and in a Hanseatic firm in Bordeaux, was 
an associate in the merchant house of Vezin & Co.. Their daughter, Johanne Juliane von Lengerke, was to 
marry Stephan August Lürman, Gustav W. Lürman’s cousin, in 1860. If the von Lengerkes and the 
Lürmans had been acquainted in the 1820s, which is likely, considering their shared ties to Bremish trade, 
Gustav W. Lürman may well have come to Baltimore with a recommendation to the Donnells from von 
Lengerke or his wife. See Louise Kalisky, “Tagbuchauszug der Louise Kalisky (später verh. von Lengerke) 
*1806, von einem Aufenthalt in den USA, 1.9.1819-1824,“ folder “Briefe, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und 
Dokumente der Familie Lürman in Bremen” (typescript), p. 17-57, entry of 1823/12/11, p. 38-41, 
Staatsarchiv Bremen (from hereon abbreviated as StAHB) 7,128, Lürman [family papers], box 1; Julie 
[Johanne Juliane] Lürman, née von Lengerke, „Etwas aus dem Leben meines lieben Vaters F. v. 
Lengerke“, Ibid, p. 58-59; Hirschfeld, George W., genealogical overview to “Stephan Lürman, Brief an 
meine Kinder aus 2. Ehe (1813),” typescript 1977, unmarked, orange binder, StAHB 7,128, Lürman 
[family papers], box 3. 
123 The Senat was Bremen’s executive body. To avoid confusion with the United States legislative body of 
the same name, the word will be italicized when referring to Bremen. 
124 Lürman, Gustav W., handwritten account, see note 121. Hidy, House of Baring, p. 292. 
125 Hirschfeld, George W., genealogical overview to “Stephan Lürman, Brief an meine Kinder aus 2. Ehe 
(1813),“ typescript 1977, unmarked, orange binder, StAHB 7,128, Lürman [family papers], box 3. Gustav 
W. Lürman, himself, was a son from his father’s third and final marriage. 
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thus left the firm on January 1st, 1861.126 J. E. Hirschfeld left the firm, now called Lurman 
& Co., by the end of 1865, whereafter father and son ran the business jointly.127
When it came to settling Lürman’s account after his death in 1866, there were 
open bills of $169,759.44 to pay. Lürman’s widow and son had to sell not only the 
tobacco warehouse on South Street, and Lürman’s half of a wharf in Fells Point, but also 
three residential houses. Fortunately for Frances Donnell Lürman, she had kept her 
property separate from that of her husband throughout the marriage, especially her 
mansion in the country, “Farmlands”.128
Nevertheless, Lürman’s is a story of success. Few people in 1860s Baltimore 
would have been able to pay a bill of $170,000 at all. For the sake of comparison, the two 
men who were by far the richest members of the Maryland legislature in 1861, the bank 
president J. Hanson Thomas, and the civil engineer, Ross Winans, owned property (real 
and personal combined) worth $400,000 and $251,700, respectively. Only two other 
members of the legislature owned more than $100,000.129  Furthermore, even after 
settling the estate, enough of Lürman’s assets were left to enable his son, John Stephen, 
to continue the business throughout the rest of the century.130
 
                                                 
126 Since Gustav Lürman was a strong supporter of the Confederacy (see chapter 6), the dissolution of the 
firm, and Oelrichs’ move to New York, might have had to do with political disagreement among the 
business partners. 
127 Maynard Sons & Co, London, to G.W. Lurman, 2.6.1865; Lurman & Co., notice of change in 
partnership, 1.1.1861, folder “1830-1867 E.G. Oelrichs and Lurman Company”; Lurman & Co., circular, 
7.16.1866, folder “1866, Lurman & Co.”, box 2, MdHS MS.541. 
128 Folder “Frances Lurman Donnell – Ledger”, folder “Agreements and Covenants”, and folder “1866-
1867, Gustavus Wilhelm Lurman – Estate Papers”, box 1, MdHS MS.541; Bevan, Edith Rossiter, “Willow 
Brook, Country Seat of John Donnell”, MdHM vol. 44, no. 1 (March, 1949), p. 33-41, especially p. 37. 
129 Lurman, John, Genealogy, Wooster, Ralph A., “Sidelights – The Membership of the Maryland 
Legislature of 1861”, in: MdHM vol. 56, no. 1 (March, 1961), p. 94-102, Appendix 1. 
130 Folder “Frances Lurman Donnell – Ledger”, folder “Agreements and Covenants”, and folder “1866-
1867, Gustavus Wilhelm Lurman – Estate Papers”, box 1, MdHS MS.541; Bevan, Edith Rossiter, “Willow 
Brook, Country Seat of John Donnell”, MdHM vol. 44, no. 1 (March, 1949), pp. 33-41, especially p. 37. 
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Meier & Co. of New York 
 Lurman & Co. was not a singular case. The most important Hanseatic firm in 
New York likewise was a tightly-knit family concern. Caspar Meier and his brother, 
Herman Henrich,131 together with their descendants, had established this most important 
dynasty of German-American traders of the nineteenth century, based in Bremen and 
New York. Caspar Meier had come to New York in 1796, and worked for an American 
firm for two years, before establishing himself in his own name. He was joined by his 
brother, Herman Henrich, in 1799. Together, they conducted business in New York as C. 
& H. H. Meier from 1800 to 1805. In the spring of 1805, H. H. Meier, I., returned to 
Bemen to found his own firm. The brothers formed a contract between their houses that 
established the New York and Bremen firms as branches of the same company: 
Any business done by either party for his own account between Europe and America 
shall be considered as for joint account. (...) It is therefore agreed that, as an unlimited 
confidence is to take place, each of the parties shall consent to any shipment made by the 
other party for the joint account between this place [New York] and Bremen, unless they 
are of a hazardous nature, it being expected and understood that neither of them would 
enter into any business which would, reasonably expected, not meet the approbation of 
the other party.132
 
This contract, which essentially laid the groundwork for a ‘multinational’ enterprise, was 
repeatedly renewed, even between the successors of the two founding brothers. It was 
only allowed to expire at the end of 1864.133
Meier & Co. of Bremen and New York were not just an example of a 
‘multinational’ family firm; they were also emblematic for the close ties between 
different families within the Hanseatic network. The Meiers’ interests connected 
                                                 
131 Herman Henrich Meier, I. (17**-1821), father of Herman Henrich Meier, II. (1809-1898). Unless 
indicated, reference to Herman Henrich, or H. H., Meier throughout this thesis will mean the younger 
Meier, the politician and founder of the Lloyd and the Bremer Bank. 
132 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, New York 1898, p. 19-20. 
133 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 20. 
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seamlessly with those of other Hanseats we already encountered. In Bremen, Stefan 
Lürman, father of Gustav Lürman, was a regular correspondent of Caspar Meier's before 
H. H. Meier & Co. assumed the role of prime business contact for that port. In Baltimore, 
C. A. Heineken & Co. was the Meiers’ main trading partner. This firm came to be known 
as Albert Schumacher & Co., once its new namesake – a former apprentice in the firm of 
H. H. Meier & Co. in Bremen – took over as senior associate.134 The Oelrichs formed an 
additional link between the Meier and Lürman families. As shown above, members of the 
Oelrichs family in Baltimore set up shop with Lürman, while those in New York entered 
into a partnership with Meier. Meier & Co. of New York changed its name to Oelrichs & 
Co. in 1852, when Edwin A. Oelrichs became the senior member of the firm.135
In linking his firm to additional, well-established Hanseatic families, Caspar 
Meier strengthened its ties to the overall Bremish network. On a trip to Bremen in 1822, 
Meier met Lawrence Henry von Post, a clerk in the firm of Meier’s brother. He recruited 
the 20-year-old off the spot, and took him back to New York, where he made him a 
partner in his firm in 1826. A year later, von Post was wedded to Meier's eldest daughter, 
Eliza. Like Meier, von Post had a distinguished lineage of merchants and Senatoren on 
both sides of his family, making him a good choice for a son-in-law.136 As a junior partner 
in the firm of Caspar Meier & Co., L. H. von Post followed in his mentor's footsteps, 
when he went to Bremen in 1833, and picked another of H. H. Meier's clerks, Hermann 
Oelrichs, as an additional business partner for the New York firm. Oelrichs, then 24 years 
old, gladly accepted the opportunity. He might have had a chance to join his brother, 
                                                 
134 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 27. 
135 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 32. 
136 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 22-23. 
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Henry, in Baltimore, but probably found doing business in New York more promising.137 
Another brother of Hermann Oelrichs, Edwin Adalbert, joined the firm as an associate in 
1844. In 1852, Caspar Meier's grandson, Herman Caspar von Post, rose from clerk to 
associate in the counting-house, and was to stay with the firm for the rest of the 
century.138
Like his counterparts in Baltimore, Caspar Meier amassed offices that established 
his standing in New York society, and his successors followed in his footsteps. Apart 
from the consulship for Bremen, he held a seat on the board of directors of the New York 
Mutual Insurance Co., belonged to the Chamber of Commerce, and was a vice president 
of the German Society. The Bremish consulate was handed down from one senior 
member of the firm to the next. Upon Caspar Meier's death in 1839, Lawrence Henry von 
Post took the job. Von Post's early death, on a trip to Havana in the winter of 1839, led to 
the succession of Hermann Oelrichs. After an interlude from 1859 to 1861, during which 
a different Bremish firm had the honor, the consulate devolved back to Caspar Meier's 
heirs in 1861, when Gustav F. Schwab, then the senior member of Oelrichs & Co., 
received the appointment.139
Caspar Meier’s successors were equally well connected through marriage and 
business ties. Hermann C. von Post was married to an American, Jane S. Whitlock. While 
not of Hanseatic origin, Whitlock was from an American mercantile family.140 Like von 
                                                 
137 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 23. 
138 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 30-32. 
139 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 25 and 42. For Schwab, see Vagts, Alfred, “Gustav 
Schwab 1822-1880. Ein deutschamerikanischer Unternehmer”, in: 1000 Jahre Bremer Kaufmann. Aufsätze 
zur Geschichte bremischen Kaufmannstums, des Bremer Handels und der Bremer Schiffahrt aus Anlaß des 
tausendjährigen Gedenkens der Marktgründung durch Bischof Adaldag 965 (=Bremisches Jahrbuch 50), 
Bremen 1965, p. 337-360; and extensively in chapters 2 and 5. 
140 “Mr. H. C. von Post Dies at Age of 85” (obituary), New York Herald, 1913/10/11, in: Hermann Caspar 
von Post, 1828-1913, scrapbook, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series II, box 20, folder 222. 
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Post, H. H. Meier might have married an American during his stay in Boston as an agent 
for Meier & Co. in the 1830s. In his own recollection, he had been popular among young 
Brahmins, who admired his horsemanship, poetry and rowing. The parents of his 
prospective bride objected to their marriage, however, and Meier married a fellow 
Hanseat not long after his return to Bremen. Indicating the degree to which Hanseats 
could swim in the main-stream of American elite life, Miss Frances E. Appleton later 
married Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, the poet.141
 
Gustav F. Schwab and H. H. Meier II 
 Gustav F. Schwab had come into the orbit of the Meiers and their firms in Bremen 
and New York as a child. His mother, Sophie, had been friends with H. H. Meier’s 
mother, Lucy, since the 1820s. The acquaintance of Lucy Meier and Sophie Schwab, in 
turn, was based on the university friendship between a relative of the former, and the 
husband of the latter. During his student years at the University of Tübingen, Lucy’s 
future husband Gustav B. Schwab, a well-known poet and Calvinist minister, had known 
among his fellow students a number of scions of Hanseatic mercantile houses. In 1823, 
the recently widowed Lucy Meier had decided to send her youngest son, Herman 
Henrich, and her daughter, Betty, to a grammar school away from Bremen. It was one of 
Schwab’s Hanseatic acquaintances who had suggested to her that she have her children 
educated in the Stuttgart academy, where Gustav B. Schwab was a teacher at that time.142
 In 1824 and 1825, Lucy Meier and her children lived in the Schwabs’ house in 
Stuttgart, where she befriended the poet’s wife, Sophie. Young Herman Henrich attended 
                                                 
141 “Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth,” in: Dictionary of American Biography (DAB), vol. 6, New York 
1933, p. 239-240; Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 30. 
142 Klüpfel, Gustav Schwab, p. 125-126; Hardegen/Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 6-7. 
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Gustav B. Schwab’s classes. Schwab’s second son, Gustav Friedrich, was at that time 
two years old. Though thirteen years apart in age, Gustav F. Schwab and H. H. Meier 
would live under the same roof for many of their formative years. In Stuttgart, during the 
1820s, Meier had seen little Gustav Friedrich grow up in his family’s house. In the 1830s, 
both men had been apprentices in the firm of H. H. Meier & Co. in Bremen, founded by 
the late father of H. H. Meier. Here, they shared quarters in the Meier family homes, the 
counting-house on Langenstraße and the estate in Oberneuland.143
 Schwab's and Meier's merchant careers developed in much the same way as those 
of dozens of their peers.  After completing their apprenticeships, they were sent to the 
U.S. to learn the American side of the business.  Schwab came to America in 1844, where 
he worked as a clerk in the New York Meiers’ counting-house. In 1849, he established 
himself in a partnership with a Mr. Recknagel in New York. Meier, too, had spent some 
years in America, but returned to Bremen to become a partner with J. H. Adami in H. H. 
Meier & Co. After the death of his brother Diedrich Meier in 1852, Herman Henrich 
Meier became head of that house.144
In some essential ways, Meier and Schwab differed from their peers, in that they 
were more open to innovation. Still, their success was largely a function of their 
continued commitment to the Hanseatic network, and its reliance on family ties. In 
Bremen and New York, respectively, Meier – born in 1809 – and Schwab – born in 1822 
– came to occupy leading roles in the mercantile world by the time they reached their 
40s. 
                                                 
143 Ibid, and Hardegen/Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 16.. 
144 Bessell, Georg, 1857-1957. Norddeutscher Lloyd. Geschichte einer bremischen Reederei, Bremen 1957, 
p. 16; Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 34. 
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In 1859, after a decade in his partnership with Recknagel in New York, Schwab 
entered the house that Meier's uncle had founded in the same city in 1798, then known as 
Oelrichs & Co.. In Bremen, H. H. Meier founded the two joint-stock companies that were 
to be the center-pieces of Bremen's mercantile economy for decades to come. In 1856, he 
established the Northern German Lloyd, a steamship company dedicated to serving the 
New York-Bremen market. In 1857, he added to his responsibilities the Bremer Bank, the 
first large commercial lending institution in Bremen that was based on joint stock. 
Schwab, likewise, expanded his activities beyond the traditional reach of 
Hanseatic commerce; into stocks, railroads, and insurance. A first step in making 
Oelrichs & Co. into a full-service transportation concern was gaining the New York 
agency for the Lloyd in 1861, affirming the connection between his and Meier’s concerns 
by extending it to this newest project. In the same year, Schwab became Bremish consul 
in New York. Between 1858 and 1861, Gustav F. Schwab had risen to a position as the 
leading German merchant, and thus a man of note and standing in the larger mercantile 
community, in New York. By the 1870s, Schwab was considered a leading member of 
the New York Chamber of Commerce. This rapid ascent was to a large extent a function 
of his family connection with H. H. Meier in Bremen. 
 His marriage to Eliza von Post connected Gustav Schwab more firmly to the 
Meiers. The von Posts had been associates in Oelrichs & Co. since 1826. Eliza von Post 
was Eliza Meier’s daughter, and the granddaughter of Caspar Meier. Her brother was 
Hermann Caspar von Post, who had been an associate in the firm of Oelrichs & Co. since 
1852.145 Eliza's sister, Emily von Post, married Gustav's brother, Johann Christoph 
                                                 
145 “Mr. H. C. von Post Dies at Age of 85” (obituary), New York Herald, 1913/10/11, in: Hermann Caspar 
von Post, 1828-1913, scrapbook, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series II, box 20, folder 222. 
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Schwab, whom she had met at their siblings’ wedding, further cementing the ties between 
the two families. For Gustav Schwab, this marriage provided one more connection to the 
Hanseatic elite in New York and Bremen, and opened an additional source of financing 
for his ventures.146 The von Post siblings had grown up in the U.S., but, like many 
Hanseats abroad, had been sent to Bremen for their education, where they boarded with 
family members.147
 
 In all these cases, Hanseatic business is shown to be family business. The 
interlocking of old boys’ clubs, marriage, and business partnerships tied families into 
clans, and clans into a dense, transnational network. To insulate the individual merchant 
or firm as the basic economic unit of Hanseatic trade, as Böhmert’s reading of Bremish 
success in terms of political economy suggests, misses the central characteristic of this 
network. On the world market, Hanseats did not simply rely on ‘private enterprise’, but 
on their membership in a tightly-knit, exclusive group that provided them with 
indispensable financial, moral, and emotional resources. 
 
 
                                                 
146 D. A. Meier to Gustav B. Schwab, Bremen 1849/12/11, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, folder 
29. Klüpfel, Karl [and Sophie], Gustav Schwab. Sein Leben und Wirken, Leipzig 1858, p. 381-383. 
147 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 32. 
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Conclusion 
The way in which Hanseats organized their business partnerships was not 
exceptional. Business in the antebellum period, especially commerce, was still mostly a 
matter of small firms. Two or three owners, actually present in the office, and with 
intricate knowledge of the commodities the firm dealt in, usually ran a business.148 Yet, 
continuity and stability were not major features of mercantile operations in the nineteenth 
century. In this regard, the stories of these Hanseatic families are remarkable exceptions. 
What allowed them to keep their firms in the hands of the family over multiple 
generations was the closely-knit character of their transatlantic community. Across 
generations and families, Hanseats continued to socialize in clubs and counting-houses, 
assuring through familiarity the reproduction of basic, shared attitudes towards business, 
and the stability of the network in times of crisis. 
On the basis of this family network reminiscent of eighteenth-century traders, 
Hanseats were able to direct a significant branch of the swelling stream of transatlantic 
trade to their city. The quick pace of the expansion of Hanseats’ share of American 
foreign trade was matched by that of the extension of their network. They founded new 
firms by giving credit to younger men who had been socialized into their estate during 
long apprenticeships, while expanding the capital handled by existing firms at a pace that 
lagged behind the overall growth of business. More often than not, capital was transferred 
to new firms or to junior associates in an existing firm, as a long-term credit or as a 
dowry. 
                                                 
148 Perkins, Edwin J., Financing Anglo-American Trade: The House of Brown, 1800-1880, Cambridge, MA 
1975; Pitsch, Beziehungen, p. 197-207; Porter, P. Glenn, and Harold C. Livesay, Merchants and 
Manufacturers. Studies in the Changing Structure of Nineteenth-Century Marketing, Baltimore 1971, 
especially p. 17-22. 
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The way Hanseats did business confirms Marx’s assertion that the mercantile 
cities looked towards the past. The ‘livelihood’ of the family and its offspring drove the 
expansion of the Hanseatic network just as much as did a desire to accumulate capital. 
Nevertheless, their traditionalism served Bremen’s merchants well. As long as the 
linkage between emigration and importation allowed them to offer cheap freight rates, 
their business of buying commodities cheaply, while selling them at a higher price to 
industrial consumers in Europe, remained profitable. With only a limited use of modern 
financial instruments, Hanseats’ became one of the major trading partners of the United 
States in the decades leading up to the Civil War. To be sure, once Hanseats put their 
funds into circulation, they were subject to the exigencies of political economy. On the 
world-market, capital, expertise, prudence, and reliable business contacts were 
indispensable ingredients of success. Hanseats’ transatlantic network amply supplied 
them with these very ingredients. 
In one essential respect, the image of traditionalism does not hold up. As far as 
wholesale trade was concerned, Hanseats were uncompromising, radical liberals; and 
their most prominent employee, the Handelskammer’s Syndikus Victor Böhmert, gave 
voice to this position. As owners of emigrant ships, Hanseats promoted the free flow of 
people along with that of commodities and money. A closer look at the content of their 
social and political value-systems in the two following chapters, however, will show that 
we have to recognize the limits of Hanseats’ willingness to embrace the liberal creed, 
beyond the freedom of trade and circulation. The history of Hanseat’s transatlantic 
network after 1860 likewise will illuminate the limits of their peculiar way of doing 
business, no longer sustainable in a developed, industrial world-economy. In the decades 
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between the Napoleonic Wars and the year 1860, however, Bremen’s merchants could 
live in a world that allowed them to stick to their traditions, while contributing to a 





Chapter 2: The Hanseatic Household –  
Families, Firms, and Faith, 1815 – 1864 
 
 
The Spirit of the Hanseatic Household 
 We cannot understand Hanseats’ performance on the emerging global market-
place without understanding their private lives. We have seen that the family, not the 
enterprising individual, was the primary unit of Hanseatic business activities. Family life 
took place in the household, in its broadest sense. The household provided merchants 
with the emotional and ideological, as well as with the financial, resources that ensured 
their success. For analytical purposes, and for the sake of clarity, it makes sense to 
consider the household separately from Hanseats’ political and economic lives. We 
should, however, keep in mind that for Hanseats themselves, these spheres were not 
sharply separated. Business ventures, a mercantile ethos, and the political privilege they 
enjoyed as members of an estate formed the interdependent moments of Hanseats’ life as 
a cosmopolitan community.149
                                                 
149 See Beckert, Sven, The Monied Metropolis. New York City and the Consolidation of the American 
Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896, Cambridge, Mass. et. al. 2001, p. 17-45, for the role of family ties for the broader 
merchant class of New York; and Evans, Richard J., “Family and class in the Hamburg grand bourgeoisie 
1815-1914,” in: Blackbourne, David, and Richard J. Evans, eds., The German.Bourgeoisie. Essays on the 
social history of the German middle class from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century, London 
and New York 1991, p. 115-139. 
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To Hanseats, family, firm, and faith were equally important in defining who they 
were. Marriage was not simply a source of capital and business connections. It was a 
sacred bond between husband and wife, based on a shared commitment to Calvinism. 
Within the parameters set by this creed, women enjoyed significant independence, 
financially, politically, and socially. Men and women were held to similar standards of 
respectability that rested on sound Christian convictions. Together, they actively 
reproduced an ideology that sanctioned commercial activities. Since Hanseatic men and 
women considered as the ultimate end of mercantile enterprise the welfare of the family, 
they were equally committed to upholding the gender arrangements that had proven 
essential for their success as a group. 
The moral economy reproduced within the Hanseatic household served to cement 
the ties within this transnational community. It imbued its members with the sense of a 
higher calling. Doing god’s work by linking distant lands in commerce was a self-
consciously collective effort. At the same time as their beliefs kept Hanseats together, 
they also linked them to a larger world of Calvinism outside of their immediate network. 
Bremen was a point on the Calvinist Axis stretching from Switzerland to New England. 
These religious ties reinforced those woven by commerce. 
Hanseatic children were brought up to perpetuate this cosmopolitan community, 
by mastering both the rigid demands of traditional, Calvinist morality, and the skills 
required for doing well in a rapidly changing world of markets and machines. In 
educating their successors, Hanseats relied on the household in its widest sense, 
encompassing the far-flung family network as well as domestic employees. Thus, in 
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bringing up their children, Hanseats confirmed the mutual dependence of the household 
and the network of families. 
While the ethos that permeated the Hanseatic household united Bremen’s 
merchants with one another and with the larger world of Protestantism, it also established 
a boundary that separated Hanseats’ from other social groups. In interactions with the 
‘lesser sort’, Hanseats felt assured of their superior morality. In their minds, diligence, 
prudence, sobriety and modesty had not only contributed to their economic success, but 
also made them models of behavior for those who were not as fortunate. The family 
home, and the domestic life that filled it, embodied these social distinctions. 
Family, firm, and faith were initially united under one roof, that of the counting-
house. When Hanseats began to move their residences to the countryside in the second 
half of the century, they nevertheless insisted on the unbroken continuation of the 
harmony between the domestic sphere and the market place. Still, Hanseatic family 
homes were increasingly ostentatious, requiring a heightened ideological effort for 
maintaining the idea of undivided spheres of life governed by the same ethical principles. 
Up until the 1860s, however, Hanseats clung to their traditional ways that posited their 






In the winter of 1839, the ship Pauline, built for Meier & Co., was ready to leave 
the slipway. Lucy Meier had asked Gustav B. Schwab to contribute a poem for the ship's 
christening ceremony. His words provide a synthesis of morality and exchange in 
'Christian seafaring': 
 
Der, welcher ins Verborg'ne He who occludes 
Des Wassers Tiefen legt, The waters' depths 
Ist's, der auf seiner Rechten Is who almightily in his right hand  
Dies Haus allmächtig trägt. Carries this house. 
  
Er heftet ihm wie Flügel Like wings he pins 
Gefüllte Segel an; filled sails to it 
In seinem Botendienste As his messenger 
Furcht es den Ozean. It plows the ocean. 
  
Und so durch Wellenbrausen, Thus through the waves' raging 
Und so durch Wellenruh Thus through the waves' calm 
Führt es im Tausch die Schätze It carries treasures in exchange 
Getrennten Ländern zu. Between separate lands. 
  
Zu unsres Bremens Ehre, To our Bremen's honor, 
Zu Deiner Herren Glück, To your masters' gain, 
Mit schwerer Ladung scheide Leave with a heavy load, 
Mit schwerer komm zurück! And return with one again.150
 
 
 The ship is God’s messenger. Her errants have his blessing. He helps her weather 
the elements, his creation. Exchange between lands separated by oceans is a work worthy 
of divine support. It is, therefore, a Christian deed to facilitate this exchange. The glory 
obtained in accomplishing this deed reflects back on the community as honor, and only 
secondarily on the ship’s masters as gain. The commercial success of individual 
                                                 
150 Cited in: Hardegen, Friedrich, and Käthi Smidt, geb. Meier, H. H. Meier, der Gründer des 
Norddeutschen Lloyd. Lebensbild eines Bremer Kaufmanns, 1809-1898, Berlin and Leipzig 1920, p. 111. 
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merchants, and the honor of their state – the success of the political collective of 
Hanseatic merchants – reflect God’s blessing, earned for doing his work. 
 Schwab’s poem expresses the self-image of Hanseatic merchants. In their minds, 
their commercial activities answered a higher calling; and the community of Bremish 
merchants was the basis for their success and their beliefs. It may not be surprising to 
find merchants convinced that they are following a higher calling in going about their 
business. It takes some faith to commit one’s fortune to an uncertain fate aboard a sailing 
vessel, and in the market. At first sight, it may be more surprising to see Gustav B. 
Schwab, the Calvinist parson of the village of Gomaringen, located in the Kingdom of 
Württemberg, the hotbed of Southwest German anti-commercialism, endorse this 
Hanseatic view.151
Gustav B. Schwab was a family friend of the Meiers (see chapter 1). In 1839, 
Herman Henrich Meier II. had grown up to be an associate in the firm of Meier & Co., 
where the poet’s son, seventeen-year-old Gustav F. Schwab had, been an apprentice for a 
year. Hence, the christening ceremony of the Pauline would have been like a family 
reunion, bringing together Lucy Meier and Sophie and Gustav B. Schwab, as well as their 
grown children.152 Still, Gustav B. Schwab’s presence in Bremen in 1839 was not just a 
matter of accidental family connections. His poetic praise for Hanseatic commerce was 
not merely a service for old friendship’s sake. Between Württemberg and Bremen, there 
existed a broader connection, resting on, yet going beyond, a shared Calvinist faith. 
                                                 
151 Friedrich List, the father of national economy, was from Württemberg. In his attacks against the 
Hanseatic cities, contemporaries saw him as a spokesman for Southwestern manufacturers. See List, 
Friedrich, The National System of Political Economy, trns. Sampson S. Lloyd, London et.al. 1928 (1841); 
Etges, Andreas, Wirtschaftsnationalismus. USA und Deutschland im Vergleich (1815-1914), Frankfurt a. 
M. and New York 1999. 
152 Klüpfel, Karl [and Sophie], Gustav Schwab. Sein Leben und Wirken, Leipzig 1858, p. 125-126, 321-322. 
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 In his evening job as a poet, Schwab had by the time of the Pauline’s christening 
made a name for himself as one of the main exponents of the Swabian School of Poetry. 
His subjects were the landscape and culture of his native Swabia, the heart of 
Württemberg. While his piety alienated him from the radical liberals in the German 
literary world, Schwab was too much of a rationalist easily to be subsumed under the 
Romantic label, either. His translations of Classical Greek mythology into German, and 
from there into numerous other languages, remain standard versions of these texts to this 
day. His deep appreciation for the sophistication of these ancients, combined with the 
rigorously methodical theological training he had received in the seminary of Tübingen 
University – Hegel’s alma mater – imbued his faith with a reflexivity that was inimical to 
the Pietist reliance on the heart, alone. In this, Schwab’s version of the Calvinist creed 
harmonized with the variety one might find among Bremen’s elite.153
The friendship between the Schwabs and the Meiers shows that Bremen’s elite 
was a part of a specific, Calvinist segment of the larger world of the German educated 
bourgeoisie (Bildungsbürgertum). This Calvinist current, however, was not limited to 
Germany, but linked its members to fellow believers across the world. 
 
 
The Calvinist Axis 
 
Bremen and Württemberg were located on what one might call a Calvinist Axis 
that connected the scattered strongholds of this creed, and which included the Hanseatic 
Cities, the Principality of Schaumburg, Württemberg, parts of Northern Baden around 
Heidelberg, and much of Switzerland. Connections between Bremen and Württemberg 
                                                 
153 See Klüpfel, Gustav Schwab, which is a biography of Gustav Benjamin Schwab from the pen of his 
daughter and son-in-law. 
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were not exclusively based on this shared creed, but the shared creed facilitated a dense 
web of business, family, and educational ties. Württemberg was a major source of wine 
and emigrants, both essential items in Bremen’s shipping business. Hanseats who 
traveled to the Southwest might seek an education at Tübingen University, with its 
renowned faculties for Theology and Law. They might look for recreation in the Black 
Forest, on the highland of the Swabian Alb, or on the shores of Lake Constance. Bonds 
forged in commerce or education would last over generations, with families sending their 
children to Württemberg for their primary or academic education, or to Bremen for a 
mercantile apprenticeship. Württembergers who vacationed on the seashore might stop 
over in Bremen on their way. 
Senator John Meier and his daughters were frequent visitors to Württemberg. 
Conversely, whenever the Schwabs went to Bremen, visits with the various Meiers in 
town were always part of the program. 154 Judge C. W. Pauli of Lübeck had been friends 
with Gustav B. Schwab since their days in the Tübingen seminary in the 1810s. Pauli had 
known Sophie Schwab since before her marriage to Gustav B. Schwab, and remained 
friends with the family throughout his life. On several occasions in the 1850s, he visited 
Sophie Schwab, now widowed, and kept up an exchange of letters with her, sometimes 
sending her presents. Among those presents, the biography of Pauli's pious cousin, the 
Protestant reformer Amalie Sieveking, was Sophie Schwab's favorite.155
                                                 
154 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1857/08/02b, MSS 434, John Christopher Schwab 
Family Papers. Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, series I, box 2, folder 34; and Stuttgart 
1860/11/11, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 36. Sophie Schwab and Christoph Th. 
Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1861/04/09, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 37. 
Christoph Th. Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1859/09/28, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
2, folder 35. 
155 Klüpfel, Gustav Schwab, p. 31-37, 77, and 301; Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 
1857/08/02b and 1857/08/28, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 34; Stuttgart 1860/04/01, 
MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 36. 
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In other places along the Calvinist Axis, merchants’ biographies intersected, as 
well. During the Napoleonic Wars, C. W. Pauli’s family had lived in Bückeburg, the seat 
of government of Schaumburg. In the same town, young Gustav W. Lürman was a 
student in a boarding school in 1817. Decades later, Herman Henrich Meier (II.) was to 
represent the Principality in the German Reichstag.156 Neighboring Lippe-Detmold, with 
its fashionable spa of Pyrmont and its natural wonders was a meeting-place of German 
nobility and mercantile aristocracy during the summers.157
Personal friendships along the Calvinist Axis were not limited to the Schwabs and 
Meiers, but extended to other important Hanseatic families. The Vietor family in Bremen 
maintained close ties to the New York and Stuttgart Schwabs. Vietor & Co. were the 
main business partners of Schwab & Recknagel in New York, and frequently conveyed 
items sent as presents between the branches of the family as part of their regular 
shipments to and from the U.S., which included emigrants from Württemberg.158 When 
the Vietors traveled to Stuttart in 1857, they attend the German Protestant Convention 
(Kirchentag) in that city, a gathering bringing together reformers from all regional 
protestant churches, but heavily influenced by the Calvinist creed.159 The house of 
Noltenius in Bremen, likewise, was involved in varied exchanges along the Calvinist 
Axis. Like the Vietors, they facilitated transactions between New York and Stuttgart, and 
                                                 
156 Klüpfel, Gustav Schwab, p. 31 and 37; Gustav Wilhelm Lürman to Charlotte Lürman, n.d. [1817], folder 
“1817-1865, n.d.; Gustav[us] [W.] Lürman – Correspondence”, box 1, MdHS MS.541; Hardegen/Smidt, H. 
H. Meier, p. 224. 
157 Möller, Kurt Detlev, “Zur Politik der Hansestädte im Jahre 1806,” in: Zeitschrift des Vereins für 
Hamburgische Geschichte, vol. 41 (1951) (=Festschrift für H. Reincke), p. 330-352; Lippe, Pauline, Fürstin 
zur, Eine Fürstin unterwegs. Reisetagebücher der Fürstin Pauline zur Lippe, 1799-1818, edited by 
Hermann Niebuhr (=Lippische Geschichtsquellen, vol. 19), Detmold 1990. 
158 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1857/08/28, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 34; Stuttgart 1858/04/03, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 35. 
159 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1857/10/17-19, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
2, folder 34. 
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went to both places for vacation, education, and business. When Sophie Klüpfel, Sophie 
Schwab’s daughter, traveled to the North Sea to reconvalesce after a lengthy illness, she 
availed herself of this established network, paying a visit to the Noltenius' in Bremen, 
before journeying on to the island of Norderney, where she stayed in a guest-house 
recommended by one of the Vietors' daughters, and run by a pastor’s widow.160
 But Calvinism was not limited to Germany. Abroad, Hanseats found fellow 
believers across the Atlantic World. Like their pious eighteenth-century predecessors, 
Hanseats considered this ocean as “the great Sea of Protestant Industry,” where Bremen’s 
ships were on the same mission as their Scottish, Dutch, and New England sisters.161 
Thus, Hanseats’ beliefs connected them to a transatlantic space just as much as it made 
them a part of the German educated bourgeoisie. Like their vessels, whom the Lord 
carried in his right hand, so the network of Hanseatic families relied on a religious basis 
to give meaning and strength to their personal and public endeavors. They found this 
basis in Calvinism, whose global extent conveniently matched that of their business 
interests. Families and firms were intertwined through numerous connections between 
different kinship networks, and ships connecting ports on two continents carried the 
cargo that built the economic foundation of these networks. Hanseats infused the entirety 
of these personal and public links with religious meaning.  
Family ties played a particularly central role in the world that Hanseats made. 
Marriage was expressly charged with religious significance; intermarriage was a major 
tool of pooling capital resources; and family life was the location in which a 
                                                 
160 For this and further examples, see: Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1860/02/26, 
1860/04/01, and 1860/06/29-30; Niedernau 1860/06/22 (folder 36); Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, 
Stuttgart 1861/04/09 and 1861/05/09 (folder 37), MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder as 
indicated. 
161 Kiesselbach, Wilhelm, Der Gang des Welthandels im Mittelalter, Bremen 1860. 
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comprehensive ideology linking families, firms, and faith was constantly recreated in the 




Mothers, Sisters, and Wives 
Kinship, friendship, and business interest overlapped to provide multiple 
connections between Hanseats in Bremen, Baltimore, and New York. Memories of a 
childhood or an apprenticeship shared in Bremen, refreshed by correspondence, trade, or 
joint summer vacations, formed a strong bond among the male heads of Hanseatic firms. 
Nevertheless, women played a central role in establishing and maintaining the ties 
between Hanseatic families – unmarried Albert Schumacher tended to drop off the social 
map for prolonged periods of time (see chapter 1). 
 Marriage helped to cement and rejuvenate Hanseatic family networks. Men 
apparently could more easily marry outside of Hanseatic society, especially if the 
connections they established brought with them added opportunities for trade. Hanseatic 
women seemed more likely to marry a young man already recruited into the network as 
an apprentice or associate. Whether his background had originally been a Hanseatic one 
seemed secondary. The five or more years spent in the counting-house during a formative 
time of any man’s life would have given him a sufficiently Hanseatic socialization. It 
would be misguided, however, to conclude that women played a subordinate role in 
Hanseatic family life. As guardians of existing family ties, and as those who established 
new ones, women had a centrally important role to fill. 
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 An astonishing number of Hanseats lost their fathers at an early age. Hermann 
Henrich Meier’s father died in 1821, when his son was eleven years old.162 Gustav 
Lürman lost his father in 1816, at the tender age of seven.163 Rudolf Schleiden could 
almost count himself lucky to have grown to age eighteen by the time his father died in 
distant Mexico in 1833, though, at that point, father and son had not seen each other in 
over two years.164 Eleven-year-old Laurence Henry von Post was orphaned in 1839. He 
and his four sisters were left to the care of their grandmother.165 As men worked 
themselves to an early death in mercantile professions, the importance of mothers grew 
beyond the task of bringing up sons and daughters, to include the burden of keeping 
together a family and its fortune. This burden included maintaining ties with other 
families, and assuring a smooth succession at the head of the family firm.166
Even when their husbands were still alive, relations between mothers linked 
different families with each other, cementing connections among Hanseatic merchants in 
Bremen, Baltimore and New York. For example, the mother and sister of Julius Wilkens 
were friends with the mother of Johann Stellmann, co-owner of the house of Stellmann & 
Hinrichs in Baltimore. Eleonore Wilkens wrote to her brother: “I visited Madame 
                                                 
162 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 10. 
163 Hirschfeld, George W., genealogical overview to “Stephan Lürman, Brief an meine Kinder aus 2. Ehe 
(1813),” typescript 1977, unmarked, orange binder, StAHB 7,128, Lürman [family papers], box 3. 
164 Schleiden, Rudolph, Jugenderinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners, Wiesbaden 1886, p. 84-85, 146, 
and 171-173. It took three months for the news of his father’s death to reach Schleiden. Apparently, he only 
had a chance to visit the grave in 1853. 
165 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, New York 1898, p. 32. 
166 The prevalence of financially independent widows in the larger circles of the German bourgeoisie is 
suggested by the story of Rosa Sutro, mother of Otto and Emma Sutro (see chapter 1). After the death of 
her husband, a textile manufacturer in Aachen, in the Prussian Rhineland, Rosa Sutro took he children to 
Baltimore, where she apparently ran a business as a textile importer. Scharf, J. Thomas, History of 
Baltimore City & County, 2 vols., Philadelphia 1881, vol. 2, p. 673-674. 
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Stellmann. They have a nice house on Kohlhökerstraße.”167  Madame Stellmann was 
apparently part of a larger circle of women. Johann Georg Graue wrote to his brother, 
Heinrich Hermann, in 1856 that their mother, Mrs. Stellmann, and Mrs. Hinrichs planned 
to travel to Baltimore together to visit their sons and their families. This circle of 
matriarchs in Bremen thus established a link between at least four of the Hanseatic firms 
in Baltimore.168
Considering their importance for keeping the family together, whether or not their 
husbands were still alive, the presence of strong and independent women in Bremish 
circles was not surprising. Widowed in 1821, Lucy Meier was typical for a Hanseatic 
lady of her house. She had entered her marriage to Herman Henrich Meier (I.) with a 
substantial endowment that contributed to the initial capital stock of H. H. Meier & Co.. 
As was customary, the spouses' stakes in the business were kept separate by prenuptial 
agreement. The older H. H. Meier was in charge of day-to-day business decisions, but we 
can assume that he would have considered his wife's opinion before making major 
investments.169
After her husband's death, full control over her capital reverted back to Lucy 
Meier. Other merchants' widows before her had been known to run a counting-house, 
themselves, while the sons were not yet of age. In the Meiers' case, the oldest son, 
                                                 
167 Eleonore to Julius Wilkens, Bremen 1862/12/19, MdHS MS.439. Cunz, Germania Club, p. 7. 
Kohlhökerstraße was one of the first addresses in the new suburbs. See the discussion on p. 123-137, 
below, and the map “Bremen, 1850.” 
168 Johann Georg to Heinrich Hermann Graue, 5.14.1856, Graue, Heinrich H., fl. 1834-1871, Papers, 1834-
1871, MdHS MS.2826, box 4. These firms were Stellmann & Hinrichs, Wilkens & Geyer, Graue & Co., 
and Wilkens & Niemann, and possibly further ventures by other relatives. On Stellmann, see Scharf, J. 
Thomas, History of Baltimore City & County, 2 vols., Philadelphia 1881, vol. 1, p. 417-418. 
169 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 10. 
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Hermann Henrich, was years from reaching his twenty-first birthday. Lucy Meier kept 
her late husband's associate, Johann Helfrich Adami, in charge of the firm.170
While leaving counting-house operations to Adami, Lucy Meier stayed in control 
of hiring policies for H. H. Meier & Co.. To decide who became an apprentice meant to 
control who would become an associate. By keeping these choices to herself, Lucy Meier 
made sure not to yield influence over the future direction of the firm to Adami, whose 
own sons might otherwise have risen within its ranks. One way of keeping her sway over 
the firm was to pick an apprentice from a family with no prior mercantile interests of its 
own, but with a background that guaranteed the young man’s sound morality. In 1829, 
when visiting the Schwabs in Stuttgart, Lucy Meier offered that if they picked one of 
their sons for a mercantile career, she would ensure that he would be trained alongside 
her own sons in Adami’s counting-house. The choice fell on six-year-old Gustav F. 
Schwab.171 Almost three decades later, when Gustav F. Schwab was made a partner in the 
firm of Oelrichs & Co. in New York, his mother, Sophie Schwab, wrote that "this would 
have been to the wishes of Madame Meier, and she may already have foreseen this, when 
she called you to Bremen."172
In 1836, when Lucy Meier's own son, Hermann Henrich, then an employee of the 
firm, wanted to have himself transferred from Boston to New York, he lobbied his 
mother, rather than Adami. Meier and Adami, however, agreed that the young man – then 
twenty-seven years old – was not yet ready for the big city. He had recently lost 
significant amounts speculating in land in the American West, and his mother had used 
                                                 
170 The firm of “Johann Lange’s Son’s Widow & Co.” (Joh. Lange Sohns Wittwe & Co.) is a case in point. 
Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 35. 
171 Klüpfel, Karl, Gustav Schwab. Sein Leben und Wirken, Leipzig 1858, p. 126. 
172 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Tübingen 1858/10/22, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 35. 
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her own funds to cover these losses. While designated as the future head of the firm, 
H. H. Meier had yet to arrive at a point where he was deemed experienced enough to be 
put in charge of business at the most important American port. Lucy Meier wanted to be 
certain that her heir would indeed be a conscientious caretaker of the family business. 
Perhaps the choice of young Gustav F. Schwab, son of her closest friend, was meant as 
an insurance for the case that her own Herman Henrich did not turn out as desired, and 
failed to shed his proclivity for haughtiness and recklessness. 
Trusting her son more blindly, Sophie Schwab entrusted her fortune to Gustav F. 
Schwab, then in New York.173 Annually, Gustav Schwab would send his mother a bill of 
exchange over the amount earned on her capital. At the same time, Sophie Schwab kept 
an account in Stuttgart in her son's name. Occasionally, she used these funds to settle his 
accounts with others in the area. Every year, she purchased with her son's money a supply 
of Württemberg wine to be sent to the U.S..174 On one occasion, she pointed out an 
opportunity to buy up a whole cellar full of wine at low cost from a vintner who had to 
make room for the upcoming harvest.175 As she was not from a merchant family herself, 
her control over the mercantile business was miniscule. Repeatedly, she had to urge 
Gustav to disclose where he had invested her funds.176 Still, her involvement in some 
business transactions speaks to a certain degree of independence in financial matters. 
 
                                                 
173 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1859/01/16, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 35. 
174 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, n.P. 1859/11/xx and Stuttgart 1859/03/23-24, MSS 434, Schwab 
Papers, series I, box 2, folder 35. 
175 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1860/06/29-30, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
2, folder 36. 
176 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1859/01/16 and 1859/02/12, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, 
series I, box 2, folder 35; and Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1861/01/07, MSS 434, 
Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 36. 
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 Financial independence gave women among the German elites choices for their 
careers and partnerships. While they would be expected to marry, they could often hope 
for financial independence as a single woman. In 1859, when it appeared that their sister 
Emmy would remain unmarried, Sophie Schwab asked her other children for permission 
to give her a larger share of the inheritance, "so that after my death Emmy will be secure 
and can live independently with a maid. The dear grandfather had the measure that a girl 
of our kind can live independently on a capital of 12,000 fl[orint]. I think under current 
conditions 16,000 fl[orint]. would be needed."177
 
 
                                                 
177 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1859/05/08, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 35. 
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Hanseatic Women and the Family Fortune 
 Both in Germany and in the U.S., where women had gained more rights to 
financial independence in marriage, Hanseatic marriages were usually accompanied by 
prenuptial agreements.178 Even absent such agreements, families made sure that their 
daughters would retain some financial independence in marriage. For example, Frances 
Donnell Lürman, Gustav Lürman’s wife, kept her estate separate from his in their 
marriage.179 Eliza Schwab, neé von Post, on the other hand, abandoned full control over 
her dowry to her husband, Gustav F. Schwab – in spite of her pure Hanseatic lineage. 
Nevertheless, Schwab saw to it that the women of the family would not lose control over 
their share of the family fortune. In his will, Schwab stipulated that his wife, if she should 
survive him, was to benefit from the income on his estate. Not Eliza, but the executors of 
the estate, however, were to take charge of investment decisions. These executors were to 
be Eliza Schwab's brother, Hermann Caspar von Post, and sons, Gustav Henry and 
Hermann Caspar Schwab. After Eliza Schwab's death, the inheritance was to be divided 
per stirpes among their children. For his daughters, Schwab prescribed "that the portion 
of my property and estate which may go under this will to any female is to be for her own 
sole and separate use, free from control of any husband," following the standard usage of 
Hanseats.180 Eliza Schwab’s abandonment of her control over her dowry was thus an 
exception to the rule. Perhaps the early death of her parents had reduced her bargaining 
power in negotiating the terms of the marriage.181
                                                 
178 Chused, Richard H., "Married Women's Property Law, 1800-1850," Georgetown 
Law Journal, vol. 71, no. 5 (June 1983), p. 1359-1426. See also Hartog, Hendrik, Man and Wife in 
America. A History, Cambridge, Mass 2000. 
179 See chapter 1. 
180 Gustav F. Schwab, Will, New York 1877/04/18, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 61. 
181 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 32. 
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Marriage arrangements between families further confirmed women in their 
relatively independent role, in that they were rarely made between patriarchs, or even 
matriarchs. Rather than having to consent to marriages of utility, women were expected 
to choose a partner they loved, and to reject those they did not. Sophie Schwab 
sympathized with her nephew, Adolph, whose fiancée broke up their engagement, 
because she felt that "he was not elegant and worldly enough" for her.182 At the same 
time, if love served to further the family fortune, this was considered an added benefit. 
When H. H. Meier's brother, Judge Diedrich Meier, died, another brother of theirs, 
Senator John Meier, married the widow, Meta, a move that helped to consolidate the 
family fortune, and that was approved by the family and its friends.183
 These gender arrangements were rarely discussed in public as long as they could 
be taken for granted. Hanseats simply seemed to assume that their wives would be 
financially independent, and created the legal conditions to this end. Germanic (common) 
law, which assumed coverture and joint property (Gütergemeinschaft) under the control 
of the husband, did not recognize prenuptial agreements that established separate estates. 
Yet, in Bremen, they were legalized under provisions borrowed from Roman law.184 
While prenuptial agreements remained heavily regulated and had even been officially 
discouraged by Bremish law since 1754, in practice were the norm in mercantile 
marriages.185
                                                 
182 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1857/08/02b, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 34. 
183 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1858/08/01, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 35. 
184 Schnelle, Albert, Bremen und die Entstehung des allgemeinen deutschen Handelsgesetzbuches (1856 - 
1864) (=Wilhelm Lührs, ed., Veröffentlichungen aus dem Staatsarchiv der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, vol. 
57), Bremen 1992, p. 112-114, and notes 234, 237, and 238 to these pages. 
185 Schnelle, Handelsgesetzbuch, p. 112-114, and notes 234, 237, and 238 to these pages. In many 
instances, local law under the old Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was drafted officially to 
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 Hanseats valued the independence of the women of their estate as a part of their 
traditional practices. The basis of their economic activities was the household, 
encompassing the counting-house and country-home in an arrangement between the 
genders that did not yet draw a clear line between a male, public and a female, private 
sphere. In this world of intertwined families and firms, women had more power than 
under a modern regime of legal codes based on the person as a subject of rights, which 
limited women’s claims to personal rights. 
The modernization of law implemented by German legal reformers in the mid-
nineteenth century tended to grant equal rights to males, while abolishing the ancient 
privileges that had benefited elite women. In early 1863, a bill to make the new German 
Commercial Code (Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch, ADHGB) part of 
Bremish law was before the Bürgerschaft (the legislature).186 The Handelskammer - the 
official organ of the mercantile estate – initially embraced the new legal foundation for 
business transactions, because it would standardize procedures across the different 
German states, facilitating trade with the hinterland.187 When Hanseats realized that the 
new code threatened existing gender arrangements, however, they adamantly defended 
                                                                                                                                                 
comply with Reich standards, while local jurisdiction would continue to follow traditional practice, creating 
a wide divergence between the text and the reality of the law. A well-known example is the 
Reichshandwerksordnung of 1734, which was intended to curb the power of guilds, and was frequently 
sabotaged by local courts and authorities. The same might have applied to Bremish marital law, considering 
that the 1754 law followed a Reich mandate to curb female financial independence. See Stürmer, Michael, 
ed., Herbst des Alten Handwerks. Meister, Gesellen, und Obrigkeit im 18. Jahrhundert, München 1986; 
Grießinger, Andreas, and Reinhold Reith, “Obrigkeitliche Ordnungskonzeptionen und handwerkliches 
Konfliktverhalten im 18. Jahrhundert. Nürnberg und Würzburg im Vergleich,” in: Elkar, Rainer S., ed., 
Deutsches Handwerk in Spätmittelalter und Früher Neuzeit (=Göttinger Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialgeschichte, vol. 9), Göttingen 1983, p. 117-180. 
186 Schnelle, Handelsgesetzbuch, for the history of this work of law. Drafted by a committee convened by 
the Germanic Confederation, this law, like all laws emanating from this loose political framework, had to 
be made into law by the states, and would not automatically take effect in any state that did not adapt it. 
187 While ‘Handelskammer’ technically translates as ‘Chamber of Commerce’, the German original seems 
more appropriate to be used, since the English term, especially in its American context, fails to convey the 
corporatist connotation and medieval origins of the Bremish body. For a detailed discussion of the 
institutions of Bremen’s government and their respective roles, see chapter 3. 
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the financial independence of the female members of their estate, framing their position 
as an appeal to the protection of orphans and widows. 
One of the key innovations inscribed throughout the proposed Commercial Code 
was the idea of the corporation as a natural person. In Bremish law, as in all countries 
under simple Roman law or common Germanic law, only individuals could own 
property. Under the old laws, the capital a merchant invested in his firm remained 
indistinguishable from his private funds.188 As a consequence, a widow or an orphan 
would inherit the entirety of a deceased husband's or father's property, including any part 
invested in a mercantile business. Moreover, funds that had been brought into a marriage 
by a wife, and kept separate from her husband's fortune in a prenuptial agreement, would 
revert to her in the case of her husband's death, even if her capital had been invested in 
his firm.189
The modern legal construct of the corporation called into question existing 
arrangements between the genders. Under the new commercial code, capital invested in a 
business became the property of that abstract entity, the corporation-as-natural person; 
and was no longer at the unconditional disposal of the original investor, an actual person. 
Creditors could directly hold the corporation accountable for its debts, and did not have 
to rely on the solvency of any of its owners. More importantly, according to the new law, 
creditors' claims preceded heirs' claims to corporate funds. If a deceased merchant had 
left behind a failed company, his widow would have no way of rescuing her funds from 
                                                 
188 Schnelle, Handelsgesetzbuch, p. 90-122, especially p. 91-92. 
189 Schnelle, Handelsgesetzbuch, p. 209-216 
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the remaining assets of the company. Instead, any proceeds from assets would first have 
to be employed to pay off creditors.190
 
The Senat, which had at first wholeheartedly supported the new Commercial 
Code, reversed its position once its members realized the full implications of the new 
idea of the corporation.191 In its ultimate statement against an unaltered implementation of 
the Code, the Senat based its case on an argument in favor of traditional marriage 
arrangements:  
 
In considering our peculiar social circumstances and legal institutions, the Senat cannot 
consider the introduction of that principle, which holds that a commercial association 
owns its particular funds as a corporation; nor that of the consequences that follow from 
this principle, as well-advised.  If this principle is introduced, it will impair the inner 
conditions and the well-being of families and their fortunes. (...) It will annul rights 
whose abolition may, in the case of bankruptcies, cause the loss of entire fortunes. This 
principle, therefore, has to be removed [from the Code].192
  
 By the early 1860s, many leading Hanseats had become convinced that a 
modernization of Bremen’s legal system was a necessity. Creating compatible standards 
throughout the area in which they did business was a matter of staying competitive. The 
new model of the corporation promised to ease the recovery of outstanding debt from a 
failed company, adding a measure of accountability beyond the trust in a person’s good 
name. These considerations had driven the initial approval among mercantile 
representatives in the Handelskammer and the Senat. It was for the same reasons that H. 
                                                 
190 Schnelle, Handelsgesetzbuch, p. 112-115. 
191 The Senat was Bremen’s executive body. To avoid confusion with the United States legislative body of 
the same name, the word will be italicized when referring to Bremen. 
192 Cited from: Schnelle, Albert, Bremen und die Entstehung des allgemeinen deutschen 
Handelsgesetzbuches (1856 - 1864) (=Wilhelm Lührs, ed., Veröffentlichungen aus dem Staatsarchiv der 
Freien Hansestadt Bremen, vol. 57), Bremen 1992, p. 208-209.  
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H. Meier favored the principle of the corporation-as-natural person in his speeches in the 
Bürgerschaft, and that a majority of that body was willing to follow his lead.193
In spite of a widely held conviction among Hanseats that the international 
standardization of laws was good for business, many merchants were willing to put 
family fortunes first. The Senat's veto against the Bürgerschaft’s endorsement of the new 
commercial code gave voice to these reservations. It took another year of negotiations 
between the two organs, until the spring of 1864, before a compromise was reached that 
made it possible to accommodate Hanseats’ conflicting desires.194
 The resulting law introduced the new idea of the corporation into Bremish law, in 
principle, while allowing for a continuation of the customary gender arrangements, in 
particular. §§16 and 52 of the law that implemented the Commercial Code in Bremen 
created two groups of private debtors who were defined as privileged claimants on 
corporate funds, children and wives. The capital that had been brought into a corporation 
by a man who did not own this capital, but merely held it in trust for a wife or child, was 
to be identified in the books, and to be treated as separate from the total funds of the 
corporation for purposes of inheritance.195
 This compromise established the corporation-as-natural person in Bremish law. 
The one item it salvaged from the old legal tradition was the peculiar gender arrangement 
that ensured the independent role of merchants' wives. If those merchants who had 
initially supported the unaltered introduction of the new commercial code had been 
categorically opposed to a continuation of the traditional gender arrangements, this 
compromise would not have possible. The outcome of the legislative process thus 
                                                 
193 Ibid, p. 195-213. 
194 Schnelle, Handelsgesetzbuch, p. 212-217. 
195 Schnelle, Handelsgesetzbuch, p. 214-215. 
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suggests that, even as many Hanseats began to advocate a departure from the accustomed 
ways of their estate, a majority of them was so committed to the traditional gender 
arrangements that they were willing to incur a competitive disadvantage by blocking a 
standardization of German law, if this was necessary to save women’s financial 
independence. 
Twentieth-century commentators and scholars of German law have denounced 
this compromise as contradictory and exceptional, since it failed to carry through the 
principle of the modern corporation, purely. Albert Schnelle, on whose work this account 
of the legal tradition of Bremish commercial law and the principles of the new German 
Commercial Code rests, faults the Senat for "entirely ignoring economic considerations, 
which would have had to favor a separation of [private and company] funds." Somewhat 
puzzled by his discovery, Schnelle found that what he regarded as an extra-economic 
consideration was paramount in the eyes of many Hanseats: the family fortune; and 
especially the welfare of widows and orphans.196
 Counter to this somewhat teleological account of legal modernization, which 
perceives the introduction of the corporation-as-natural person as a logical and necessary 
step to a rational economic order, and thus as an innovation that merchants ought to have 
viewed as serving their best interest, Hanseats' experience led them to attribute central 
importance to the family as a key institution for their economic success. Their ardent 
defense of the specific legal arrangements that defined the traditional relations between 
husbands and wives in their domestic life – most of all prenuptial agreements – was thus 
                                                 
196 Schnelle, Handelsgesetzbuch, p. 209. On p. 114, note 237, Schnelle acknowledges that marriage was an 
economic act, yet fails to apply this insight in the main body of his text, and contradicts it throughout the 
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not driven by extra-economic considerations. Rather, it reflected a different definition of 
the economy – one that operated from the basis of the household; not from the logic of a 
purely profit-maximizing individual. 
 
In the larger picture of international legal development, Hanseats’ defense of their 
peculiar family arrangements was a battle of retreat. But it was nevertheless a battle 
tradition-minded Hanseats wished to pick. Considering the ubiquity of the practice of 
prenuptial agreements, the contribution of women to their husband's firm, and the ties 
between families established by the transfer of capital into newly-formed marriages, we 
can conclude that the specific arrangement between the genders in Hanseatic families was 
somewhere very near the core of their social identity. After all, marriage was what 
connected families and firms. The nexus of family and fortune, moreover, invested 
business with a certain moral quality arguably lacking from the depersonalized 
corporation that legally personifies capital in the abstract. Hanseats did not think of 
themselves as mere agents of the 'automatic subject', capital, but as providers of a public 
good. Families not only bundled and focused capital streams, but did the same for the 




Husband and Wife in the Christian family 
Family ties played a crucial economic role for Hanseats, and women played a 
central part in perpetuating the household as an economic unit. At the same time, 
marriage, and the gender arrangements within the family, established an indispensable 
moral household. In Hanseats’ minds, the respectability and independence of husbands 
and wives – their moral and economic existence alike – rested on a shared faith, and on 
the sanctity of the bonds of marriage which it tied. For Hanseats, the family as an 
economic unit and the family as a bulwark of faith were one and the same. 
The idea of marriage as a sacred compact against original sin, which they shared 
with fellow Reformed Protestants, was one of the corner-stones of Hanseats' morality. 
Gustav B. Schwab, the poet, summed up the function of marriage in a letter to his future 
wife, Sophie, in 1817: 
My temperament will certainly never leave me alone; I think, however, that when one is 
united in an honest striving towards heaven – when one reads together in the Holy 
Scripture, when one prays together daily – that then, one might be too ashamed, on the 
very same day that one solemnly practiced those holy acts together, to submit oneself to 
sin, to anger, to fervor, or to other passions.197
 
 Gustav F. Schwab shared his father's take on marriage. His letters to his wife, 
Eliza, breathe the spirit of the poet's words. They bespeak a constant, conscious struggle 
with temptations; a struggle fought and won in each instance in the name of the spouses' 
joint commitment to Christian morality. 
 After a few months of business travel through Italy, where he had often felt 
strangely enchanted by the pagan art of Classical cultures, Schwab turned his steps back 
North. As he was returning within the orbit of Protestantism, he reassured himself and his 
wife of the firmness of his Christian convictions: 
                                                 
197 Gustav B. Schwab to Sophie Gmelin, n.P. 1817, quoted in Klüpfel, Gustav Schwab, p. 89-90. 
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Today, I took part in the Lord's Supper in the Lutheran church here [in Venice]. I much 
regretted that once again you and I could not enjoy the Holy Communion on this Holiday 
[Easter], together. (...) After so much diversion it is edifying to collect one's mind; and 
before this spiritual nourishment, all the enjoyment of the arts pales as a weak likeness of 
eternal beauty and truth. I am glad that you, too, will take communion tomorrow, and I 
hope it will be a blessing for both of us, and that next time we can celebrate it together all 
the more joyfully.198
 
Like his father, Gustav F. Schwab considered Christianity a bond between 
husband and wife, and marriage a bond between man and his God. These bonds were all 
the more necessary, since mankind, and the educated bourgeoisie in particular, had 
enjoyed the apple of ancient art and learning – while more dangerous varieties of produce 
were within their reach: 
 
Der neueste Sündenfall The New Fall from Grace 
Du arme Menschheit wie mir graut Poor humanity, how I dread 
Vor deinem bösen Gestirne: your bad star: 
Kaum hast du den alten Apfel verdaut, You only just digested the old apple, 
So beißest Du in die Birne. 
 
and now you bite into the pear. 
(Gustav B. Schwab)199  
 
 
Still, marriage did not necessarily imply a submission of wives to husbands. 
Rather, Christianity suggested to Hanseats that men and women jointly submit to a 
specific morality. On that basis, there was a proper role for independent women, as well. 
The conditions and boundaries of this independence were defined by the values Hanseats 
shared with other Reformed Protestants, both in Germany and abroad. 
                                                 
198 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Venice 1856/03/20, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, 
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Like his fellow Hanseats, Gustav F. Schwab belonged to the larger sphere of the 
Reformed Protestant bourgeoisie. For Schwab, his father’s prominence in that sphere 
might have made him more eloquent in expressing the values Hanseats shared with their 
fellow believers. The multiple ties between Hanseats and other Calvinists suggest that he 
was not alone in holding these values. 
In the world of the predominantly Protestant German Bildungsbürgertum, some 
women could make an independent living, for example as authors or teachers. Sophie 
Klüpfel, née Schwab, Gustav F.'s sister, was the primary author of the biography of their 
father, the poet Gustav B. Schwab. The sales of this book helped to augment her 
husband's meager salary as a professor.200  
Through her late husband, Sophie Schwab was acquainted with many female 
writers of her time, and commented on their works in her letters. For example, she 
condemned what she saw as the moral laxity of Ludmilla Assing's works. Assing’s 
edition of the spicy letters exchanged between two major figures of the German 
Enlightenment, Alexander von Humboldt and her uncle, K. A. Varnhagen von Ense, was 
a best-seller. Proceeds from its sale provided Assing with the income necessary to sit out 
an arrest warrant for indecency in a comfortable exile in Florence. By contrast, Sophie 
Schwab highly praised Amalie Sieveking's autobiography. The vita of this Hanseatic 
philanthropist, who founded the German order of Protestant nurses, left Sophie Schwab 
with a "delightful resonance" of its deeply Christian spirit.201
                                                 
200 Klüpfel, Gustav Schwab, while published under her husbands name, is identified by Sophie Schwab as 
authored by her daughter, see Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1857/03/21, MSS 434, 
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201 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1860/04/01, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
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 To the Schwabs, independence alone was not a sign of moral laxity in a woman; 
nor did Christian morality preclude female independence. Both Ludmilla Assing and 
Amalie Sieveking were outspoken activists in matters of morality and social policy who 
sought to shape the role of women in Germany. But they did so from opposing 
ideological points of view, one committed to the German Enlightenment, the other to a 
pious Calvinism. Not their independence and activism, but the content of their 
philosophy, was the criterion by which Sophie Schwab judged them.  
 Incidentally, the condemnation Mrs. Schwab passed on secular liberals was not 
limited to women. Even Friedrich Schiller, the literary national hero, was found lacking 
in his moral convictions: "Reading the Bible is something different from, and not as 
corrosive as, these philosophical statements," Sophie Schwab found, when pondering 
whether Schiller's writings were appropriate fare for her grown daughter.202
 
Gustav Schwab followed his mother's line. His view of women's rights was 
founded in, and limited by, his Protestant world-view. For example, on a journey through 
Italy in 1856, he and his travel companions refused to visit several Catholic convents 
when learning that women were barred from entry.203 On two separate occasions during 
that journey, he encountered two women who were similar in that they traveled alone. 
Yet only one of them drew his ire for that sin. This was Frau von Succow, an 
acquaintance he successfully avoided meeting in Genoa, knowing she was in that city at 
                                                                                                                                                 
folder 36. Ottilie, Ludmilla Assing’s sister, was the mistress of the American abolitionist, Frederick 
Douglas. Ottilie Assing and Gustav Schwab drew their sympathies for abolitionism from opposing sources, 
the former from the Enlightenment, the latter from Calvinism. Sophie Schwab also liked the writings of 
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202 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1859/03/23-24, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
2, folder 35. 
203 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Naples/Rome 1856/02/29, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
1, folder 32. 
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the same time as he. On a pleasure trip to Italy, her carriage had overturned on a road in 
Switzerland. Rather than compassion, this incident elicited a reprimand from Schwab: 
"That woman can consider herself fortunate if nothing worse than [the accident] happens 
to her, roaming about unaccompanied, as she is. ... I heard quite a few [other] things 
about her that prove that she isn't in her right mind."204
The other single lady he encountered, on the other hand, had Gustav Schwab's 
enthusiastic approval. Dorothea Dix's moral credentials were impeccable, since she was a 
well-known social reformer in the U.S., and her unaccompanied journey through Europe 
was justified as undertaken in her cause of the humane treatment of the insane. In the 
account of Helen Marshall, one of Dix's biographers, "she carried with her no letters of 
introduction but was always fortunate in meeting some person who would give her the 
assistance which she desired. ‘You will not be more surprised than I am that I find 
traveling alone perfectly easy,’ she wrote American friends."205 She even refused the 
service of a maid, whether for assistance or company, writing that “a maid would only be 
in the way, with nothing to do; (…) I never felt desolate in my life, and I have been much 
alone in both populous and thinly-settled countries.”206
Apparently, Dix’s sturdy self-sufficiency impressed Schwab, who also voiced 
support for Dix's cause. Only his slight sarcasm betrayed a sense of unease that a woman 
should play such a prominent political role. Schwab wrote to his wife: 
 
I have made another interesting acquaintance, an American lady who revealed to me 
today that she is the well-known Miss Dix, who has done so much good for the insane 
                                                 
204 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Livorno/Milan 1856/03/12, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
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asylums in America, and who effected that the last Congress appropriated 10 Million 
dollars for such institutions. 
In Rome, she pestered the Pope, because she found his insane asylums in a despicable 
state, and now, after having pressed hard the authorities here [in Austria], she is traveling 
to Constantinople.207
 
While otherwise Schwab was concerned that women should not travel without 
company, he chose not to mention to his wife that Miss Dix was likewise guilty of that 
sin. Perhaps he shared the sentiment of a Washington, D.C. politician who praised 
Dorothea Dix as "a woman’s rights woman worth having, going in for their rights in the 
right way."208 He may also have been eager to avoid the impression that he was granting a 
stranger what he refused to his own wife, who was staying at his mother's home in 
Stuttgart with their children, and to whom he had written a few days earlier: "Concerning 
your meeting me in Munich on my way back, (...) you can take along one or more female 
companions on our account, so that you do not have to make the journey on your own."209
 
 Married or not, Hanseatic women were judged by their respectability. The criteria 
that defined 'respectability' were largely the same for both genders. Financial 
independence underlay a merchant's honor, while it did not diminish the honor of his 
widow or daughter. To know one's place was indispensable, even if the correct places for 
men and women differed. A solid Christian morality further supported claims to honor, 
independent of gender. In the case of moral reformers like Dix or Sieveking, women with 
strong Christian credentials could redefine their proper place, to include high places in 
state and society. They could not become burgomaster or Pope, but they deserved being 
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heard by the burgomaster and the Pope. Women like Succow and Assing, who lacked a 
higher calling to legitimize their independence, had to expect nothing but scorn.  
While Hanseats expected women to seek the protection of god or of their 
husband, they enjoyed considerable leeway within these boundaries. Moreover, men 
likewise had to submit to the moral authority of deity and wife, not just of their male 
peers, in their commercial and other public pursuits. Women passed from generation to 
generation not only the fortunes that made Hanseatic success, but also the values that 




 Upholding Hanseatic morality was a mutual affair between the genders. It fell to 
Hanseatic women to enforce in their husbands and sons the moral standards that would 
keep them on the righteous path in their commercial dealings. Commerce was not 
traditionally a highly-valued activity in Christian morality. Hanseats had to reconcile 
their economic activities with their sense of morality embodied in the family. This 
successful reconciliation was what created a specifically mercantile value system, 
integrating family, faith, and firm. Two core notions underpinned this reconciliation; a 
profession that God gave and took success in business, and a corresponding sense of 
humility in the face of one's growing wealth, exhibited chiefly by renouncing excessive 
enjoyment thereof. 
 Most often, the enforcement of this commercial code of honor fell to mothers and 
wives. More than once, Sophie Schwab reminded her son that "poor or rich is, even for 
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this life, not the most important thing; because where contentment is lacking, the 
outwardly goods of fortune are often of little use."210 Gustav Schwab's sister, Sophie 
Klüpfel, likewise, emphasized the happiness "inside the family" over worldly fortune in a 
note to her brother.211
 Gustav Schwab, in turn, reassured his relatives that he held to the right kind of 
values. His mother was pleased to "receive proof from you, that outwardly wealth does 
not remove you from Him who grants it, and that you have not allowed [this wealth] to 
weaken your compassion for suffering."212
 Crises and financial losses, in particular, were favorite occasions for reminders of 
the values supposedly underlying commerce. After her son had incurred heavy losses in 
the panic of 1857, Sophie Schwab wrote to him: 
The Dear Lord surely does not send such trials without reason, and surely it will become 
clear to you, eventually, why these bad times had to come upon you. May God give that 
things will be better, soon; so that then, you will be able to rejoice at what you overcame, 
at having experienced that feeling inside of yourself, that you can make yourself 
independent from the outwardly goods of fortune.213
 
Miss Engel Thiermann, whose brother’s firms were involved in trade with the United 
States, likewise explicitly attributed the 1857 crisis to merchants’ moral shortcomings. In 
her diary, she wrote that “a pure striving for profit leads to ruin.”214
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To a morally upright merchant, God might grant success; or he might bestow 
failure on him as a lesson in humility. When a merchant failed to live up to his fellow 
Hanseats’ standards of business or personal conduct, however, he could not count on the 
support of either Deity or mortals. Wilhelm Wilkens, of Baltimore, commented on an 
acquaintance who apparently had failed to pay his debts: 
Driver is still here (...) and he will hopefully get out of here in a while, since he does 
know that he is superfluous here and he must have little sense of honor[.] He boards with 
his brother-in-law and does not make an effort to find employment.215
 
Wilhelm Wilkens was not the only merchant to make observations on the business 
failures of others. The specter of failure and possible bankruptcy haunted the minds of 
many of his colleagues.  In a letter written about the same time, Friedrich Wilkens 
expressed compassion for a certain Mr. Reinken, whose business apparently failed. While 
he abstained from harsh words of the kind his brother Wilhelm found for Mr. Driver, he 
might have implied a judgment on the moral failure of Reinken, who jeopardized the 
livelihood of his wife and daughters: “What is going to happen with Reinken now; will 
he gnaw himself through? I hear he offered his creditors 50%. The poor girls are to be 
pitied.”216 At least Reinken had not failed to acknowledge his financial obligations in their 
entirety. The honor of a person – as measured by the sincerity of his effort to meet his 
financial and personal obligations – determined whether merchants supported them in 
founding their own firms, or helped them in need.217
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The example of Mr. Reinken also shows that morality and success, family and 
fortune, formed a complete ideological circle: the ultimate moral end of worldly fortune 
was the welfare of the family, or, more specifically, of women and children. "Praise be to 
God that you can find joy in your dear wife, and in the development of your children, and 
can find rest from your worries [in them]; this is the most important thing, and business 
comes only after that," Sophie Schwab wrote to her son.218
 
 
The Household as a Source of Identity 
To Hanseats, family, faith, and firm were part and parcel of the same complex, 
drawing their guiding principles from the same fount, a comprehensive ideal of 
mercantile morality. The consciousness of this shared ideal was the force of gravity that 
held this group together from within. As “conscious agents of the process of capital 
circulation” (MARX), however, Hanseats moved in a larger social context. Dispersed in 
different ports, they interacted with a wide range of other social groups. In relation to the 
latter, and in response to the centrifugal forces to which Hanseats were exposed in these 
relations, Hanseats set themselves apart through their lifestyle. Family life – specifically, 
domestic arrangements – played a central role in positioning Hanseats vis-à-vis other 
social groups. 
Ever since E. P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class, historians 
have looked for culture, in the broadest sense, for clues as to how specific social groups 
acquired a particular identity and consciousness. Hanseats were not a class, however, but 
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would have described themselves as an estate. By definition, members of an estate ‘know 
their place.’ From such a starting-point, making oneself into anything seems less of an 
issue than it would be for a modern class whose members are jumbled together from 
multiple origins.219 Hanseats came from a place in which they could be certain of their 
identity. For them, the point of their cultural expressions relative to other classes was the 
task of maintaining this identity; in spite of changing external circumstances. 
Nonetheless, it is not moot to explore in the Hanseatic case the domestic 
arrangements that play such a prominent role in the new social history that explores the 
making of classes as a process driven by the relations between individuals of different 
social status. The choice of residential location and the practices of designing domestic 
space provide social historians with clues to the attitudes of individuals towards social 
distinctions. Like the middle classes or working classes, the making of which have been 
studied by social historians, the Bremish mercantile estate set visible markers of its 
distinct station in the family home.
                                                 
219 Of course, children and those merchants who came to Bremen from the provinces to become long-
distance merchants had to be socialized into the Hanseatic network. For the latter, this process was helped 
by the fact that they usually came to Bremen at a young age. In either case, successfully to rise into the 
ranks of the Hanseatic elite meant to embrace its value-system. 
 124
Class, Lifestyle, Distinction 
 Whether in Germany or America, Hanseats were particularly eager to distinguish 
themselves from those closest to their own position in society: other upper-class 
members, and the nobility. For example, the relationship between Bremen's elite, and 
those of other German states, remained problematic. Leading Hanseats perceived 
industrialists, bankers, and even merchants from the hinterland as players in a minor, 
more provincial league. In turn, many hinterland notables regarded Hanseats as agents of 
a foreign interest, undercutting German industry by peddling cheap imported goods.220
For New York, Sven Beckert has shown that a wide gulf separated mercantile 
from industrial capitalists until the 1860s. Their association with manual labor, their often 
lowly origins, and the general odor of ‘new money’ that attached itself to industrialists, 
made this group unfit for the salon in the eyes of the mercantile elite. Credit reports on 
manufacturers colorfully reflected this condescending attitude. The extant papers of New 
York’s Hanseats confirm this picture, in that they contain not a single reference to social 
interaction with manufacturers.221
For upper-class commoners in nineteenth-century Germany, one's relation to the 
nobility was a key marker of distinction. Hanseats were in a particularly ambivalent 
position. On the one hand they were proud burghers of a Republic that did not recognize 
titles of nobility among its inhabitants; while on the other, they felt superior to the 
common brand of small-town merchants and other notables who made up the bulk of the 
bourgeoisie in the German states. In setting themselves apart from the latter, they 
sometimes borrowed practices from the aristocracy. When Johann Georg Graue's wife 
                                                 
220 Engelsing, Rolf, “England und die USA in der bremischen Sicht des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in: Jahrbuch der 
Wittheit zu Bremen, vol. 1, 1957, p. 33-65. List, National System; Etges, Wirtschaftsnationalismus. 
221 Beckert, Metropolis, p. 52-55. 
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gave birth to twins, her husband decided that, even though “the girl was born first, 
nevertheless the boy shall be the oldest; this way it is judged in ruling houses when twins 
are born.”222 Gustav F. Schwab displayed some measure of mercantile, republican pride 
when he visited Genoa, and saw the splendor of the palaces that old merchant families 
had built. "One could give several [of these] palaces to each of the German princes, better 
ones than they have now, and there still would be enough left."223 Direct interaction with 
noblemen created a particular need watchfully to police the border that separated 
Hanseats from aristocrats. H. H. Meier found himself almost the only commoner in the 
private school he attended in Stuttgart. In their letters, Meier's friends in Bremen warned 
him against becoming too close to aristocratic circles and adopting their values. His 
eighteen-year-old brother Diedrich wrote: “Incidentally, they [the aristocracy] are no 
better than we commoners, especially we Bremeners. Since there exists no nobility here, 
we could all call ourselves noble, that is, if we wanted to; but we consider ourselves to be 
above doing so.”224
 
 In the way they related to the lower classes, Hanseats most resembled other 
upper- and middle-class groups, both in the U.S. and in Germany. For all these groups, 
the family home was a show-case of one’s status, and a statement of class-consciousness. 
Interior and exterior architecture announced to lower classes one’s ability to afford what 
                                                 
222 For proximity between traditions of the nobility and Hanseatic merchants, see Schulz, “Weltbürger”, p. 
638. Quote from Johann Georg to Heinrich Hermann Graue (in Baltimore), Bremen 1862/1/4, MdHS 
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they could not, and demonstrated to one’s peers the mastery of the code of a refined 
taste.225
 The design of Schwab’s mansion, “Fort Number Eight,” displayed precisely this 
mastery. Ship-captains and merchants had always had more opportunities to lend a 
particular character to their dwellings by adding exotic items acquired on their journeys. 
Gustav F. Schwab falls into this category. While in Italy, he was constantly watching out 
for opportunities to acquire decorative items for the household – oil paintings, statues, 
and photographs.226
 Residential location was another general marker of distinction. For Hanseats, as 
for other groups in the middle-class and bourgeoisie on both sides of the Atlantic, 
residential choices since the 1850s signal an increasing withdrawal from the multitude, 
driven in part by a fear of insurrection. Traditionally, the merchant's home was in the 
same building as his counting-house. After 1850, this began to change. For Bremen, there 
was an obvious political condition for this sudden exodus beyond the boundaries of the 
old town. Until the 1848 revolution, only those who lived within the old town, on the 
right bank of the Weser River, and within the limits of the former city walls, could 
acquire full civic rights. The new constitution, even after receiving reactionary 
modifications in the years between 1851 and 1854, gave inhabitants of the new town, a 
walled extension of the city on the left bank, developed in the 17th century; and of the 
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extramural suburbs on the right bank of the Weser River, the right to acquire a status as 
full burghers (see map “Bremen, 1850”).227
The highest civic status, the Greater Privilege, not only conferred political rights 
on its holder, but was the legal prerequisite for engaging in overseas trade. As merchants 
now had the option to keep the Greater Privilege, and move their permanent abode out of 
the old town, and away from the plebeian hustle and bustle within it, they availed 
themselves of this option in droves. H. H. Meier moved into his new villa, on the corner 
of Meinken- and Kohlhökerstraße, in 1850. The Graue and Wilkens families moved into 
new houses on Kohlhökerstraße, as well. The first address in the new eastern suburb 
(Östliche Vorstadt) was the Contrescarpe, a street facing the park that occupied the spot 
where the city fortifications had stood. A view of the greenery along the elongated lakes 
that had taken the place of the former moat created an idyllic setting whithin walking 
distance of the counting-houses, city hall, and the stock-exchange. Meinkenstraße ran 
North-eastward from the Contrescarpe, linking it with Kohlhökerstraße. While lacking 
the view of the park, the villas and townhouses along Kohlhökerstraße still offered ample 
garden space, making them the second best thing to a villa on the Contrescarpe (see map 
“Bremen, 1850”).228
 
Architectural histories of Bremen prominently feature the buildings that were 
erected by merchants during this period. Stately, three- to four-story mansions with 
representative parlors, surrounded by spacious walled gardens, these new buildings were 
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markers of distinction. They signified withdrawal from those urban masses that had 
previously, in 1848, left such a frightening impression on the mercantile elite. Ironically, 
it had been the pressure exerted by these urban masses that had created the political 
conditions for the removal of full burghers from the city, in the first place.229
While the political changes in Bremen contributed to the urban flight of the 
merchant elite, Hanseats in Baltimore and New York followed the same, global trend. 
Albert Schumacher constructed his mansion in Baltimore’s elite Mount Vernon 
neighborhood toward the city’s northern edge in the 1850s.230 Heinrich Wilkens, likewise, 
moved into a house away from the port, in the countryside surrounding Baltimore. There, 
he enjoyed working in the large garden for recreation. His letters to his brother Julius are 
filled with detailed descriptions of the country home and its grounds. He boasted of a new 
garden parlor (Laube), an orchard filled with plentiful fruit, lawns dotted with flower-
beds, an herb garden tended by his children, and a monkey to entertain the family. In this 
“comfortable” (gemüthlich) setting, Wilkens enjoyed “Sunday afternoons, [when] Fritz 
Roeholl and I usually lie in the hammocks.”231 By the middle of the 1860s, when Heinrich 
Wilkens wrote these letters, he no longer seems to have had any qualms about 
conspicuous consumption. 
In New York, the construction of a railroad line along the Hudson River brought 
the farmland in the upper half of Manhattan within commuting distance of the counting-
                                                 
229 Stein, Rudolf, Klassizismus und Romantik in der Baukunst Bremens, 2 vols. (=Senator für das 
Bildungswesen, ed., Forschungen zur Geschichte der Bau- und Kunstdenkmäler in Bremen, vols. 4 and 5), 
Bremen 1964/1965; Marschalek, “Erwerb.” 
230 Chalfant, Randolp W., “Calvert Station: Its Structure and Significance”, in: MHM v. 74, no. 1 (March, 
1979), p. 11-22, for Schumacher’s house, p. 14; Mayer, Brantz, Baltimore, as it was and as it is. A 
Historical Sketch of the Ancient Town and Modern City from the Foundation, in 1729, to 1870, Baltimore 
1871, p. 449-452 
231 Heinrich to Julius Wilkens (in Bremen), Baltimore 1865/4/20 and Baltimore 1865/6/9 (quote), MdHS 
MS.439. 
 129
houses, located on the southern tip of the island. A step ahead of the headlong flight of 
the New York bourgeoisie to the suburbs, Gustav Schwab was lucky to acquire a prime 
piece of real estate, fifteen acres on a hilltop overlooking the Harlem River.232 In letters to 
his mother, he frequently reveled in the splendor and idyllic setting of his new home. To 
Sophie Schwab, however, a life apart from the city and one's place of work was still an 
alien notion. “I cannot form an image of your arrangements there, even less so of your 
plans to build at such a great distance from the city,” she wrote after learning of her son's 
plans.233 She feared for her son's health on the “long journey,” especially in the short and 
cold days of winter, when he would travel into the night hours, and suggested that he 
spend weeknights in town, where he could lodge with his brother-in-law and associate, 
Hermann von Post.234
The flight to the idyll of the country-house presupposed the very industrial 
technology that drove the expansion of the city, and that created the urban proletariat 
from which the better sort hoped to escape. In moving to the countryside, Schwab relied 
on what was still a comparatively new and accident-prone technology, the steam engine. 
In his relatives' letters the fear of steam-powered conveyances, to land and to water, was 
palpable. It probably did not help to ease his mother's mind that he was on a train that 
was wrecked on his commuter route, even though he escaped uninjured from the 
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incident.235 What made it worth while, in Gustav Schwab's mind, was the escape from the 
"unpleasant crowd in the New York docks."236
The only way a plebeian would find his way into the refined halls of "Fort 
Number Eight" was as a servant or sculpture. "I bought 4 terracotta figurines of beggars 
and fishermen, which they make very nicely here. I will keep two for our parlor, and give 
two to Recknagel," Schwab wrote his wife from Palermo.237 As witnessed in earlier 
letters, live beggars had previously elicited reproach from Schwab. These were not the 
kind of poor who were deserving of Hanseatic charity.238 Apparently, an added benefit of 
an aesthetically schooled mind was the ability it conferred to sublimate misery in its 
artistically rendered form. Figurines of paupers superseded the proletarian menace by 
representing it in an inert, romanticized fashion. Like Schwab’s nephews dressing up as 
peasants for a festive occasion (see p. 141, below), or noblemen donning shepherds' garb 
for play, the appropriation of lower-class attributes reassured upper classes in a romantic 
view on the good and simple pauper of the past. Contentment in misery, which 
presumably characterized the “good peasant” and artisan, was in turn held up as an ideal 
to which actual proletarians ought to live up.239
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Perhaps Schwab was reminded of his own situation by the palaces of the past 
Florentine mercantile elite, "whose windows gaze into our time with a sinister 
expression, solidly enclosed with lattice-work, showing quite well how the gentlemen 
who built them had to protect themselves from uprisings and other violence."240
Earlier generations of Hanseats had acquired country estates as save investments, 
and in some cases as a marker of their rise into the land-holding elite. As late as the 
1810s, many merchants quit the risky business of exposing their funds to circulation, as 
soon as they could afford rural real estate, which promised a more steady return in the 
form of rent and produce sales. The structural adjustment crisis that began to affect 
agriculture after the Napoleonic Wars, however, had ruined this dream for quite a few 
Hanseats. Other than switching to industrial production, keeping merchant capital in 
circulation began to appear as a more promising option. Rudolf Schleiden’s father had 
learned this lesson the hard way. His estate, Ascheberg in Holstein, lost money from the 
beginning, and dropped 36% in value between 1811, when he bought it, and 1825, when 
he was forced to sell it.241
For Gustav F. Schwab’s generation, the house in the country was no longer an 
object of investment, but one of conspicuity. Consequently, moving to a country estate, 
and away from the masses, created an ideological problem for Hanseats' self-image. If 
modesty was a key value, was the construction of such a home objectionable as a 
flaunting of wealth? As if to placate any fears that she considered the construction of a 
country estate as an undue indulgence for a Christian merchant, Sophie Schwab gave her 
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blessing to her son's relocation by couching it in terms compatible with her moral view: 
"I will be happy if (...) you have built yourself a pleasant and comfortable nest, and if the 
Dear Lord will let you enjoy this blessing in peace."242 In the same spirit, she reminded 
her son, "that the most beautiful houses cannot entice me [to visit you], just the people 
who live in them can, and they would entice me even if they lived in a lowly hut."243
 Perhaps Sophie Schwab was less inclined to condemn her son's withdrawal from 
the city, as she, herself, perceived the re-making of Stuttgart into an industrial city as an 
encroachment on her own peace and comfort. In the spring of 1859, as new houses were 
built around her apartment, she complained of a loss of light and greenery, and 
considered a move. Unable to afford a country house, and unwilling to move further 
away from her son, Christoph, who lived in town, she had to move at least twice in the 
following years. Frequently, she complained about scarce housing and rising rents, both 
indicators of an accelerated process of urbanization. Sophie Schwab complained that 
"there are many strangers here now, which makes everything more expensive."244 It 
helped that some of these strangers were in a weaker position than she on the housing 
market, and she could bank on that: "A Jewish family has rented [this apartment], and the 
landlord regrets it. If he will not keep them for longer, it may still be possible that I can 
move in on St. James’s Day (Jacobi)."245
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 As the 1850s progressed, even as more and more Hanseats moved into 
representative villas outside of the port cities, they nevertheless insisted on constructing 
the country estate as the moral center of family life. Here they presented to the world 
their wealth and their pious if comfortable domestic life. In their minds, the unity of 
family, faith, and firm remained unaffected by the removal of their residence from the 
counting-house. One way of asserting this unity was to delimit one’s own group by 
positioning it against the ‘lower sorts’. 
 
 Whether in the country or in town, the home, itself, was a location of class 
relations. Drivers and valets, who tended to the male head of the family; or the office 
staff and apprentices in the counting-house; and even more so, guides and carriers hired 
for limited time, rarely are mentioned by name in family or business letters. If they are 
mentioned at all, it is because they failed to perform their function to the satisfaction of 
their employer.246 Rudolf Schleiden relied on a valet and a clerk to fulfill his duties as 
Bremish minister-resident in Washington, DC. In his letters, he never mentioned either of 
these men, and if it had not been for a customs declaration, they might have entirely 
eluded the historical record.247
Two groups of employees make for an exception: maids and private tutors. From 
Hanseatic letters, there emerges a sense that the maid played a central role for the 
domestic economy – both in a narrower sense, and in the wider sense of the emotional 
                                                 
246 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Livorno 1856/02/01, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, 
folder 32. 
247 Rudolf Schleiden to Hon[ora]ble General Lewis Cass, Secretary of State of the United States, 
Washington, D.C., 1857/12/1, StAHB 4,48.21/5.E.1, Bremische Gesandtschaft in Washington, 
Angelegenheiten des bremischen Ministerresidenten Dr. Rudolph Schleiden (1845) 1853-1862, lists 
“Bernhard Bätjer, Clerk of the Legation” and “Gustav Forstberg, servant of Mr. Schleiden.” In all of 
Rudolf Schleiden's extensive papers, this is the only document to mention his servants or clerks. 
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economy of the family. Margarethe, the Schwab's maid in New York, and Bärbel, Sophie 
Schwab's maid in Stuttgart, are frequently mentioned in letters between family members. 
In a hierarchy of hired help, these maids appear to have stood above the rest, surpassed 
only by the children’s private tutors. Mr. Böckle, the tutor of Gustav F. and Eliza 
Schwab's children had been recommended to the Schwabs by the Meiers in Bremen, for 
whom Böckle had previously worked. 
These three employees seem to have built close and intimate relations with the 
families, sharing the most important moments in the lives of family members. Sophie 
Schwab relied on Bärbel for her more complete and accurate memory to keep those 
moments alive to herself: "Not only does she remember everything that happened during 
your stay, but also everything that you and the children and Margarethe said, and she tells 
me about it every day."248 Bärbel usually read the letters from America together with 
Sophie Schwab, and discussed their content with her. In particular, she seems to have 
provided additional reinforcement for the moral grounding of Mdme. Schwab's views, 
especially when it came to admonitions not to become intoxicated with worldly 
success.249 During a long visit of Gustav Schwab and his family to his mother's house in 
1856, Bärbel and Margarethe, the maids, bonded over their shared responsibilities for the 
different branches of the family. For as long as Bärbel remained in Sophie Schwab's 
service, Margarethe and she sent each other their regards by way of the letters exchanged 
by their employers.250
                                                 
248 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1857/10/17-19, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
2, folder 34, and 1859/04/11, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder35 (quote). 
249 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1858/03/14, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 35. 
250 E.g., Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1858/05/02, 1858/08/01, and n.P. 1859/06/24, MSS 
434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 35. 
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 When a young man from Lake Constance asked for Bärbel's hand, Sophie Schwab 
felt her life disrupted. She consoled herself in the belief that Bärbel had wanted her 
employer to deny her the marriage, and that she, Sophie, had made a final sacrifice for 
the maid in granting her hand to this man. This selfless act was, after all, in Bärbel's 
interest, since her suitor was "a good man".251 Even after Bärbel had left Mdme. Schwab's 
employ, the family stayed in touch with her, visiting her in her new home, and continuing 
to convey greetings between her and the New York Schwabs.252 More than a year later, 
Bärbel even briefly returned to Stuttgart for another three-week stint in Sophie Schwab's 
services, to help her move to a new apartment.253
 Mr. Böckle, the teacher, had come to Gustav Schwab's home from Bremen, by 
recommendation of the Meier family. His name, though, suggests Swabian origins. 
During the Christian holidays, which were increasingly occasions to celebrate the family, 
Böckle was part of the inner circle. Artistically gifted, he helped outfit the parlor in a 
festive way. 254
Böckle’s influence as a preceptor was considerable. In his letters home from 
Stuttgart, where he attended school in the 1860s, little Gustav H. (‘Gussy’) Schwab was 
afraid to mention to his parents that he was having fun with his friends on Sundays. 
When his parents inquired whether their son really worked even on the weekend, it 
                                                 
251 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1859/02/12, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 35. 
252 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, n.P. 1859/06/24, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 
35. 
253 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1860/05/06, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 36. 
254 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1859/03/23-24 and 1859/12/27, MSS 434, Schwab 
Papers, series I, box 2, folder 35. The diminuitive suffixes –le and -lin are particular to, and defining of 
family names in this region, surrounding Stuttgart and stretching south-east and south-west from there up 
the Neckar River and onto the Schwäbische Alb highland. The teacher’s name is variously spelled Böcklin 
or Böckle by the Schwabs. 
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became apparent that he feared the judgment of Mr. Böckle, who was in New York at 
that time, and who was likely to read the letters. Little Gussy’s super-ego was working a 
bit too hard. 
 
 The special status of these three employees was grounded in their role as 
guardians of the family's lineage and heritage: They cared for the children, and helped 
remember those stories that families tell to define who they are and what it is that they 
have in common. Considering the weight the Schwabs gave to molding their children into 
good merchants and merchants' wives, the influence of the personnel was of great 
concern to them. Thus, Sophie Schwab wrote: "I often think how glad I am to have met 
Margarethe, knowing the dear children so well cared for in her hands, next to maternal 
supervision."255 Maternal supervision was indeed often an afterthought in considering 
childcare, as it were the maids in the earlier years, and the tutor in the later ones, who 
most influenced the character of mercantile offspring. 
 
 
                                                 
255 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, n.P. 1858/04/03, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 
35. 
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Making Children into Hanseats 
 Mr. Böckle would have been pleased to know that he had implanted in little 
Gussy that – to use David Riesman’s term – “gyropscope” of self-control so essential to a 
successful merchant. To instill in their children unbendable morals, firmly rooted in 
Christian beliefs, was a central concern to Hanseats. Everything else – success and 
happiness – would automatically follow, once the moral foundation of a young person's 
character had been laid. At the same time, the quick pace of change in the world 
demanded that Hanseats’ children learn to adapt to new conditions. Thus, from 
childhood, Hanseats were primed to master the balance between commitment to tradition 
and innovation.256
To equip them for this dual task, Hanseats' children received a comprehensive 
education in the basics of languages and sciences, which would enable them to function 
in the rapidly modernizing world. German, English, French, ancient Greek, and Latin 
were the minimum requirements among the languages. This entailed the use of three 
different scripts, the Latin, the Gothic, and the Greek. For both boys and girls, 
mathematics and geography were added to the curriculum, which was rounded off by 
studies in the Bible, and the modern and classic literatures in the languages learned.257
 To prime their sons (or daughters) and heirs in the embrace of Christian virtues as 
well as in modern languages, sciences, and business practices was no small feat for 
Hanseats. Occasionally, the burden of this task can be glimpsed in the letters of parents 
                                                 
256 Riesman, David, The Lonely Crowd. A Study of the changing American Character, New Haven, CT 
1950; Bruford, Walter Horace, The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation. ‘Bildung’ from Humboldt to 
Thomas Mann, Cambridge 1975. 
257 John Christopher Schwab Scrapbooks, 1860-1864, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series II, box 20, folder 
222; Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1857/08/28, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 34. 
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who agonized over the prospects of their children. Sophie Klüpfel, writing to Gustav 
Schwab, her brother, summed up the anxiety of a parent charged with bringing up her 
children in accordance with inflexible moral prescriptions, and concerned for their 
prospects in life: 
 
May God ... let you have much joy through your children!  I am delighted that they have 
been developing so splendidly, but you will also find that the worries multiply when they 
grow older. Hence I daily ask God only that he may lead my children, inwardly and 
outwardly, onto the right path of a living community with Him, so that they will submit 
themselves to the discipline of the Holy Spirit, in which case everything else could be 
anticipated with calm. While I cannot be certain in this respect, I still am generally 
optimistic that God will answer my prayers, even if many a battle will still have to be 
fought; and some small, inconspicuous beginnings prove to me that I may regard the 
many promises in the word of God as also directed to me, and that He who directs the 
hearts like streams of water will not let any of my children be lost. From this unintended 
ejaculation of my heart, you can gather what occupies me the most, and just how filled I 
am with my own powerlessness in the face of the difficulties of bringing up children.258
 
Rarely were mothers left alone with these worries. Children's characters were 
under close scrutiny by all relatives and by the domestic employees. Parents involved the 
larger family in the bringing-up of their offspring. To reassure family members of their 
proper development, parents encouraged their children to write to other relatives, as soon 
as they had learned to write. Delighted over the first mail from her grandsons, Gustav H. 
and Hermann Schwab, Sophie Schwab wrote that she would "frame this letter in gold."259 
In Gussy, his grandmother particularly enjoyed a character trait she also recognized and 
encouraged in her own son, compassion. "Do you remember the beggar-boy whom he 
followed on the avenue when we walked up from Christophs'," she asked her son.260 The 
                                                 
258 Sophie Klüpfel to Gustav F. Schwab, Tübingen 1858/10/22 MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 35. 
259 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1858/11/14, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 35; see Sophie Schwab to Gustav H. 'Gussy' Schwab, Stuttgart 1861/02/03, MSS 434, Schwab 
Papers, series I, box 2, folder 37, for another example of letters exchanged between grandparents and 
grandchildren. 
260 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1859/01/16, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
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elders used their correspondence with the children of the family to remind them to stay 
on the righteous path. The family matriarch Eliza von Post in New York closed a letter to 
her great-grandchildren with the words, "Do not forsake Jesus!"261
Through these exchanges, a set of values emerges that shows as much about 
Hanseats’ self-image as it reflects the aims of education. Modesty, a mindset to be 
pleased with whatever life deals a person, and an according ability to be grateful to God 
for one's possessions, no matter how meager, was highest on the list of Sophie Schwab's 
virtues. Repeatedly, she praises this trait in children.262
 Diligence closely followed modesty on the list of values desired in children. After 
all, diligence would lead to that wealth about which one could then be modest. Sophie 
Schwab praised her grand-daughter, Henny, "prophesying" her mother that "you will 
have a very diligent daughter in her," remembering the girl's eagerness to help with 
domestic chores during a visit to the grandmother's house.263 In line with his mother, 
Gustav Schwab's maxim was "not to despair over a person's prospects, as long as he 
enjoys rising early in the morning."264
One of the favorite cautionary tales in the upbringing of Hanseatic children was 
the story of the prodigal son. Many a biography of leading Hanseats contains a key 
moment, when the over-confident young man squanders a substantial part of his, or a 
                                                                                                                                                 
folder 35. 
261 Eliza von Post to Gustav H. and Hermann C. Schwab, Fordham 1865/04/04, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, 
series I, box 2, folder 39. Though blind and aged, Eliza von Post continued to take an active part in the life 
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262 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Tübingen 1857/08/28, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 34. 
263 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, n.P. 1858/04/03, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 
35. 
264 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1859/02/12, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, 
folder 35. 
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relative's, fortune in speculation. These narratives function to acknowledge the 
temptation of a merely profit-maximizing attitude, while at the same time assuring the 
audience that the young man had learned his lesson for life, and had become a truly 
responsible, truly Hanseatic merchant.265
 While class- or estate-consciousness was not an officially endorsed value for the 
education of the Schwab's children, they nevertheless seem to have acquired some 
measure of it along the way. For Christmas, Sophie Schwab wanted to dress up her 
grandchildren in "Swabian peasant costume." This project greatly upset little Gustav 
Klüpfel, "who feared that he would have to remain a peasant boy," and was only 
convinced to model the lowly garb for the occasion, when he was given permission to 
speak in dialect while thus clad.266 At the same time, Sophie Schwab assumed a linkage 
between a person’s character and his station. His haughty attitude towards his brother, 
Carl, served as proof that her grandson Ludwig "will not be suited for a merchant", but 
should attend the university, instead.267 Carl, on the other hand, seemed destined for a 
mercantile career in his mother's eyes, since "Greek is terribly difficult to him, and 
thinking is not his strength, generally. Since he is gifted and smart in practical matters, 
however, I strongly wish he may turn out to become a merchant."268 The unintended insult 
to the recipient of this letter was probably hidden to its author. After all, even in 
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Hanseatic circles, the status of the scholar trumped that of a merchant, despite of its lesser 
remunerative rewards.269
 
 Parents were ultimately responsible for the way their children turned out. 
Nevertheless, the shaping of the next generation was a collective task. It enlisted many 
different strands of Hanseatic family networks. This collective task was an exercise in 
mutual social control which involved domestic employees and relatives in distant cities. 
This shared burden of priming children for their future roles helped to perpetuate the 
family network. Moreover, the journeys undertaken by young Hanseats in the pursuit of 
knowledge not only reinforced the ties within and between families, but also established 
new ones among the next generation. 
 Travel and the exposure to different cultures were considered a prerequisite for 
young Hanseats. This puts them in one camp with much of the European nobility, and 
wealthy Americans, who, too, sent their young abroad. Yet the journeys young Hanseats 
undertook for their education were not quite the classical grand tour. Rather, a desire to 
put children in suitably Calvinist surroundings, and, when they had chosen a mercantile 
rather than academic career, to give them first-hand experience in the main branches of 
trade, informed the choice of destinations for these journeys. 
 For the first years of their general education, Hanseatic children were privately 
tutored. When it was time to go to grammar school, the choice often fell on one not 
located in the home town. Gustav Lürman, for example, attended a boarding school in 
Bückeburg, in the Principality of Schaumburg-Lippe. H. H. Meier enrolled in the lyceum 
                                                 
269 Consider, for example, H. H. Meier's initial preferenc for an academic career, or the precedence the 
scholarly estate took in the political leadership of Bremen over the mercantile estate. Of course, the 
members of Bremen's scholarly estate were recruited almost exclusively from mercantile families. 
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of Württemberg's capital, Stuttgart, where Gustav B. Schwab, the poet, taught Latin and 
Greek. Later generations of children from the Schwab and Meier families followed in 
their footsteps. The defining commonality of Bremen, Schaumburg-Lippe, and 
Württemberg, was the dominance of Calvinism in these states.270
 Whereas Hanseats looked inland for general learning, they traveled across the 
Atlantic for their mercantile education. Nearly every son of the major Hanseatic traders 
spent at least a few years in New York or Baltimore, and less often Boston, or other 
American seaports of lesser importance to Bremen. There, they learned the ways of the 
Yankee, and the ins and outs of the commodity markets, including the crucial detailed 
knowledge required to judge the quality of staples like cotton and tobacco.271
 From the vantage point of Hanseats moored on the Atlantic's Western shore, the 
journey took them in the opposite direction. Gustav Schwab's children attended the same 
lyceum that had once seen their grandfather, and now, in the 1860s, saw their uncle, 
Christoph Schwab, as a teacher; and which their father had attended as a pupil. To round 
off their mercantile qualifications, they spent some time in Bremen counting-houses, 
before returning to New York eventually to establish themselves in their fathers' firm.272
 Daughters were not given a mercantile education, but otherwise enjoyed the same 
kind of learning as their brothers. H. H. Meier's sister, Betty, attended school in Stuttgart 
during the same time that her brother was at the Lyceum. The four sisters von Post – 
among them Eliza and Emily, who were to marry the Schwab brothers – were sent to 
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Bremen from New York to receive an education.273 Gustav F. Schwab's daughters 
attended a private school for girls in lower Manhattan.274 Rudolf Schleiden’s mother, 
Elisabeth Van Nuys, had received a comprehensive classical education. Schleiden 
recalled discussions of Greek philosophy and literature with her, more often than not 
conducted in Greek.275
  
 Those sons – and very rarely daughters, too – of Hanseats who embarked on an 
academic career would choose their alma mater according to their field of specialization. 
For law and other secular professions, Göttingen and Jena were the universities of choice. 
For theology, the hotbeds of Calvinism, Heidelberg, Tübingen, and Zurich were the 
favorite destinations. 
 Even in a family like Gustav F. Schwab's in New York, who, after the Civil War, 
increasingly considered themselves as Americans, a few years at Yale had to be 
complemented with a few more years at Göttingen. By the 1870s, when the New York 
Schwabs' children were students, however, the world had changed in ways that rendered 
their Göttingen experience less of a natural element of a continuum in a shared 
transatlantic space, but rather introduced to it moments of an alienating encounter with 
difference.276  
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 The educational journeys of young people confirmed the bonds between families 
in the present generation, and laid the foundation for those between the coming 
generation, as family, or friends of the family, provided housing for youths who attended 
school away from home. Over the years, several children at some point lodged in Sophie 
Schwab's house in this way. Her grandson, Gustav Klüpfel, was the first, joining her in 
1859.277 Lucie Noltenius joined the household later that year. She was the daughter of one 
of the most well-connected and wealthy overseas traders in Bremen.278 More children of 
friends and relatives populated the household during the summer vacations.279 In New 
York, Gustav Schwab was the host to many young visitors whose parents were either 
relatives or business partners of his, or both.280 In Bremen, the Meiers' house saw an 
equally broad stream of young people passing through on their way from childhood to 
adulthood.281
 These Hanseatic children grew into a well-established network. Their parents had 
built this extensive and dense web of mutual obligations on their own childhood 
acquaintances, and on the additions that courtship and business had brought into its orbit. 
They might have hoped that the ties their own children formed would one day furnish 
them with the same kind of transnational connections, and that they would renew the 
complex of families, firms, and faith that held together this network. 
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Conclusion 
As a group of merchants, Hanseats seem first and foremost defined by their 
economic activity. Indeed, they only became a distinct, transnational social group in the 
space of the Atlantic economy by virtue of the trade they conducted. This Atlantic 
economy, however, was characterized by instability. Communication remained 
haphazard before the establishment of a transatlantic telegraph (1866), in spite of the 
establishment of mail-steamer lines since the 1840s. “Buying cheap and selling dear” was 
not the most reliable way of valorizing capital, and the uncertain trustworthiness of many 
business partners added another moment of risk to transatlantic ventures. Wars 
exacerbated this instability. The Napoleonic Wars, in particular, had been devastating for 
German and American merchants. 
The networked character of Hanseatic business enterprises lent a necessary 
element of stability to their ventures. Family ties and a shared morality, in turn, were 
essential in knitting this network. The firm belief in the every-day applicability of 
Calvinist tenets was reflected in the watchfulness of both genders over the conduct of the 
other. The mercantile moral economy upheld by men and women woven into this dense 
web of mutual social control invested Hanseatic business interests with a sense of higher 
calling. Close family ties between different merchant houses mitigated competition 
between different firms. Outside the immediate family circle, ties of friendship that, in 
some cases, dated back decades, established obligations that suggested a cooperative 
mode of business transactions. Even in such relations between men that were unmediated 
by female influence, a shared value-system helped to take the edge out of competing 
interests. This value-system rested on the convictions of both genders. 
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The importance of mothers, wives, and sisters for upholding the moral economy 
of the Hanseatic household gave women a role much more decisive than their usual 
absence from the counting-house or the legislature might suggest. The basic unit of 
Hanseatic commerce was the household, and in it, women’s power over the financial and 
ideological resources rivaled that of men. The willingness of male Hanseats to defend the 
legal standing and financial independence of their wives and children reflects their 
awareness of the centrally important role the women of their estate played for its 
collective success. The gender arrangements in the Hanseatic household were a matter of 
tradition, not an outflow of a modern sense of women’s rights. Indeed, women’s status 
was threatened by the modernization of the legal code. Among this elite, progress meant 
a threat to women’s independence. 
While Bremen's merchants in all ports were linked to one another by 
intermarriage to an extraordinary degree, they were nonetheless not all part of the same 
family, nor had they all been apprenticed in the same firm. Hence, competition between 
different Hanseatic 'clans,' or clusters of firms, could have been just as fierce as that 
between Hanseats and other groups of merchants. But it was not. Beyond the family, the 
state of Bremen served to tie together the different clans and companies in a shared 
political framework. Bremen's status as an independent player in the concert of states 
allowed it to pursue policies that served the interest of Hanseats world-wide. These 
policies were set by political institutions dominated by merchants, and scholars who 
hailed from mercantile families. 
Overseas, the development and enforcement of Bremish policies were supported 
by a dense consular network, whose functionaries were drawn from mercantile circles. In 
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addition, Bremen's newspapers, which were circulated to foreign ports along with the 
commodities traded by Hanseats, kept those who did business overseas in touch with the 
political affairs of the free city. Through these venues of communication, a peculiar 
Hanseatic ideology, neither all traditionalist, nor all liberal, was kept fresh in the minds of 
Hanseats in Bremen and abroad. The state of Bremen posited a political interest common 
to all members of her mercantile elite, whether at home or abroad. This shared political 
interest, together with the ideology of cosmopolitan conservatism, formed the third, 





Chapter 3: Cosmopolitan Conservatives –  
Home-Town Traditions and Western Ideas in Bremish Politics, 




Tradition and Modernity 
Hanseatic politics present a seeming paradox for the study of political ideas in the 
nineteenth century. In their role as free-traders and pioneers of trans-Atlantic trade, 
Bremen’s elite appears to be on the radical liberal fringe of the Western political 
spectrum. In their role as home town burghers committed to the traditions of an estate, it 
appears to be a part of the Central European forces of reaction against the achievements 
of the French Revolution. 
Historical scholarship offers little to resolve this seeming paradox. The Hanseatic 
mercantile elite occupies a marginal position in the national histories of Germany and the 
U.S., in spite of their active involvement in transatlantic trade, as well as in German and 
American politics. 
In the American context, these Hanseats have hardly been noticed outside of a 
specialized field of 'ethnic' history.282 Within the history of German liberalism and the 
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middle-class, Hanseats have only recently begun to attract attention as a peculiar local 
case.283 Where German or American historians have noticed Hanseats, the view of 
Bremen's elite as part of the left wing of German liberalism dominates, not least fueled 
by the self-image promoted by post-war Bremish historians.284 German historians of 
America and of German-American relations followed the received view of the Hanseats, 
fitting them into a larger picture of transatlantic democratic ties among these two 
countries.285
 
Indeed, Hanseats were both ‘modernizers’ and conservatives; committed both to 
their ancient traditions and the revolution of international trade; both home-town 
particularists and trans-Atlantic cosmopolitans.286 We have seen that Bremen’s elite relied 
on traditional practices in their business ventures and in their family life; and that their 
                                                                                                                                                 
New York bourgeois (p. 147); subsuming them into his, otherwise excellent, study of an important and 
neglected aspect of U.S. History in his The Monied Metropolis. New York City and the Consolidation of the 
American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896, Cambridge, Mass. et. al. 2001. A notable exception is Mustafa, Sam A., 
"The Role of the Hanseatic Cities in Early U.S.—German Relations", in: Maryland Historical Magazine, 
vol. 93, no. 3 (Fall 1998), p. 265-287. 
283 Schulz, Andreas, "Liberalismus in Hamburg und Bremen zwischen Restauration und Reichsgründung 
(1830-1870)", in: Lothar Gall and Dieter Langewiesche (eds.), Liberalismus und Region. Zur Geschichte 
des deutsche Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert, München 1995, p. 135-160; Idem, Vormundschaft und 
Protektion. Eliten und Bürger in Bremen, 1750-1880 (=Stadt und Bürgertum, vol. 13), München 2001. 
284 Two important contributions: Beutin, Ludwig, Bremen und Amerika. Zur Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft 
und der Beziehungen Deutschlands zu den Vereinigten Staaten, Bremen 1953; Engelsing, Rolf, "England 
und die USA in der bremischen Sicht des 19. Jahrhunderts", in: Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen 1 (1957), 
S. 33-65. 
285 E.g., Adams, Willi Paul, "German Translations of the American Declaration of 
Independence", http://chnm.gmu.edu/declaration/adams2.html; Dippel, Horst, Die 
amerikanische Verfassung in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert. Das Dilemma von Politik 
und Staatsrecht, Goldbach 1994; Moltmann, Günter, Atlantische Blockpolitik im 19. 
Jahrhundert. Die Vereinigten Staaten und der deutsche Liberalismus während der 
Revolution von 1848/49, Düsseldorf 1973. 
286 I understand ‘modernization’ as the political program of actors who perceived a need for their respective 
societies to 'catch up' to the leading industrial and commercial powers. Following the argument made by 
Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn in The Peculiarities of German History (Oxford, UK and New York 
1984), I do not believe that democratization, or even a liberal political stance, are necessarily contained in a 
'package' of modernization. Rather, with Eric Hobsbawm (The Age of Capital, London 1975), I believe 
modernizers' political and social views varied, in a continuum ranging from a full embrace of 'Western 
freedom' to authoritarianism. 
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success as merchants in a rapidly changing world-market was founded on their very 
traditionalism. 
In developing their political ideas, and in building the institutions of the state of 
Bremen, Hanseats likewise negotiated contradictory desires: to preserve a traditional 
politics of deference, and to make Bremen’s institutions efficient tools for facilitating 
world trade. The ideological and institutional framework they developed was capable of 
containing these contradictions, and of realizing both these conflicting desires. 
With Hegel, we can understand the form in which contradictions can move 
towards a synthesis as a dialectical relation.287 With Marx, we can add an awareness that 
this relation depends on particular social and economic conditions.288 The form that 
allowed Hanseats at the same time to criticize and to realize modern, capitalist social 
relations, including a capitalist world market; and the form that allowed them 
simultaneously to deny and to affirm the traditional, communal values of an early-
modern home-town, was modern conservatism. Hanseats’ intense trading ties to the 
Atlantic world, and their exposure to its political ideas, added a cosmopolitan dimension 
to this form, resulting in a peculiar brand of cosmopolitan conservatism.289
 
The political positions at which Bremen's merchants arrived by the mid-
nineteenth century put them in a transnational political current that has as much, if not 
more, in common with an emerging post-traditional conservatism, as it does with 
                                                 
287 Hegel, G. W. F., Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trns. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge, UK 1991. 
288 Marx, Karl, Theses on Feuerbach, in: Robert C. Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader, New York and 
London 19782, p. 143-145. 
289 Engelsing, “England und die USA,” p. 47, cites Heinrich Smidt, son of Burgomaster Smidt, as saying 
that the commercial relations between Bremen and the United States were a step toward the fulfillment of 
the “as yet unrealized ideals of the cosmopolitans.” 
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classical liberalism. This new Western conservatism was a response to the French 
Revolution that did not want to turn back the clock to absolute monarchy, but that also 
rejected democracy.290
At a time when German proponents of a market society and a constitutional state 
were not yet sharply differentiated into camps of liberals and conservatives, Hanseatic 
adherence to liberal ideas was at best selective, and driven by particular interests. 
Hanseats’ primary allegiance was to tradition, order, and estate. Not unlike conservatives 
in the U.S., they were willing to adapt some of their institutions and practices to the 
exigencies of an emerging industrial capitalism, but strove to contain potentially 
threatening consequences of this ‘modernization’ by preserving corporatist traditions and 
a hierarchical social order. 
Moreover, as participants in U.S. politics, Bremen's merchants contributed to the 
transatlantic scope of this brand of modernization. While, at first sight, Hanseatic politics 
may appear as stubbornly local and particularistic, we will find that they were part of a 
transnational bourgeois alternative to liberalism and democracy, drawing their 
inspirations from Burke rather than Rousseau; preferring Adam Müller to Hegel; and 
having more in common with John C. Calhoun than with John Stuart Mill.291
 
                                                 
290 When Bremen’s burgomaster, Arnold Duckwitz, witnessed the campaign for the Northern German 
Reichstag in 1867, the first election in the Hanseatic City that was conducted under the rules of universal, 
equal, male suffrage, he remarked that “this election business here is becoming American.” See Engelsing, 
“England und die USA,” p. 55. 
291 Johann Smidt, Bremen’s arch-conservative burgomaster, saw the cities “friendship” with the U.S. as a 
possible source of support for maintaining the city’s independence. See Engelsing, “England und die 
USA,” p. 46-47. 
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In locating Hanseats within the spectrum of political ideas in Germany and the 
United States, we will first turn our attention to Bremen. This chapter will lay out the 
governmental system of the city, and the political ideas it reflected. 
Bremen enjoyed its independence as a function of the restoration of a European 
order based on custom and divine right by the Congress of Vienna. Its standing in the 
international system was tied to its status as a member of the Germanic Confederation 
that encompassed the German monarchies and free cities. The state of Bremen used its 
power to make treaties for giving its merchants access to foreign markets. It also created 
the transportation infrastructure and the laws that laid the foundation for Hanseats’ 
engagement in world trade.  
Within Bremen, the mercantile elite enjoyed a legally privileged status. As the 
highest class of burghers, holders of the “Greater Privilege,” they maintained a firm grip 
on the institutions of the city-state.***NOTE They used this power to perpetuate a 
corporatist social order that shielded the artisans and laborers from the pressure of 
capitalist competition. While foreign trade was free trade, guild-like arrangements 
governed the markets for all commodities within the city, even for import and export 
staples. 
Bremish politics formed a bond between Hanseats in Bremen, Baltimore, and 
New York. Through Bremen’s consular network and numerous newspapers, the channels 
of political communication between Hanseats in all these ports complemented family 
correspondence in an essential way. They tied together the different family groups, 
creating a transnational public sphere in which Hanseats could formulate their shared 
interests. 
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Where Hanseats engaged with merchants, politicians, or intellectuals beyond their 
network, this transnational public sphere intersected with the political life of both the 
United States and Germany. These varied influences on the Hanseatic political mind left 
their imprint on the writings of one of Bremen’s most prolific scholarly authors, Wilhelm 
Kiesselbach, an “organic intellectual” of Bremen's elite.292
Through Kiesselbach, we can understand the political ideology that allowed 
Hanseats to synthesize the contradictions of their existence laid out above. In his 
engagement with American and Bremish institutions and ideas, Kiesselbach developed a 
theory of a “social-economic state.” In essence, what he meant by this was an estatist 
order that preserved deference in the political realm, while allowing for capitalist social 
relations. For his ideas, Kiesselbach was indebted to an Anglo-American conservatism 
that had arisen as a response to the French Revolution and the Enlightenment.293
 
 
                                                 
292 While Antonio Gramsci’s term applies in its literal sense – as an intellectual of his class – the pun is 
intended, in that Kiesselbach was an advocate of organicism. 
293 Bremen’s elite carried out in practice what Kiesselbach developed in theory. For this, it is immaterial 
whether they took his views as a blueprint, or whether Kiesselbach systematized the views prevalent among 
his peers. While Kiesselbach’s main works were published around 1860, they give meaning to Hanseatic 
politics throughout the era between the Congress of Vienna and the German and American domestic wars 
of the 1860s. 
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A Cosmopolitan Place 
The Hanseatic network served as a continuous conduit for political ideas. 
Hanseats in the United States remained involved in Bremen politics in two ways: By 
following the Bremen press, and by making demands on the state of Bremen through the 
consuls. Information thus flowed both ways, in print as newspapers and prices-current, 
and hand-written as letters and as consular correspondence, mainly based on local 
mercantile sources. The interlocking of political and economic channels of decision-
making and information is illustrated by the common practice of forwarding consuls’ 
reports to the Bremen Handelskammer (Chamber of Commerce).294
The transoceanic, semi-public sphere Hanseats created for themselves relied not 
just on written communication, but also on face-to-face interaction. In a letter to his 
brother Gustav in 1861, Christoph Theodor Schwab relates a conversation he had with 
merchants in Bremen about the debates over the abolition of guilds, then taking place in 
the Bürgerschaft (see Chapter 4). During this conversation, the wine merchant Mr. 
Platinius told C. T. Schwab about a discussion he had had on the same issue in Bordeaux, 
involving Hanseats residing there, as well as one Bremish merchant from California, 
Heinrich Loening. The latter had bought advertising space in Bremen’s papers to publish 
a statement in support of the abolition of guild prerogatives. Merchants and artisans in 
Bremen alike had responded to Loening’s statement.295
                                                 
294 For example, Hermann Wätjen could write his Frühzeit des Nordatlantikverkehrs, a history of foreign 
trade, based almost exclusively on the diplomatic records in the Bremen State Archive. 
295 Christoph Theodor Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab (in New York), Stuttgart 1861/04/09, MSS 434, 
Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 37. I call the space in which these conversations took place a ‘semi-
public sphere’, because it functioned like Habermas’ public sphere, without meeting the criterion of being 
open to general participation. Habermas, Jürgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge, Mass. 1989. 
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Hanseatic social clubs in American ports were sites of the transoceanic 
conversation in which Bremen’s merchants debated their political interests. These clubs 
had numerous German newspapers delivered, most of them from Bremen. We can safely 
assume that these papers were read for information on prices and ship-movements, but 
political information was no less relevant for business in the nineteenth century than it is 
today. The correspondents of Baltimore Hanseat Julius Wilkens took it for granted that he 
followed the local news from Bremen. His sister Eleonore wrote, “I cannot think of 
anything else to tell you, you will read the regular city news in the Courier [an der 
Weser]” – the daily paper catering to the merchant elite and especially covering shipping 
and trade. Eleonore Wilkens’ husband-to-be, Wilhelm Knoche, mentioned another paper, 
which covered more continental news and was read by the middle-class. He wrote in 
reference to the war against Denmark in 1864, “you will be well informed about these 
matters by the Weser Zeitung.”296
In similar clubs in Bremen, one would have looked in vain for American papers. 
Hanseats had a variety of these delivered directly to their counting-house. When they 
arrived at a club like the Museum or the Erholung on a day the newspapers arrived from 
the United States, they could expect to be on the same page as their peers. American 
politics and business news mattered just as much to Hanseats as did intelligence from the 
continent.297
                                                 
296 Eleonore to Julius Wilkens, 12.19.1862; Wilhelm Knoche to same, 2.27.1864, MdHS MS.439. A 
sampling of the Weser-Zeitung for 1856 showed that the paper published correspondents’ reports from the 
U.S., and carried almost daily reports on that country.  Some of these correspondents may have been 
merchants, which would make the newspaper a two-way medium, as well. Future research might be 
directed at establishing the professions of these writers. See Weser-Zeitung, StA HB, Mikrofim FB 311; 
Engelsing, Rolf, Massenpublikum und Journalistentum im 19. Jahrhundert in Nordwestdeutschland  
(=Wolfram Fischer et.al., eds., Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, vol. 1), Berlin (West) 1966, 
especially pp. 212-229, on mercantile journalism in Germany. 
297 Engelsing, Massenpublikum. 
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Still, for Hanseats in Bremen and America, Bremen remained the reference point 
for their shared political ideals that reflected their peculiar existence as cosmopolitans 
who were rooted in a community with claims to a centuries-old tradition. In personal 
letters to his friend and brother-in-law, Julius Wilkens, Wilhelm Knoche frequently 
invoked this shared tradition, in almost identical wording: “Otherwise all is as it used to 
be and even the old Roland still stands on the market square.” 
If Knoche had looked for a more apt symbol of permanence and the particularity 
of a place, he would have been unlikely to find one in Bremen. The eighteen-foot stone 
statue of the legendary knight, Prince Roland, has been standing on the market square, in 
the very heart of the city, since 1404. The statue depicts a standing knight in armor, 
holding a drawn sword in his right hand, and a shield with a double-headed eagle by his 
left arm. Above his bare, curly-haired head, a canopy rises another 10 feet, giving him the 
appearance of a guard-post. He is flanked to the north by city hall, the seat of the Senat, 
and to the south by the Schütting, the home of the Handelskammer. Yet, his watchful 
gaze faces east, towards the Cathedral. 
The symbolism of Roland statues is traditionally that of an emblem of justice. He 
stands in the market square not by accident, but as a reminder to the moral embeddedness 
of commerce. The distance between the points of his characteristic, pointed pieces of 
knee-armor measures a Bremish yard (ca. eighty-three centimeters), serving as a 
yardstick to buyers and sellers in both the literal and the figurative sense. In his defiant 
stance towards the church, Roland’s statue represents the claims to power of the 
mediaeval commune of burghers, which had wrested control of the city from the bishop. 
Based on these initial symbolic meanings, the statue came to embody mercantile 
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tradition, pride, and political independence, as the mercantile estate became the ruling 
group in the city.298  
The Schütting, to the Roland’s South, is adorned by the motto of the merchants’ 
guild, “buten un binnen, wagen un winnen” – “without and within, venture and win.” 
City Hall, to his North, was often more inclined to follow the prescription borne by 
St. Ansgar’s Gate, “Bremen wes gedhechtig; laß nicht mehr ein, als Du bist ihrer 
mechthig” – “Bremen be prudent; do not admit more than you can support.”299 Like the 
Roland, Bremen’s merchants were situated between tradition and progress; between 
venturing out into the world and keeping a closed society at home. They negotiated the 
demands of both in a unique and often ingenious way. 
The state of Bremen based its claims to legitimacy on its upholding of tradition in 
economic, political, and social life. Hanseats clung to a restrictive citizenship in Bremen, 
to a constitution that tied political rights to membership in an estate, and to a politics of 
deference. In their view, even if individuals had enjoyed perfectly equal, contractual 
rights in the market-place, social and political equality did not logically follow from this. 
Unlike liberals, for whom the contract is the basis of human relations, Hanseats held the 
conservative view that the individual gains rights and duties only as a consequence of his 
station in society. They recognized as social equals men of standing and their wives, and 
as political equals men who had bought the Greater Privilege, which alone conferred full 
civic and economic rights in Bremen. 
                                                 
298 Wilhelm Knoche to Julius Wilkens, 6.7.1865 (direct quote); Wilhelm Knoche to Julius Wilkens, 
2.3.1859, both MdHS MS.439. Schwarzwälder, Herbert, Geschichte der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, 4 
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Antonius David, Rolande als Rechtssymbole. Der archäologische Bestand und seine rechtshistorische 
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299 Both inscriptions are in Lower German. English translation by this author. 
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Hence, understanding the state of Bremen as a political entity is important not 
only because it provided a source of coherence to Hanseats who were active in different 
parts of the world, by representing their shared interest and their common beliefs; but 
also to avoid the trap of characterizing Hanseats as liberals, by way of a short-circuited 
conclusion that assumes that liberalism, capitalism, and cosmopolitanism form a package 
deal under a label of ‘modernization.’300
When Wilhelm Knoche invoked the Roland in his letter to Julius Wilkens, he was 
invoking the particularity of a place, Bremen, which undergirded Hanseats activities 
across the space created by world trade. True, Hanseats were in many essential ways 
cosmopolitans. Yet, their cosmopolitanism, itself, was rooted in a particular local 
tradition. This tradition was the foundation, not just of their political ideas, but also of 
their economic ventures and their family bonds. 
 
 
                                                 
300 Cf. Introduction, note 2. 
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Bremen in the International System 
Its long history as an independent, mercantile city-republic lent the force of 
tradition to Bremen’s role in international politics, and to the elite’s role in Bremen’s 
politics. It also helped shape the ideology held by that elite. Within a system of states 
founded on the idea of divine right, Bremen, along with its Hanseatic sister cities of 
Hamburg and Lübeck, had a republican governmental system that dated back to the 
Middle Ages. While this form of government made Bremen suspicious to the rulers of the 
territorial monarchies in Germany, there was nothing inherently progressive about 
Hanseatic republicanism. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Bremen’s constitutional system was 
based on elite rule. The aldermen were hand-picked from the merchants’ guild, and the 
majority who lived in the lower rungs of the corporatist structure were excluded from 
political participation. Sovereignty rested with the government, until 1822 officially 
called Rat (council), but publicly referred to as the Senat, whose members were called 
into that body by way of co-optation. The Burgomaster was chosen from amidst the 
members of the Senat, and technically remained a primus inter pares who represented the 
city as a whole. Until 1848, both the Burgomaster and the Senatoren served in their office 
for lifetime terms.301
Before 1806, Bremen had been a Free Imperial City, not under the domain of a 
secular territorial ruler or a bishop, but under the immediate, if entirely nominal, rule of 
the Emperor. In 1806, as a result of Napoleon’s victories over Prussia at Jena and 
Auerstädt, and over Austria at Austerlitz, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation 
ceased to be, and Bremen’s political status was called into question. Senator Johann 
                                                 
301 Schulz, Weltbürger, pp. 642-648. 
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Smidt bemoaned that the “free burghers of the Reich” had been turned into “republican 
outlaws” overnight.302
French dominance over the German states affected Bremen’s economy, in that the 
Continental Blockade made illegal all commerce with England. As Bremen’s merchants 
engaged in brisk smuggling ventures with British traders located on the island of 
Heligoland, the city increasingly ran afoul of French interests.303 In 1810, in order better 
to enforce the blockade, France annexed the Northern German seaboard, making Bremen 
the seat of a French Département, named “Bouches de Weser.”304
With Napoleon’s defeat in 1813, Bremen was ‘liberated,’ but her political status 
remained unsettled. Ultimately, the arrangements made by those states that emerged from 
the war as Great Powers would determine the fate of the city. The Congress of Vienna 
created the Germanic Confederation as the loose framework that would comprise the 
German states. There would no longer be an Emperor, but rather a council of sovereigns 
(Bundesrat) at the head of this federation. The member states of the Confederation 
retained the right independently to form alliances with foreign countries, unless they were 
directed against other member states. The individual states had full control over their 
armed forces. Only along the Rhine, a few federal fortresses were formed, in which 
soldiers from several states were combined under the command of the Confederation. If 
the whole Confederacy was to declare war, the member states were obliged to send fixed 
contingents. The Bundesrat had the right to pass laws; however, these would not become 
                                                 
302 Johann Smidt, as quoted in Möller, Kurt Detlev, “Zur Politik der Hansestädte im Jahre 1806,” in: 
Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte, vol. 41 (1951) (=Festschrift für H. Reincke), p. 330-
352, quote p. 337; Bippen, Wilhelm von, Johann Smidt, ein hanseatischer Staatsmann, Stuttgart and Berlin 
1921, on Smidt in general. 
303 Schleiden, Jugenderinnerungen, p. 51. 
304 Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, p. 14-20; Rössler, Horst, Hollandgänger, Sträflinge und Migranten. 
Bremen-Bremerhaven als Wanderungsraum, Bremen 2000, p. 73. 
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effective in any of the states, unless enacted by its sovereign. For all practical purposes, 
the different states retained full sovereignty, including the right to enter into treaties and 
levy tariffs.305
Of the many Free Imperial Cities that had existed in 1789, only Hamburg, 
Bremen, Lübeck, and Frankfurt survived the end of the old Holy Roman Empire of the 
German Nation, the territorial arrangements of the Napoleonic Wars, and the Congress of 
Vienna. There had been 1,789 sovereign entities in the Empire in the year 1789. After the 
Congress of Vienna, there were less than two dozen left. Under the circumstances, it was 
no small feat for Bremen’s representative at the Congress, Senator Johann Smidt, to have 
secured Bremen’s independence.  
Johann Smidt embodied in his politics the sensibilities of Bremen’s elite. He was 
an arch-conservative in domestic matters, while embracing liberalism and free trade in 
international politics. Bremen’s merchant elite left their political affairs mostly to legal 
and religious scholars of their fellow Calvinist faith. Smidt fit that description well. Born 
in 1773, he was the son of a Reformed minister. He studied Theology in Jena and 
received his ordination as a minister in Zurich. While in Jena, Smidt had befriended 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and mixed with other figures of the German Enlightenment. After 
his return to Bremen, Smidt had been elected into the Senat in 1800. His biographers 
paint a picture of Smidt as a sharp-witted intellectual who was convinced that Bremen 
could play a leading role in world trade. The city’s political elite must have realized 
                                                 
305 Lemnitzer, Jan Martin, “’A few burghers in a little Hanseatic town’ – Die Bremer Seerechtskampagne 
von 1859,” in: Bremisches Jahrbuch vol. 83 (2004), p. 87-111. 
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Smidt’s gift – his age at the time of his election was twenty years below the average for 
new Senatoren.306
While a delegate to the Congress of Vienna, Johann Smidt used his diplomatic 
talent and influence for a cause equally important to him as Bremen’s sovereignty: the 
exclusion of Jews from the city. Under French rule, Jews had been allowed to settle in 
Bremen. The spirit of reform that gripped Prussia during the wars against Napoleon had 
resulted in Jewish emancipation in that kingdom. The liberal ideal of a citizenry 
composed of equals, rather than a people divided into privileged orders and estates, was 
the dominant principle in German political thinking in the period from 1810 to 1818. 
Prussia, with its comparatively enlightened ministries during this brief reform period, was 
perceived as the bellwether of a general trend contemporaries believed would shape the 
constitutions of the Germanic Confederation and its member states. Smidt, dedicated to a 
vision of community based on tradition, was not about to allow this liberal trend to 
become a reality.307
A provision in the founding document of the Germanic Confederation under 
discussion in Vienna stated that “Jews receive full civic rights in the states of the 
Confederation.” Cunningly, Johann Smidt worked behind the scenes to have the word 
‘in’ replaced with the word ‘by.’ Instead of an obligation to emancipate Jews, states 
would be given the discretion to do so. Smidt’s lobbying efforts were successful, and the 
final document contained the change in wording he had desired. Jewish emancipation in 
                                                 
306 Bippen, Johann Smidt; Möller, “Politik der Hansestädte.” 
307 Wippermann, Wolfgang, Jüdisches Leben im Raum Bremerhaven. Eine Fallstudie zur Alltagsgeschichte 
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Germany was thus deferred for another thirty-three years. Free to revert to the exclusive 
criteria for citizenship, Bremen’s government quickly moved to exclude Jews from the 
city. Those Jews who had settled in Bremen under French law were expelled.308
Arguably, Jews were not the only ones excluded. Catholics were equally 
unwanted in the Hanseatic city, and even Lutherans found it hard to be accepted into 
Bremish society. On the one hand, Smith’s anti-Judaism was merely an affirmation of the 
general principle of communal exclusivity and homogeneity. On the other hand, Smidt 
went to great lengths to have the principle confirmed specifically for Jews; and in 
practice, no other group was as systematically purged from the city. 
In 1821, in recognition of his achievements, Johann Smidt was elected 
Burgomaster. As such, he pursued a particularistic policy, directed against both 
nationalism and popular participation. If Bremen found herself aligned with German 
liberals on occasion, it was due to a convergence of interests on questions of trade. After 
1830, however, the liberal-nationalist mainstream increasingly favored a protective tariff, 
to which Bremen’s merchants did not subscribe.309
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During his thirty-six years at the head of the government, Smidt put into practice 
his vision for Bremen as a city of world trade. He systematically created the conditions 
that put Bremen’s merchants in the position competitively to engage in trade with the 
United States. In the 1820s, he secured by treaty with the neighboring Kingdom of 
Hannover a piece of land by the mouth of the Weser River, on which the deep-sea port of 
Bremerhaven was built. In 1827, he signed the trade treaty between Bremen and the 
United States. In the 1830s, he lent his support to merchants’ efforts to attract German 
emigrants to the port of Bremen. Further strengthening the ties between the Hanseatic 
city and the hinterland, a railroad line connecting Bremen to Hannover was completed in 
1848, with the financial backing of the Bremish state.310
Still, international trade remained the priority of Bremen’s mercantile elite and its 
burgomaster. Smidt kept Bremen out of the German Customs Union, formed in 1833. 
The abolition of tariffs on trade between its member states was not worth the impediment 
to foreign trade – especially the considerable re-export trade – of the high external tariff 
barriers the Customs Union had set up. In the 1840s, Smidt made sure that Bremen would 
be among the first continental ports to establish a direct steam-ship connection with the 
new world. In 1853, he further cemented the ties to the United States by appointing 
Rudolf Schleiden as Bremen’s first professional diplomat in Washington, DC. If his 
modest world-historical fame rests on his anti-Judaic record, Johann Smidt’s image in 
Bremen remains that of a man revered for a prudent foreign policy that propelled the city 
from a regional trading center to an entrepôt of world trade.311
                                                                                                                                                 
deutsche Wirtschaftsordnung. Wirtschaftspolitische Aufsätze  (=Abhandlungen und Vorträge 
herausgegeben von der Wittheit zu Bremen, vol. 15, no. 1, August 1942) , Bremen 1942. 
310 Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, p. 73 and 121-134. 
311 Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, p. 221-222. Today, one of the four bridges across the Weser River in 
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Rudolf Schleiden became the head of an already well-established network of 
consulates in the New World, whose functionaries were recruited from Bremen’s 
merchant houses in American ports. Through this network, Bremen projected abroad its – 
admittedly modest – power as a state; as consuls served judiciary functions for ship 
crews, negotiated with custom officials, helped hunt down deserters, and labored to 
create public good-will towards the immigrants who arrived on Bremish vessels. Through 
the consuls, Bremen also received crucial intelligence about the economic and political 
situation abroad. As consuls tended to come from well-established Hanseatic families, 




                                                                                                                                                 
Bremen is named after Smidt. Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen 1853/06/16, StAHB 7,116 
[Rudolf Schleiden Papers], folder “Briefwechsel Rudolf Schleiden mit Senator Arnold Duckwitz, 1854-
1879,” third of five unnumbered and unlabeled boxes. 
312 Rösing, Johannes, “Schleiden”, in: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, vol. 54, p. 38-39; Steinsdorfer, 
Helmut, “Zur Erinnerung an Rudolf Schleiden (1815-1895) – Diplomat, Politiker und Publizist aus 
Schleswig-Holstein”, in: Die Heimat (Hususm) vol. 102, no. 9/10 (Sept./Oct. 1995), pp. 201-215; Fink, 
Georg, "Diplomatische Vertretungen der Hanse seit dem 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Auflösung der 
Hanseatischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin 1920”, in: Hanseatische Geschichtsblätter, vol. 56, Lübeck 1932, p. 
112-155; Graßmann, Antjekathrin, “Hanse weltweit? Zu den Konsulaten Lübecks, Bremens und Hamburgs 
im 19. Jahrhundert,” in: Idem, ed., Ausklang und Nachklang der Hanse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert 
(=Hansischer Geschichtsverein, ed., Hansische Studien, vol. 12), Trier 2001, p. 43-66. 
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Bremen as Home Town 
In domestic politics, Johann Smidt presided over the dismantling of the 
Napoleonic Code in Bremish law, and the reintroduction of customary laws. At the center 
of this traditional legal order stood a tiered system of citizenship that made participation 
in the political and economic life of the city a matter of acquired privilege, rather than of 
rights. It was in a memorandum Smidt wrote during the occasion of the Congress of 
Vienna, that he summed up the modus operandi of Bremen’s governmental system: “In 
states this small, the constitution is but the framework of an extended family life, where 
the bond is only held by mutual trust.”313 As much a normative as a descriptive statement, 
Smidt affirmed here his firm believe in a communal basis of government, and his 
opposition to liberal theories of society. 
After 1813, the Senat had reinstated a corporatist structure of city government. 
Not unlike the “home towns” of central Germany described by Mack Walker, Bremen’s 
political and social institutions intertwined to uphold a pre-capitalist form of society. Its 
cornerstone were the guilds, bases of civic identity and cultural expression, as well as 
institutions with an economic function – that of limiting the markets for labor and 
commodities, in the service of providing all market participants with a ‘just price.’ Limits 
on residency and citizenship restricted occupational mobility within, and the movement 
of outsiders into the city.314
The institutions of civic government represented layers of power, emanations of 
particular estates, created under specific historical circumstances, and hence invested 
                                                 
313 Smidt, Johann, Denkschrift über die Judenfrage in Bremen, as paraphrased by Baron, Salo W., Die 
Judenfrage auf dem Wiener Kongreß, Vienna and Berlin 1920, p. 105. In 1920, Baron found this document 
in the Vienna State Archive. I could not establish the present location. 
314 Cf. Walker, Mack, German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1817, Ithaca, 
NY and London 1971. See also chapter 4 for the demise of the guild system in the early 1860s. 
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with the aura of tradition.315 They had come into being over the course of centuries, as 
more and different groups came to lay claims to participation in the governance of the 
city. The Senat316 represented the oldest layer of communal rule. The Kaufmannskonvent 
(merchants’ convention) and its organ, the Handelskammer,317 embodied the claims by 
merchants to participate in city government, historically often in conflict with the Senat. 
The Bürgerschaft318 was the youngest layer, a body incorporating artisans and their guilds 
into city government alongside the mercantile representatives. 
The 1848 revolution in Bremen was the first successful attack from within on the 
political principle behind this tangle of institutions. The brief reign of the democrats – 
supported by the lower and middling classes of the city, but constantly sabotaged by the 
Senat – brought universal male suffrage and a formal separation of powers between the 
Senat (as government), the Bürgerschaft (as legislature) and the judiciary. However, it 
left the corporatist social structure unaffected.319
 
Burgomaster Smidt’s course of action during the revolutionary upheaval of 1848 
can be regarded as an apt expression of the peculiar mix of conservatism and innovation 
that characterized Bremen’s mercantile elite at home, and helped shape the behavior of its 
merchants abroad. Smidt had been called by the revolutionary German parliament, the 
Frankfurt National Assembly, to serve as foreign minister in the revolutionary German 
                                                 
315 Cf. Niehoff, Lydia, 550 Jahre Tradition der Unabhängigkeit. Chronik der Handelskammer Bremen 
(Handelskammer Bremen, ed.), Bremen 2001, p. 101. 
316 The Senat functioned as the government of Bremen. To avoid confusion with its U.S. namesake, I will 
use the German original in italics whenever refering to the Senat of Bremen. 
317 I will use the German original, throughout, since the correct translation – Chamber of Commerce – fails 
to convey the sense of a traditional estate carried by the German. 
318 As for the Handelskammer and the Senat, I will leave the parliamentary body in Bremen’s government 
in the German original, since any English translation would fail to convey the corporatist connotation. 
319 Biebusch, Werner, Revolution und Staatsstreich. Verfassungskämpfe in Bremen, 1848-1854 
(=Veröffentlichungen aus dem Staatsarchiv Bremen, vol. 40), Bremen 1974. 
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government, but declined. Instead, he encouraged his protegée, Senator Arnold 
Duckwitz, to accept an appointment as minister of commerce. This sent a signal that 
Bremen was with the revolutionary movement, in case it won; yet made sure that the 
Hanseatic presence at Frankfurt was conservative enough not to forego future 
cooperation with crowned heads, in case these stayed on their bearers’ shoulders.320
Within Bremen, Smidt made sure that the popular movement demanding the 
extension of citizenship rights to the unpropertied was kept in check. A new 
Bürgerschaft, elected in 1848 with universal male suffrage, had a democratic majority. 
The Senat, however, remained in office, its existing members confirmed in their life-long 
tenure. Only newly elected Senatoren were to be restricted to a twelve-year term. The 
revolutionary Bürgerschaft had the chance to replace one Senator who died in 1849, but 
otherwise the Senat remained an institutional safe haven for reactionaries, who could bide 
their time until an opportunity presented itself to restore the traditional political order.321
Senator Diedrich A. Meier displayed a sense of disgust at the state of affairs in a 
letter to Gustav B. Schwab. From the point of view of this Hanseat, democracy was 
primarily a nuisance hindering good government by the elite: 
We would be happier and more joyful here if we did not have the democrats, because 
these make our life difficult and one engages in public affairs, from which one cannot 
withdraw here, but with annoyance and grudgingly, but in our station one cannot help but 
deal with these things.322
 
Fortunately for Meier, Smidt, and their allies, help was on the way. By 1851, the 
revolution in Germany had been defeated. Prussian and Austrian bayonets had restored 
                                                 
320 Bippen, Johann Smidt; Krieger, Arnold Duckwitz; Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, vol. 2, p. 181-214. 
321 Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, vol. 2, p. 181-214; Biebusch, Revolution. 
322 D. A. Meier to Gustav B. Schwab, Bremen 1849/12/11, MSS 434, John Christopher Schwab Family 
Papers. Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, series I, box 1, folder 29. 
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the Germanic Confederation and the power of the monarchs. Johann Smidt secretly 
appealed to the restored council of German sovereigns (Bundesrat) for a law that 
threatened with force any member state of the Confederation that retained a democratic 
constitution. Once that law had been passed, the Senat used the threat of an armed 
intervention by the Confederation to bypass the Bürgerschaft and to enact a voting law 
that considerably restricted the suffrage (1851, see table 9). Once the first election under 
the new law had purged the democrats from the parliamentary body, Smidt successfully 
pushed for a constitution that reinstated the rights of the estates, yet left the separation of 
powers partially in place (1854).323 Completing the reactionary backlash, the leader of the 
democrats, pastor Rudolf Dulon, was defrocked and incarcerated. Smidt, the Theologian, 
did not pass the opportunity to cite religious as well as political grounds for his 




                                                 
323 Jurisprudence, in particular, remained in the hands of a separate branch of government, where it had 
been an executive function before 1848. 
324 Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, vol. 2, p. 207-214. 
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Table 9 
Representation in the Bürgerschaft under the 1851 Voting Law 
Class Members of 
the Bürger-
schaft 




of the BBü 
I 16 Scholarly estate* 141 14.1
II 48 Mercantile estate* 776 16.2
III 24 Artisanal estate* 138 5.8
IV.a. 10 Residents of Bremen, >500 Thaler taxable 
income 
886 88.6
IV.b. 10 Residents of Bremen, 250-500 Thaler taxable 
income 
1754 175.4
IV.c. 10 Residents of Bremen, no taxable income (i.e., 
<250 Thaler) 
2460 246.0





6 Residents of Bremerhaven (three voter classes 
@ 2 members each) 
375 62.5
VII. 10 Agricultural estate* 750 75.0
VIII. 10 Other rural population 2355 235.5
 
Source: Herbert Schwarzwälder, Geschichte der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, 4 vols., Hamburg 
1987, vol. 2, p. 217-218. Classes marked by an asterisk represent proper estates, each electing a 
Chamber to represent their members. The individual members of an estate, and its Chamber, 
jointly picked the Bürgerschaft members for that class. 
Numbers reflect the population in 1852. Only 1/8th (12.5%) of the total population of the state of 
Bremen were able to vote under any of the categories. Many inhabitants were excluded from 
voting because of their age, others because they did not have a status as burghers. Even in the 1867 
Reichstag elections, however, in which every male from age 25 could vote, only 18,636 persons 
(16.3%) out of 114,000 inhabitants could vote. Assuming gender parity among the population, this 
would suggest that a share of up to 2/3 of the population was below 25 years of age. See Krieger, 
Adolf, Bremische Politik im Jahrzehnt vor der Reichsgründung (=Schriften der Bremer 
Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, Reihe F (früher A*), Friedrich Prüser, ed., Veröffentlichungen 
des Archivs der Hansestadt Bremen, vol. 15), Bremen 1939, p. 90, note 2, and p. 118, note 1. 
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The Corporatist Order of the 1850s 
The economic side of the corporatist order had not been affected by the revolution 
of 1848. Where, in other German states, free labor (Gewerbefreiheit) was high on the 
revolutionary agenda, Bremen’s democrats had a strong base among the crafts, and 
therefore left the guilds alone.325 Guild-like arrangements in the mercantile profession, 
supported by a solid consensus among the elite, likewise survived 1848 virtually 
unaltered. For example, the right to become a long-distance merchant remained tied to 
the purchase of the Greater Privilege.326
Under the 1854 constitution, a person’s station in society was once again defined 
by his or her economic function. Every occupation had a place in a corporate order. A 
cobbler was a member of the shoemakers’ guild qua his profession, which he held as a 
quasi-public office; at the same time as a person desiring to work as a cobbler would have 
to be a member of the shoemakers’ guild, in the first place. All traditional trades and 
professions were organized in this corporate manner. Providing services or selling 
commodities was reserved by law to those organized in a guild. Only non-traditional 
occupations, such as cigar-making, and laborers outside of the transportation business 
were exempt from these regulations.327
The two venues of admittance to most of the artisanal guilds, and hence to market 
participation as a producer in that craft, were apprenticeship and inheritance (in the case 
                                                 
325 Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, vol. 2, p. 193, 203, 227. While literally translating into ‘freedom of trades,’ 
Gewerbefreiheit was discussed as a matter of the right of individuals to choose their profession freely. Its 
proponents and opponents alike used the term ‘free labor’ (Freiheit der Arbeit) in the debates, and I have 
chosen to use this term to describe the idea behind the project of the abolition of the guilds. Trade in this 
sense does not describe commerce (as in ‘free trade agreement’), but artisanal production (as in ‘the tools 
of the trade’). 
326 Marschalek, Peter, “Der Erwerb des bremischen Bürgerrechts und die Zuwanderung nach Bremen um 
die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in: Bremisches Jahrbuch, vol. 66 (1988), p. 295-305. 
327 Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, vol. 2, p. 227-230. 
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of masters’ widows). For mercantile professions, access could be bought, in that the 
Greater Privilege entitled its bearer to engage in foreign trade, whereas the Lesser 
Privilege came with the right to trade commodities domestically. Some professions were 
further limited, in that the law provided for only a limited number of Senat-appointed 
office-holders. Such was the case for lawyers and notaries public, but also for brokers and 
agents, sub-divided by types of commodities; stock, bonds, bills of exchange, and specie; 
and, finally, ships. These professions, unlike the guilds, lacked bodies of self-
government. Their practitioners were answerable to the community at large, via 
Senatorial supervision.328
Among the traditional institutions of corporate society that survived into the 
1860s, those governing financial matters were particularly remarkable. In a study of 
Bremish financial markets, Hanseatic economic historian Ludwig Beutin argues that, 
where other German states had resorted to externalizing money lending and exchange 
from the Christian community by allowing it to Jews, Bremen had created the brokers’ 
corporation for these purposes. Brokers were required to be of the Reformed creed, and 
were forbidden to conduct any business on their own account. Merchants, in turn, were 
obliged to conduct their monetary transactions through the brokers.329
Mandated by law, the balancing of accounts between merchants had to be 
administered by two brokers, appointed by the Senat. On two weekdays, at a set time, the 
brokers compared outstanding accounts, and calculated balances. The merchants then 
                                                 
328 Beutin, Ludwig, Bremisches Bank- und Börsenwesen seit dem 17. Jahrhundert. Von der 
Wirtschaftsgesinnung einer Hansestadt (=Abhandlungen und Vorträge herausgegeben von der Bremer 
Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, vol. 10, no. 4, December 1937), Bremen 1937; Böhmert, Victor, Beiträge 
zur Geschichte des Zunftwesens (=Preisschriften, gekrönt und herausgegeben von der fürstlich 
Jablonowski’schen Gesellschaft zu Leipzig, IX.), Leipzig 1862 (1859). 
329 Beutin, Bank- und Börsenwesen; Ahrens, Gerhard, “Staatsschuld und Anleihenpolitik der hanseatischen 
Stadtrepubliken im frühen 19. Jahrhundert,” in: Blätter für Deutsche Landesgeschichte, vol. 134 (1998), p. 
361-406. 
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settled their accounts with each other in specie. The evident benefit of this procedure was 
to lower the amount of money needed in circulation. This venerable system had been in 
place essentially unaltered since 1626.330
The brokers were expressly forbidden from engaging in banking activities on their 
own account. They could not give credit. Their revenue came exclusively from the 
commission fees they received from the merchants.331 Still, the broker-system made 
possible a credit-system. In the eighteenth century, merchants within Bremen began to 
draw bills of exchange on three or six months - much longer than the thirty days usual 
even in the mid-nineteenth century - on each other. By doing so, they expanded the 
amount of available capital. Beutin contended that the fragility of this system, caused by 
the right of every merchant to demand payment at the due date, was counterbalanced by 
the closely-knit structure of the merchant community, based on mutual trust.332 Whether 
trust or interest constituted a stronger bond, the system worked. Most likely, a strong 
family network supplied both trust and interest as incentives to make it work. 
Beutin correctly poins out that, apart from facilitating circulation, the broker-
system fulfilled the function of keeping the market of Bremen closed to foreigners. Non-
citizens of Bremen were not allowed to do business with each other within the city. 
Wholesale trade was legally reserved to holders of the Greater Privilege, which could be 
bought for four hundred Thaler Gold, and for which a security deposit and a minimum 
amount of property were required. The Lesser Privilege, which came with more 
restrictive economic rights, went for fifty Thaler Gold. The brokers enforced trade 
                                                 
330 Beutin, Bank- und Börsenwesen, p. 8. 
331 These fees were: 1‰ of their value for bills of exchange, 1/8% of the coverage sum for insurance 
contracts, and 1/36 Taler Gold (2 Grote) per Last (literally, ‘load,’ a cubic measure) for the commissioning 
of cargo; Beutin, Bank- und Börsenwesen,  p. 10. 
332 Beutin, Bank- und Börsenwesen,  p. 18. 
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restrictions. Bremen’s market was thus a closely watched, closed society. As the brokers 
supervised the market-place, the Senat supervised the brokers.333 The traditional ethos of 
this economy continued to decry interest as usury throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century, although the use of bills of exchange expanded.334
Taxation remained governed by tradition, as well. Among the general population, 
an income tax was collected by the Senat. The holders of the Lesser and Greater 
Privilege, however, who contributed most of the tax revenue, enjoyed the privilege of 
self-taxation. With their civic oath, they had sworn to contribute an annual amount of 
taxes, dependent on their wealth. This amount was paid in cash, anonymously deposited 
in city hall on a set day of the year. As late as 1866, a special tax to finance the cost of the 
Six Weeks War was collected in this way.335
Individuals – in as far as we can speak of individuals under a system that defines a 
person first and foremost in relation to his or her station – enjoyed political rights through 
their membership in corporations. The 150 members of parliament, the Bürgerschaft, 
were elected in eight different voter classes, each class defined differently, but all defined 
by the economic standing and social function of its members (Table 9). 
The first class consisted of sixteen members, representing the scholars’ estate. All 
those who held a doctorate were eligible as voters in this class. The second, and largest 
individual class, was jointly elected by the members of the Merchants’ Convention 
(Kaufmannsconvent) and the Handelskammer. Voters in this class had to hold the Greater 
Privilege, and engage in some form of oversea trade. Class three comprised the 
                                                 
333 Beutin, Bank- und Börsenwesen,  p. 21, 50-51; Beutin, Bremen und Amerika, pp. 120-121.  
334 Beutin, Bank- und Börsenwesen,  pp. 25-30. 
335 Verhandlungen der Bremischen Bürgerschaft im Jahre 1866, 20. Sitzung, July 7, 1866, p. 301-308. 
From hereon, I will cite the Bürgerschaft minutes in the following abbreviated format: VdBBü 
[YEAR]/[SESSION No.], [SESSION DATE], page numbers. 
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representatives of the artisans’ guilds. Its twenty-four members were elected jointly by 
the Trades’ Convention and the Chamber of the Trades. Finally, freeholders of 
farmsteads, together with the Chamber of Agriculture, sent ten men into parliament. 
These four groups represented proper corporate bodies, or estates. A total of 1,805 
persons were represented through these estates. Another 8,305 persons had voting rights 
in the remaining four voter classes, defined by taxable income and place of residence. 
Bremen’s most recent chronist, Herbert Schwarzwälder, has estimated that seven-eighth 
of the population, or another 70,000 persons, were completely disenfranchised under the 
1851 voting law.336
This system of representation was evidently uneven. It was also deliberately 
confusing. To make matters more complicated, only half of the members delegated by 
each voter-class were elected every three years, for a six-year term. The other half were 
elected for the same duration of term, but at an interval three years removed. To 
American readers, this principle should be familiar. It is essentially the same mechanism 
as that by which the U.S. Senate is elected, with the difference that the latter is divided 
into three cohorts, rather than two. As in the U.S. constitution, its purpose in Bremen was 
to limit the impact of an ‘undesirable’ election outcome. The desired effect of the eight-
class voting system was to discourage broad popular participation. After its introduction, 
less than one in ten eligible low-income voters participated in elections.337
No amount of support for democrats among ‘the many’ would have been able to 
change the central fact of this system – it was an instrument of mercantile political 
dominance. Short of another revolution, any changes to that system were thus to be 
                                                 
337 Ibid. This same class had been the main force behind the 1848 revolution. 
336 Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, vol. 2, p. 217-218. 
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‘reforms from above,’ originating within the mercantile estate, itself. This estate, 
however, saw the corporate mode of popular representation as a keystone to a good social 
order and a well-run polity. While Hanseats’ support for this system of government was 
consistent, none of them justified it as elaborately as Wilhelm Kiesselbach. 
 
 
Wilhelm Kiesselbach, Organic Intellectual of Bremen’s Elite 
Practical politicians are not as prone to develop a coherent theory of their own 
interests as are intellectuals. The latter can afford an honest appraisal, where the former 
might be limited by tactical considerations.338 In spite of the standing quip of outsiders 
that Hanseats suffered from a narrowness of intellectual perspective induced by their 
fixation on commercial pursuits, Bremen’s elite did produce some original thinkers. Most 
remarkable among them was Wilhelm Kiesselbach, an organic intellectual in the double 
sense, as a theorist for his estate, and as a proponent of an organically ordered, corporatist 
society. 
An academic with a nationwide audience, Wilhelm Kiesselbach was recognized 
by his contemporaries as a Hanseatic theorist.339 In his works, he provided the theoretical 
justification for combining a corporatist political, with a liberal economic order. 
Merchants participating in public debates in Bremen resonated Kiesselbach’s arguments, 
                                                 
338 I am following Eugene Genovese in this argument. See his The World the Slaveholders 
Made, Two Essays in Interpretation, New York 1969, p. 163. 
339 For example, when Marx alleged the inability of merchant capital to grasp the essence of the political 
economy of industrial capitalism, he cited Kiesselbach as the leading example. Marx, Karl, Capital, vol. 3, 
Moscow  1974 (Progress Publishers), p. 327, note 46. Likewise, on p. 339 of the same volume of Capital, 
Marx refers to Kiesselbach’s study The Course of World Trade in the Middle Ages (Der Gang des 
Welthandels im Mittelalter, Bremen 1860) to illustrate his point that the ‘purely mercantile cities’ live in 
their glorious past, and utterly lack all comprehension of modern capitalist times. 
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familiar to them from his writings, as well as personal interaction. Born in 1824, 
Kiesselbach stemmed from a well-established Hanseatic family, and was part of the circle 
of intermarried elite members.340 He taught History at Heidelberg, but, after the death of 
his wife, retired to Bremen in 1862, where he died in 1872.341
While Kiesselbach’s most important publications date from the early 1860s, they 
illuminate the world of ideas that informed the generation of Hanseats who had made 
Bremen into a center of world trade in the preceding decades. Kiesselbach’s oeuvre 
represents the sum of experience of Bremen’s elite, systematizing the opinions generally 
shared among his estate, and affirming convictions formed and solidified over time. One 
reason these Hanseatic ideas were never developed as extensively earlier might be that 
they had never been as vigorously under attack from the forces of industrialization, 
nationalism, and democracy as they were in the 1860s. At that point, Bremen’s elite 
needed a Kiesselbach to represent to the world what they already knew to be true. 
Kiesselbach’s writings place him squarely at the center of the transatlantic nexus 
that informed political debates in Bremen. He was one of the first Germans to write on 
the subject of the U.S. Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Federalist 
Papers.342 Epitomizing the Hanseatic interest in the U.S., Kiesselbach wrote: 
Over the couch in father’s study, there hung a lithography of the American 
Declaration of Independence, of July 4th, 1776; surrounded by the portraits of 
Washington, Hancock, and Jefferson, and the coats-of-arms of the old thirteen 
states of the Union.  As a boy, I often stood in front of this tableau, asking myself 
how this confederation of states had been ordered. When, after the early death of 
the father, I was allowed to take the frame, the dear image of the deceased 
                                                 
340 Cf. Brandes, Erika, “Der Bremer Überseekaufmann in seiner gesellschaftsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung im 
‘geschlossenen Heiratskreis’,” in: Genealogisches Jahrbuch, vol. 3 (1963), p. 25-48. 
341 “Kiesselbach, Wilhelm,” NDB, v.11, p. 599-600. Kiesselbach’s brother, for example, was married to the 
daughter of Mayor Duckwitz. See also Engelsing, "England und die USA,” p. 57. 
342 Kiesselbach, Wilhelm, Der amerikanische Federalist. Politische Studien für die deutsche Gegenwart, 2 
vol., Bremen, London and New York 1864. 
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merged with my scholarly studies, which I had ceaselessly conducted in my 
youth, under this great document, now looking at me from the wall.343
 
This display of sentimental attachment to the founding documents of the U.S., as 
well as his praise for “the proud accomplishment of Washington,”344 have led German 
Historians of the U.S. to consider Kiesselbach a liberal. The late Willi Paul Adams 
claimed that Kiesselbach desired a democratic state in Germany. Horst Dippel credits 
Kiesselbach with locating the principles of the Declaration of Independence in their 
North American context, yet blames him for missing their universal content.345
Both characterizations miss the mark. Kiesselbach was an opponent of 
democracy, and he was well aware of the ‘universal’ – in his own words, ‘abstract’ and 
‘French’ – content of the Declaration of Independence. The point was that he rejected this 
content, and welcomed the Constitution as an overdue rectification of the dangerously 
revolutionary situation created under the Articles of Confederation.346
In Kiesselbach’s world-view, the ‘abstract state of law’347 had to be complemented 
by elements of a ‘social-economic state.’ He identified the former with the French model 
of “drawing straight lines from the center of power to the atomized individual in society,” 
and blamed this type of state for what he regarded as the unhealthy dominance of the 
bureaucracy over society.348
                                                 
343 Kiesselbach, Federalist, vol. 1, p. III. Kiesselbach further mentions that he received a copy of the 
Federalist, when his brother brought one back with him from the United States. 
344 Idem, p. IV. 
345 Adams, “German Translations”; Dippel, Horst, “Die Unabhängigkeitserklärung in Deutschland: 
Betrachtungen über politische Kultur und gemeinsame Werte,” 
http://www.dhm.de/magazine/unabhaengig/dippel_d.htm. 
346 Other Hanseats found the rights of states the most appealing feature of the U.S. Constitution. See 
Engelsing, "England und die USA,” p. 62-64. 
347 He uses the term Rechtsstaat, throughout. 
348 Kiesselbach, Wilhelm, Socialpolitische Studien (Nach den in der Deutschen Vierteljahrsschrift 
veröffentlichten Aufsätzen des Verfassers zusammengestellt und neu durchgearbeitet), Stuttgart 1862, p. 
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His ideal of the ‘social-economic state’ may best be characterized as corporatist, 
or rather estatist. Unlike other conservative proponents of a corporatist, ‘organic’ social 
order, however, Kiesselbach was not an enemy of capitalism by any means. This set him 
apart from both German reactionaries, and the Southern Conservative tradition in the 
United States.349 At the same time, Kiesselbach shared with these latter contemporaries 
the view that the person is more than a bearer of abstract rights.350 Overall, his views most 
closely resembled those one might find among Whigs in the United States.351 Within 
Germany, he remained a unique figure, reflecting the peculiar position of Hanseats in the 
society of the German states. 
As a member of the Hanseatic elite, Kiesselbach was in fact proud of the 
accomplishments of (merchant-)capital. He described the state as a mere “skeleton,” to 
which “mobile property”352 adds “muscles,” and “drives rolling money as blood through 
the veins it has created.”  He viewed the absolutist state as mostly concerned with war, an 
enterprise detrimental to trade interests.  Eventually, he believed, the body politic created 
                                                                                                                                                 
117. The notion of bureaucracy that informs Kiesselbach assumes a unified civil administration that decides 
from abstract principles. 
349 Riehl, Wilhelm Heinrich, Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft, Stuttgart 1861, for example p. 
174-175; Genovese, Eugene D., The World the Slaveholders Made. Two Essays in 
Interpretation, New York 1969, especially part II on George Fitzhugh, whose thought has 
a strong resemblance to both Riehl’s and Kiesselbach’s; Idem, The Slaveholders’ 
Dilemma. Freedom and Progress in Southern Conservative Thought, 1820-1860, 
Columbia, SC 1992; Gentz, Friedrich von, The French and American Revolutions 
Compared, translated by John Quincy Adams (1800), in: Possony, Stefan T. (ed.), Three 
Revolutions, Chicago 1959. 
350 For the roots of this position in German Enlightenment and Romantic thought, see Harada, Tetsushi, 
Politische Ökonomie des Idealismus und der Romantik. Korporatismus von Fichte, Müller und Hegel 
(=Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften, vol. 386), Berlin/W. 1989. A shared ancestor of English, German, and 
American proponents of this view was Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France, London 
1986 (1790). 
351 See Ashworth, John, ‘Agrarians’ and ‘Aristocrats’. Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837-
1846, London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ 1983; Howe, Daniel Walker, The Political Culture of the 
American Whigs, Chicago and London 1979. 
352 Bewegliches Eigentum, as opposed to immobile, landed property, includes both trade and trades. 
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by mobile property would be able to do without the “belligerent bone structure of the 
state.”  The Kantian vision of world peace brought about by harmonious, mutually 
beneficial commerce among nations, shared by so many Hanseats, echoed strongly in this 
view, and might excuse the awkward image of this utopian world as a body without 
bones.353
Not unlike the American founding fathers, and even not unlike democrats, 
Kiesselbach believed in the ability of society to govern itself. The key difference between 
Kiesselbach’s thought and the liberal and democratic tradition was their different views 
of what actually constitutes a ‘society.’ 
For Kiesselbach, the basis of self-government was not the individual endowed 
with political rights, but a society organically constituted by the mutual bonds of 
economic interdependence and cooperation among its members. His usage of the term 
‘organic,’ however, deserves a closer look, lest he be subsumed with those conservatives 
who regarded traditional institutions an immediate expression of (human) nature or 
divine will. Kiesselbach emphasizes that both the state and the city are “made,” once 
there arises, from an increase of the division of labor, a need for firmer social structure. 
Before the mediaeval commune of burghers, or the feudal state, there was nothing but the 
“corrosive republicanism of agriculture.” This rural society was “a group of people that 
was not yet socially organic.”354
Once states were established, trade remained the driving force behind progress 
and civilization. International law, for example, is a child of international trade.  Between 
states that do not engage in foreign trade, there would not even be any international 
                                                 
353 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 35; see also p. 46, where he praises the liberating qualities of circulation. 
354 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 41; my emphasis. The quip against Jefferson may well be intended. 
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politics in a proper sense – that is, other than mere military clashes over territory. 
Kiesselbach’s pride in the civilizing mission of merchant capital contrasts starkly with the 
anti-commercialism of agrarian conservatives.355
 
The philosophical core of Kiesselbach’s ideas was a kind of estatist materialism, 
resonating with the idea of ‘sober business sense’ so highly valued in mercantile circles: 
The struggle for the daily bread, i.e., that labor which supports the individual’s 
existence, is the condition of all human activity. The natural division of labor not 
only puts man in a particular place in the general structure of society; but the kind 
of his work also has an inescapable effect on the development of his 
individuality.356
 
The individual attains importance not as an abstract person, but as a member of a 
group defined by its economic activity. This embeddedness of the individual serves to 
counteract a second, negative impact of money: its tendency to level people, by making 
them equals in the marketplace. Kiesselbach considered the French tradition of statecraft 
and constitutionalism and its precursor, Roman Law, as “the law of a pure money-
economy.”357 This legal tradition “separates person, labor and property from one 
another,” where they ought to be considered inseparable moments of a whole.358
Evidently, mercantile activities depended on the interaction of legally equal 
partners to contracts in the market place. The ubiquity of contractual relations in their 
own social sphere, however, did not necessarily lead merchants to assume that the 
                                                 
355 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 58. For examples of anti-commercialism directed against the Hanseatic cities: 
Möller, Kurt Detlev, “Zur Politik der Hansestädte im Jahre 1806,” in: Zeitschrift des Vereins für 
Hamburgische Geschichte, vol. 41 (1951) (=Festschrift für H. Reincke), p. 330-352; Böhmert, Victor, “Die 
Stellung der Hansestädte zu Deutschland in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten,” in: Vierteljahrsschrift für 
Volkswirthschaft und Cultur, vol. 1 (1863), p. 73-115. For an important American example, see Taylor, 
John, An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States, London 1950 
(1814), especially p. 230-353. Cf. Chapter 5. 
356 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 118. 
357 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 125. 
358 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 125. 
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contract could serve as a general model for political relations in society at large. The 
contract between merchants is never an abstract legal interaction, but is embedded in the 
moral economy of the estate. Barriers to admission to the estate, the market, or both, 
assure the honor of the parties to the contract.359
This might explain why the Rousseaudian idea of a social contract appeared as an 
absurdity to Kiesselbach.360 A contract can only come to be between agents who are equal 
by virtue of their station; the mere establishment of a contractual relation, however, does 
not render both parties equal. 
That said, Kiesselbach does come down on the side of free competition on the 
marketplace for commodities and labor. He wants to see both trades and landownership 
opened up to all interested parties. In other words, he supports the abolition of 
primogeniture and entail, and the scrapping of guild exclusivity.361
Kiesselbach wants the individual to be free to establish himself in any branch of 
economic activity. Once, however, a person has settled for a calling, his political rights 
should be derived from his social position. It is here that Kiesselbach explicitly 
recommends the Bremish example as a model for the political constitution of Germany: 
The mercantile state of Bremen proves that a social organization of the state is 
possible, and that it has the best consequences for a vibrant political life. (...) 
Bremen held to the estatist principle of citizenship in her constitutional organs.  
The Senat is formed from the scholarly and mercantile estates in a particular 
proportion; the “Bürgerschaft” – that is, parliament – likewise is not formed by 
timocratically constituted voter classes, but is elected by the different great 
incorporated branches of labor in the city; in it [the Bürgerschaft], the difference 
between the scholarly, mercantile, artisanal, and agricultural estates reappears.  
                                                 
359 H. H. Meier expressed this consciousness in his defense of the broker-system, see Chapter 4, p. 224. For 
the assumption that contractual relations do not entail social equality, in the United States, see: Stanley, 
Amy Dru, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave 
Emancipation, New York 1998; and Richardson, Heather Cox, The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, 
and Politics in the post-Civil War North, 1865-1901, Cambridge, Mass. and London, UK, 2001. 
360 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 129. 
361 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 180. 
 183
This institution has immediately sprung from [social] conditions; it is a natural 
product of Bremish society.362
 
Kiesselbach emphasizes that the healthy, organic, corporatist order of his home 
town can exist in spite of the overwhelming dominance of mobile property in this 
community, which easily could have led to the development of a “pure state of law and 
abstract citizenship.” It did not, because the estatist consciousness of Bremen’s 
inhabitants made this impossible. Their corporatist institutions are so well entrenched that 
the French model never made any inroads.363
Kiesselbach’s account of the Bremish constitution is remarkable for what it does 
not reveal. He does not mention that the majority of those citizens who enjoyed the right 
to vote were represented in taxation-based classes, rather than by estate. Likewise, he 
ignores that the eight-class voting system had been established against the wishes of the 
Bürgerschaft, by a Senat wielding the threat of an armed intervention by the Germanic 
Confederation, in 1851; rather than “following immediately from circumstances.” In 
brushing over these uncomfortable bits of history and facts, Kiesselbach’s account may 
well, however, reflect accurately the view Bremen’s merchants held of their political 
institutions. To them, Bremen was a commonwealth governed by tradition, organically 
reflecting society in its concreteness – and not subject to the political influence of money 
or abstract theories. 
There are, for Kiesselbach, limits to the corporatist way of running a society. 
“Man does not belong to the state merely as a worker; his general human relations go 
                                                 
362 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 180-181. Italics: my emphasis; other: original emphasis. Note that unlike Hegel, 
who proposes a corporate scheme of representation in the Philosophy of Right (§311), Kiesselbach 
considers this legislative body an immediate expression of society. 
363 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 181. 
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beyond his station.”364 For those relations that do not fall within the immediate purview of 
economic activity, Kiesselbach regards the principles of ‘abstract law’ somewhat better 
suited. 
Rather than submitting the peasant to a patrimonial court, or having an artisan 
judged by the guild, Kiesselbach prefers equality before the law, regardless of a person’s 
station. He wants an independent judiciary to mete out justice according to uniform 
standards. Similarly, he wants taxation and military duty to be uniformly exercised across 
all strata of society.365
 
Kiesselbach manages to strip the estates of their actual, traditional content – their 
economic and legal function – while assigning them a novel, political function as 
institutions that mediate popular representation. Without economic exclusivity, and 
without an internal justice system to enforce it, an estate – whether the nobility, or the 
guilds – becomes an empty shell. Traditionalist conservatives would not have taken this 
Hanseatic version of estatism as the real item. 
Nevertheless, to Hanseats, these remnants of estatism were important enough to 
defend them until 1918. What remains of estates in Kiesselbach’s scheme is, first, an 
elaborate model for political representation that avoids the “head-count constitution” 
favored by democrats, and potentially favoring the dispossessed; second, an attempt to 
preserve tradition and an “organic,” hierarchical order; while, thirdly, giving “abstract 
law” its due in limited spheres of social life. This modernized estatism formed a key 
                                                 
364 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 181. 
365 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 181-182. 
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component of Hanseats’ political identity – it is the core of Kiesselbach’s project, just as 
it was the core of Hanseatic politics. 
 
 
Kiesselbach and America 
In this view, Kiesselbach finally appears as a writer positioned squarely in a 
transatlantic discourse on democracy; albeit not quite in the same fashion as imagined by 
the Historians of Hanseatic liberalism. As much as he despises the French example, he 
considers the British model of ‘self-government’ as worthy of emulation.366 The English 
constitution is, for him, “the product of English society,” as opposed to that of abstract 
legal or logical premises.367
What Kiesselbach likes about America is the very conservatism of her founding 
fathers, inspired by the English tradition. He particularly praises the 10th and 51st essays 
of the Federalist Papers in his discussion of that document: 
No. 10 provides a brilliant example of the clarity of Madison’s thinking as a 
statesman; in it, he documents an insight into the nature of the republican system 
of representation, which far surpasses the dominant ideas of his times.368
 
Kiesselbach quotes Madison’s – now classical – discussion of divergent social 
interests: 
                                                 
366 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 117. Kiesselbach uses ‘self-government’ in the English original throughout his 
works. Rather than rendering it in Latin script, as was customary for foreign words, he uses the Gothic! 
367 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 129. Kiesselbach follows Burke, either directly, and/or through Burke’s 
reception in Adam Müllers Elementen der Staatskunst, see Harada, Politische Ökonomie, p. 72-73. 
368 Kiesselbach, Federalist, vol. 1, p. 283. Kiesselbach’s son became a noted jurist in the tradition of the 
historical (or sociological) school of law, which develops legal standards from a basis of interests and ends, 
rather than concepts and principles. The man who is considered the father of this tradition of legal 
scholarship, Rudolf von Jhering (1818-1892), was the main inspiration for Charles Beard’s reading of the 
Federalist, for which Nres. 10 and 51 play a central part. See Beard’s An Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States, New York and London 1965 (1913), note 1 to p. 14. 
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A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed 
interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and 
divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views,369
 
and comments it in enthusiastic agreement: 
These are glorious words!  For the first time in modern political science, they 
shift the center of attention in statecraft to the harmonious balance of the different 
social forces. ... Note that the author openly states, that a purely democratic 
constitution ... must lead to majority rule, with its revolutionary consequences; 
whilst only theoreticians can delude themselves to believe, that an equal 
distribution of rights among the public can lead to an equality of property, 
opinions, or passions.370
 
The “revolutionary consequences of majority rule” that Madison had in mind, 
were partisan or sectarian dominance, but more importantly, a redistribution of property, 
undertaken by the have-nots.371 Kiesselbach shared this concern, but, unlike Madison, 
believed that only a hierarchically ordered society – a ‘social-economic state’ – where 
people knew their proper station could provide a permanent safeguard against 
democratic, egalitarian designs. 
In Kiesselbach’s view, the American experiment had failed, in spite of the 
brilliant statesmanship of Madison and his fellow founding fathers. It is as a bad example, 
rather than as a model, “for contemporary Germany,”372 that Kiesselbach discussed 
American political institutions. 
Jefferson and Jackson had forever shattered a quiet world where the masses had 
deferentially followed the leadership of enlightened notables.373 As a result, 1860s 
                                                 
369 Madison, James, “No. 10,” in: Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist 
Papers, New York et. al. 1961 (1787-1788). 
370 Kiesselbach, Federalist, vol. 1, p. 284. 
371 Kiesselbach, Federalist, vol. 1, p. 285; Madison, “No. 10.” 
372 The subtitle of his 1864 book on the Federalist was Politische Studien für die deutsche Gegenwart; 
literally “political studies for the German present.” 
373 Kiesselbach, Federalist, vol. 1, p. 422-426 
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America was characterized by a “restless striving for profit, whereas an actual humanity 
of existence has yet to take roots. (...) On average, Americans lack true human culture,” 
evidenced by their “antiquated religious ceremonies, and their ridiculous cult of 
womanhood. (...) Particularly for the Yankees, the ethical improvement of the 
individual’s worth counts for nothing,” while “a loosely structured state gives broad 
leeway to political arbitrariness.”374
Neither side in the great conflict between North and South could lay any claim to 
moral superiority.  The North, completely “beholden to pure business life,” fights to 
enslave the South to its industrial system. The South is driven by opposing interests; free 
trade, and the perpetuation of its agrarian aristocracy.375
 
From the beginning, Kiesselbach argues, the most important flaw in the American 
state had been the ‘mathematical’ delimitation of political entities, from the township on 
upwards. Partitioning the land along longitudes and latitudes, rather than following 
natural boundaries, created abstract spaces, unable to instill their inhabitants with a warm 
sense of home. Any “social, cultural, and moral accomplishments among the many,” 
however, presuppose communities that organically fit into the natural geography of a 
place.376
Like the French arrondissements and départements, which cut ‘straight lines’ 
through the historical provinces, the American political space embodied in the territorial 
form of the state the idea of society as an amassment of atomized individuals, assembled 
on an equal plain, imagined as equidistant from the focal point of governmental power. 
                                                 
374 Kiesselbach, Federalist, vol. 1, p. 419. 
375 Kiesselbach, Federalist, vol. 1, p. 438. 
376 Kiesselbach, Federalist, vol. 1, p. 417. 
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This double-meaning of the image of ‘straight lines’ is intentional: In its political and 
geographical sense, it evokes an empty geometric space, a grid or matrix, ready to be 
filled by power emanating from the bureaucracy.377
This original sin of American state-making, the oblivion to place and difference, 
in Kiesselbach’s view, had come back to take revenge on the Union at the moment of the 
Civil War. From its inception, the Union had “carried in its lap several unborn embryos 
of nationality.” The armed conflict showed Kiesselbach that “the time of the Union may 
soon be over, and the time of the formation of particular states, following the given 
geography, will follow from there – [this is] a physical process of history, impervious to 
the ethical or political free will of the individual!”378
Moreover, the equality and disembeddedness of individuals in this empty, 
geometric space of the state had given the mass of the people the wrong ideas about their 
rights. Specifically, in the absence of a warm sense of home in hierarchical, deferential 
conditions, it had created democratic aspirations. These aspirations, in turn, had led to the 
moral decay Kiesselbach logically associated with democracy. The American example 
stood before 1860s Germany, not as a model for emulation, but as a dire warning. The 
voices that had first sounded that warning, and which Kiesselbach channeled, had been 
those of American conservatives. These conservatives could point to some of the 
founding fathers’ writings to back up their positions. 
                                                 
377 Kiesselbach, Studien, p. 117. Andreas Schulz suggests that Bremen’s elite looked to France as a political 
model. He bases his argument on the structural similarity between the social and political order under the 
Bourbon monarchy and in the Hanseatic city. In both places, an undemocratic government drew legitimacy 
from providing for the welfare of the people, and from increasing the wealth of society. On this level of 
fairly abstract comparison, Bremen and France do indeed look similar. Schulz does not, however, present 
evidence that Hanseats themselves considered France a model. Indeed, evidence abounds that Bremen’s 
elite considered the principle of representation based on wealth, rather than on estates, as too close to the 
democratic mode of representation they despised. Kiesselbach’s writings display animosity towards France 
for this very reason. See Schulz, Vormundschaft, p. 336-337. 
378 Kiesselbach, Federalist, vol. 1, p. 439, 440. 
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Transnational Conservatism 
At first, Kiesselbach’s corporatism might appear to bear a mark of provinciality. 
After all, he believes that the practices of his home town can serve as a universal model. 
If we consider the full range of ideas that informed his position, however, we can 
recognize Kiesselbach as part of a transnational discourse on capitalism and democracy 
that owes more to Western influences than to Continental ones. Rather than a backward-
looking small-town burgher, he is part of a transnational strand of modern conservatism 
that was at the cutting edge of modernization on both sides of the Atlantic. 
To make sense of Hanseats’ politics, we have to follow their lead in looking 
across the Atlantic, to the ‘great sister Republic’ (RUDOLF SCHLEIDEN) on its western 
shore. This is not to deny that Hanseats were also shaped in and by a German cultural 
space. With its peculiar cosmopolitan conservatism, however, Bremen’s elite ill fits into 
the broad currents of German bourgeois politics, let alone of German liberalism. Hanseats 
shared their dislike of democracy with grand-bourgeois liberals of their time, like the 
Rhenanian bourgeoisie. Unlike the latter, however, Hanseats’ willingness to apply the 
prescriptions of political economy to their own activities was limited, betraying a 
continued investment in a traditional order.379 Not unlike Hanseats, Southwestern German 
democrats held to certain aspects of an older corporatist order for much longer than 
Rhenanian liberals. Yet their vision of a republic of small producers had little in common 
with the type of society envisioned by Hanseats, either. Moreover, Hanseatic opposition 
to democracy put them in a camp different from that of Southwest-German democrats.380
                                                 
379 Cf. Boch, Rudolf, Grenzenloses Wachstum? Das rheinische Wirtschaftsbürgertum und seine 
Industrialisierungsdebatte, 1814-1857 (=Bürgertum. Beiträge zur europäischen Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 
vol. 3), Göttingen 1991. See also chapter 4. 
380 Cf. Nolte, Paul, Gemeindebürgertum und Liberalismus in Baden, 1800-1850. Tradition – Radikalismus 
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Almost the only factor uniting these different political currents among the German 
populace was their opposition to absolute monarchical rule. From that point of view, they 
all appear as ‘progressives’ of some sort, and a general label of liberalism seems out of 
place. The reputation of Bremen as a hotbed of radicalism, acquired since the days of 
mercantile opposition to Bismarck, and confirmed by a half-century of Social-
Democratic rule after World War II, may have clouded our view of the political 
philosophies that converged in the peculiar world of mid-nineteenth century Hanseatic 
politics. In reconstructing this world, we should restore to conservatism its due place. In 
looking for its origins, we should turn our eyes towards the Atlantic, rather than to 
Bremen’s hinterland. 
In the U.S., Hanseats knew a purely bourgeois state from firsthand experience, but 
they did not necessarily like what they saw. There, under conditions of universal male, 
white suffrage, the differentiation of bourgeois politics into a conservative and a liberal 
camp, as consciously distinct political currents, had already taken place. When looking 
across the Atlantic, therefore, Bremen’s merchants could draw upon a broader range of 
political expressions for their interests. In his critique of the artificiality of American 
governmental institutions; in his dismissal of democracy, and of the moral decay it 
engenders; and in his predictions for the imminent demise of the failed experiment, 
Kiesselbach betrays his indebtedness to a broader, transatlantic current of political 
thought. 
With Burke, Kiesselbach admired some aspects of the American Revolution, but 
came to loathe the path the Union took from there. Both believed that the French 
Revolution marked the point when abstract rights – undermining solid, reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                 
– Republik (=Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, vol. 102), Göttingen 1994. 
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statecraft – appeared on the political stage.381 Nevertheless, American conservatives had 
to work with what they had been dealt, if they did not want to abandon their polity to the 
Jeffersonians and Jacksonians. Even as America was lost to a proper order, let alone 
estatism, nothing would prevent political actors from trying to restore as much of a good, 
hierarchical social order as possible. Whether this be achieved by limiting the impact of 
the popular vote, or by using it to elect conservative candidates, was a question of 
expediency. 
The Whig Party was based on the latter strategy, and it was among that party that 
Hanseats found their most important allies in the United States. The Whigs’ was a 
bourgeois conservatism, rather than a traditional, legitimist conservatism based on divine 
right.382 It is the former brand of conservatism that informs Kiesselbach’s prose, drawing 
not just on an Anglo-American tradition (Burke), but also on its German reception 
(Müller), as well as on its re-translation into an American context (Gentz via Adams).383 It 
is this same Western conservatism that influenced politically active Hanseats in Bremen, 
the German states, and the United States. 
 
To know that Bremen remained a safe spot in a changing world, where the 
imperturbed gaze of the Roland rested on a community that expressed Hanseats’ political 
wishes in its social and political order, was a source of strength and unity for these 
merchants. Yet, the benefit of being members of a transatlantic network supported on a 
sovereign state was more than simply a matter of ideological comfort, or group identity. 
                                                 
381 Burke, Edmund, Reflections on the Revolution in France, London 1986 (1790). 
382 Ashworth, ‘Agrarians’; Howe, American Whigs. 
383 Tetsushi, Politische Ökonomie; Gentz, Friedrich von, The French and American Revolutions Compared, 
translated by John Quincy Adams (1800), in: Possony, Stefan T. (ed.), Three Revolutions, Chicago 1959. 
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It provided Hanseats with a governmental framework that allowed them to posit their 
shared interests through a state that enjoyed international diplomatic recognition. Part of 
these shared interests was a modernization of the fields of shipping, commerce, and 
communication. Hanseats hoped to preserve an Atlantic economy dominated by 
commerce, rather than wishing to create a national political economy characterized by 
industry, let alone a national polity based on popular participation in politics. Within that 
Atlantic economy, however, any step towards an accelerated turnover of Capital would 
find Hanseatic support. The state of Bremen played a crucial role for Hanseatic projects 
of modernization that served this end. Hence, where Hanseats most visibly played a role 
as ‘modernizers,’ they were acting from a basis that was most ‘traditionalist.’ At the same 
time, American Whigs’ schemes of internal improvement harmonized with Hanseats’ 
wishes. A shared conservative outlook added to Hanseats’ ability to work with their allies 
in the U.S., through diplomatic and domestic channels. Between the United States and 

















Chapter 4: Community and Commerce – 
From Patronage to Wage Labor and Social Control, 1815 – 1861 
 
 
Commerce and Community 
Modern political theory has interpreted commerce as an agent of the dissolution of 
traditional communities. Ferdinand Tönnies’ ideal-type of Gemeinschaft – a community 
characterized by the inseparable unity of kinship, economy, religion, and government 
under benevolent patriarchal authority – finds its highest embodiment in the objects of 
reverence that form the geographical and spiritual center of life in an urban community.384 
In Bremen, that center is the Roland, a symbol of commerce, and of the power of the 
group that made Bremen a center of world trade. For Bremen’s merchants, the Roland 
was a spiritual center of their transnational community. In Bremen, commerce was not 
an agent of the dissolution of tradition. It was the central content, the very essence, of 
tradition. Hence, Hanseats could understand their economic and political activities as an 
outgrowth of tradition, no matter how much innovation they actually entailed.385
                                                 
384 Tönnies, Ferdinand, Community and Civil Society, trns. José Harris and Margaret Hollis (=Cambridge 
texts in the history of political thought, unnumbered vol.), Cambridge, UK et. al. 2001 (1887). 
385 Tönnies, Community and Civil Society; Loose, Hans-Dieter, “Nutzbares Erbe oder belastende Relikte 
einer glorreichen Vergangenheit? Der hanseatische Umgang mit dem Londoner Stahlhof und dem 
Antwerpener Haus der Osterlinge in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts,“ in: Graßmann, Antjekathrin, 
ed., Ausklang und Nachklang der Hanse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (=Hansischer Geschichtsverein, ed., 
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Tönnies’ Sociology finds an echo in current scholarship. In a narrative of 
modernization or globalization shared among scholars critical or supportive of liberal 
capitalism, our modern age is characterized by a supplantation of place by space.386 
People in traditional communities are emotionally and practically committed to a 
particular place. In modern societies, places are linked in manifold ways by exchange, 
communication, and governance: Commodity exchange reduces incommensurable 
objects to a common denominator, and subjects local production to international market 
forces; every new medium, from print through television to the internet, sacrifices local 
idiosyncrasies to idioms shared across a larger space; and the individual as the citizen of 
a large territorial state can no longer know his peers in the way a small-town burgher 
could. Equality comes at the price of anonymity and the loss of particularity. 
In these processes, geography is reduced to an abstract space, just as the 
particularity of places is leveled and eventually lost to the abstractions that tie them into 
these larger systems. The small town can be a home, but a shopping mall cannot. While 
perhaps useful as a model, or as a critical tool, the dichotomy of space and place fails 
accurately to describe Bremen. Here, space and place were dialectically dependent on 
each other, with home-town traditions driving the elite to conquer an Atlantic space.387
Hanseats were pioneers of changes in exchange and communication. The core of 
their mercantile interest was the extension of commodity exchange. As a consequence of 
their mercantile activities, they developed an interest in improving the means of 
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communication, including steamships, railroads, and the telegraph; all of which 
accelerated the pace of information across the globe.388 In exchange and communication, 
thus, Hanseats were at the cutting edge of a movement that transformed the world into a 
leveled, uniform space from which frictions that hindered the circulation of commodities 
or capital were increasingly removed. 
Even so, Hanseats’ ability to engage in these activities was to a great extent 
dependent on the coherence lent to their international network of families and firms by 
the political support of and by the state of Bremen.389 The social and political order within 
that state continued to embody a wish to uphold the customs and traditions of the 
mercantile estate. This wish was alive and vigorous even in the 1860s, as Kiesselbach’s 
works demonstrate. 
 
For the lower orders of Bremish society, however, the story of Bremen’s 
increasing engagement in world trade is one of increasingly capitalist social relations. For 
them, commerce did indeed mean the dissolution of the customary communal ties of 
‘patronage and protection’, and their replacement with wage-labor relations and policies 
of social control. In the 1810s, sailors were the first group to be removed from the legal 
bounds of a traditional, communal order, and to be placed under a modern, wage-labor 
regime. From the 1830s onward, emigrants who entered Bremen on their way abroad 
constituted a further group that was no longer contained within traditional communal 
arrangements. In the 1860s, artisans followed suit, as a majority of the mercantile elite 
forced an abolition of the guild system. 
                                                 
388 See also chapter 5. 
389 See chapter 3. 
 197
As Hanseats introduced legal and technological changes that opened the door to 
capitalist social relations within Bremen, they also strove to shore up the moral 
foundations of a good order based on deference and firm ethics. This meant three things: 
First, they limited the effects of ‘modernization’ to the lower orders of society, while 
keeping in place their own privileged position; second, they applied a liberal economic 
program while following a conservative political course; and third, they substituted social 
control and repression for the paternalistic integration of the lower classes. 
In following this path to modernization, Hanseats closely resembled the American 
Whigs, and to a certain extent their conservative successors. This resemblance formed the 
basis for affinity and cooperation, both in the United States, and in advancing schemes of 
international improvement. The relationship between Whigs and Hanseats was not free of 
contention. Whigs’ advocacy for a protective tariff and opposition to immigration, 
however, did not outweigh the more fundamental affinity established by the values and 
the general outlook on the world they shared with their Bremish counterparts. By 
exploring Hanseats’ policies in Bremen, the present chapter lays the groundwork for a 
discussion of the relations between Hanseats and Whigs that will be the subject of the 
subsequent chapter. 
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Sailors and Emigrants 
The very spirit of improvement, broadly conceived, that drove American Whigs, 
also inspired Hanseats. Both groups embraced the material progress unleashed by the 
Enlightenment, while rejecting its philosophical foundations and political implications. 
Hanseats’ most ambitious venture in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the 
construction of the deep-sea port of Bremerhaven, illustrates that their commitment to a 
society and state based on a union of markets, machines, and morality was second to no 
comparable Whig schemes in the United States.390
Where better to put into practice a political and social vision, then in a city that is 
built from scratch? The City by the Sea corresponded with the ‘City upon a Hill’ (JOHN 
WINTHROP), long before the first vessels crossed the Atlantic from New York to 
Bremerhaven. Here, Hanseats built a community that, while new, was designed to be as 
‘organic’ as Bremen. They were driven to undertake this project by the commercial 
impetus to ‘venture abroad’.391
Nature, as in most schemes of ‘improvement’, was an obstacle to progress in its 
unhewn state, but an ally to mankind once subjected. Waterways and their shores were 
the parts of nature most relevant to Hanseatic modernizers. Bremen is located sixty 
kilometers inland from its mouth on the Weser River. After the Congress of Vienna, the 
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city controlled a territory stretching some forty kilometers along the river, and extending 
up to ten kilometers into the countryside away from its banks. The forty kilometers of the 
river between the city and the open sea were not under its territorial control. The left bank 
belonged to the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, and the right bank to the Kingdom of 
Hannover, then ruled in personal union by the British Kings.392
Thus, nature and politics threw obstacles on Bremen’s path to the sea. Its slow 
pace led the Weser River to silt up, and the shipping channel frequently changed its 
course, as sandbanks changed their shape and location. Deep-sea vessels could travel 
only as far as Brake, located on the left bank. From there, cargo had to be reloaded onto 
barges. The Grand Duchy of Oldenburg charged a toll on vessels passing the town of 
Elsfleth, halfway between Brake and Bremen. In 1825, Oldenburg began to treat Bremish 
vessels anchoring at Brake for the purpose of transshipment, as if they had been destined 
to, or originated in, that port. The Hanseatic city seemed in danger of losing its status as 
an overseas port (see map “The Weser River between Bremen and Bremerhaven”). 
Under its British rulers, Hannover was less hostile to Bremish interests. The Senat 
had been trying since the 1790s to gain a territory by the mouth of the river, on the right 
bank, for the construction of a deep-sea port. From there, Bremen could be reached 
through Hannoverian territory by highway, avoiding tolls, fees, and harassment imposed 
by Oldenburg; or by barge, at least avoiding transshipment in Brake. The Grand Duchy’s 
changed policy in 1825 spurred burgomaster Johann Smidt to revisit these plans. It took 
nearly two years of intense, secret negotiations before a treaty was signed. In this treaty, 
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Hannover sold to Bremen 342 Morgen of land, for a price of 74,000 Thaler.393 Bremen 
received sovereignty over some of the territory, and de-facto sovereignty over the rest, 
but had to grant Hannoverian subjects equal access and rights in the entire area. Military 
sovereignty was excepted, and remained with Hannover. 
Construction on the new port of Bremerhaven began in the spring of 1827 – the 
same year that Bremen signed its first Trade Treaty with the United States. Dutch 
specialists were leading in hydrological engineering. A group of Dutch contractors under 
twenty-seven-year-old Johann Jacob von Ronzelen submitted the winning bid to 
complete the project for 833,000 Dutch Gulden. They delivered a port whose main dock 
measured 752 by 58 meters, at a depth of 5.5 meters. The lock measured 42 by 26 meters, 
with gates that could accommodate ships up to a breadth of 22 meters. The installations 
were finished in late summer of 1830. The first ship to enter the new port was an 
American vessel, on September 12th. 
Bremerhaven was a faite d’un prince, through and through. The planned city that 
was to surround the port first existed on a lithograph that laid out the roads. The 
population-to-be was designated as ‘colonists’ or ‘settlers.’ Land plots were given out by 
the state for a yearly sum of ground-rent. At the intersection of city and port, panoptically 
placed on top of the inner levee, a neoclassical building housed the administration of the 
territory. Its officers were appointed by the Senat in Bremen, and enforced laws passed in 
Bremen. Revenues from the port went into the general budget of the Bremish state. The 
new population had no traditional rights to which it could appeal. A city without history 
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has no traditions. In making and enforcing laws for Bremerhaven, the Senat worked with 
a tabula rasa.394
The irony of Bremerhaven is that it looked a lot like Kiesselbach’s foil of 
American spatial arrangements: a blank grid, filled up by the power of the central 
bureaucracy, in this case emanating from Bremen. Indeed, contemporary German 
observers compared the city to an American frontier town; without roots and soul.395 In 
Hanseats’ minds, this comparison was unfounded. The difference between their new city 
and an American one, was that Bremen’s elite used its power to recreate from scratch an 
organically ordered community, inspired by a vision of good order. Not his namesake, 
Captain John Smith, but the pious John Winthrop was the American founder of 
settlements closest in spirit to Johann Smidt in this endeavor (see map “Bremerhaven”). 
 
 
                                                 
394 To the present day, port revenue in Bremerhaven benefits the general budget of the State of Bremen. In 
the 1970s, the local Liberal politician Manfred Richter, who went on to become a mayor of Bremerhaven in 
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395 Kellner-Stoll, Bremerhaven, p. 424-431. 
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Excursus: Transients and Residents 
The laws of German home towns revolved around one main purpose: maintaining 
social cohesion (see chapter 3). Strict residency restrictions and a high barrier to the 
inclusion of new burghers served that purpose. There were no unified statui of citizenship 
even in the territorial German states: the local indigenate conferred the subject-status 
(Staatsangehörigkeit, or, ‘belonging to the state’) on an individual. As home-town 
constitutions regarded the livelihood (Nahrung) of an individual as a central concern, 
communities offered charity to the resident poor. By excluding non-members of the 
community from these benefits, residency rights limited the mobility of the poor and 
discouraged migration.396
In the U.S., communities had never had comparable control over citizenship. For a 
society based on immigration, the home town model would have been dysfunctional. 
Nonetheless, American states maintained vagrancy laws, which were built on the 
assumption that every person had a ‘natural’ place of residence. As in Germany, poor 
relief was a major concern informing such laws. Indigent immigrants threatened the 
solvency of local charities, and led to recurrent backlashes against immigration.397 As a 
counter-measure, Hanseatic merchants were among the first to institute charities 
specifically catering to needy immigrants in American ports. The poor who travel were 
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thus from the beginning a concern that Hanseats and their American peers shared, and 
had to deal with in practice.398
Whereas Bremen’s institutions, like those of other German towns, were 
traditionally bent on preventing the population from migrating, Hanseats’ shipping 
interests dictated a policy that encouraged some people to do just that. But how do you 
tell a migrant from a vagrant? 
The status was a matter of a person’s utility: paying passengers and working 
sailors were encouraged to come to Bremerhaven, but not to linger. Vagrancy was a 
trespass that followed when an individual lost his usefulness by refusing to go away when 
no longer needed, and by becoming a burden on charity. 
Throughout Germany, the large number of people drawn to cities as workers in 
the new industrial economy clashed with the rigid traditional limits on immigration 
maintained by urban communities. While industrial workers settle in a place, many of the 
people drawn to Bremerhaven were transients. This made it easier for the authorities to 
maintain a closed society for those who had a permanent residency status. Laws that 
addressed the presence of sailors and emigrants focused on ensuring that these groups 
would, indeed, remain transient. Thus, emigrants were screened for their ability to 
support themselves in transit, and sailors were limited to a four-week sojourn in 
Bremerhaven.399
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Patriarchs Gone Bad 
From the earliest days of the port’s construction, social control of the labor-force 
set in motion by the ambitious project was on the top of the Senat’s agenda for 
Bremerhaven. The laborers who excavated the port’s basin and built the new city were 
recruited from abroad, as were an increasing number of sailors who served on Bremish 
ships. The state’s dealings with both groups show that the authorities perceived them as 
an unruly, morally depraved mass that threatened good order and stability. But their 
presence was a necessary evil.400
 
For both groups, publicly licensed private institutions were put in charge of 
ensuring their smooth transit and good behavior. Emigrants who arrived in Bremen had 
been solicited by agents in the hinterland who worked for the ship-brokers. The three 
Bremish ship-brokers, as distinct from ship-owners, were publicly licensed officials, 
working for set fees. As a public office farmed out to private citizens, the ship-brokerage 
functioned analogously to the office of the money-broker. The ship-brokers had extended 
their activities into soliciting immigrants as a matter of broadening their income base. 
Their success, and the tacit official recognition they received for this activity, made them 
into de-facto, full-time emigration agents. Their offices in the German states sold tickets 
to prospective emigrants, who would thus arrive in Bremen with the bulk of their travel 
expenses already covered.401
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While waiting for their passage, emigrants relied on private lodgings. 
Increasingly, these small inns and guesthouses came under official scrutiny. On the one 
hand, a significant part of the population of Bremen and Bremerhaven relied for their 
income on emigrant boarders. Hence, mandating that emigrants stay in government-
operated dorms would have hurt the local economy. On the other hand, landlords were 
prone to fleecing the strangers. Reports of fraudulent practices that would reach the 
villages inland, as well as the foreseeable American hostility to immigrants who arrived 
in the New World without means, were likely to hurt the emigration business, overall. 
The state responded by licensing private landlords to operate official immigrant lodgings 
under supervision by the authorities.402
Sailors, likewise, relied on private boarding-houses for their lodgings while in 
port, and faced the same problems as emigrants did. Tavern-keepers who housed sailors 
would ask that their guests deposit their entire funds with them. Landlords deducted the 
costs of lodging, food, drink, and personal services directly from their boarders’ accounts. 
More often than not, they overcharged for these items. Many landlords doubled as hiring-
agents. Sailors whose accounts had become depleted were at the mercy of their landlords, 
who frequently signed hire-contracts on their behalf. The first installment of the hire then 
went to settle the sailor’s account. Destitute sailors made willing crew-members. Hence, 
the excesses of the inn-keepers against sailors were not checked to nearly the same extent 
as those against emigrants. An ordinance passed in 1832 did, however, mandate the 
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separation of boarding-houses and hiring-agencies, and required that both be licensed. 
Still, supervision remained sporadic.403
Both sailors and emigrants were essential for Bremen’s mercantile business. The 
primary function of laws passed to regulate their behavior was thus to ensure the 
availability of a pool of cheap maritime wage-labor on the one hand, and a constant 
supply of reasonably solvent passengers, on the other. If the law had stopped there, one 
might argue that it followed a sheer interest of profit-maximization. Yet, regulations for 
emigrants and sailors went beyond the immediate demands of business, to include a wide 
variety of moral commandments. Alcohol and prostitution were the main targets of the 
moral regulations the Senat decreed over these transient populations.404
Two ordinances, passed in 1832, formed the legal framework for Bremen’s 
handling of sailors and emigrants, respectively. Emigrants were required to register with 
the police upon their arrival in Bremen. If they could not prove that they owned sufficient 
funds to continue their trip to the U.S., they were deported. The owners of emigrant ships 
leaving Bremerhaven were required to uphold minimum standards for their passengers. 
Rudolf Engelsing found that the emigrant ordinance of 1832, which demanded that ship-
owners store ninety days worth of provisions on their westbound journey, and prove the 
seaworthiness of their vessels, was “an almost literal copy of a U.S. passenger law passed 
in 1819.”405
Bremen continued to follow the American legal example for as long as it 
remained an independent state. Horst Rössler found that the Senat gave drafts of emigrant 
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ordinances to the American consul in Bremen, and made his suggestions into law without 
further changes. Compliance with U.S. standards would ensure that immigrants who 
disembarked from Bremish ships would not run afoul of the law in America. Moreover, 
Bremen looked to the U.S. for inspiration when it came to regulating the flow of transient 
populations, for which the German legal tradition held no useful precedent. Hamburg, 
treating emigrants as vagrants under German laws, had hurt its interests by outlawing 
emigration altogether in the 1840s.406
Sailors, unlike emigrants, had held a place in customary German law. We are 
indebted to Heide Gerstenberger and Ulrich Welke for their path-breaking study of 
maritime labor relations in the transition from the early-modern Atlantic to the 
nineteenth-century capitalist world-market. This account of Bremish dealings with sailors 
is based on their findings, and on the work of Gerstenberger’s student, Jan Oberg. 
Gerstenberger and Welke found that early-modern German sailors had not been a 
transient population, at all. Not unlike the artisanal household, the ship was a communal 
workspace governed by traditional privileges and mutual obligations between crew 
members, including captains and officers. Roughly until 1815, ship-crews had been 
composed of men drawn from the same villages, who relied for governance on the social 
control assured by mutual familiarity. Ventures were communal endeavors, where the 
crew signed an agreement to sail out, at the beginning of the shipping season, to a 
specific port and back. A captain’s authority was based on his navigational skills and his 
                                                 
406 Engelsing, Auswandererhafen, p. 131; Rössler, Horst, Hollandgänger, Sträflinge und Migranten. 
Bremen-Bremerhaven als Wanderungsraum, Bremen 2000, p. 203-207, and notes 23 and 27 (p. 254-255). 
When Heinrich Smidt, burgomaster Smidt’s son, wrote in 1832 that “we can only learn from America,” he 
might have referred to emulation of the kind evident in Bremish emigrant laws. See Engelsing, “England 
und die USA,” p. 53-54. 
 208
respect for traditional rights and obligations. These rights included the Führung, the right 
of sailors to transport a certain amount of cargo on their own account.407
Kiesselbach would have found these arrangements a fine example of healthy 
communal relations between superiors and their dependents. Unfortunately, these legal 
traditions stood in the way of Bremen’s participation in transatlantic trade. To make 
worth while voyages to America, merchants wished to extend the length of sailors’ 
engagement beyond customary, seasonal limits; and to gain full control over vessels and 
cargoes as their property. 
In reaching these goals, Bremen’s elite received welcome assistance from a 
‘foreign aggressor’. The French had slashed sailors’ customs along with all other 
traditional German laws when they had governed Bremen. Significantly, amidst the 
rhetoric of restoration that had followed on the French defeat of 1813, the Senat had 
refused to restore the traditional rights of sailors. In their place, a new maritime labor 
regime was constructed, in which sailors were made into wage-laborers, and captains into 
commanders. Captains were no longer backed in their control over their workforce by 
customary authority based on personal honor and skill, but by positive law, upheld by 
special courts in port. In a legal framework that defined ship and cargo as nothing but 
property, under the undivided control of their respective owners, the Führung was 
specifically outlawed. 
Hire-contracts were now made, not for a specific route, but ‘to some port and a 
market,’ allowing for transatlantic journeys of indeterminate duration. Desertion became 
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a crime under this new regime. Sailors had to agree to the new laws when they signed the 
muster-roll, which they had to do in front of the Wasserschout – the novel Admiralty 
court-cum-administration. Sailors were no longer part of a communal venture, but 
individuals in a wage-labor relation.408
The function of the new maritime labor laws was to enable a practice of shipping 
that allowed for longer and more frequent journeys. Whereas, under the old customs, 
crews had been absent from home only during the summer, they now could be offshore 
for several years, without a right to terminate their employ. The shipping-season was 
extended, sailing dangerously close to the forbidding conditions of winter-time 
navigation; and in some cases right through them. Layover-times in port were 
dramatically reduced. In 1840, transatlantic ships on average spent as little as sixteen 
days in the port of Bremerhaven. Bremish participation in world trade came at the price 
of a general speed-up in maritime transportation, a process Gerstenberger and Welke call 
“the industrialization of sail.”409
The brawling, boozing, whoring sailor, whose “homeland was the sea” was made 
by these new laws.410 The collapse of communal work-relations, embedded in the coastal 
village, made seafaring men, in the words of one Bremish merchant, into the “reckless 
and clumsy” strangers who were “often helpless and at a loss like a child,” and who 
therefore became a charge of the “authorities, as to be guided by strict paternal justice.”411 
This ‘paternal justice’, however, was no longer the paternalism of the ‘organic’ 
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community. It was a system of social control designed to cushion the consequences of the 
destruction of communal customs; Toennies’ communal patriarchy gone bad.412
 
The transition from paternalism to social control – so familiar from the social 
history of American and German artisans – affected emigrants, too.413 Hanseats brought 
this same paternalistic attitude of a state that takes charge of a “lower class” of people to 
emigrants and sailors, alike. In 1852, the Handelskammer claimed: 
In the past, the emigrant was considered a commodity, which should provide the ship-
owner with the highest gain possible. In Bremen, one began to treat him like a human 
being, namely as a human being in particular need of assistance, whose exploitation by 
speculation ought to be shown into limits which ensure that his well-being is maintained, 
and that he may flourish in his new homeland, to his own blessing, and, if possible, also 
to that of his fatherland.414
 
In the early 1830s, at the point when emigration and, with it, the maritime labor 
market experienced an explosive growth, the Senat laid down a framework of regulations 
that stressed the ‘helplessness’ of these two groups of transient strangers. Upholding their 
morality was at the core of the ordinances passed at that time. Hanseats perceived their 
moral guidance of the helpless as the offer of a hand up into a useful, and therefore 
blessed, life of ‘industry.’415
Like Whigs and Social Reformers in the United States, Hanseats substituted 
Calvinist stewardship for a moral economy embedded in communal customs. Instead of a 
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right to livelihood (Nahrung), they offered uplift, sobriety, and prayer.416 Soon, however, 
it became clear that the aim of making available a sufficient supply of emigrants and 
sailors tended to conflict with that of molding the behavior of these groups. Individual 
voices began explicitly to reject the aim of betterment: “immigrant ships cannot be model 
institutions,” one merchant remarked in 1856.417  
As a result, the paternalistic approach to emigrants and sailors was bifurcated: on 
board the ships at sea, a strict discipline that criminalized alcoholism, lewdness, and 
insubordination predominated for both sailors and emigrants; in port, the two groups 
were spatially segregated from each other, and jointly from the resident population. For 
emigrants waiting in port for their passage, close supervision prevailed. In Bremerhaven, 
the construction of heavily-policed emigrant dorm-buildings facilitated a tight moral 
regime. 
Jan Oberg found that for sailors in Bremerhaven, moral standards were relaxed. 
Providing a safety-valve and a source of income to locals, prostitution and drinking 
became unofficially tolerated. The establishments that served alcohol and housed 
prostitutes were still subject to police supervision. Now, however, the object of that 
supervision was to prevent a spill-over of immorality into the resident population. By 
1851, the marching band of the revolutionary German Navy could give a concert in the 
largest bordello in Bremerhaven, owned by one Friedrich Freudenthal. This still caused a 
scandal in Bremen, but it reflected the praxis in Bremerhaven. Significant parts of the 
town had been turned into a port district, where other moral standards applied.418
                                                 
416 Cf Schulz, Andreas, "Weltbürger und Geldaristokraten. Hanseatisches Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert", 
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The toleration towards sailors’ habits practiced by the Senat in Bremerhaven was 
by no means a departure from Hanseats’ principled commitment to morality and good 
order. Oberg shows that the same merchant (F. A. Delius) who called for “strict paternal 
justice” in 1850, had believed in 1839 that the right sort of laws “would not impair the 
independence of the proper sailor at all, but improve the one who is messy and raffish, 
but otherwise capable.”419 Oberg concludes that over the course of the 1840s, Delius, 
along with many of his peers, had given up on sailors as a group that could be 
‘improved.’ Spatially segregating them from other groups of the population reinforced 
the moral standards for everyone else, as the exception that proves the rule. Hanseats’ 
still held sailors to be a group requiring close ‘paternal’ attention, albeit one that had 
turned down the helping hand offering betterment, thus forcing the benevolent authority 
to mete out punishment.420
Indeed, Oberg finds that repression and the concern with penal institutions in 
Bremerhaven increased, as the attempts to improve sailors failed to show results. 
Violence and riots became a main concern of the local authorities, and were met with 
imprisonment.  By contrast, Oberg observed that personal damages were “punished far 
less heavily than any offence which endangered the effectiveness and the safety of the 
transportation system.” Property and (hire-)contracts now became the main focus of 
criminal prosecution. For example, Oberg found that in 1837, members of the crew of an 
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American ship that had sold some of its cargo to the local population were sentenced to 
three years in prison.421
Contract-mindedness and a respect for property were, of course, marks of a 
civilized member of society to those on both sides of the ocean who held a broad concept 
of ‘improvement.’422 Where education, refinement, sobriety, and piety failed to produce 
the values that made a person into a functioning participant in the labor-market, however, 
repression could step in to compensate for the lack of those values. Seth Rockman has 
shown that vagrancy legislation in the early American republic followed this very logic. 
It ensured directly, by means of repression, what gentle moral persuasion and schemes of 
betterment had failed to achieve; without, however, giving up on the rhetoric of 
‘improvement.’423 If conformity to the rules of a capitalist market is the substance of the 
cake, and if morality is the icing, it still takes both to make a complete piece of pastry. In 
running their city by the sea, Hanseats’ were following the same recipe-book as 
contemporary American reformers. 
 While a ‘modern’, capitalist regime of wage-labor, contractual relations, and 
sacrosanct property ownership guided Hanseats’ dealings with sailors and migrants in 
Bremerhaven from an early point on, their approach to the lower orders in the city of 
Bremen remained characterized by a wish to maintain a closed market and society. An 
economy based on Nahrung bought the consensus from the resident population in 
Bremen – a consensus for which the elite did not have to ask the transients who came 
through Bremerhaven.  
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 In Bremen, the guilds continued to serve as integral parts of a community that 
included the elite as well as the broad mass of burghers and subjects. These “idyllic 




                                                 
424 Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels, ”Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in: Robert C. Tucker, ed., The 
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Free Labor vs. Guild Labor 
Until the early 1860s, socially and economically, the city of Bremen retained 
many of the quaint forms of an embedded exchange uncharacteristic of a liberal, 
capitalist society; at least for merchants and craftsmen. As the 1850s progressed, a 
growing number of Hanseats came to see the institutions of their home town as 
anachronistic. They were determined to adjust to the changing times, and not let the 
“factory towns” overtake them. 
By the late 1850s, a majority of merchants had begun to view many corporatist 
limitations on economic activity as harmful to the competitiveness of their city, as well as 
to the general welfare and education of its burghers. Yet, those merchants who became 
the leading modernizers, most prominently H. H. Meier, picked selectively from the 
liberal economic program. They had no intention of applying it to their own activities – 
long-distance trade was supposed to remain a closed shop. Moreover, Hanseats were 
virtually unanimous in their refusal to change the political and constitutional structure of 
their state. 
Inconveniently, the constitutional and social structure that had resulted from the 
revolution of 1848 and the reaction of the years 1851-1854, was a delicately balanced 
edifice of corporatist and liberal building blocks. Any changes to one part would 
inevitably upset other parts. Because of the linkage between economic and political rights 
– voting rights were based on membership in an estate, which is an economically defined 
social grouping – Bremen’s constitution appeared especially inimical to any reform that 
would try to extend economic liberties, while leaving political privilege in place.425 
Moreover, unlike sailors and migrants, artisans were citizens of Bremen, represented in 
                                                 
425 See chapter 3. 
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the Bürgerschaft. The majority of artisans was vehemently opposed to ‘free labor’, and 
wished to see the guilds maintained. 
The task of mercantile reformers was thus threefold: First, they had to invent ways 
of changing the economic structure of society without upsetting the political order that 
rested immediately on it; second, they had to maintain consensus among the merchant 
class, so as not to jeopardize their dominance of the Bürgerschaft; and third, they had to 
preserve mercantile hegemony over the other social groups. For even if the formal 
political influence of artisans and the middle-class was negligible, there remained a fear 
of revolution, kept awake by the recent memory of 1848. As the 1860s dawned, the 
Hanseatic elite had to demonstrate that it was up to this task. 
 
Victor Böhmert was a leading promoter of ‘free labor’. From 1856-1860, the 
economist served as editor of Bremen’s Handelsblatt, the internationally circulated daily 
catering to the mercantile interest. His views, laid out in an 1859 prize essay, eloquently 
restated the classical arguments of political economy: guilds inhibited innovation by 
insisting on traditional techniques and styles; they stifled competition by setting prices; 
they kept men from unfolding their talents by restricting access to the trades, and so on.426 
In 1860, Böhmert was rewarded for his efforts with the prestigious job of 2. Syndikus 
(head lawyer) of the Handelskammer. By hiring this nationally renowned champion of 
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free labor, the core institution of Bremen’s merchants had made a clear policy 
statement.427
British political economy was, of course, a staple of Hanseatic mercantile 
education. Yet, while free trade had long been a key component of the ideology of 
Bremen’s elite, and the basis of Bremen’s foreign policy, adherence to tradition, and a 
desire to keep social relations at home harmonious, had led merchants to strengthen the 
guilds as late as in the 1851 trades law (Gewerbeordnung).428 H. H. Meier had argued in 
1851 that free labor was theoretically right, and that he wished its introduction, but that 
he was willing “to take existing conditions into account.” At that time, many of his fellow 
merchants were not yet ready to follow him even that far. By 1857, in debating a bill for 
the abolition of the guilds, Meier publicly declared that “competition is the drive behind 
the energy of the individual.” He hoped for free labor to regain markets for Bremen’s 
trades, “so that no longer will one have to buy one’s furniture in Berlin,” where factories 
were readily producing such items for a mass market, and in the newest fashion. Against 
the defenders of guild prerogatives, who feared being crushed by foreign competition 
once stripped of exclusive market access, Meier marshaled the vision of an unfettered 
Bremish industry, itself setting out to conquer markets abroad.429
In the 1850s, industrialization within Bremen, and in the immediate vicinity, was 
still a far cry from the centers of German industrialization in Saxony and the Rhineland. 
Yet, as Meier’s example of furniture bought in Berlin shows, the rise of industry in 
general, even if elsewhere, changed the rules of the game throughout the German states. 
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Where free foreign trade, even if slightly skewed by Bremen’s absence from the German 
customs union, introduced a growing number of non-guild-made items into the local 
market, the erosion of guild privilege had already become a fact.430
The problem of social control of the producing majority of the population by the 
merchant elite was fundamentally altered by the rise of industry. A proletariat removed 
from the paternalistic bonds of the artisanal home/workplace, shared by a master, his 
family, and his apprentices and journeymen, could no longer be integrated into the 
community in the same way that artisans had been through the guilds. In other words, as 
a means for creating political and social harmony, the guilds were becoming increasingly 
useless.431
In 1857, the first attempt to legislate away the guilds had failed. This only served 
to spur modernizers’ determination. The balance of power between trade traditionalists 
and advocates of free labor did not change much in the Bürgerschaft that convened in 
1858, yet when the 1860 election results had been tallied, it became clear that the new 
Bürgerschaft, to be in session from January 1st, 1861, would have an insurmountable 
majority against free labor.432
In this situation, the mercantile modernizers, lead by Meier, made a desperate 
effort to force a new trade law through the old Bürgerschaft, before the newly elected 
members joined it. Unexpectedly, they were successful, in spite of the bitter resistance of 
                                                 
430 Bremen did not join the German customs union until 1886, and had been completely surrounded by 
customs union territory since 1854, when Hannover and Oldenburg had joined that organization. See also a 
statement by the Senat cited in: VdBBü 1861/7, March 20, 1861, p. 107. For the conscious emulation of 
successful, foreign examples, see Engelsing, Rolf, “England und die USA in der bremischen Sicht des 19. 
Jahrhunderts,” in: Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen, vol. 1, 1957, p. 33-65, esp. p. 36-38. 
431  Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, vol. 2, p. 229, 233-234. 
432 Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, vol. 2, p. 228-229. 
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every single member elected from the guilds. On December 29th, 1860, the Bürgerschaft 
passed the ‘Gesetz, die Gewerbekammer betreffend’ with a five-vote majority.433
 
In the debate that surrounded the passage of the 1860 trade law, modernizers sold 
free trade as a step towards more liberty, reiterating Smithian political economy. State 
Archivist Dr. Meinertzhagen was representative for this group, when he declared that 
“industry will be unfettered, (...) [and no longer will anyone be] dragged into court for 
exercising a right [to work], which he could have lost only because of [the] unnatural 
[guild system].”434
Most of the defenders of the guilds were either democrats or craft traditionalists.435 
A few representatives of these latter two groups were merchants or academics, whose 
views had convinced them to run for office in one of the lower orders. One of them was 
Dr. Karl Theodor Oelrichs, brother of the Baltimore and New York Oelrichs, head lawyer 
of the Gewerbekammer (Chamber of the Trades), and a staunch defender of guild 
tradition. Leader of the democrats was Johannes Rösing, a linen merchant and banker.436 
His group, however, was entirely marginal among the elite. 
The democrats in the Bürgerschaft regarded an unfettered market for labor and 
commodities as a guarantee for social upheaval. Where modernizers pointed to foreign 
countries with a wish to emulate their success, their opponents saw the danger of social 
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disharmony. Johann M. Wulftstein, a representative for the middle rank of Bremen’s 
voters, stated this argument most starkly, if not clearly: 
You pointed to larger countries, in which one could presumably observe the blessing of 
free labor. If we look more closely at these countries, we [see] filled almshouses and 
correctional institutions; a numerous proletariat on the streets – always prone to be made 
rebellious by some eggheads, since where there is free labor, the greater number of 
workers will remain on a lower level of education; finally, the recurrent plague of hunger, 
all these are not signs of blessing. Those gentlemen who wish to bring such blessings to 
Bremen will soon see them turned into a terrible curse. They drive the workers down the 
road of beggary, crime, and vice.437
 
Among the representatives of the mercantile estate, Wilhelm E. Backhaus was one 
of the few who shared Wulfstein’s views. To Backhaus, the modernizers were 
abandoning the compact between the social classes and were “divid[ing them] into hostile 
camps.” Free competition was “nothing but the arbitrary domination of the weak by the 
strong.” “What we need,” Backhaus tried to convince the Bürgerschaft, “is not an 
extension of economic freedom, but its restriction, so that the exploitation of one 
individual by another will not become the only, dominant moral law.”438
But Backhaus was not merely a disappointed traditionalist. He had come to side 
with the democrats because he saw in equal voting rights a remedy for class conflict. Like 
American Democrats, he argued that a politically empowered populace could end class 
legislation in favor of the few. If the mercantile class did not dominate the polity, it could 
not pass legislation that only benefited them.439
In spite of their legislative victory, modernizers had reason to be uneasy. The 
menacing alliance between traditionalists and democrats contributed to their fear of 
losing political power to the have-nots. “We do not have a democratic majority in the 
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Bürgerschaft yet, but, alas, the party is strong enough to cause all kind of discontent,” 
burgomaster Duckwitz stated with some resignation.440
 
It soon became clear that by introducing free labor into the Bremish economy, the 
mercantile modernizers had removed a keystone of the constitutional order, and, 
therefore, potentially, of their own privileged position. The Handelskammer, like the 
Chamber of Trades, drew its legitimacy from a corporatist worldview. The opponents of 
free labor in the Bürgerschaft were eager to exploit the contradiction of liberalizing craft 
production, while keeping mercantile professions closed shops. 
To democrats, the ‘liberty’ heralded by modernizers seemed to imply the full-
scale implementation of the democratic political program, along with the liberal 
economic one. If the state was no longer to recognize ‘station’ or ‘estate’ for one group of 
burghers, the same certainly should apply to all burghers. If the Chamber of Trades no 
longer embodied an officially recognized, exclusive social group, how could it continue 
to claim representation of that group in the Bürgerschaft? If all burghers were in fact to 
become equals in the market, why should they not also become citizens, that is, equals in 
politics? Free competition for the Thaler logically called for a free competition for the 
popular vote.441
The mercantile elite – not even the most committed modernizers in its ranks – 
never granted that logical connection. They were ready to prop up the estatist constitution 
by replacing the corporatist keystone, which they had just removed, with a construction 
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that proved stable enough to last 57 years, with remnants still in place to this day.442 
Membership in the guilds became voluntary. Every person practicing a trade could now 
vote for the Convention of the Trades, which continued to elect the Chamber of the 
Trades. As before, the Trades’ Chamber and Convention still jointly selected the twenty-
four members of the Bürgerschaft that were reserved for artisans. Thus the estatist mode 
of political representation was assured. In essence, this construction put artisans in a 
position analogous to that of merchants: to be engaged in trade meant to be represented in 
the Merchants’ Convention, and thus meant to enjoy political rights qua one’s economic 
activity.443
This was an ingenuous solution. For even if a capitalist economy can do without 
democracy, it still had seemed a contradiction to leave an estatist political order in place 
while removing its “organic,” corporatist, economic essence. In effect, the new model of 
the Chambers preserved the deferential spirit of the corporatist world, and transformed it 
into an institutionally based political expression of that proper sense of social hierarchy 
that the Hanseatic elite wished to uphold. This was Kiesselbach’s political theory put into 
practice. 
 
While the modernizers had managed to avoid a spillover of the spirit of liberty 
that had been unleashed by their economic reforms into the realm of political 
representation, they were much less successful in defending their own monopolies in the 
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economic sphere. Between 1861 and 1863, the broker system was stripped of its essential 
functions, the Lesser and Greater Privilege were abolished for one general status of 
citizenship, and the fee for naturalization was lowered. As a result, the mercantile 
profession became a lot less exclusive.444
Restrictions on most economic activities were abandoned. For example, the 
handling of cargoes, formerly an exclusive privilege of stevedores specializing in 
different goods, was now open to free competition. The broker-system lost its communal 
exclusivity through its reform. Now, non-Christians could nominally also become 
brokers, and foreigners were allowed to do business with one another in Bremen. Devoid 
of its main rationale, the broker-system for commodities was completely abandoned in 
May 1867. Any person taking an oath under the law was now allowed to call himself a 
broker and mediate business transactions. As a financial institution, the brokers remained 
in charge of settling balances among merchants twice weekly, but this procedure was no 
longer mandatory.445
The laws that scrapped these remnants of corporatism in the economic order of 
Bremen were introduced by democrats, and were openly designed to taunt the mercantile 
mainstream. Johannes Rösing’s democrats and their allies hoped to unmask the rhetoric 
of ‘free trade’ merchants wielded against the guilds as a mere smokescreen for a class-
based attack on the rights of working people. In putting the axe to mercantile privilege, 
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some traditionalists furthermore hoped for a chance to exact revenge on those merchants 
who had abolished the guilds.446
Indeed, now the roles of the earlier debate on free trade were virtually reversed.  
H. H. Meier, himself, took to the rostrum to defend the limitations and privileges of the 
brokers’ office: 
We have a corporation of brokers that is, as a whole, respectable, and different from what 
one can find in any other mercantile city. The standing of the brokers (…) contributes in 
essential ways to the solidity of Bremen’s commerce. (…) I strongly wish that we will not 
change the brokers’ office, and the mercantile interest at large shares this wish. (…) 
[Abolishing the brokers’ office] is not a consequence of free labor, since brokers are not 
engaged in a trade. Their position can be compared to that of notaries-public, who are 
under oath, and whose word and signature can be trusted. This would not be the case if 
brokers were entirely free.447
 
When it came to their own exclusive institutions, it became quite clear that even 
the most committed modernizers among Hanseatic merchants embraced liberal policies 
only in a very selective fashion; as their democratic opponents were quick to remind 
them. The point Rösing and his democrats missed, however, was that H. H. Meier and his 
allies had at no point committed themselves to a full implementation of the liberal 
economic program.  Their selective adaptation of individual liberal policies was not a 
matter of inconsistency, but followed from Hanseats’ overall worldview. 
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Reluctant Modernizers 
Competition with “other mercantile cities” in a capitalist world-market 
contributed both to H. H. Meier’s desire to improve the existing, good order, and to his 
ongoing investment in its moral economy. This competition created an impetus to 
emulate the most successful model. In transportation and production, this meant to follow 
a path to capitalist wage-labor relations. While the Bürgerschaft debated the merits of 
guilds, the Civil War raged in North America, radicalizing and popularizing the critique 
of slavery. There, the Northern elites were rapidly moving to make a virtue out of the 
necessity of wage labor. In so doing, they were beginning to reformulate their social 
creed to posit the necessity of wage labor as a virtue. The use of the term “free labor” by 
the enemies and defenders of guild privilege in Bremen suggests an awareness that this 
social transformation was a transnational process.448
In spite of his role as Bremen’s leading ‘modernizer,’ H. H. Meier’s language 
betrays his continued investment in the ethos of his estate. His is not the language of a 
man committed all-out to unfettered, capitalist relations, but of a traditionalist wanting to 
preserve the ethos of a communal order by improving upon it. If this meant dissolving 
communal social relations for the lower sorts, he was willing to bite this sour apple. To 
Meier and his peers, the ethos of honor and mutual trust within their own estate still 
appeared as an asset in the competition with other cities, giving Bremen’s market a 
“solidity” that assured the continued patronage of buyers.449
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But the competitive advantage it conveyed was not the only reason for Hanseats 
to remain committed to their communal nexus of families, firms, and faith. This was the 
way of life that they were used to, and they were not about to abandon time-honored 
traditions lightly. While H. H. Meier defended the brokers’ office in the Bürgerschaft, the 
coherence of his estate was already beginning to crumble, as subsequent chapters 
(Chapters 7-9) will show. To effect this process of dissolution, however, it would take 
foes more formidable than Bremen’s democrats. 
 
The initial drive to engage in the world-market the exigencies of which now 
transformed Bremen’s society had emanated from the customary communal ethos that 
had governed Bremen. By the 1860s, as the price for ‘venturing and winning’ on a 
changing world-market, Bremen was faced at its gates with ‘more than [it could] support’ 
within its traditional social structure. Not just migrants, but also industrially 
manufactured commodities – Marx’s “heavy artillery of capital” – were asking for 
admittance.450 Opening the doors to either of them meant to change the customary 
arrangements in Bremen. Hanseats took the clues for the laws and ideas that replaced 
these customary arrangements with modernized ones from the West, especially from the 
United States. 
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Chapter 5: International Improvement – 
Hanseats, Hamiltonians, and Jacksonians, 1845 – 1860 
 
 
Hanseats in American Politics 
 On June 15th, 1846, the U.S. Senate voted on an amendment to the Post Office 
Department appropriations bill. Connecticut Democrat John M. Niles had moved to 
“appropriate $25,000 for the establishment of steam mail service, between New York and 
Bremen.” For Bremen’s special envoy, Carl Theodor Gevekoht, the success of his 
mission hinged on the passage of this amendment. We might imagine that he anxiously 
watched from the gallery, as one by one the legislators were called to give their vote. 
Passage was by no means assured, and the Yeas went head to head with the Nays 
throughout the roll-call vote. The amendment had managed to whip up a storm of debate 
that followed the sectional and party rifts characteristic of the Second Party System. The 
Whigs, with twenty-three out of fifty-six Senators clearly the weaker party, had been the 
strongest supporters of the measure. Infrastructural, or ‘internal,’ improvements had been 
a key plank in the party’s platform since its inception in the 1830s. Both parties 
understood steamer subsidies as an extension of this policy overseas. Thus, the strong 
opposition to mail steamer subsidies in the South and West was based on the principled 
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Democratic hostility to federal spending on internal improvements and ‘chartered 
monopolies.’ Whigs from those regions would be unlikely to support this unpopular 
measure. In fact, not a single Senator from outside the Northeastern states had spoken in 
support of the subsidies. Some of the Northeastern supporters, however, were Democrats. 
Gevekoht could take some comfort knowing that one of them had given enthusiastic 
support to the amendment – its author, John M. Niles of Connecticut. Niles had been 
Postmaster General under Van Buren, and now served on the Committee on Post Offices 
and Post Roads. Another nine Democrats were to join him in the final vote: five from the 
Northeast, two from Gulf coast states, and one, each, from Virginia and Arkansas. In the 
end, party discipline trumped sectional interest only for the minority party. Four Whigs 
from interior states abstained, allowing the rest of their caucus to pass the amendment 
with the help of the ten Democrats who put a policy of ‘improvement’ over party 
doctrine. By a majority of three votes, the amendment passed. Thus the path was cleared 
for the first American mail steamer line to Europe, to be subsidized by the federal 
government. That its Eastern terminus was to be Bremerhaven, Bremen’s young outpost 
on the mouth of the Weser River, was not an accident.451
 
 European Americanists have emphasized that the United States serves as a plane 
for Europeans’ projections. Old-world liberals and conservatives can pick and choose 
from American political life to support their own views.452 In Hanseats’ interactions with 
                                                 
451 Congressional Globe, vol. 15, 29th Congress, 1st Session (1845-1846), p. 973 (vote), p. 943-945 (Senate 
debate), and 722-725 (House debate). 
452 See, for example, Barclay, David E., and Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt, eds., Transatlantic Images and 
Perceptions. Germany and America since 1776, Cambridge, UK and New York 1997; Gaehtgens, Thomas 
W., and Heinz Ickstadt (eds.), American Icons. Transatlantic Perspectives on Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-
Century American Art (=Bloomfield, Julia, Kurt W. Forster and Thomas F. Reese, eds., Issues and 
Debates. A Series of the Getty Center Publication Program, vol. 2), Santa Monica, CA 1992. 
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Americans, we see that this mechanism works both ways. Bremen could be imagined as a 
place where their social vision had been realized by both Whigs and some Democrats. 
But the cooperation between Hanseats and their American allies was not just a matter of 
imagined commonalities. These political actors knew to a large extent who they were 
dealing with, and they realized their shared interests.453
The American advocates of ‘improvement’ could see in Hanseats like-minded 
men. These were Germans equally opposed to mob rule as America’s republican elites, 
yet untainted by any association with monarchical regimes in Europe. Whigs and 
Hanseats agreed that the march of technological and moral progress was the calling of the 
nineteenth century, and that they were executing a Divine design in furthering such 
progress. Markets, machines, and morality made for the gradual ‘improvement’ of a 
fundamentally good society. This trinity of ‘improvement’ was the respectable answer to 
the terror of the French Revolution. If men of standing and sound morals managed to 
break the spell of mediaeval superstition and feudal dominance over mankind, the rabble 
that had frightened the better sorts in the 1790s, and again in 1830, might well be turned 
into a populace diligently and prudently laboring for their own betterment. As long as the 
masses accepted these terms, their superiors would gladly lend them a hand up.454
                                                 
453 Engelsing, Rolf, “England und die USA in der bremischen Sicht des 19. Jahrhunderts,” in: Jahrbuch der 
Wittheit zu Bremen, vol. 1, 1957, p. 33-65, here p. 45, claims that the United States barely noticed the 
Hanseatic Cities, and therefore left them to their own devices in trans-Atlantic trade. While Bremen was 
not as important to American foreign policy as England or France, or even as Spain or Prussia, its 
commercial importance was not lost on contemporary Americans, as even Engelsing’s own sources show. 
When Andrew Jackson compared the Hanseatic Cities to ‘chicken’ whom the American ‘horse’ refrained 
from crushing out of sheer compassion, he not only showed that he had noticed the Hanseats, but that he 
was none too fond of them. This sentiment was shared by many in his party, and it was mutual. 
454 Cf. Chapter 4; Howe, Daniel Walker, The Political Culture of the American Whigs, Chicago and London 
1979; Ashworth, John, ‘Agrarians’ and ‘Aristocrats’. Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837-
1846, London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ 1983; Idem, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum 
Republic, 2 vol., vol. 1: Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850, Cambridge, UK 1995. 
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 Orthodox Jacksonian Democrats did not share this vision of ‘improvement’. To 
them, a republic was safest in the hands of an empowered citizenry, whose equality 
before the law and at the ballot-box formed a bulwark against the usurpation of their 
power by any class with aristocratic pretensions. More rather than less committed than 
Whigs to free, unfettered competition on the market-place, Democrats believed that 
private enterprise supported by government was the first step onto a slippery slope that 
led back to a society in the thrall of a privileged order. However aware orthodox 
Democrats may have been that Hanseats were just such a privileged order in their home 
town, the support these foreign merchants showed for government-funded corporations 
would have been proof enough that they were on the side of ‘aristocracy’.455
 In spite of the party line, a few internationally-minded Democrats were among the 
strongest allies Hanseats had in Washington. Most important among them was Ambrose 
D. Mann. In 1846, he had just returned from Bremen, where he had served as American 
consul since 1842. While Mann was solid in his Democratic convictions, his politics 
reflect an earlier strand of Democratic thinking. In the image of the early John C. 
Calhoun, or even Jefferson himself, Mann held to both emanations of the strong belief in 
reason fostered by the Enlightenment: the betterment of mankind through science and its 
application in technology, and the ability of the people to govern themselves 
democratically. This was a vision of modernization quite unlike the notion of 
‘improvement’ shared by Hanseats and Whigs. As with his intellectual ancestors, Mann’s 
convictions, too, reached their limits when it came to slavery. Thus, he became a 
steamship promoter specifically with a view to making the slave-holding South 
                                                 
455 Cf. Chapter 3; Sellers, Charles, The Market Revolution. Jacksonian America. 1815-1846, New York and 
Oxford 1991; Taylor, John, An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United 
States, London 1950 (1814).  
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independent of Northern commerce. As a diplomat, his postings reflect this transition: 
After serving as consul to Bremen, he returned to the continent once more in 1849-1850 
to support the democratic revolutions in Germany and Hungary. His final mission took 
him to Paris in 1861, as an agent for the Confederacy.456
 There were of course some Democrats who, once in positions of influence, 
adopted the policies initially associated with Hamilton. Embracing tariffs, banking, and 
infrastructural measures designed to create a denser and more extensive market-place, 
John M. Niles was a perfect specimen of this current. His orthodox colleagues in 
Congress despised him for this reason, and alleged that he was not in full possession of 
his mental powers.457 Ever since his tenure as Postmaster General under Martin Van 
Buren, Niles had been a champion of a developmental vision compatible with that of the 
Whigs; without, however, abandoning his belief in the Democratic politics of equality. 
To Niles, working with Hanseats made sense, since these Bremish merchants could 
deliver a mail steamer line that promised to extend American commercial relations at a 
comparatively modest price. 
 
 Hanseats, too, knew their American counterparts and their political views. They 
were pragmatic in building a coalition for their aim of securing mail subsidies for a line 
to Bremen. Whigs’ preference for a strong tariff, and Democrats’ advocacy of popular 
participation in politics made for points of contention between Hanseats and both major 
                                                 
456 Beutin, Ludwig, Bremen und Amerika. Zur Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft und der Beziehungen 
Deutschlands zu den Vereinigten Staaten, Bremen 1953, p. 284, note to p. 57; “Mann, Ambrose Dudley,” 
in: Dictionary of American Biography (DAB), vol. 6, New York 1933, p. 239-240. 
457 “Niles, John M.,” in: Dictionary of American Biography (DAB), vol. 7, New York 1934, p. 522-523; 
Sellers, Market Revolution. 
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parties. As long as a Congressman was willing to vote for a Bremen line, however, these 
differences mattered little. 
Beyond questions of practical policy, however, Hanseats had a deep affinity with 
Whigs based not only on their shared vision of ‘improvement’, but also on their 
fundamental agreement on social and political values. By contrast, Bremish merchants 
brought a basic dislike to their interactions with Democrats, whom they regarded as the 
party of mob rule.458
 
 Their interactions, both disagreements and affinities, with Hanseats place the 
main currents of the Second Party System in a transnational context. In this context, the 
debates that define the ante-bellum United States no longer appear as exclusive or 
exceptional to the new world. Instead, Democrats and Whigs can be recognized as 
specifically American political currents that correspond with two major variants of 
Western, bourgeois politics – one liberal-democratic, the other conservative-elitist. 
Bearing on the debates in American historiography on the nature of Democratic and 
Whig politics, we can realize that their main disagreement was not over whether capitalist 
social relations were a desirable goal; but over the political and ideological arrangements 
that were to accompany capitalist modernization. With Hanseats, Whigs envisioned a 
union of markets, machines, and morality to buffer the disruptive consequences of 
capitalism. American and European democrats, on the other hand, demanded an 
empowerment of the populace to counter the growing clout of the elites who steered the 
social transition to industrial capitalism. 
 
                                                 
458 Cf. Chapters 3 and 4. 
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The Political Economy of Trans-Atlantic Commerce and Communication 
To judge not only the merits of Democrats’ and Whigs’ positions in the debate 
over mail steamers, but also the assumptions underlying these positions, we will have to 
take a detour into the history and political economy of ocean navigation.  Democrats 
demanded that international shipping be left to the free play of market forces. Whigs 
insisted that the free market was unable to deliver steam-driven ocean liners.459 The 
historical record supports the Whigs’ claim. 
Even if both parties had been able to agree on the facts of the matter, however, the 
political question would have remained open: Did the United States really need its own 
mail steamers, and who would benefit from them? Whigs argued that expedited mail 
delivery was in the public interest, and that, hence, government subsidies would serve the 
common good. Orthodox Democrats disagreed. Letter-writing was a private luxury, 
practiced by few.460 If these few wanted their correspondence to travel more quickly, they 
ought to pay for it. Hence, the essential question at stake in this debate was the role of the 
state vis-à-vis society. 
To complicate matters, as a new technology that captured the public imagination, 
ocean steamers were ideologically overdetermined. On April 22nd, 1838, the first 
transatlantic steamship, the Sirius, had arrived in New York from Cork. A day later, a 
vessel owned by a rival British company, the Great Western, joined her there, after a 
passage of fifteen days from Bristol, beating the eighteen-day passage of the rival vessel, 
which had had to cover less distance.461 The sudden realization that it was possible for an 
                                                 
459 Cf. note 451. 
460 See the remarks by Rep. William W. Payne, below, p. 252. 
461 Tyler, David Budlong, Steam Conquers the Atlantic (PhD dissertation, Columbia University), New York 
and London 1939, p. 52; John G. B. Hutchins, The American Maritime Industry and Public Policy, 1789-
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Atlantic crossing to be made by a vessel relying exclusively on steam power set off two 
conflicting, equally emotional responses: The hope for universal progress through 
technology, and the fear that this technology would give a rival nation – specifically, 
Britain – a decisive advantage in war and commerce.462 In both cases, contemporaries 
assumed that ocean navigation had been changed radically overnight. Steamers would 
cruise to a fast and inevitable victory over sail, both in Christian seafaring and in naval 
battles. 
 To this day, the hubris contemporaries of the nineteenth century brought to 
steamships remains a standard feature in histories of this transportation technology. In 
works like Steam Conquers the Atlantic or The Great Atlantic Steamships, the titles 
betray a great deal of romanticization.463 The heroic story of daring entrepreneurs who 
embraced a technology of the future, and wielded it as a tool in titanic struggles between 
competing, equally glorious, steamship-lines will be familiar to anyone who has ever 
been fascinated by this mode of transportation. Especially in the past decade, maritime 
scholarship has been making great strides towards debunking this well-entrenched myth, 
even if its impact on the popular literature so far has been negligible.464
                                                                                                                                                 
1914. An Economic History (i.e., Harvard University, inst. ed., Harvard Economic Studies, vol. LXXI), 
Cambridge, Mass 1941, p. 343-344, erroneously claims the British Queen, rather than the Sirius, had been 
the first transatlantic steam vessel to arrive in New York. 
462 Auxiliary steam engines had previously been used on some transatlantic packet boats (see Tyler, Steam, 
p. 54-55). The novelty of these two vessels, and those that were to follow, was their capacity to cross the 
Ocean by steam-power, alone. This capacity was just that, however, and throughout the 1840s, 1850s, and 
1860s, steam vessels remained fully-rigged as sailing vessels, since steam was too unreliable.  
463 Tyler, Steam; Fox, Steven, Transatlantic. Samuel Cunard, Isambard Brunel, and the Great Atlantic 
Steamships, New York 2003. 
464 Three works that stand out as sober accounts of early steam navigation: Sloan, Edward, “Collins versus 
Cunard: The Realities of a North Atlantic Steamship Rivalry, 1850-1858,” in: International Journal of 
Maritime History, vol. IV, no. 1 (June 1992), p. 83-100; Gerstenberger, Heide, and Ulrich Welke, Vom 
Wind zum Dampf. Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Handelsschiffahrt im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung, 
Münster 1996; and Hutchins, John G. B., The American Maritime Industry and Public Policy, 1789-1914. 
An Economic History, London, UK and Cambridge, MA 1941 (=Harvard Economic Studies, vol. 71). 
Common to these works is their attention to the role of the state in setting the parameters for international 
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 The ‘technology of the future’ was anything but efficient. Early steamers were 
side-wheelers, rather than screw-driven vessels. The inefficiency of paddle-wheels was 
evident even to contemporaries.465 The upward motion of the wheel-paddles, and the 
friction of the paddles as they enter into and leave the water, counteracted the forward 
motion of the ship. In gales, one paddle-wheel might be submerged too deeply to have 
any motive impact, while the other would stick out of the water, with the same result. The 
low efficiency of the paddle-wheels was only exceeded by that of early steam-engines. 
Combined, these two technological components required a tremendous amount of coal to 
keep the vessel moving, leaving little if any space for the transportation of cargo. If 
steamships were going to be useful, it was going to be for goods that were high in value, 
but low in volume, as well as for passengers and mail. In other words, their benefit was to 
be found in a fairly abstract quality, speed.466
While steamers provided for speed, they did so at a price of human lives. Even 
after decades of their use in industry and transportation, steam engines remained a 
dangerous technology. A boiler explosion on a riverboat was a deadly disaster, but 
survivors would still stand a chance if they reached the shore. Not so on board a vessel on 
                                                                                                                                                 
trade and shipping, and to the character of steam-ship lines as capitalist business enterprises. This 
distinguishes them from most maritime literature, whose authors tend to focus on technology and lore. 
465 One of the doubters was Dr. Dionysius Lardner, a natural scientist, engineer, and member of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science. His assertion, made in 1827, that a steam-ship “voyage 
directly from New York to Liverpool” was as likely as “a voyage from New York or Liverpool to the 
moon” earned him lasting ridicule. Nevertheless, Lardner’s assumption that the maximum range of a 
steamer was 2,550 miles was based on a realistically pessimistic assessment of the problems with coal 
consumption, engine efficiency, and paddle-wheel technology that were in fact to plague early steamers. 
See Tyler, David Budlong, Steam Conquers the Atlantic (PhD dissertation, Columbia University), New 
York and London 1939, p. 4, 33-34, and 40-41. 
466 Tyler, Steam, p. 38, 40. Steam-engine technology made a significant break-through in the 1880s, with 
the development of compound engines that better utilized the steam. Even before that, the introduction of 
the propeller-screw in the 1850s increased the efficiency of steam engines, although early screw steamers 
were slower than side-wheelers. Side-wheelers were still built in the 1860s, but the share of propeller-screw 
vessels increased steadily. See Gerstenberger and Welke, Vom Wind zum Dampf; [North German Lloyd 
Steamship Company, Bremen,] 70 Years North German Lloyd Bremen, 1857-1927, Berlin 1927, p. 32-38. 
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the high seas. The risk of fire on steam-ships was considerable, even short of a boiler 
explosion. On her very first trip, a fire broke out in the boiler-room of the Great Western, 
while still on the River Thames. Isambard K. Brunel, the director of the company that 
owned the ship, had to risk his life, and was incapacitated for weeks, after an attempt to 
quell the flames. He survived the fall from a ladder in the smoke-filled boiler room, 
because he came to land on his fellow director, Captain Claxton. Though the damage to 
the ship was minor, all but eight of the passengers fled the vessel as it anchored off 
Bristol, preferring the slower but safer passage on a sailing-packet.467
Under these conditions, transatlantic steamers remained unprofitable for decades. 
A number of companies went out of business after a few years of operation. Few steamer-
lines ever paid dividends, and the stock prices of nearly all steam-ship companies 
plunged by as much as ninety per cent at some point in their career. The losses of the 
pioneering Great Western were covered by the parent company, the Great Western 
Railroad; and even she remained in service for only eight years. Those steamship 
companies that became known as success stories relied heavily on government subsidies, 
paid under mail contracts. Without these subsidies, private capital would have stayed 
away from steam-ship schemes. Not capital in search of valorization, but governments in 
                                                 
467 This account is based on Tyler, Steam, p. 49-50. Innumerable other examples of steamship disasters 
exist. On average, one in two steamships appears to have been lost at some point during her service. One of 
the most dramatic incidents of the 1850s was the sinking of the Hamburg-Amerika Packetfahrt-
Actiengesellschaft’s (HAPAG) Austria in 1858, which killed five hundred. See Tyler, Steam, p. 255; 
Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1858/11/14, and Sophie Klüpfel to Gustav F. Schwab, 
Tübingen 1858/10/22, both: MSS 434, John Christopher Schwab Family Papers. Manuscripts and 
Archives, Yale University Library, series I, box 2, folder 35. For the shortcomings of the first steamers 
between New York and Bremerhaven, see Wätjen, Hermann, Aus der Frühzeit des Nordatlantikverkehrs. 
Studien zur Geschichte der deutschen Schiffahrt und deutschen Auswanderung nach den Vereinigten 
Staaten bis zum Ende des amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges, Leipzig 1932, p. 36; for those of Fritze’s and 
Lehmkuhl’s venture (see below, p. 261), Ibid., p. 56-57. For other examples, see Arnell, J. C., Steam and 
the North Atlantic Mails. The Impact of the Cunard Line and Subsequent Steamship Companies On the 
Carriage of Transatlantic Mails, Toronto 1986, p. 107-124, 239, 241, 243-244. 
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pursuit of accelerated communication and naval advantages in war kept the first 
transatlantic steamers afloat.468
 
 Merchants had a vested interest in convincing states to pay for mail-steamer 
service. The speed of communication is an essential factor for trade. Capital remains tied 
up in transit, when bills of exchange, contracts, and orders cross the ocean to reach their 
destination. The faster the documents that represent it, the shorter the turnover time of 
capital. Traditionally, merchant capital draws its largest profits from arbitrage – buying 
cheap to sell dear. The pursuit of arbitrage profits tends to pit one merchant against all 
others. Whoever learns first about market conditions abroad, can react first by shipping a 
certain type of cargo, or withholding another. Even as late as 1860, we still find private 
and business letters displaying the excited tone of men who wanted to be the first to profit 
from uncommon opportunities. When the market for hops was undersupplied in Bremen, 
Johann Georg Graue wrote to his brother in Baltimore: “Have first-grade commodity 
bought right away; I expect the price [in Baltimore] has risen, but that is immaterial, I 
must have some.”469
Regular venues of communication tend to even out informational advantages, as 
prices-currents from foreign ports arrive on a dependable schedule, and become available 
to all merchants through daily newspapers. Hence, merchants’ private interests to be first 
to know add up to a collective interest to speed up communication. This is a collective 
                                                 
468 See the literature cited in notes 461 through 467. 
469 Johann Georg Graue to Herman Henrich Graue, Bremen 1860/10/22, Maryland 
Historical Society, MSS 2826, Graue, H. H., Papers, 1834-1871, 4 Boxes, box 4, 1855-
1871. Strong emphasis in the original. H. H. Meier spoke for Bremen’s merchants when 
he said that “speed of movement in trade and exchange is becoming more and more 
important.” Cited by Bessell, Georg, 1857-1957. Norddeutscher Lloyd. Geschichte einer 
bremischen Reederei, Bremen 1957, p. 16. 
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interest established, first, among the merchants in one port against those of all other ports, 
since the more and the faster information and goods are available in one place, the greater 
its competitive advantage over others.470
 Since the 1820s, regularly scheduled sailing-packets had gone a long way towards 
making the transatlantic flow of information more reliable.471 Within months of the arrival 
of steam service, however, mail migrated to these newer vessels. Steamers made the 
passage from the English Channel to New York in as little as two weeks. Especially on 
the westbound journey, a sailing-vessel could not beat this time. It took the average 
sailing-ship forty-three days from Bremen to New York. Even the fastest vessels rarely 
made the voyage in less than twenty days. Steam-ships were not only faster, but also kept 
their schedule more reliably, provided they did not run into engine trouble. Given the 
common interest of merchants in accelerating the speed of communication, it is not 
surprising that they favored steamers over sailing-packets.472
 But merchants were unable to shoulder the cost of the new transportation 
technology; particularly not the gigantic operating losses. By the mid-1840s, the lesson 
that steam navigation was not a good investment opportunity had become generally 
acknowledged. Not even in a city like New York would the collective interest of 
merchants in expedited communication have sufficed to bring them to finance a steam-
                                                 
470 Cf. Chapter 1. 
471 Arnell, J. C., Steam and the North Atlantic Mails. The Impact of the Cunard Line and Subsequent 
Steamship Companies On the Carriage of Transatlantic Mails, Toronto 1986, p. 20. 
472 StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten Staaten von 
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ship venture. Private capital was not going to be attracted to any steamship schemes, 




Unprofitability of Steamers 
Average Expenses and Income for a steamer round-trip, 
New York – Liverpool, ca. 1850473
Expenses US$ Income US$
Fuel 8,600 Revenue 12,065
Repairs 9,215 Subsidy 19,250
Insurance 8,900  
Overhead 21,600 Operating Loss 17,000
Total 48,315 Total 48,315
 
 From the start, ocean steamers were tokens in international rivalry. Britain had 
begun in 1840 to subsidize the Cunard Line, for the transportation of mail between 
Liverpool and British North America. Cunard steamers called at Boston on a regular 
schedule. Especially in the winter, Canadian mails were transported through the United 
States, as the Saint Lawrence River became unnavigable.474 For their correspondence with 
Britain and Europe, U.S. merchants had to depend on these British mail steamers. The 
considerable amount spent on transatlantic postage, although by itself insufficient to 
support a steamer line, nonetheless benefited British interests, exclusively. Moreover, 
Cunard’s mail contracts stipulated that the steam-vessels had to be made available to the 
                                                 
473 Based on Cunard’s estimates for Collins’ vessels, as cited by Fox, Transatlantic, p. 125. With all cabins 
fully booked, a Cunard steamer could make $38,000, and an OSNC steamer $35,280 in passenger revenue 
on a round-trip. See Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 34. Judging from Fox’s and Wätjen’s figures, a subsidized steamer 
could break even, if 76-82% of available passages were sold. At $60 (OSNC, 3rd class) to $190 (Cunard) 
per one-way ticket, steamer passages were not affordable to all but a handful of emigrants, and the steamers 
were rarely sold out. The occupancy rate of 33% suggested by Fox’s figures seems realistic for Collins’ 
vessels. 
474 Arnell, Steam, p. 39-56, 78, 82-89, 136-154. 
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Royal Navy in case of war; and naval officers routinely received training on board 
Cunard’s vessels. 
 If the United States wanted its own mail steamers, it would have to pay subsidies. 
Mercantile interest, national defense, and cosmopolitan hopes coalesced to lead 
increasing numbers of American politicians to advocate an emulation of the British 
example. As advocates of an active government role in providing for infrastructural 
improvements, Whigs were more likely then Democrats to support such subsidies. Their 
defeat in the 1844 election spurred them to a last-minute effort. The passage of a bill 
authorizing the Postmaster General to award contracts to American companies for 
carrying the mail by steamer to foreign countries was one of the last acts of the 28th 
Congress, and President Tyler signed it into law during his last hours in office in early 
March, 1845.475 The foundation for American mail steamers had been created. Now it 
remained up to financiers to avail themselves of the option. 
 
The involvement in shipping of the federal government somewhat complicated the 
political interest of merchants. Whereas merchants in one port tend to be united in their 
wish to have an informational advantage over merchants of all other ports, mail steamers 
provided a potential common interests between merchants in all port cities within a 
country. United States merchants shared the interest that the federal government provide 
for mail steamers. A local, mercantile competition for speed was thus partly displaced by 
international rivalry. 
                                                 
475 Tyler, Steam, p. 142-142. Whether Bremen’s inclusion in the list of European ports that the law listed as 
prospective Eastern termini for steamer lines was already the result of a lobbying effort on Hanseats’ part, 
or whether it reflected a recognition by the bill’s authors of Bremen’s importance as a port for American 
trade, is unclear. 
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Due to the cost of steamers, however, not every port could have its own line. If 
the federal government was to get into the steamer business, it had to decide on one 
terminus, creating a new kind of inter-city competition to become that terminus. This 
inter-city competition had a new quality: It no longer pitted every port against every 
other, but involved only those under the domain of one particular territorial state. By 
assuming responsibility for steamer service, the federal government had to become the 
arbitrator of local mercantile interests in determining trans-oceanic mail routes. 
This explains both the inter-port rivalry for becoming the end-point of the new 
mail-steamer lines, as well as the eventual, although grudging, assent of Congressmen 
favoring lines between ports other than Bremerhaven and New York to the proposed 
subsidy for the OSNC: Without unanimity among those favoring ‘international 
improvement’ in principle, their opponents would have voted down subsidies, altogether, 
and America would have continued to depend on Britain for its international 
correspondence. 
For Bremen, as a city-state, the matter was less complicated. New York was the 
main American port Hanseats served; and on the European side, Bremen stood in a 
competition with all other trans-Atlantic ports, unmediated even in its relations with 
Hamburg by a nation-state. Hence, the Hanseatic elite could apply itself with single-




The Bremish Effort to Gain the First American Ocean Steamer Line 
In Bremen, Senator Arnold Duckwitz, Burgomaster Johann Smidt’s young 
protégée, read the American newspapers attentively. Thanks to the Cunard steamers, they 
were but three to four weeks old when they reached him. At the first sign that mail 
steamer subsidies were contemplated, he urged the Bremish Senat to make use of the 
opportunity.476 Through Dudley A. Mann, the U.S. consul in Bremen, the Senat offered 
Polk’s administration to exempt American steamers from port fees, and promised a tariff-
exempt storage of coal in Bremerhaven. Mann was recalled from his post in Bremen in 
1845. He returned to Washington a convert to Bremen’s cause, equipped with 155 bottles 
of German wine to aid his lobbying efforts. As a result of Mann’s good rapport with 
Secretary of State James Buchanan and Postmaster General Cave Johnson, Bremen 
moved to the top of the list of European ports under consideration as destinations for 
American mail steamers.477
The law of March 3rd, 1845, authorized the Postmaster General to solicit bids for 
two lines of mail steamers, one offering bi-weekly service between New York on the 
Western shore of the Atlantic, and either Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp or Havre on the 
Eastern end, with an obligation to call at an English port on the Channel; the other 
offering bi-weekly service between New York and Liverpool. Contractors had to be 
American citizens, the ships had to be American-built, and manned exclusively by 
American crews. The subsidy was to amount to $20,000 per trip to Bremen or Hamburg 
(20 sailings, for a total of $400,000 p.a.), $19,250 per trip to Liverpool ($385,000), and 
$15,000 per trip to Havre or Antwerp ($300,000). Contracts could be made for a period 
                                                 
476 Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 33. 
477 Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 25-26. 
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of time of up to ten years, and were to contain a provision that gave the U.S. government 
a right to sequester the vessels in case of war.478 As a conscientious public official, Polk’s 
Postmaster General, Cave Johnson, was not about to subvert the law, even if he was not a 
friend of government support to private companies. Thus, in late 1845, he publicly 
solicited bids for contracts under the steamer law.479
The Senat knew that public opinion and congressional votes mattered in U.S. 
politics. It dispatched Carl Theodor Gevekoht to New York, where he was to enlist 
merchants in support of the cause, before going to Washington for a concerted lobbying 
effort. Gevekoht had been a merchant in Baltimore, and was well-connected in the United 
States. A number of important American citizens lent their names to Gevekoht’s mission. 
Most prominent among them was John Jacob Astor. This dean of New York society had 
been sympathetic to Hanseatic interests for decades. His daughter was married to Vincent 
Rumpff, Hanseatic Ambassador to France.480 Hanseats in New York began publishing 
newspaper articles in support of a line to Bremen. Prussia’s ambassador to Washington, 
Baron von Gerolt, joined their campaign.481
Three bids were entered for the mail contract, all from New York. The Postmaster 
General picked the offer that was most favorable to the federal government, made by 
Edward Mills. Historians of American steam navigation have characterized Mills as a 
blank page in mercantile circles, a speculator who lacked any experience in shipping or 
trade. His fate before and after his involvement with the mail steamer line has eluded the 
historical record, lending some support to the received opinion of his importance. Mills’ 
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bid proposed a bi-weekly service between New York and Havre via Cowes on the Isle of 
Man.482 Postmaster General Cave Johnson, by now convinced that Bremen would be 
preferable to Havre, moved Mills to change his plan, and to offer monthly service to 
Bremen and Havre, each, with bi-weekly departures from New York alternating between 
these two destinations.483
On the German side, meanwhile, Bremen had begun to create the conditions 
necessary for the success of the projected line. The existing dock in Bremerhaven, dating 
from the early 1830s, was too narrow and shallow for an ocean-going paddle-wheeler. 
The Senat began construction of a new dock, which could not only accommodated the 
newest steamers, but whose design was based on an optimistic assessment of the future 
growth in overall traffic and in the size of ocean-going vessels.484 As part of the effort to 
make Bremerhaven a desirable destination for American steamers, the Senat had also 
negotiated with Hannover a significant reduction of transit tariffs, and the streamlining of 
mail transportation between Bremen and the Kingdom, including the construction of a 
post office in Bremerhaven.485
After Mills had incorporated the Ocean Steam Navigation Company (OSNC), it 
soon became clear that no amount of government-built infrastructure would attract 
sufficient private capital to get the enterprise afloat. New York’s financial markets 
remained frosty towards his company.486 Supporters of the line began looking for other 
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sources of capital. The limits of American federal financial commitments to the venture 
were set by the law of 1845. Contributions to the capital stock were explicitly not part of 
the contracts under that law. The state of Bremen had already committed $1,000,000 to 
the new dock, and was unable to carry much more of a financial burden. Hanseatic 
merchants in Bremen and America had bought some stock of the new company, but by 
the spring of 1847, only about $200,000 of stocks had been signed, out of a total of 
$1,000,000 offered. Other sources of capital were badly needed. 
In this situation, the Senat decided to sell the scheme to other German 
governments. Duplicating the successful approach taken earlier in Washington, three 
special envoys were dispatched to the German capitals. Their mission was astonishingly 
successful. Prussia and Bremen each contributed $100,000, Hannover $25,000, Saxony 
$20,000, and a number of smaller states combined gave a total of $44,100. The smallest 
individual contribution came from a tiny Thuringian principality, which gave $300. The 
total of funds contributed by German governments came to $300,000.487 This amount was 
given as a loan to Oelrichs & Co., of New York. That firm then signed $300,000 worth of 
OSNC stock, formally complying with the provision of the 1845 act that the mail steamer 
company be funded by American investors. Mills yielded control of the company to a 
group of established New York merchants, with Hermann Oelrichs, who was Bremen’s 
consul in New York and an American citizen, as vice president. Mills settled for a 
position as ‘general agent’ of the company.488 Hanseats’ successes in Germany and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
steam navigation was thus not limited to the OSNC. See Sloan, “Collins versus Cunard”. 
487 Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 31. The total of $300,000 includes another $11,000 signed by other New York 
merchants on behalf of the state of Bremen. 
488 Tyler, Steam, p. 147-148. According to Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 29-31, Oelrichs & Co. signed an additional 
$15,000 on their own account. Combined with the stock held in combination with the German loans, this 
would have made Oelrichs & Co. a near-majority interest in the OSNC, since, altogether, only $643,800 
worth of stock were sold. Wätjen also claims, erroneously, that Hermann Oelrichs’ younger brother, Edwin, 
 246
U.S. represented a triumph of Bremish diplomacy, which relied exclusively on mercantile 
connections.489
Getting Congress to pay the bill for the subsidies proved a harder task than 
convincing the German governments to contribute to an American business enterprise. 
By the time Congress debated the appropriations bill, E. K. Collins of New York had 
made a bid for a contract for mail service to Liverpool. Some congressmen preferred this 
line over one that sailed to a relatively small German port, and many did not believe that 
two lines were sustainable, in spite of the provisions of the law of 1845. Most Democrats 
were hostile to the plan of mail steamer subsidies, on principle. It did not help much that 
one of their own party, John M. Niles of Connecticut, was the main advocate of the 
measure. In the end, it was decisive that Hanseats and their allies were able to build a 
majority based on a shared commitment to ‘improvement’. 
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Winning Friends in Congress 
 Congressional proponents of the subsidies stressed their importance for trade and 
war. For John M. Niles, the arrival of ocean-going steamers had shrunk the world. It had 
brought the U.S. “nearer to Europe,” and had thus resulted in increased commerce and 
communication. This expansion of opportunities, however, came to benefit a “rival 
nation,” which had made “international correspondence (…) subservient to the 
advancement of her commercial interests.” Since Niles attributed to ocean steam mail 
service “a connexion with, and influence upon, the commerce of the country, and (…) 
advantages for naval defense in case of war,” command of the new technology would be 
of decisive importance for American success in her ongoing rivalry with Britain.490
Note that Niles assumed a crucial role of correspondence for commerce, even 
though it was unfeasible to transport any but “light and valuable goods” on the new 
steamers. He saw the main benefit for trade of mail service in “affording facilities for 
commercial transactions.” Not the transportation of goods, as such, but the ease of the 
commercial transactions that set these goods in motion, was his main concern. 
Commodities were bought, transported, and sold, because merchants wrote contracts, 
bills of exchange, orders, powers of attorney, and a wide range of general business 
correspondence. Without these documents, not a single hogshead of tobacco or bale of 
cotton would ever leave the American shores. Britain treated the provision of the 
communicational infrastructure that underlay commercial relations as a responsibility of 
government, because it understood the importance of the flow of information for trade. 
For Niles, this British policy was “worthy of our imitation.”491
                                                 
490 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., Appendix, p. 986. 
491 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., Appendix, p. 987. An Economic Historian of the transportation 
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Niles could argue that “government has no interest in the freights,” at least not in 
providing for their transportation, because he assumed that trade would follow routes of 
communication, rather than vice versa. Mail service was “changing the course of trade, 
and freights are taking that direction.” Allowing the British to dominate this new mode of 
transportation would, therefore, serve to reinforce the existing domination of American 
trade by Liverpool. This seemed especially dangerous at a time when “every year the 
proportion of our importations in foreign vessels is increasing.” Bremen promised an 
alternative to American dependence on Britain. The provision of a communication 
infrastructure, however, was essential for realizing this promise.492
  
 Advocates of the steamer subsidies also embraced the darker side of steam 
navigation – the possibility of using this new technology for a naval advantage in case of 
war. Unlike many of his colleagues, however, Niles did not treat national defense as a 
problem of technology, alone. Instead, Niles displayed a broader view of international 
security, in which it mattered almost as much, if not more, to have friends abroad, as it 
did to have steamers at home. Britain, America’s “jealous rival,” had placed herself in a 
menacing position, blocking the young republic from unimpeded access to her natural 
friends, and thus from her potential allies in that very rivalry: 
At present, all communication, all intelligence from this country, reaches the continent 
through England, and has a British taint or odor given to it. The people of the continent 
know nothing about this country [the U.S.], except what passes through English channels; 
and, as a rival nation, jealous of our growing prosperity and greatness, there exists a 
                                                                                                                                                 
industry supports Niles’ take: “These [mail steamer] services, by improving transport relations between 
England and the area touched, had an active influence on the localization pattern of world trade rather than 
the passive effect of tramp sailing vessels. It was, therefore, a matter of some importance to the United 
States that the ocean transportation was being so organized with its hub in Great Britain.” Hutchins, 
American Maritime Industry, p. 348. 
492 Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., p. 943 and Appendix, p. 985-987. 
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natural disposition to pervert or misrepresent everything concerning our institutions and 
the character of our people, and the rising prosperity of this country.493
 
Hence, mail steamers promised to realize the hope of cosmopolitanism, a world in 
which mutual understanding, fostered by commerce and communication, guaranteed 
peace.494 England appeared as the main obstacle on the path to such a world. 
By contrast, when Americans looked to continental Europe in the antebellum 
period, they saw peoples eager to shake off aristocratic tyranny, and to embrace 
‘government by the people.’ In the 1830s, the struggles for independence in Poland and 
Greece had confirmed American observers in this hopeful gaze. The revolutions of 1848 
would serve further to reinforce it.495 It was this hope that Europeans were potential 
republican allies that promoters of the mail steamer subsidies appealed to when they 
praised the steamer lines as venues for “the diffusion of a knowledge of American 
institutions” abroad.496 Learning about these institutions meant wanting to emulate them. 
Hanseatic lobbyists successfully appealed to these American hopes. Bremen’s 
representatives in the U.S. cast the “very small” city-state as a natural ally of “her great 
sister-republic,” the United States. The appeal to the perpetual peace among republics 
was a major selling point. When Bremen’s minister resident, Rudolf Schleiden, lobbied 
Congress for a renewal of steamer subsidies in 1856, he would claim that “Bremen, being 
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a small republic was not likely to be ever involved in any war, (…) her institutions, 
inclinations and habits are more like those of the United States.”497  
As the Senate debated the mail steamer subsidies, the U.S. were already at war 
with Mexico. In a situation like that, good diplomatic ties even to aristocratic European 
governments might have looked like a valuable gain, in their own right. Prussia had given 
strong support to Bremen’s lobbying effort, and Niles made explicit that this concerted 
campaign had left an impression on him: 
There are connected with [the line] numerous political advantages. To the people of 
Germany and Prussia the enterprise was of great importance. The Prussian Minister 
[Baron von Gerolt] took a deep interest in it, and a special agent [Gevekoht] had been 
sent from Bremen for the express purpose of aiding in the completion of this work of 
commencing a direct communication between the United States and the German States, 
which would so materially enlarge the commercial and political intercourse, and extend 
the relations of both countries.498
 
 
Opposition to the subsidies shows that Democrats were treating this issue as a 
battle over principles. William Allen of Ohio led the charge. Allen had been a stalwart of 
the Jacksonian party line in Congress since the 1830s. During the Polk administration, he 
was instrumental in assuring Congressional approval of the appropriation of funds for the 
Mexican War. His word carried some weight with his fellow Democratic legislators.499 
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Other Democratic figureheads, like Thomas Hart Benton and John C. Calhoun, also were 
strong opponents of the mail steamer plan.500 To Allen, however, fell the role of 
representing the pure Jacksonian position. 
Ever watchful of the “evils” of “joint-stock concerns,” Allen “wished to keep this 
Government clear of all manner of connexion with human combinations – especially 
moneyed combinations” and the “immense patronage” inherent in this entanglement. The 
line to Bremen was but the beginning of a universal “system” of mail-steamer lines. The 
idea of ‘systems’ was highly fraught in the Jacksonian mind, and evocative of paper 
money, tariffs, and chartered monopolies. What these “systems” had in common was 
their purpose of redistributing wealth from the “citizens in the interior” to “particular 
companies of men,” by setting up monopolies and “removing competition.”501
 In the less genteel debating culture of the House, Alabama Democrat William W. 
Payne called by name the ‘particular companies of men’ who were to be the beneficiaries 
of this system: 
Who was benefited by the Post Office Department? Was it not those who were engaged 
in writing letters? And if so, ought they not to bear the burden of its expenses? Instead 
(…), you require individuals in the country, who perhaps do not write one letter a year, to 
pay their equal proportion to meet the expenditure of this Post Office Department. In 
other words, we taxed the coat, the salt, the shirt, of the laboring man, to pay the postage 
upon the letters written by the commercial men of the country.502
 
For Payne, mail steamer subsidies were yet another scheme of “taxing the laboring 
classes for the benefit of the merchants of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, 
&c.”503
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 Mainstream Democrats’ view of international politics was determined by their 
commitment to Western expansion, and a resulting indifference to relations with 
European powers. By the time the post office bill had reached the Senate, war with 
Mexico had commenced. In the light of this event, Thomas Hart Benton – one of the 
main war hawks – agreed that the United States should build war steamers. Still, he 
doubted that the vessels built under the contract with Edward Mills would be fit for such 
a use. Benton preferred vessels produced by “navy yards, with proper workmen” to “a 
scheme of getting the ships built by a kind of partnership” with private capital. In a 
resounding statement of national sovereignty, he exclaimed that “the Government was 
committed to nothing in this matter; and if it were, he would violate the obligation [to 
Mills] at all hazard, rather than embark in such an enterprise.” From Benton’s point of 
view, making friends in Europe was apparently not a high priority for a self-sufficient, 
well-armed nation.504
 Niles’ explicit support for an emulation of British policies raised a particularly red 
flag for Democrats. They had considered Britain’s original Navigation Act as part and 
parcel with the corruption of that country’s polity. Under government protection, and 
only under it, special interests thrived, and private enterprise withered.505 The very idea of 
copying Great Britain’s policies, hence, was anathema to them. Benton thundered: 
As well it might be contended that this nation should be involved in a debt of nine 
hundred millions, because the national debt of Great Britain amounted to that sum, as 
propose to establish steam lines because Great Britain had done so.506
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Behind the “scheme” to inaugurate a “steamer system,” Jacksonians like Benton saw 
lurking the entirety of “aristocratic,” Hamiltonian politics – and, rhetoric aside, their 
suspicion was not entirely unreasonable. 
 
 
International Trade, National Principles, and Local Interests 
Besides the principled Jacksonian argument against steamer subsidies, Bremen’s 
friends in Congress had to fight against those who preferred a line to Liverpool, which 
had been proposed by the merchant E. K. Collins of New York. As it was unclear 
whether more than one of the proposed lines could be realized, merchants with trading 
ties to different ports were pitted against each other. International competition for steamer 
business thus found a mirror in inter-city competition within the United States. 
Nonetheless, for proponents of ‘improvement’, the national interest in keeping up with 
British competition overruled local jealously towards New York. 
T. B. King, a Whig representative from Georgia who later would join A. D. Mann 
as a Confederate agent in Europe, said that while “he had no feeling of hostility to the 
route recommended; he had his doubts in relation to it.” When Alabama Whig Henry W. 
Hilliard took offence at King’s lack of enthusiasm for the proposal, King hastened to 
declare that he “was not opposed to this system [of mail steamer subsidies]; he was as 
anxious as [Hilliard] to see such a line of ships established on American capital, and by 
American skill and industry.” In the end, King gave his vote for the measure.507
Congressmen were aware that the federal government had to allocate a 
competitive advantage to some particular city in positioning the nation as a whole more 
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favorably on the world-market. Hanseats’ friends therefore appealed to the competing 
shipping interests to accept that New York “was the proposed terminus of the line, 
because her [i.e., New York’s] [commercial] position made her so.” In serving as the 
United States’ most prominent port, New York was furthering the common good.508
While New York’s importance for American commerce was obvious even to the 
city’s rivals, the case for Bremen as the Eastern end of the line was more difficult to 
make. Opponents and supporters of the OSNC agreed on the analysis that American 
commerce was dependent on Liverpool, but disagreed whether a steamer line to a 
continental port could offer a remedy, or even questioning whether a remedy was needed, 
at all. T. B. King doubted whether Bremen could reduce American dependence on 
Liverpool. In his view, “Liverpool was the great commercial point, and if we sent letters 
to Cowes, they must go to Liverpool afterwards.”509
Niles’ fellow Senator from Connecticut, the Whig Jabez W. Huntington, “was 
opposed to the Bremen line, [which] would be attended with sundry disadvantages.” He 
“would go for the Liverpool line, [and] thought the time had not arrived for two lines.” 
Justifying why he nonetheless voted for the Bremen line, Huntington explained that, “if 
the contract [with Mills] was obligatory, having been fairly made, he would not hesitate 
in authorizing it.”510
New York’s Congressional delegation shared Huntington’s preference for 
Liverpool. For Manhattan’s Nativist representative, W. W. Campbell, Britain was the 
main commercial competitor. By subsidizing her mail steamers, “Great Britain (…) was 
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destroying our trade, and interfering with the enterprise of our people.”511 In the Senate, 
Democrat John A. Dix echoed this concern: the Cunard Line had a de-facto monopoly on 
passenger and mail service between Liverpool and the U.S. East Coast. If Cunard was to 
put into effect an existing plan to extend service to New York, the costs for entering the 
New York-Liverpool market would be increased for any newcomers. Hence, there was 
some urgency to Collins’ project. Funding a line to Bremen while leaving Cunard alone 
on the line to Liverpool meant to sidestep the real problem.512
Even so, Dix acknowledged that the Hanseatic city might be on the way of 
becoming a significant foreign market in the future: “Bremen-Haven (…) furnishes 
access into the heart of northern Germany, [and is] the chief outlet for the maritime 
commercial communications of the Zoll Verein [Customs Union] States. (…) We carried 
to the Hanse-Towns 46,460 hogsheads of tobacco, and only 26,111 hogsheads to 
England.”513 Gevekoht’s efforts apparently had made an impression even on skeptics like 
Dix. 
 
Without the massive opposition to the subsidies by orthodox Democrats, the 
coalition that passed Niles’ amendment may well never have come to be. In the face of 
such opposition, however, representatives of all conflicting shipping interests realized 
that they had to win the fundamental battle over the principle of international 
improvement first, before they could bicker over the particulars. Supporters of the 
Liverpool and Bremen lines, and spokesmen for other American ports, agreed that the 
government had a responsibility for promoting commerce by providing the infrastructure 
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for communication. A vote for Bremen was a vote for that principle, and against 
Jacksonian opposition to ‘improvements.’ For furthering a commercial, transatlantic 
expansion of American interests, rather than a military expansion of American territory, 
Bremen looked like a promising ally. Hence, apart from the Jacksonians, every single one 




Bremish-American Steamer Lines between 1846 and 1860 
The steam vessels that began to plow the waves, propelled by international 
rivalry, cosmopolitan hopes, and government subsidies, heralded a revolution in 
international communication and transportation. Financially, however, steamer 
companies remained in shallow waters until the 1860s, when the search for a more 
efficacious use of steam power on the seas led to technological improvements.514 Yet 
none of the supporters of mail steamer subsidies had ever claimed that these lines would 
be a great financial success. They were a fiscal burden that had to be assumed to reach 
other, more important political goals. 
When it began operations, the OSNC was celebrated on both sides of the ocean. 
On June 19th, 1847, the steamer Washington arrived at Bremerhaven, completing the first 
trip from New York of the new mail steamer line in seventeen days. One of the 
immediate benefits of the line was the establishment of the first postal convention entered 
into by the United States. Mail transported on the OSNC steamers was conveyed to and 
from the states of the Germanic Confederation, as well as the parts of Austria and Prussia 
located outside of its borders, for fixed postage rates well below those charged for letters 
sent via Britain.515
The new steamer line gave the United States a valuable bargaining token in its 
rivalry with Britain. The kingdom at first reacted with punitive measures to the new 
competition. The Royal Post Office charged letters arriving via Cowes with the full 
transatlantic postage that would have been due for their transportation by a Cunard 
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letter from Baltimore to Bremen would have cost a total of 29c, from New York to Berlin 34c, from St. 
Louis to Vienna 44c. 
 258
steamer. First Assistant Postmaster General, Major R. S. Hobbie, went to London to 
negotiate a postal convention with Britain that avoided this dual postage. His mission 
failed, and for about a year, the U.S. and Britain became locked in an escalating struggle 
over the mails. When the U.S. blocked the Canadian mails from traveling through the 
U.S., Britain gave in. Both countries signed a postal treaty that went into effect in 
January, 1849. A central foreign policy goal stated by Hanseats’ friends in Congress had 
thus been achieved.516
In other respects, too, the Bremen line lived up to the expectations of its 
supporters, vindicating the Hanseatic-Whig alliance. Mail volume between New York 
and Bremerhaven grew from 79,637 annual letters in 1848, to 354,470 in 1852. 
Commerce between the two places grew at a slightly slower pace. In terms of commerce 
and communication, the United States had become more independent of Britain. It had 
only been able to do so because American politicians had been willing to engage in 
transnational cooperation.517
For the ten years that the United States paid lump sums to mail steamer lines, the 
OSNC survived as a business enterprise. Partly because of the disruptions caused by the 
revolution of 1848, the company was unable to pay dividends until 1852. Even then, 
dividend payments to American investors were only made possible because the German 
governments forfeited interest payments on the loans they had given to Oelrichs & Co. in 
New York. In 1852, the mail subsidy contract was renewed for another five years, thanks 
                                                 
516 Arnell, Steam, p. 176-179. 
517 Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 34, 36. See also chapter 1, graph 3. 
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to the exertions of Bremen’s diplomats and their friends in Washington. After 1853, the 
OSNC finally turned a profit.518
Then, effective in 1857, Congress abandoned lump-sum subsidies for a system 
that paid steamship lines only the postage for the letters they actually transported. In 
1856, Rudolf Schleiden had attempted to convince a majority in Congress to continue 
subsidizing the OSNC, but this time, Hanseatic diplomacy failed.519 The 1851 and 1856 
debates in Congress over the renewal of the contract with the OSNC were exact replicas 
of the one in 1846. Perhaps, the animosity between the camps had become sharper in 
1856, but the basic arguments remained the same.520
Between 1846 and 1857, the political economy of ocean steam navigation had 
changed as little as the fundamental outlooks of American politicians in the Jeffersonian 
and Hamiltonian traditions. What had changed were the political conditions in the United 
States, where an increasingly assertive Democratic Party returned to its Jeffersonian roots 
in economic policy, as it remade itself into an organization more and more committed to 
the defense of slavery. Men like Niles were increasingly rare among its ranks. After 
Buchanan’s election to the Presidency, federal financial commitment to the internal or 
                                                 
518 Tyler, Steam, p. 241-242, claims that OSNC stock had been on par only for a brief period of time, in 
1854. This is technically correct, but not exactly true. Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 37-45, discusses the financial 
situation of the OSNC, and states that OSNC stock rose above par after 1854 (p. 40). While OSNC stock 
was valued at below 10 per cent in the summer of 1853, it closed the fiscal year of 1853 – in which the 
German governments forfeited interest payments – with a net profit of $112,465.05 and was able to pay a 
7% dividend, and 10% thereafter (p. 39-40). 
519 [Schleiden, Rudolf,] “Facts in Relation to a Direct Steam Communication Between the United States 
and Germany” (leaflet distributed to members of the U.S. Congress), Washington D.C., August 1856, 
StAHB 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.I., document no. 5.  
520 Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, 3rd Session (1856-57), p. 107, 196, 908, 915, 993, 997, 1103-
1107, and 1112. 
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international improvements that nourished the rival political economy of the North fell 
victim to this increased vigor of Jeffersonian doctrine.521
Unable to meet expenses without full subsidies, the OSNC was dissolved, and its 
steamers sold to the British government to be used as troop transporters in the Crimean 
War. After liquidation, stock-holders recuperated a mere third of their initial investment. 
Other steamer lines did not fare much better. From 1853 to 1855, the Bremish firms of 
Fritze & Co. and Carl Lehmkuhl jointly ran steamers between Bremerhaven and New 
York. They bought two decommissioned vessels of the defunct German navy, which 
sailed on alternate weeks from the OSNC steamers. On Rudolf Schleiden’s request, the 
U.S. Postmaster General promised to pay a subsidy to the line on the same terms as those 
granted to the OSNC if its vessels managed to keep a regular schedule. While the 
Fritze/Lehmkuhl steamers apparently carried some mail, technical difficulties and the 
resulting reluctance of the traveling public to entrust their lives to these vessels, made the 
line a failure, and it never met the Postmaster’s standards. Fritze and Lehmkuhl were glad 
for the opportunity to sell their ships to the British government for use in the Crimean 
War.522
In 1857, the American Vanderbilt Line took over the mail route to Bremerhaven 
previously served by the OSNC. Immediately, its vessels encountered the same 
difficulties that had plagued every other steamer line. Schleiden attempted to capitalize 
on the hostile press reaction to the unreliability and unsafe state of the Vanderbilt vessels, 
but his effort to convince the Postmaster General to strike Vanderbilt’s vessels from the 
                                                 
521 See the debates over the renewal of mail-steamer subsidies in Congressional Globe, 34 Cong., 3 sess. 
(1856-1857), especially p. 1103-1112. 
522 Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 37-45 and 56-59. 
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list of official mail carriers did not bear fruit. Service improved after 1858, but the line 
never became profitable. In 1860, it was unceremoniously abandoned.523
In 1858, H. H. Meier’s Northern German Lloyd began to compete with Vanderbilt 
for mail and passenger business between Bremerhaven and New York. The Lloyd 
remained unprofitable for the remainder of the decade. H. H. Meier’s stubbornness, 
persuasiveness, and entrepreneurial skill in leading the Lloyd kept investors and creditors 
of this line pacified through these doldrums. Only in the mid-1860s did the company turn 
the corner to profitability. Financial backing by the state of Bremen, including the 
continual extension of the port infrastructure in Bremerhaven, from which the Lloyd 
profited most, played a crucial role in keeping the Lloyd afloat during its first decade. 
‘Improvement’ still required some state to shoulder its costs – for the time being, the 
United States was no longer that state.524
 
 
                                                 
523 Ibid, p. 59-63. 
524 Bessel, Norddeutscher Lloyd, p. 29-30; [North German Lloyd Steamship Company, Bremen,] North 
German Lloyd, p. 30-38. For the Northern German Lloyd, see also chapters 1 and 7. 
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Hanseats, Democrats, and Whigs – the Transnational Second Party System 
 The history of American mail steamer subsidies has broad implications for our 
understanding of the Second Party System. It shows that Democrats and Whigs were 
much more in touch with developments outside of the United States than we commonly 
assume. There were many American politicians, in both parties, who were aware that 
they had friends, as well as foes, abroad. In achieving their policy goals, these politicians 
sought transnational partners. The main currents of bourgeois politics in the United States 
and in Europe ran along the same lines. Whigs and Democrats represented two competing 
paths towards capitalist modernization. The conservative-authoritarian and the liberal-
democratic paths to capitalist development were equally transnational in the extent of 
their followership, and in their intellectual lineage. In the case of the mail steamer 
subsidies, the conservative side was better prepared to cooperate transnationally, and thus 
to further its interests. 
 
How much of a basis was there for a cooperation between Whigs and Hanseats 
beyond the mail steamer question? Strong policy disagreements between the two groups 
might suggest that their collaboration was founded on a momentary concurrence of 
interests. Whigs stood for a program of national industrialization, while Hanseats were 
committed to an Atlantic economy. Whigs embraced protective tariffs, while Hanseats 
were free-traders. The Whig party became the home to American Party nativists, whose 
attacks on immigration immediately hurt Hanseats’ most lucrative business. Northern 
Whigs had within their ranks some of the few who openly criticized slavery, whereas 
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Hanseats traded in the produce of slave labor. And yet, in 1840, Hanseats in America had 
enthusiastically greeted Harrison’s election to the presidency.525
Since at least 1832, we find Hanseats taking clear sides in the American political 
conflicts, and they exclusively sided with the Whigs. Caspar Meier, Bremen’s consul in 
New York, had written to his nephew, H. H. Meier in Bremen: “So you will have to put 
up with [Nathaniel Pearce, the new American consul in Bremen], at least as long as the 
Jackson party remains in power.” Echoing Whigs’ complaint over Jackson’s ‘spoils 
system’, Bremen’s merchants were furious that Friedrich Jacob Wichelhausen, who had 
served as American consul to Bremen since 1796, was removed from his post, and 
alleged that Pearce owed money to Bremish firms in Baltimore.526
When Senator Diedrich A. Meier found democrats distasteful in 1849, he could 
rest assured that Hanseats’ American friends had been in his shoes before.527 Like this 
Hanseat, Whigs perceived democrats as a group of self-proclaimed tribunes of the lower 
sort, who were arousing the masses against their social betters. If only left alone by such 
agitators, the simple folk surely would have realized that the elite was acting in their 
interest, and out of a selfless commitment to the public good. Could a man of standing 
not expect gratitude for giving his valuable time in public service? Whigs could have 
sympathized with a man like Meier, and vice versa. 
Nativist rabble-rousers, by contrast, found the sympathies of Whigs and Hanseats 
alike. In 1854, Senator Heinrich Smidt, the son of burgomaster Johann Smidt, 
approvingly restated what the American consul in Bremen had told him, that “the Know-
                                                 
525 Only in 1845, the Whig majority in the U.S. Senate had rejected a trade treaty with the German Customs 
Union that would have lowered the tariff on some German imports. Chitwood, Oliver Perry, John Tyler. 
Champion of the Old South, New York and London 1939, p. 332-333.  
526 Beutin, Ludwig, Bremen und Amerika, p. 20, 33-34, 277, quote on p. 277. 
527 See chapter 3, p. 168. 
 264
Nothings have a justified side as a necessary reaction of intelligent and provident 
Americans against the blind despotism of numbers of immigrants, in as far as they [the 
immigrants] are merely tools of political agitators.”528 Many of these ‘tools of agitators’ 
had sailed to the United States on Bremish vessels, and their passages paid Hanseats’ 
bills. Still, Hanseats applied the same criteria to the handling of emigrants, as nativists 
brought to their interaction with immigrants.529 In both cases, the migrant was treated as a 
suspicious stranger whose permanent settling in the community nativists in New York 
and Baltimore wanted to avoid as much as Hanseats in Bremerhaven. Maintaining an 
exclusive community of respectable protestant citizens was just another common concern 
between Bremen’s merchants and their American friends. 
The tariff question was a serious policy issue that could have divided Hanseats 
and Whigs. As much as Hanseats were committed to free trade, though, they had to suffer 
fairly little from the tariff barriers around the United States – under the 1827 treaty with 
the United States, Bremen’s merchants enjoyed a most favored nation status. Besides, 
some Hanseats were willing to grant that a modest, differential tariff might be a 
legitimate tool of trade policy. In other words, they were in favor of free trade only if it 
relied on a mutual agreement between the two sides involved, not as a unilaterally 
applied open-door policy.530
Still, it remains ironical that in the alliance between Whigs and Hanseats, 
American protectionists and Bremish free traders were working hand in hand to 
                                                 
528 Cited by Beutin, Bremen und Amerika, p. 294. American consul to Bremen at that time was William 
Hildebrand, Ibid., p. 277. 
529 See chapter 4. 
530 Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden (in Freiburg i. Brsg.), Bremen 1878/01/20, 1878/02/16, and 
1878/02/23, StAHB 7,116 [Rudolf Schleiden Papers], folder “Briefwechsel Rudolf Schleiden mit Senator 
Arnold Duckwitz, 1854-1879,” third of five unnumbered and unlabeled boxes; Beutin, Bremen und 
Amerika, p. 25-26, 30-31, and 62-63. 
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‘improve’ international commerce and communication. Without the underlying 
agreement on their political values and their social vision, this alliance would have 
seemed an absurdity. If, however, we take into account the basic outlook of these two 
groups, their cooperation makes perfect sense. 
 
As we have seen in the writings of Wilhelm Kiesselbach and in Bremish policies 
in Bremerhaven, Hanseats looked to America for inspiration. They owed a debt to Whig 
thinkers and practitioners not only for their conceptual tools for judging democracy, but 
also for the legal and administrative techniques for handling those transient populations 
for which German law held no precedent. They shared with Whigs their apprehensions 
and perhaps a sense of nostalgia as they ‘improved’ the world. Neither of these 
sentiments weighed too heavily to be placated by ideas such as those of Wilhelm 
Kiesselbach. He told Bremen’s merchants what he needed to believe as much as they did: 
that by changing the world beyond all recognition, they had stayed true to time-honored 
traditions. This is the classical ideological operation of modern conservatism. 
From this perspective, Burgomaster Johann Smidt’s programmatic statement on 
the future of the Hanseatic cities, made in 1806 under the immediate impression of the 
collapse of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, appears in a new light: 
[The Hanseatic Cities] have not abandoned the hope to become (...) generally respected 
asylums of peace and quiet in the midst of the world’s storms (...). They will stand 
justified before the world, by striving for the highest not only in cosmopolitan regard, but 
also, in a patriotic respect, by striving to salvage from the ruins of the Roman Empire of 
the German Nation that character which it, although it was its most noble one, has 
hitherto sought to assert in vain, its Holyness.531
 
                                                 
531 Johann Smidt to the Rat of Bremen, September 1806, StAHB B.5.e, quoted in: Möller, “Politik,” p. 348. 
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The Kantian, cosmopolitan vision of world peace that reverberates in this 
statement has as its complement the enforcement of good order and morality (Polizey). 
The latter is directed against the ‘lower sorts,’ so that the ‘better class’ may devote their 
energies to the higher ideals they salvaged from the lost, pre-industrial world. Together, 
both can then ‘improve’ the world, fulfilling a destiny that is perhaps less manifest than 
the continental expansion favored by American Democrats or German nationalists, but no 
less tangible or preordained in the minds of its advocates.532
Like their Hanseatic allies, Bremen’s friends in Congress were aware that they 
operated in a larger world. They saw political friends and adversaries in foreign places 
who closely resembled those they knew at home. Whigs and Hanseats shared a vision in 
which the state, under the stewardship of elites, pursued the moral and material 
improvement of society. In Bremerhaven, with its mixture of modern commerce and 
social control, Whigs could have seen their ideals of an improved society realized. 
Markets, machines, and morality formed the constellation that guided the political 
course Whigs steered in the U.S., and Hanseats followed in Bremen. To both groups, the 
founding of a mail-steamer line with the support of governments was a logical extension 
of their fundamental political commitments. In working for an extension of commerce, 
Whigs and Hanseats saw themselves as offering extended opportunities for wage-labor to 
the lower orders of society, thus presenting a practical remedy to the dangerous radical 
ideas prevalent among democrats. 
                                                 
532 Governmentally and ideologically, we can understand this transnational correspondence between Whigs 
and Hanseats both as a continuation of the Calvinist Axis described in chapter 2, from Bremen via 
Bremerhaven to New York; and as an extension of Hanseats’ political preference for a hierarchically 
ordered society described in chapter 3. Bear in mind, too, that Hanseats drew a line where it came to the 
traditions of their own estate, which were not up for modernization (cf. Chapter 4). 
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The Whigs were also the “Christian party in politics,” the Evangelicals and 
reformers whose vision of improvement linked inseparably technological progress and 
the moral betterment of individuals.533 The Whig program thus included an excessive 
dose of an ideology that overdetermined the state as a source of good policy and morality, 
not just of legal protection and financial support for the creation of a national market.534 
Public schools that imbued children with piety and a patriotic respect for republican 
institutions; laws that encouraged temperance and the observation of the Sabbath; 
reforms of penal institutions, hospitals, and asylums, which kept deviant parts of the 
population under close supervision; public libraries, which offered workingmen the tools 
required for understanding their proper place in society and for perfecting their skills; 
professional police and fire departments that removed rowdy elements from city streets; 
and the discouragement of the immigration of undesirable groups, most of all Catholics; 
formed the main items on the Whig agenda.535
Both in their Calvinism, and in their stewardship over the Bremish population, 
Hanseats found common ground with Whigs. Bremen’s elite had always considered the 
mass of the population as their charges, maintaining a tight lid on any stirring of demands 
for popular participation. Like Whigs, Hanseats envisioned for themselves the role of the 
benevolent guardian towards a materially and morally bright future of a populace who 
had yet to live up to the promise of their own perfection contained in the plan of their 
Divine Creator. In this view, theorized by Wilhelm Kiesselbach, maintaining a 
                                                 
533 Ely, Ezra Stiles, Discourse Delivered on the Fourth of July, 1827, quoted in: James, Bessie Rowland, 
Anne Royall’s U.S.A, New Brunswick, NJ 1972, p. 192. 
534 Mintz, Steven, Moralists and Modernizers. America’s Pre-Civil War Reformers (=Stanley I. Kutler, ed., 
The American Moment Series, unnumbered vol.), Baltimore, MD and London 1995. 
535 Ashworth, ‘Agrarians’ and ‘Aristocrats;’ Wilentz, Sean, Chants Democratic. New York City and the 
Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850, New York and Oxford 1984; Howe, American Whigs. 
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hierarchical, paternalistic society was the best framework for allowing this populace to 
improve itself, so that they might attain their promise. Like the Whigs, Hanseats moved 
gradually from a paternalistic relation with the common folk to one of social control as 
the century progressed. 
Both Hanseats and Whigs rejected the liberal idea of the individual as driven by 
rational self-interest. Instead, they held to a pessimistic anthropology informed by the 
idea of original sin. Therefore, they believed, in the words of one Whig legislator, in “the 
rule of law and of morals,” to be upheld by government over whatever individuals might 
come to regard as right or true in the arbitrariness of their will or conscience.536 This idea 
of the state is the exact opposite of the classical liberal formulation, in which society, and 
the individual rights of its members, precede the formation of the state; and in which the 
state is the creation of society for the very protection of the individual rights of the 
members of society.537
While Democrats stood in the Enlightenment tradition of trust in the individual 
and his capacity for reason and self-government, the Whig Party was committed to an 
essentially illiberal state, one that Wilhelm Kiesselbach might have recognized as the 




                                                 
536 Reed, William B., Daily Pittsburgh Gazette, January 26, 1836, p. 2. Reed was a state 
representative from Philadelphia. For a contemporary portrayal of Reed’s position, see Poulson’s 
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and 225, note 1. 
537 Ashworth, ‘Agrarians’ and ‘Aristocrats;’ Howe, American Whigs. 
538 Cf. chapter 3. 
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Only a minority of Democrats – among them Ambrose D. Mann – realized what 
Whigs had seen: That they, too, had friends abroad. But Mann picked strange bedfellows, 
building his alliance with an estate that would drive out of town in 1851 those in its home 
town whose ideas would have made them a perfect match for American Democrats. Had 
Congressional Jacksonians been less provincial, they might have discovered that the 
Bremische Bürgerschaft had in its ranks those who rejected the vision of ‘improvement’ 
championed by the Hanseatic elite. They might have learned that in the very same year 
that they questioned the wisdom of a steamer line to Bremerhaven, democrats in the 
Bürgerschaft were mounting a strong challenge to the Senat’s near-absolutist control over 
the port town.539
It is difficult to imagine that Mann was not aware of these democratic stirrings in 
Bremen, where he had spent four years. Perhaps he put his sectional interest over his 
political predilections. Or, perhaps, he was afflicted with the syndrome that has brought 
many progressives, in their desire to see a world full of allies, to imagine all kinds of 
foreign political actors as kindred spirits, no matter how much their actual politics were 




                                                 
539 Kellner-Stoll, Rita, Bremerhaven, 1827-1888. Politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Probleme einer 
Stadtgründung (=Burchard Scheper, ed., Veröffentlichungen des Stadtarchivs Bremerhaven, vol. 4), 
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The Irony of Modernization 
Unable or unwilling to realize their affinities with their Bremish counterparts, 
orthodox Democrats drew their arguments against mail steamers from a familiar source, 
the critique of Hamiltonian politics developed by John Taylor of Caroline, and 
popularized by Jefferson and Jackson.541 These Democrats knew what they were up 
against: a comprehensive world-view that combined the logic of market morality with 
technological progress in a political program that called for an active, good government. 
This program still appeared as a cosmopolitan endeavor, in the service of the betterment 
of humanity – often including the abolition of slavery. By the 1850s, however, it was 
clear to observers that this same program laid the groundwork for the take-off of 
industrial capitalism, now well under way in both the United States and Germany.542
The late Atlantic economy rested on the new types of regimes of social control 
that American Whigs set up in cities like New York and Baltimore, and that their 
Hanseatic allies inaugurated in Bremerhaven and on their vessels. As schemes of 
‘improvement’ – furthering markets, machines, and morality – ocean steamers, port 
facilities, and the laws and institutions that molded populations into market participants 
and wage-labor-forces are points on a continuum.543
To their promoters, these schemes meant the betterment of mankind by combining 
the material blessings of progress with the spiritual blessings of a Christian tradition. The 
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function of ‘improvement’, however, was the creation of the conditions that made 
possible an industrial world-economy. The logic of competition and profit-maximization 
that drove this world-economy undermined what remained of local, communal 
particularity, or “organic customs.” 544  
On both sides of the ocean, democrats appeared as defenders of the social 
substance, the moral economy, of local particularity. When Democrats accused Whigs of 
destroying or exploiting the communal world of honest, hard-working small commodity 
producers, and when Bremen’s artisans accused the Hanseatic elite of abandoning them 
to the vagaries of free competition, they alleged that the function of ‘improvement’ was 
the real, hidden intent. This allegation misses the mark. 
Whigs and Hanseats were just as disturbed as Democrats by the disruptive 
consequences of forging globally linked societies from disparate communities. The 
former, however, differed from the latter, in that they attempted to rescue from the lost 
communal world of the early modern period which Tönnies described, not the 
embeddedness of production and exchange, but the shared, binding morality that rested 
on tight social control. Aware that morality was no longer made binding as a function of 
immediate personal ties among the members of a community, these modern conservatives 
put government in charge of exerting social control over the members of a society.545
 
In a simple teleological account of modernization, the liberal-democratic vision of 
the state is held to be the political theory most compatible with a capitalist society. If we 
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presume that personal freedom and political equality are essential elements of a capitalist 
society, the Whigs would not appear to be a “capitalist party.” In historical practice, 
however, making populations into functioning wage-workers and contract-minded 
individuals almost always involved a coercive effort.546
The transnational strand of conservatism represented by Hanseats and Whigs, and 
the policy of international improvement it pursued, was therefore a contradictory affair. 
While Whigs spoke a language presumably incompatible with a liberal-capitalist state, 
they nonetheless expressed in that language the policies that turned the American 
populace into functioning members of a capitalist society, and that made the financial and 
transportation infrastructure required for creating such a society. This same irony holds 
true for Hanseats. They were busy building a world – technologically, legally, and 
economically – that would unleash the furies of democracy, nationalism, and liberal 
capitalism that would undermine their independence as an estate. 
The making of an industrial world market was not exclusively the work of private 
enterprise. It required an active role for governments to provide the nerves of 
communication that set in motion the bone and muscle of industry; and to mold 
populations into willing, useful, and morally firm market participants. These processes 
changed the world in dramatic ways.  
Still, ‘improvement’ was not just a smokescreen for a program of capitalist 
change – it was the real content of a program that resulted in such change, but which 
created a world quite different from the one its proponents had envisioned. The view of 
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the state conservative modernizers held did indeed offer a moral justification for 
strengthening government to a point where it could assume the burden of improvement; 
and measures of ‘improvement’ did indeed create the necessary conditions for the 
development of an industrial capitalist world market; but they were the outcome of a 
political process, whose results were contingent. It is therefore not surprising that the 
motivations of the actors in that political process, and the results of their actions, did not 
always correspond. 
Recent scholarship on the idea of ‘improvement’ has emphasized both the role of 
the state for putting it into practice, and the continuity between repressive government 
policies directed in the name of this idea against domestic and colonial populations. In 
the work of Richard Drayton, the enclosure movement in Britain, that original sin of 
primitive accumulation, appears as an immediate ancestor to the administration of the 
Other in Britain’s colonial Empire.547 I have suggested here that a concept of 
‘improvement,’ and attention to the role of government, are indeed indispensable for 
understanding the transnational conservatives who made the modern industrial world-
economy. The next chapter is devoted to exploring, through the lens of the Hanseatic 
world-view, how ‘improvement’ squared off with ideas about races, nations, nation-
states, and empires. 
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Chapter 6: Nations, Races, and Empires –  
Hanseats Encounter the Other, 1837 – 1859 
 
 
Essential Assumptions  
 An older generation of Hanseatic historians has claimed that Bremish merchants 
gradually but consciously advanced the cause of German unification, through their 
activities in commerce and international politics. More recent scholarship has followed 
this characterization of Hanseats as promoters of national unification.548 1871, the year 
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15), Bremen 1939. Remarkably, the latter, based on Krieger’s dissertation, is one of the few texts that give 
significant room to those Hanseats who continued to oppose national unification, either on principle or 
under Prussian leadership. Bessell, Georg, 1857-1957. Norddeutscher Lloyd. Geschichte einer bremischen 
Reederei, Bremen 1957, p. 13. Schwarzwälder, Herbert, Geschichte der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, 4 vols., 
Hamburg 1987, vol. 2, p. 274-277; Schulz, Andreas, Vormundschaft und Protektion. Eliten und Bürger in 
Bremen, 1750-1880 (=Gall, Lothar, ed., Stadt und Bürgertum, vol. 13), München 2002 / 
Habilitationsschrift, Universität Frankfurt (Main), 2000, p. 683-684, who claims that there was “no 
alternative”to an alliance between Bremen’s elite and Bismarck; and Biefang, Andreas, Politisches 
Bürgertum in Deutschland, 1857-1868. Nationale Organisationen und Eliten (=Kommission für 
Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, corp. ed., Beiträge zur Geschichte des 
Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, vol. 102), Düsseldorf 1994, show Bremen as a stronghold 
of the nationalist movement, specifically the Nationalverein (National Association, see chapter 8), and 
suggest that the Bremish elite in the 1860s favored national unification. See chapter 8 for a discussion of 
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Bismarck unified Germany, clouds the view of the decades that preceded this watershed. 
All previous history appears to run along straight lines that culminate in the telos of 
German unity, much like the history of the ante-bellum U.S. remains under the shadow of 
the Civil War.549 Even as a transnational approach calls into question such national 
history, we would engage in the same rewriting of history to fit our present sensibilities, 
if we were to dismiss every national sentiment uttered by Hanseats during the first two-
thirds of the century. 
The point is to understand the meanings that Hanseats attributed to the nation 
before the 1860s, in all their nuances. When Hanseats encountered strangers, did they 
make nationality a criterion for socializing or doing business with them? Did nationality 
structure the way Hanseats thought about culture and civilization? Was the nation-state a 
political project to which Hanseats lent their support, and if so, what constitutional and 
social foundations did they envision for a unified Germany? Were their demands on 
states for the provision of infrastructure, law, and order dependent on those states 
becoming nation-states?  
As an ideology that posits essential, inherent differences between people, based 
on culture or biology, the idea of race is a close kin to that of the nation. Hence, 
Hanseatic reactions to encounters with non-Europeans can serve as a test case for the 
world-view of Bremish merchants. A reconstruction of this world-view – of their basic 
assumptions about peoples and nature, culture and civilization – will show that a wide 
range of intellectual influences beyond nations and races competed with and often 
overruled essentialist assumptions in the Hanseatic mind. Most importantly, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
this claim. 
549 Evidently, if we take seriously the metaphor of the watershed, the course of history should be running 
towards the First World War from 1871 up, and towards the French Revolution from 1871 down. 
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The Elephant on the Commons 
Racism is the elephant in the room of any history that sets out to construct a 
positive line of tradition for the nation. This is particularly true for German history. Only 
between 1933 and 1945 did Hanseatic historians proudly stress the race-consciousness of 
their subjects. Rewriting the history of Bremen, Richard Rüthnick celebrated Johann 
Smidt’s anti-Semitism, Adolf Krieger praised Arnold Duckwitz’s “struggle for a German 
economic order,” and Herman Wätjen discovered the civilizing role Germans played in 
conquering the American West.550
Bremen’s elite had led the way for this reevaluation of the transnational ties of its 
ancestors. Already in 1932, Hanseats commemorated the glory of German colonialism by 
erecting the statue of a thirty-foot-high brick elephant next to the burghers’ commons 
(Bürgerweide), within view of the main train station. For the decades that followed the 
Second World War, this elephant was conventionally agreed to not be there. Only in 1990 
did the city complement it with a placard some thirty feet from the statue, explaining the 
latter as a symbol of colonialism. At the center of this placard is a hole in the shape of the 
African continent, inviting the visitor to contemplate the elephant through this hole. By 
making visible again the elephant on the commons through a silhouette of Africa – 
                                                 
550 Rüthnick, Richard, Bürgermeister Smidt und die Juden (Bremens Judenpolitik 1803-1848), Bremen 
1934; Krieger, Arnold Duckwitz; Wätjen, Hermann, Der deutsche Anteil am Wirtschaftsaufbau der 
Westküste Amerikas, Leipzig 1942. 
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present by virtue of its absence – the complementary exhibition strives to confront and 
come to terms with the city’s racist past.551
In the sources that illuminate Hanseats’ world pre-1860, race is a conspicuous 
absence. The few exceptions, however, allow for some extrapolation. Germany did not 
acquire colonies until the 1880s, and while Hanseats did trade with Africa and Asia 
throughout the century, they were not yet the commercial handmaidens of a German 
Imperial power. Bremen’s trade relied largely on the products of slave labor, but the 
slave-owning Hanseat was a rare exception. Not tainted with the direct political or 
economic exploitation of non-Europeans, Bremen’s merchants could consider themselves 
as cosmopolitans, not involved in imperial domination, but in building a morally and 
materially brighter future for all humanity by peaceful trade. 552
Hanseatic trade and foreign policy operated within the framework of a global free-
trade regime dominated by the British Empire. The Atlantic World was but the busiest 
sector in this global space.  Race has been read back into the making of the West, and of 
Britain in particular, by recent scholarship. Even the most “civic” – i.e., not based on 
ethnic homogeneity – projects of European nation-building had a subtext of race, in that 
the emergence of European modernity materially rested on the exploitation of extra-
                                                 
551 In 1990, the elephant was officially rededicated as an ‘Anti-Colonial Monument’, in the presence of 
Sam Nujoma, President of the Republic of Namibia. In 1932, the main speakers at the dedication of the 
monument had been Eduard Achelis, the head of one of Bremen’s major merchant houses, and General von 
Lettow-Vorbeck, the military leader of the massacre of the Herero and Nama in German South-West Africa 
in 1906-1907. See Gustafsson, Heinz, Namibia, Bremen und Deutschland. Ein steiniger Weg zur 
Freundschaft, Delmenhorst 2003; Gebel, Thomas, “Schwachhausen und die SWAPO,” taz (i.e., Die 
Tageszeitung) Bremen, no. 6639 (Jan 2, 2002), p. 23; Achelis, Eduard, Meine Lebenserinnerungen aus 
50jähriger Arbeit (photocopy of typescript), Bremen 1935/1936, StAHB, call number 135.Ai, especially p. 
23. 
552 Cf. McBride, David, Leroy Hopkins, and C. Aisha Blackshire-Belay, eds., Crosscurrents : African 
Americans, Africa, and Germany in the Modern World, Columbia, SC 1998. 
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European peoples. To reap the benefits of Empire, it was not necessary to buy into the 
ideology of race.553
Still, notions of race began to enter the minds of Hanseats at the same time as they 
were making up these minds on the national question. Many of those non-white peoples 
drawn into the Anglo-American world created by the British Empire crossed paths with 
Hanseats, and helped shape their thinking about themselves, and about their place in the 
world. Even so, as late as the 1850s, Hanseats brought to their encounters with the Other 
the same mercantile mindset that allowed them to keep an open mind towards different 
nations. The refined and respectable non-white person could socialize with Hanseats on 




Ships’ Names as Cultural and Political Statements 
If we look for evidence of national imagery in Hanseats’ world, we need to look 
no further than to the names Bremen’s merchants gave to their vessels. The first two 
steamers built by the Ocean Steam Navigation Company (OSNC) were the Washington 
and the Hermann. They were named after the founders of the nations they connected – 
General Washington for the U.S., and Arminius, the leader of the Cheruskans, the tribe 
who defeated Varus’ Roman legions in Northern Germany in 9 A.D., for Germany. The 
                                                 
553 Drayton, Richard, Nature’s Government. Science, Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’ of the World, 
New Haven, CT and London 2000; Gilroy, Paul, The Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness, 
Cambridge, Mass. 1993; Idem, There ain’t no Black in the Union Jack. The Cultural Politics of Race and 
Nation, London 1987; Bolster, W. Jeffrey, Black Jacks. African American Seamen in the Age of Sail, 
Cambridge, Mass. and London, UK 1997. 
554 This pattern of status trumping race is supported by the findings of Cannadine, David, Ornamentalism. 
How the British Saw Their Empire, London et. al. 2001. 
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first Northern German Lloyd steamers on the line to New York were christened Hudson 
and Weser – after the rivers flowing through New York and Bremen, respectively.555
The names of these steamers appeal to different types of nationalism, but they all 
invoke nationality. In the imagination of romantic nationalists, landscapes and peoples 
formed an organic whole. In 1848, the nationalization of landscapes through their 
representation in art and literature was already well established, and rivers played a 
particularly central role in the nationalist imagination. The Hudson had come into its role 
as the stream whose image defined American nationality. The Weser, on the other side of 
the ocean, carried less of a strong symbolic meaning. The ‘German River’ is the Rhine, 
and only a much later Bremish steamer would be named for it. Nonetheless, as a river, it 
invoked romantic imagery.556
The two ‘fathers of their nation,’ Washington and Arminius, stand for two major 
currents of nationalism in the modern age. Washington represents the civic nation – 
Friedrich Meinecke’s Staatsnation – defined by the political framework of a constitution 
that guarantees rights and representation to the citizen. Arminius, by contrast, represents 
the ethno-cultural nation, the Kulturnation, based on the shared ethnic or cultural 
characteristics of its members.557 Unlike Washington, Arminius did not set out to build a 
nation when he beat the Romans. He was claimed as a founding father only in retrospect, 
by ethno-cultural nationalists who, during the Napoleonic Wars, made a case for the 
perpetuity of German ethnic homogeneity and difference from, mostly, the state-peoples 
                                                 
555 Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 33, 36 (OSNC), and 67 (Lloyd). 
556 Andree, Rolf, and Ute Rickel-Immel, The Hudson and the Rhine. Die amerikanische Malerkolonie in 
Düsseldorf im 19. Jahrhundert, Kat. Ausst. [i.e. exhibition catalog] Düsseldorf, Kunstmuseum, 1976. 
557 Meinecke, Friedrich, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat (=Hans Herzfeld, Carl Hinrichs and Walther 
Hofer, Friedrich Meinecke. Werke, Bd. 5), München 1962 (1911). Meinecke’s work was an attempt by a 
liberal in late Imperial Germany to defend the German Enlightenment against its nationalist critics. See also 
Brubaker, Rogers, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, Mass. 1992. 
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of France and its forerunner, Rome. By 1848, the image of Arminius as a tribal, 
Germanic ancestor of the modern German nation was familiar to all educated Germans.558 
But Washington was not an empty symbol to Germans, either. Even before the revolution 
of 1848, the first American president was venerated by German liberals and radicals, who 
held up the revolution Washington had defended as a model for their own hopes.559 Thus, 
the names of the OSNC steamers appealed, with alternate visions of nationality, to both 
Germans and Americans. 
The simultaneous appeal to romantic, ethno-cultural and civic nationalism betrays 
a certain opportunism towards potentially conflicting visions of both nations, not a firm 
commitment to one vision of the German nation, alone. Their invocation of nationality 
does not necessarily mean that Hanseats believed in the nation as a uniform cultural 
entity, that they made nationality their criterion for judging others, or that it drove their 
political initiatives and desires. The idea of Germany as a ‘mere geographical concept’ 
(METTERNICH) or as cultural space, moreover, does not necessarily entail a commitment 
to a nation-state. 
For naming the second set of its steamers, the OSNC tapped into yet a different 
discourse. These vessels bore the names of men of science, Humboldt and Franklin. 
While contemporaries saw both Alexander von Humboldt and Benjamin Franklin as 
eminent representatives of their respective nations, their achievements also belonged to 
humanity at large. In naming steam vessels after scientists, Hanseats appealed to the hope 
                                                 
558 Dörner, Andreas, Politischer Mythos und symbolische Politik. Sinnstiftung durch symbolische Formen 
am Beispiel des Hermannsmythos, Opladen 1995 (also PhD diss, Universität Essen, 1994); Flacke, Monika, 
„Deutschland. Die Begründung der Nation aus der Krise,” in: Idem, ed., Mythen der Nationen. Ein 
Europäisches Panorama, München and Berlin 1998, p. 101-128, esp. p. 102-107. 
559 Moltmann, Günter, Atlantische Blockpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert. Die Vereinigten Staaten und der 
deutsche Liberalismus während der Revolution von 1848/49, Düsseldorf 1973 
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for technological progress evoked by this new technology. It might have been an added 
benefit that Franklin was also known as a champion of a protestant work ethic. As a 
teacher of frugality and self-discipline, and as a contributor to material progress, Franklin 
embodied the sense of improvement Hanseats held so dear. As a developmental vision, 
this notion of improvement resonated with a cosmopolitanism that had dominated 
German intellectual life in the Enlightenment, and that still mattered for Hanseats.560
 
An important reason for the subordinate status of the nation in Hanseats’ thinking 
was that their sight was set towards the Atlantic. This ocean was a transnational space. It 
was so not least because the British Empire, the state-entity that dominated the Atlantic 
World, was more than just an extended nation-state. The context of Empire for the 
making of the nation was invoked by the names of the first two OSNC steamers in ways 
that may not have been apparent to those who christened them. Washington’s unification 
of the British colonies against the motherland could be likened to Arminius’ unification 
of the warring Germanic tribes against Rome. Both men were military leaders. Both had 
previously been in the military service of the Empire they defeated. They were recruited 
in the peripheral dominions of that Empire, policing its marches against the barbarian 
outside world – Washington as an Indian fighter in the Transappalachian West, and 
Arminius as a Roman ally in the borderlands between Rome and the unromanized 
Germanic North. 
If the stories of both leaders would be incomplete without their relation to the 
overbearing imperial power of the time, so would that of the Ocean Steam Navigation 
                                                 
560 Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 38. The Humboldt and the Franklin were built for the Bremen line, but never used 
as intended. Instead, they ran on the New York-Havre Line, partly owned by the OSNC. 
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Company and the relation between America and Germany it established and embodied. 
The British Empire set the framework of political economy in which these subsidized 
mail steamers operated, in which Hanseats plied their trade, and in which German and 
American nationalism were made. This framework, moreover, extended beyond the 
Atlantic, to establish a global regime of free trade and European domination. 
Britain likewise set the cultural tone of the age that we call the Victorian Era. It 
defined respectability and refinement as universal middle-class values, but it did so in 
positing civilization as the opposite to the barbarism of Others. It placed the Western 
bourgeoisie in one cultural camp, and the barbarian Other in an opposing one. The 
cultural difference thus made became the basis of racial ideas that emerged in the same 
process.561 While Hanseats moved in this Victorian, cultural space, the main point of 
reference for their judgments remained the mercantile ethos of their own estate. 
 
 
Socializing with the Other 
In early 1856, Gustav F. Schwab went on an extensive trip to Europe. He had 
made the crossing from New York with his family. In Paris, just after New Year, he said 
good-bye to his wife, Eliza, and their young children, whom Eliza took with her to 
Stuttgart for an extended stay with Sophie Schwab, Gustav Schwab’s mother. An 
accomplished Hanseatic merchant in New York, Schwab planned to inspect first-hand the 
places in Sicily from where his firm, Schwab & Recknagel, received sumac and sulfur. 
On the journey through France and Italy, he wanted to combine business and edification, 
                                                 
561 For the global character of Victorian culture, see Young, Linda, Middle-Class Culture in the Nineteenth 
Century. America, Australia and Britain, New York et. al. 2003. 
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visiting several business partners and experiencing the treasures of antiquity along the 
way. Throughout the trip, Schwab shared his impressions with Eliza, in a constant stream 
of detailed letters. In April, he reunited with his loved ones in Stuttgart, where the entire 
family spent the Spring, before returning to New York via Bremen. 
The trip took Schwab onto unknown terrain, inviting him to reflect upon his 
encounters with strangers and strangeness, and to make decisions with whom to socialize 
or do business. What criteria did he bring to these encounters? One might expect him to 
hold a fixed set of assumptions about the ‘national character’ of ‘Others’ (HEGEL). 
Instead, we see Schwab apply a range of differentiated criteria to cultures and 
individuals, which allowed him to revise and develop his views as his journey 
progressed. As travel makes us learn more about ourselves than about the places we visit, 
so from Schwab’s judgments of Others there emerges an image of his view of himself 
and of his place in the world relative to Others. This image is not one of ethnic or cultural 
nationalism. It is one of an elite cosmopolitanism that set clearly defined, yet open and 
flexible boundaries between the world of one’s peers and the world of outsiders. 
As a true cosmopolitan, Schwab was nowhere a stranger. He discovered that most 
of his new acquaintances shared some mutual friends or business partners with him. In 
one letter, he remarked, "I hardly meet any person with whom I do not already have some 
kind of relation."562 A case in point was a soirée in the house of the merchant Adolf 
Gruber in Genoa. "It turns out that young Pagenstetter, who came to our counting-house 
the past spring, had previously been in Gruber's counting-house for several years, and 
was well-liked there. Further, [Gruber's associate] Herr Weyermann has a brother in New 
                                                 
562 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Palermo 1856/02/09, MSS 434, John Christopher Schwab Family 
Papers. Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, series I, box 1, folder 32. 
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York in Spies' counting-house. We will have an opportunity to return to him the 
hospitality I have received here."563
Hanseats moved in a global class of merchants. With others in that class, they 
shared the habit of assessing the worth of an individual based on ‘character’ and 
refinement. Hanseats were groomed from childhood to develop these essential 
qualifications for moving among the better sort.564 Yet, as much as Hanseats might have 
liked to believe that refinement was an inherent characteristic, they, along with anyone 
who made a claim to an exalted station, knew that cultural tastes, social skills, and 
commercial and political knowledge were acquired. Since anyone with the necessary 
means and connections could acquire them, a solid command of the habits that signaled 
refinement did not necessarily indicate that a person was, indeed, inwardly a gentleman. 
For social intercourse, this fine distinction might not have mattered as much.565 For 
business transactions, however, Hanseats liked to be on firmer ground before deciding 
that a counterpart could be trusted. 
Within their own network, Bremen’s merchants knew with whom they were 
dealing. Personal acquaintance, or at most two degrees of separation, ensured credibility 
(chapter 1). In the port-towns where Hanseats were active, non-Hanseatic merchants were 
still no strangers to them. For better or worse, one’s character was known to those who 
mattered. When Julius Wilkens planned to ‘establish himself’ in Baltimore in a firm of 
his own, his brother Friedrich offered him a word of warning about his prospective 
                                                 
563 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Genua 1856/01/27, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, folder 
31. 
564 Bushman, Richard, The Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities, New York 1992. For Hanseats’ 
education, see chapter 2. 
565 Halttunen, Karen, Confidence Men and Painted Women. A Story of Middle-Class Culture in America, 
1830-1870 (=Yale Historical Publication, Miscellany, vol. 129), New Haven, CT and London 1982. 
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associate: “If I were you, I would think twice about Crichton’s proposal, the burned child 
fears the fire, yet you know best.”566 In exchanges like these, merchants evaluated each 
other’s credibility. 
The further away from familiar ground Hanseats ventured in establishing business 
connections, the more important this kind of second-hand advice became. Especially in 
the fast-growing and fluctuating world of the American bourgeoisie, credit-rating 
agencies came to play a central role for replacing first-hand knowledge about a person’s 
character with anonymous standards. In the 1850s and 1860s, credit ratings were still 
largely based on assessments of the ‘character’ of an individual, gained by interviewing 
those of standing who knew him. Ratings agencies filled in the gaps that emerged where 
merchants could no longer acquire first- or even second-hand knowledge about 
prospective business partners; but they applied the same standards to which a merchant 
would have held them if he had known  them in person.567
Outside of the U.S., merchants could not depend on the help of ratings agencies. 
To an extent, second-degree connections as described by Schwab could help to establish 
a basis for trust. A recommendation by Gruber might have carried some weight for 
Schwab. Schwab, himself, received frequent requests for help from young Germans who 
hoped to establish themselves in America, and most of these came with references from 
Bremen or Württemberg.568
                                                 
566 Friedrich to Julius Wilkens, 1864/1/18, , Wilkens, Julius, 1838?-1898, Papers, 1849-83, MdHS MS.439. 
567 Beckert, Sven, “Merchants and Manufacturers in the Antebellum North,” in: Gerstle, Gary and Steve 
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Where these means of ascertaining the character of a counterpart were absent, 
merchants were forced to rely on their own judgment. Schwab’s letters show that 
nationality, religion or creed, and race were criteria in his preliminary judgments, or 
prejudices, of strangers. Nevertheless, he was able to reflect on these criteria, and to 
revise the images he formed under first impressions. When in doubt, he fell back on the 
same standards he employed in judging business partners. 
 
Nationality was a criterion that allowed Schwab a first, rough sorting of the 
strangers he encountered on his journey. Schwab was more likely to give Germans, 
Britons, and Americans the benefit of the doubt, while he would approach Frenchmen 
and Italians with a prejudicial caution. In Genoa, Schwab was introduced to a Mr. Parodi-
Köster, whom he found to be "a crook, like all Genoese."569 In the same vein, he felt 
comfortable in Livorno, where he "enjoy(ed) dealing with proper German and English 
houses, rather than French and Italian ones."570
These attitudes were not based on a fully-fledged ethno-cultural construction of 
the nation. His positive or negative prejudice about either nation did not determine 
Schwab’s attitude towards all of their individual members. For himself, Schwab at times 
seemed to be filled with a sense of his own inadequacy, rather than superiority, in dealing 
with Italians and Frenchmen. Much of this unease had to do with language. 
                                                 
569 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Genua 1856/01/27, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, folder 
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In Genoa, Schwab turned down an invitation to a grand ball, “so as not to reveal 
my ignorance of the Italian language.”571 In Milan, as in most places before that, Schwab 
chose an English-speaker for his companion in his tourist activities, a lieutenant of the 
U.S. Navy, so that he could share his impressions in a familiar tongue.572 On another 
occasion, Schwab hints that he has made progress with his French, but is not yet 
confident that he has mastered the language.573 As long as his French and Italian 
counterparts did not speak English or German as well as he, Schwab would have found it 
difficult to carry on a conversation that would allow for the subtleties of refinement to be 
communicated, and thus to evaluate the character of his counterparts, independently. 
Indeed, where he met English-speaking Frenchmen, he had nothing but kind words. On a 
carriage-ride to Rome, Schwab shared the coach with two Frenchwomen, whom he 
praised as educated and modest – models of feminine virtue in spite of their national 
background.574 On another occasion, he found a Mr. de Bonneville to be an “interesting 
person,” with whom he enjoyed an animated debate over religion on a train ride through 
France. When Schwab came to Rome, he even sought to meet de Bonneville there, but 
was disappointed to find that he had already departed. But de Bonneville was not just a 
gentleman not separated from Schwab by a language barrier; he also qualified as a 
“person with whom I … already have some kind of relation” – “Theodor Pressel of 
Tübingen … had been the private tutor of [de Bonneville’s] sister;” and Pressel was an 
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acquaintance of Schwab’s brother-in-law, Karl Klüpfel.575 These connections put this 
Frenchman squarely in the same group of people as Adolf Gruber, the German merchant 
in Genoa – a cosmopolitan elite. 
Just as Schwab did not consider all Frenchmen as essentially inferior, neither did 
he assume that all Germans, Americans, or Britons were essentially his peers. In spite of 
his general affinity for the United States, Schwab once uttered 'surprise' at a number of 
recent transactions in New York that had brought him into contact with 'honest' American 
counterparts.576 The sense that a shared nationality did not establish much of a 
commonality emerges from Hanseatic attitudes towards hinterland Germans: Dealing 
with non-Hanseatic German elites, Senator Gabain, when attending a conference on 
commercial law in 1857, remarked upon the absence of "higher mercantile experience 
and intelligence" among the delegates from other German states, and found the bankers 
and industrialists from the hinterland characterized by the "narrowness of their vision." In 
the early 1860s, burgomaster Arnold Duckwitz complained in similar terms about the 
Prussian ministerial bureaucracy, whose members were recruited from the landed 
nobility.577 One way in which Hanseats marked their distinctness from these provincials 
was that they often spoke English among themselves, especially in Bremen.578  
Hanseats might have moved with most ease in the worlds of the Anglo-American 
Atlantic and the Germanic Confederation, but they remained, in their own view, a group 
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apart from either of these worlds. Against Anglo-Americans, they held the suspicion that 
self-interest overruled morality in their business ethics. Hanseats shared this prejudice 
with nationalist Germans, who made the same accusation of crude materialism against 
Hanseats.579 From other Germans, Hanseats felt themselves distinct by the breadth of their 
cosmopolitan vision, as opposed to the provincial narrowness of the hinterland. In both 
cases, as far as Hanseats were concerned, nationality could not serve as an automatically 
assumed basis for socializing or conducting business with others. In social interaction 
between individuals, refinement and character trumped nationality. 
 
If nationality was not a firm criterion for the recognition or rejection of Others as 
equals, we might suspect that religion or creed were – after all, Calvinism was such an 
integral part of Hanseats’ identity (cf. chapter 2). In Naples, Gustav F. Schwab expressed 
delight at meeting 'countrymen' – and then went on to list men and women from Bremen 
and Württemberg, two solidly Calvinist states.580 Indeed, the nations Schwab found more 
trustworthy than others were predominantly Protestant, whereas those he distrusted were 
predominantly Catholic. Yet, Schwab’s account of his acquaintance with de Bonneville – 
“an ardent propagandist for Catholicism” – shows that he could look beyond religious 
differences, if a person was otherwise a gentleman.581
                                                 
579 Engelsing,“England und die USA,” especially p. 40-43 and 57-58, quote on p. 40-41, cites the Bremish 
merchant Friedrich Adolph Delius, who, “in the 1840s,” wrote: “On the one hand, England is the most 
dangerous enemy of an economically independent Germany and the epitome of all self-interested trade 
policy; on the other hand, English trade policy gives the best practical instruction as to how Germany, in 
responding to England, must conduct herself vis-à-vis foreign countries.” See chapter 4 for Delius’ ideas on 
the social control of itinerant populations, which seem to reflect a change of heart that parallels that of 
British liberals over the 1840s. 
580 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Naples 1856/02/06, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, folder 
32. 
581 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Marseille 1856/01/20-21, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, 
folder 31. 
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In dealing with the general Italian population, however, Schwab was initially led 
by solid anti-Catholic presumptions. The further South he traveled, the more frequent and 
dismissive his remarks about Catholicism became. In Palermo, at first, his anti-
Catholicism reached new heights. Schwab explained the backwardness of the Kingdom 
of Both Sicilies, and the poverty of its general population, on religious grounds: "Monks 
and priests rule the land and bleed it dry. Imagine, there are 20 to 30 thousand monks and 
nuns in Palermo alone, a city of 160,000 inhabitants. Such an army of idlers is even 
worse than one of soldiers, and Sicily has an abundance of the latter, in addition."582
The image of benighted despotism Schwab invokes resonates with the anti-
Catholicism then prevalent among Nativists and Evangelicals in the United States. In the 
view of these groups, there existed a linkage between liberty, industry, and faith that 
explained American success. This trope, so familiar to American Protestants in the 1850s, 
would also come to inform patriotism in the German Empire of the 1870s, and we can see 
in Schwab’s depiction of the Two Sicilies a nucleus of that later ideology.583
Perhaps Schwab’s initial view of the Sicilians was informed by the opinions of his 
acquaintances, most of whom were Germans residing in that port as merchants. Among 
his companions in Palermo were also two British merchants who were en route to China, 
                                                 
582 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Palermo 1856/02/09, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, 
folder 32. 
583 On the U.S., see Knobel, Dale T., America for the Americans. The Nativist Movement in the United 
States, New York 1996; Baker, Jean H., Ambivalent Americans. The Know-Nothing Party in Maryland, 
Baltimore 1977; Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Raab, Earl, The Politics of Unreason. Right-Wing Extremism 
in America, 1790-1977, Chicago and London, 19782 (1970). On Germany, see Fischer, Fritz, “Der deutsche 
Protestantismus und die Politik im 19. Jahrhundert,” in: Böhme, Helmut (ed.), Probleme der 
Reichsgründungszeit 1848-1879, Cologne and Berlin 1972, p. 49-71; Flacke, “Deutschland,” p. 111-115; 
Hübinger, Gangolf, Kulturprotestantismus und Politik. Zum Verhältnis von Liberalismus und 
Protestantismus im wilhelminischen Deutschland, Tübingen 1994; Becker, Frank, ”Konfessionelle 
Nationsbilder im Deutschen Kaiserreich,” in: Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard, and Dieter Langewiesche, eds., 
Nation und Religion in der deutschen Geschichte, Frankfurt am Main and New York 2001, p. 389-418; 
Kuhlemann, Frank-Michael, ”Pastorennationalismus in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert – Befunde und 
Perspektiven der Forschung,” Ibid, p. 548-586. 
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where they were established. Schwab undertook his sightseeing tours of the environs in 
the company of these Britons, to whom he referred as "the Chinese." He invited them to 
join him and his German acquaintances at the local German enclave – a beer-pub run by 
Sicilian monks in a convent's cellar. Surely the irony was not lost on Schwab.584
If the judgments of his local acquaintances had been the base of Schwab’s first 
impressions of Sicily, he was ready to question them after gaining first-hand experience. 
Indeed, after a few days in Palermo, Schwab consciously began to question his 
assumptions about the linkage between Catholicism and idleness, eventually to discard 
them. He had discovered that the land on a steep hillside, which he climbed to gain the 
view from the mountaintop, was cultivated almost all the way to the summit. "I have to 
revise my opinion of the Sicilians," he conceded. "It takes no small amount of diligence, 
after all, to cultivate these small patches of land, some thousands of feet above the valley, 
so difficult to access, and under so hot a sun." These cultivators were clearly Catholics. In 
Schwab’s eyes, they had redeemed their nation and their creed through their industry. In 
this case, all it took to gain Gustav F. Schwab's respect was the embrace of a Protestant 
work ethic, not of the Protestant creed, itself.585
 
Religion and nationality might have served Schwab as a priori criteria for his 
judgments, but they were not in any way fixed and immutable. Considerations like 
character, refinement, and work ethic modified or overruled religion and nationality not 
just in the case of individuals with whom he interacted, but also in Schwab’s opinions of 
                                                 
584 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Palermo 1856/02/09, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, 
folder 32. 
585 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Palermo 1856/02/09, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, 
folder 32. 
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‘the many,’ whatever their nationality may be. He looked at individuals, merchants or 
not, with an eye that judged the qualification of his counterpart as a business partner; and 
he assessed the worth of a country with the gaze of someone who asks for its value as a 
partner in foreign trade. The rational core of this approach is the concern with profit. 
Schwab would give credit where it was due, to countries or individuals alike. The 
conscious moral root of Schwab’s attitude, however, was his commitment to the 
Calvinist-mercantile ethos that was founded on the existence of Bremen’s mercantile 
estate as a cosmopolitan community. 
 
 
Race and Empire 
The true test for the universality of their mercantile values would be whether 
Hanseats were willing to apply them to non-Europeans. If we assume that refinement and 
civilization emerge in the nineteenth century as generically ‘Western’ attributes 
functioning as complements to an increasingly dismissive view of the racialized Other, 
we should find that Hanseats brought racist assumptions to their encounters with non-
whites. Indeed, racist ideas had taken root in Hanseats’ minds. Not unlike their views on 
nationalism and religion, however, Hanseats were able to question and revise their racist 
assumptions. In actual encounters with, and in policies directed towards non-Europeans, 
Hanseats could look beyond the racial construction to detect, not a uniform Other, but 
both unwashed masses and gentlemen in dark skin. 
When Haiti gained its independence from France, the United States refused to 
grant diplomatic recognition to a state founded on the rebellion of slaves. Bremen, on the 
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other hand, approached the new nation with the same attitude it had brought to the United 
States. Here was a former colony, now open to direct trade with the continent. This was 
good for business, and the Hanseatic City established two consulates in Haiti.586
In 1837, Bremen joined the anti-slave-trade treaty that had been made between 
Britain and France in 1835. The main concern that drove the Senat to this step was the 
danger that Bremish emigrant ships would be seized as slavers. The criteria laid down in 
the Franco-British treaty for telling a passenger vessel from a slave-trading one were 
based on the amount of space allotted to each passenger. A ship that could be densely 
packed with humans, by the lay-out of the steerage quarters or by the amount of 
provisions carried, was automatically suspicious. In itself, an emigrant vessel could not 
easily be distinguished from a slaver. Being a party to the treaty gave Bremen more 
leverage to protect its vessels from seizure.587
A secondary consideration was to prevent Africans from coming to Bremerhaven. 
Britain and France had agreed to capture any and all slave-trading vessels. Under the 
treaty provisions, liberated Africans would be sent to the home port of the vessel. By 
joining the treaty, Bremen was able to prevent this clause from being applied to any 
Bremish ships that might be seized by either of the treaty powers. Article 3 of the 
agreement by which the Hanseatic cities joined the Anglo-French treaty states that 
liberated slaves are to disembark in French or English ports, “because the disembarkation 
of Negroes in the above-mentioned [Hanseatic] ports would be accompanied by great 
                                                 
586 Graßmann, Antjekathrin, “Hanse weltweit? Zu den Konsulaten Lübecks, Bremens und Hamburgs im 19. 
Jahrhundert,” in: Idem, ed., Ausklang und Nachklang der Hanse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (=Hansischer 
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587 StAHB 2-C,4,g,1,II, Beitritt der Hansestädte zu den zwischen England und Frankreich zur 
Unterdrückung des Sklavenhandels abgeschlossenen Verträgen 1837. Generalia et diversa 1836-1868. 
This file contains a printed form that allows Bremish authorities to declare that the purpose of the journey 
of a specific vessel is not related to slaving. 
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inconvenience.”588 It would be a mistake, however, to read this clause as motivated 
simply by racism. 
Blacks, like migrants and sailors, were a group Hanseats treated with a ‘paternal’ 
attitude. Neither of these groups could expect to receive recognition as equals from 
Bremen’s merchants. All of them were equally unwelcome to remain on Bremish 
territory for any prolonged stay. Within these limits, blacks did not receive special 
discriminatory treatment based on race. As illegally traded slaves, they were just another 
group in a larger, transient population that posed a problem to law and order, and that had 
to be dealt with by administrative means. The Senat took care that freed slaves should not 
stay for any prolonged period of time in Bremerhaven, let alone settle there; but it did the 
same with sailors and migrants. In the case of all three groups, the main objective was to 
keep strangers from becoming permanent residents who might become a charge to public 
charity, or a problem for the maintenance of order. To be sure, to fear that these groups 
would end up indigent if they stayed on Bremish territory meant to assume that their 
individual members lacked the necessary ‘industry’ to prosper. This assumption, 
however, was based on a class prejudice. It might have been an essentialist assumption – 
that certain groups were inherently incapable of bettering themselves – but not one 
primarily based on a notion of race.589
On the issue of black slavery in the United States, Hanseats were largely silent. 
American blacks are rarely mentioned in their letters. In this respect, enslaved blacks 
formed a blind spot not unlike the personnel who served Hanseats in their homes and 
                                                 
588 Ibid. 
589 By contrast, Jews were explicitly excluded from Bremish territory as a ‘nation’ and as a religious group. 
See above, chapter 3, and Wippermann, Wolfgang, Jüdisches Leben im Raum Bremerhaven. Eine 
Fallstudie zur Alltagsgeschichte der Juden vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur NS-Zeit (=Burchard Scheper, ed., 
Veröffentlichungen des Stadtarchivs Bremerhaven, vol. 5), Bremerhaven 1985, p. 46-52. 
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counting-houses.590 When slaves did appear in correspondence, it was as commodities 
alongside tobacco and cotton. Bremen’s consul in Richmond, Eduard Wilhelm deVoß, 
dutifully listed the prices of slaves in that market in his annual reports.591 Here, too, 
Hanseats’ attitude towards slaves mirrors the one they took towards immigrants and 
sailors, who were mostly important as factors on the balance sheet.592
The cotton merchant Ludwig Kirchhoff was an exception. Of Bremish origin, 
Kirchhoff served as consul for Lübeck in New Orleans. There, he had married the 
daughter of a plantation owner, a Mr. Welham. When his father-in-law died and 
Kirchhoff inherited the plantations, it did not take long for the news to reach Rudolf 
Schleiden and Gustav F. Schwab. It is more than a little likely that Welham had owned 
slaves who worked on his estates. Schleiden and Schwab agreed that Kirchhoff should 
sell the plantations. Schleiden based this opinion on Kirchhoff’s precarious health. He 
had learned about Welham’s death after Lincoln’s election, which had put slavery on the 
national agenda. Yet Schleiden’s only reference to slavery was his remark that “the 
current situation may not be especially favorable for a sale of the old man’s plantations.” 
This was a decidedly pragmatic take on the issue of slavery.593
Hanseatic newspapers followed the mounting tension in the United States over 
slavery during the last half of the 1850s. In March of 1856, the Weser Zeitung ran a series 
of articles that debated the pros and cons of slavery, without, however, favoring one 
                                                 
590 See chapter 2. 
591 StAHB, 2-B.13.b.10, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten Staaten von 
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633 to this chapter, as well as chapter 8. 
593 Rudolf Schleiden to Gustav F. Schwab (in New York), Brattleboro, VT 1860/08/29 and 1860/08/31, and 
Washington, DC 1860/11/24, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 38. 
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position over the other. In its columns, correspondents’ reports from the U.S. were 
printed without regard to their tint. One correspondent in New York described the 
conflict in Kansas as a confrontation between “abolitionists and friends of law and 
order.” A different correspondent called the Fugitive Slave Law “horrible” and described 
its devastating consequences for escaped slaves.594 Editorials ignored the issue. 
Apparently, Hanseats were not ready to side with either party to the conflict. Their 
religious leanings might have drawn them towards abolitionism, while their commercial 
interests in cotton and tobacco would have given them an interest in seeing slavery 
maintained. Neither of these conflicting interests seems to have outweighed the other 
strongly enough to have driven Hanseats towards an active stance on slavery. 
If Hanseats largely ignored slavery, the defenders of the ‘peculiar institution’ did 
not ignore Hanseats. In his opinion concurring with U.S. Chief Justice Rodger B. Taney’s 
Dred Scott decision, Justice John A. Campbell pointed to Bremen law. Campbell stressed 
the contrast between German Law that confers freedom to a person by virtue of his 
presence in a specific territory, and the American legal situation. Campbell, who would 
later become assistant secretary of war in the Confederate States of America, held that the 
principle of Bremish law, that “city air makes free,” was not a valid precedent for 
American jurisprudence.595
 
If Hanseats were color-blind in their condescension and paternalism toward the 
‘lower sorts,’ they were equally open to accept non-Europeans as peers if they passed the 
test of refinement and character. An encounter of Gustav F. Schwab’s stands as an 
                                                 
594 Weser Zeitung, 1856/01/03, 1856/02/14, 1856/03/06, and 1856/03/07. 
595 See Dred Scott v Sandford, U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Campbell concurring, in: 
http://www.tourolaw.edu/patch/Scott/Campbell.asp. (Touro College Law Center, Project P.A.T.C.H.). 
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impressive example. On the journey from Paris to Marseille, Schwab became friends with 
a fellow train passenger. His account reveals a surprisingly open-minded flirt with the 
Other, while at the same time showing the strong roots racial stereotypes had in Schwab's 
thinking. Schwab wrote to his wife: 
I have to tell you about an acquaintance I have made on the way. On the station in Lyon I 
met a man who had drawn everyone's gaze upon himself, and who was a mystery to 
everyone. A tall, handsome man, almost as black as a Negro, a fine physiognomy, a 
marvelous turban on his head, woven from silk and gold, and with oriental garments 
under his coat. By chance, I came to sit in the same compartment as he; he was 
accompanied by a very well-educated Frenchman and his mother, and since these people 
spoke English, we soon began a conversation. By and by I found out that the man was a 
Hindoo, and a Khan of the belligerent and famous tribe of the Mahrattas, whose history is 
still fresh in my mind from Macauly's essays. He speaks perfect English, and must have 
lived in the nobility in London and Paris. We had the most interesting conversation, and 
we soon become such good friends, that he told me just minutes ago how much he regrets 
having to leave here tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, and that we cannot make the 
journey through Italy, which he also plans to make, jointly. (...) 
There is nothing new under the sun; just imagine, an honest Swabian and a Hindoo Khan 
arm in arm! Although he is of a belligerent tribe, you do not have to think that he could 
suddenly twist my neck; he is a very gentle and refined man, and on the train, when I 
offered him some of my excellent raspberry schnapps, he made a face like our children 
did when they first tried to drink beer. Since he is very well-informed and curious, we 
have very good conversations, and today he, Louis Gmelin, and I walked around for 
several hours, through the city [of Marseille] and the port, where we were onboard the 
Great Republic, which has anchored here to load bombs for the Crimean. (...) 
The Hindoo had invited me for breakfast, and Louis also took part, and was very useful to 
the people for his knowledge of travel opportunities and of this place [Marseille] in 
general. Afterwards, we went for the walk I already mentioned. (...) For tomorrow, I have 
invited the Khan and his companions to lunch.596
 
 'Refinement' trumped race in Schwab's assessment of the man who as yet 
remained the anonymous 'Khan.' Not that Schwab lacks in racial stereotypes that would 
suggest a condescending attitude. The Other can be child-like and cruel at the same time. 
In describing him to Eliza, his wife, he paints the Khan as the non-threatening, docile and 
child-like other, while addressing a concern that would be on the mind of both spouses: Is 
this man a threat? 
                                                 
596 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Marseille 1856/01/14, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, 
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  Having established the Khan's fundamentally benign disposition, Schwab can 
then grant him the honor and dignity that makes him one of his peers. The Hindoo speaks 
English and associates with nobles. Now, Schwab can feel justified in expressing 
unabridged admiration – he and the Other walk “arm in arm.” Apparently, the feeling was 
mutual: 
On Tuesday, I brought my friend, Azimullah Khan, to his steamer. I hope to meet him 
again in Rome. He wanted to make me King of India, with a salary of 50,000 pound 
sterling; what do you think about that, maybe for a year? His companion, Msr. de 
Bonneville of Paris, a very interesting man, and an ardent propagandist for Catholicism, 
wanted to know the address of Theodor Pressel of Tübingen, who had been the private 
tutor of his sister. Since I did not know it, I gave him Klüpfels' address, and he might 
send them a letter for Pressel. (...) 
Louis and I have had a lot of fun with his majesty, the Khan, who urgently invited me to 
visit him in India, where he promised to take me on the hunt for lions and tigers. You will 
find this clearly evident.597
 
After a few days, the Khan had ceased to be a mere specimen of his kind, and had 
become a person with a name, even a ‘friend.’ He is established as yet another "person 
with whom I already have some kind of relation" – in this case, four degrees of separation 
from Sophie Klüpfel, Gustav F. Schwab's sister. The offer to come to India seems worth 
toying with for Schwab. What gentleman would decline an invitation to hunt wild game? 
Eliza Schwab shared her husband's enthusiasm. He answered her, that "I am glad 
that you felt pride over my acquaintance with the Khan. I will tell him when I see him in 
Rome." She had even sent his letters to Bremen, so that friends and relatives could read 
them. Apparently, Schwab could expect his Hanseatic friends to be equally proud of his 
encounter.598 Still, as a good Hanseatic wife, Eliza Schwab had to ask Faust's question, 
"how do you think about religion?" Her husband could assure her that "the Khan is a 
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Mohametan, although he holds Christianity to be the true religion, and he knew much 
about it." Apparently, matters of belief had been among the subjects of conversation 
between Schwab, Aziumllah, and de Bonneville. Schwab had learned that he was not, in 
fact, dealing with a 'Hindoo,' and had discovered de Bonneville to be an ardent Catholic. 
Their religious differences, and what appears to have been a candid debate about the 
merits of their respective beliefs, did not diminish Schwab's respect for either of the two 
men. Among gentlemen, the boundaries for tolerance were wide.599
Sadly, for Schwab, by the time he made it to Rome, Azimullah and de Bonneville 
had already left. They "have traveled on to the Holy Land, but I still met Monsieur de 
Bonneville's mother here in my hotel." This was the last Gustav F. Schwab saw or heard 
from Azimullah Khan.600 Or was it? 
 
We do not know with certainty what further information Schwab received about 
his friend's world-historic role; or how he judged this information. Schwab never 
mentions Azimullah again in his extant correspondence. But he had read Macauly, and he 
might have read future publications on India. He certainly read the German and American 
newspapers, which would have covered the story of the 'Sepoy Mutiny.' 
Did Azimullah take him into his confidence about his plans? Did he mean it, 
when he invited Schwab to take a post in the government of India? Azimullah was in no 
position to make such an offer, and Schwab must have known this. When Schwab met 
him, Azimullah had just spent two years in London, lobbying futilely on behalf of his 
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lord, Nana Sahib. This adopted prince was not recognized by the British as a legitimate 
heir to Peshwa Baji Rao, the last ruler of Oudh. They thus denied the adopted son the 
lavish stipend that had been granted his father.601
When Azimullah left London, he was disenchanted with the British, and a plan to 
gain independence for India was beginning to form in his mind. From Rome, he traveled 
to Constantinople, and spoke to representatives of the Sublime Porte in the hope of 
forming an alliance. From there, he visited the Crimean battlefields, to gain insight into 
military tactics. It was there, so some of his biographers claim, that he became convinced 
India could win an armed struggle for independence.602
Considering his active efforts during this trip to win allies, was Azimullah testing 
the waters with Gustav F. Schwab? Would he have been ready to fight arm in arm against 
the British? We cannot know. Conventional wisdom suggests that Gustav F. Schwab 
would have sided with the Empire, with the white Protestant side, against the Other, once 
that Other dropped the child-like meekness and showed his bloodthirsty self.603
In British accounts of the Uprising of 1857, Azimullah is personally held 
responsible for what is considered the most cruel act of violence committed by the Indian 
side. In Kanpur, the outnumbered British garrison, besieged by Nana Sahib's forces, was 
offered safe passage in a note written by Azimullah. The British agreed to his terms for 
their surrender. At Satichaura Ghat on the River Ganges, however, as the disarmed 
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soldiers and their families embarked boats that were to take them to Allahabad, Nana 
Sahib's troops opened fire. There was a single survivor.604
After the British had crushed the first struggle for Indian independence, 
Azimullah accompanied the Nana Sahib into exile in Nepal, where both men presumably 
died of a fever in 1858. Still, rumors of Azimullah's survival, periodic appearances of 
self-styled descendants of the Khan, and the discovery of what turned out to be a forged 
diary of Azimullah’s as late as the 1950s, suggest his elevation to the status of a martyr 
and national hero within India. Both the British and Indian sides agreed that Azimullah 
was a mastermind of the 1857 Rebellion. Schwab's account, as well as others, suggests 
that he would have had the skills to be such a leader, though the need of both sides to 
create a master villain, or a heroic leader, might have created a tendency to 
overemphasize his role.605
Azimullah did not lack admirers in the West, as a British officer had to discover to 
his annoyance: 
 
While searching over the Nana’s Palaces at Bithur, we found heaps of letters directed to 
that fiend “Azimula Khan” by ladies in England (…) written in the most lovable manner.  
Such rubbish I never read (…) How English ladies can be so infatuated (…) You would 
not believe me if I sent home the letters.606
 
 
Whatever Gustav F. Schwab's feelings about his friend might have been after 
learning of his role in the rebellion, at the time of their encounter this Hanseatic merchant 
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 302
was perfectly willing to admit Azimullah to that global class of refined gentlemen among 
which Bremen's merchants counted themselves. 
 
 
Nation and Culture 
While refinement and character trumped race and nationality for Hanseats in 
personal encounters, their views of culture and nature, in general, were influenced by the 
romantic nationalism that had become a dominant strain of Western thought since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. Scholars of nationalism have identified art and 
literature as the main media that helped disseminate romantic nationalist views in the 
nineteenth century. With history and landscape painting, as well as novels and poetry, the 
medium was the message.607
The aesthetic of nationalism, the investment of culture and nature with essentialist 
meaning – something ‘higher’ or ‘deeper’, or otherwise ‘transcendent’ – was at the core 
of the intellectual movement of romanticism. In Germany and elsewhere, romantic 
nationalists actively constructed their nations in the image of the Kulturnation.608 
Nevertheless, romantic nationalism was not the only set of ideas informing 
contemporaries’ views on nature or culture. A reverence for the Classical world and the 
ideal of reason that went along with it was still available as part of the legacy of the 
Enlightenment. Christianity, too, continued to inform the value judgments of men and 
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women in the nineteenth century. Hanseats were influenced by all three of these 
currents.609
German nationalism after 1871 achieved a synthesis of romanticism, Classics, and 
Christianity. Thus, by the late nineteenth century, Germans came to believe that their new 
Empire embodied the best of the Classical heritage, while being rooted in the essential 
soul of the German people, and completing the work of a Protestant god.610 In the 
thinking of 1850s Hanseats, however, this synthesis had not been achieved. In their 
minds, romanticism, reason, and Protestantism still stood as competing and conflicting 
frameworks of interpretation for their perceptions of culture and nature. Moreover, these 
three discourses – neither individually, nor taken together – did not inevitably lead them 
to an embrace of nationality as the main organizing principle of their world-view. 
The idea of the nation was of limited use to Hanseats, who relied on international 
trading ties that were based on the strength of their transnational community and its 
cosmopolitan ethos. Assured of their identity as an estate, they had perhaps less need than 
others to look for a spiritual or political home in a nation or nation-state. 
 
For all their sober business sense, Hanseats were not immune to the influences of 
romantic nationalism. In fact, Gustav F. Schwab’s father, the poet Gustav B. Schwab, had 
made significant contributions to this current. He was the author of a widely-read travel 
guide to the Lake Constance region, which took the reader into a mnemnotically charged 
Swabian landscape, invoking the presence of figures and events of historical significance 
for Germany. In the same vein, the poet’s Journeys across the Swabian Alb weaved tales 
                                                 
609 See chapter 2. 
610 See above, p. 291 and note 583. 
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of local heroes and dramas into a narrative of past German glory, implying a call to 
contemporaries for its revival. 
This move of investing what stands for the particularity of a place with a national 
meaning culturally transforms local artifacts into national symbols. It fills the abstract 
space of the nation with the spirit of particular places, in that process leeching their 
original content and their embeddedness in local customs. The end result of that process 
is the transposition of manifold local particularities into one national particularity.611
In itself, the romantic gaze is employable for different means. The nation is not its 
only possible content. Gustav B. Schwab’s style, and the effect of invoking a glorious 
past through particular localities and the stories associated with them, resembles that of 
Washington Irving in his Alhambra. Whether or not Gustav F. Schwab had read Irving, 
he shared his poetic sensibility, which helped shape his gaze on historic locations. Upon 
visiting a Moorish palace near Palermo, he phantasized that "one can imagine quite well 
how the Moorish beauties enjoyed their lives in this place."612 Here, the content of the 
romantic mindset is an orientalist imagination.613
 
Even more important as a medium than literature, paintings powerfully conveyed 
the same sense of a nationalized landscape as Gustav B. Schwab’s works. Gustav F. 
Schwab indicates the impact that landscape painting had had for conditioning his 
                                                 
611 This argument follows Mack Walker, who sees the National Socialist vision of a ‘national community’ 
as the result of an analogous process in the socio-political realm, whereby the sense of place felt by home 
town burghers was appropriated for the nation by National Socialism. See Walker, Mack, German Home 
Towns: Community, State, and General Estate, 1648-1817, Ithaca, NY and London 1971. 
612 Schwab, Gustav Benjamin, Der Bodensee und das Rheinthal bis Luciensteig, Stuttgart 1826; idem, 
Wanderungen durch Schwaben (=Das malerische und romantische Deutschland, vol. II), Leipzig 1837; 
Irving, Washington, The Alhambra, Philadelphia 1832; Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Palermo 
1856/02/09, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, folder 32. 
613 Said, Edward, Orientalism, New York 1978. 
 305
perceptions, when he complained that “I found Mt. Vesuvius more picturesque than it 
appears in the paintings.”614 Contemporaries explicitly considered landscape and history 
painting as a medium that could convey a sense of national identity. Nevertheless, the 
skills that went into this art-form, as well as the discourse surrounding their 
interpretation, were made in a transnational space. Authors, painters, and their audiences 
shared tastes and aesthetic criteria across borders. Consumers and creators of culture who 
traveled and translated contributed to this dimension of romanticism as a transnational 
discourse.615
Emmanuel Leutze is a case in point. The German-American painter had come to 
Düsseldorf, because Wilhelm Schadow’s art school had a reputation for producing the 
finest artists in the fields of landscape and history painting. For his project of creating 
works of art that expressed the essence of American nationality, Leutze turned to 
Germany. There, he found not only the techniques, but also the themes and ideas that 
went into German painting at the time.616
Perhaps Leutze had read Gustav B. Schwab’s works when he decided to travel in 
Swabia, the land of his birth. The painter’s biographer relates that Leutze “spent months 
                                                 
614 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Naples 1856/02/06, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, folder 
32. 
615 Groseclose, Barbara S., Emmanuel Leutze, 1816-1868: Freedom Is the Only King, Exhibition Catalogue, 
National Collection of Fine Art, Smithsonian Institution, 1976, Washington, D.C. 1976; Gaehtgens, 
Thomas W., and Heinz Ickstadt (eds.), American Icons. Transatlantic Perspectives on Eigteenth- and 
Nineteenth-Century American Art (=Bloomfield, Julia, Kurt W. Forster und Thomas F. Reese, eds., Issues 
and Debates. A Series of the Getty Center Publication Program, vol. 2), Santa Monica, CA 1992, 
especially Christadler, Martin, “Romantic Landscape Painting in America: History as Nature, Nature as 
History,” p. 93-117; Andree/Rickel-Immel, Hudson; Bluestein, Gene, “The Advantages of Barbarism: 
Herder and Whitman’s Nationalism,” in: Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 24, no. 1 (1963), p. 115-126; 
Handlin, Lilian, “Harvard and Göttingen,1815,” in: Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, vol. 95 
(1983), p. 67-87; Burwick, Fred L., “The Göttingen Influence on George Bancroft’s Idea of Humanity,” in: 
Jahrbuch fur Amerikastudien [West Germany], vol. 11 (1966), p. 194-212. 
616 Gaethgens, Barbara, “Fictions of Nationhood. Leutze’s Pursuit of an American History Painting in 
Düsseldorf,” in: Gaehtgens/Ickstadt (eds.), American Icons, p. 149-154. 
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in [Swabia], enchanted by its wildly dramatic scenery and intriguing legends.”617 The 
painter’s words in 1845 betray the same spirit as the poet’s book in their praise of the 
Free Imperial Cities of mediaeval Swabia: 
There [in Swabia], the romantic ruins of what were once free cities (...) in which a few 
hardy, persevering burghers bade defiance to their noble oppressors (...) led me to think 
how glorious had been the course of freedom from those small isolated manifestations of 
the love of liberty to where it has unfolded all its splendor in the institutions of our own 
country. (…) this course represented itself in pictures to my mind, forming a long cycle, 
from the first dawning of free institutions in the middle ages, to the reformation and 
revolution in England, the causes of emigration, including the discovery and settlement of 
America, the early protestation against tyranny, to the Revolution and Declaration of 
Independence.618
 
While this might appear as a straightforward statement of American 
exceptionalism, it was the German landscape that triggered these reflections in the 
painter’s mind. Put into the broader context of Leutze’s oeuvre, it becomes just as much 
an expression of German romantic nationalism. 
One of the lesser-known works by the German-American painter was a rendition 
of Mount Hohenstauffen, an image literally taken straight out of Gustav B. Schwab’s 
tales.619 Hohenstauffen had been the site of the ancestral castle of the Stauffer dynasty, 
                                                 
617 Hutton, Ann Hawkes, Portrait of Patriotism. “Washington Crossing the Delaware,” Philadelphia and 
New York 1959, p. 36, my emphasis. 
618 Emmanuel Leutze in 1845, cited by: Howat, John K., “Washington Crossing the Delaware,” in: 
Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin, vol. 26, no. 7 (March 1968), p. 289-299, quote on p. 295. 
619 Leutze, Emmanuel, Hohenstauffen, Württemberg, ca. 1854, see Groseclose, Emmanuel Leutze, p. 25 and 
86; Schwab, Gustav B., Wanderungen, p. 96-101, 247-248. Leutze’s painting takes the same perspective on 
the bare mound of Hohenstauffen, with the Rechberg in the front, as the lithograph in Schwab’s book 
(opposite p. 96). The painting embodies the formal language of romantic paintings. The lower three fifths 
of the canvas show landscape. Below a diagonal from the horizon to the lower right corner of the painting, 
rugged rock represents pure nature. From a rock mound near the left side of the painting, a cross reaches up 
almost to the horizon. Above the diagonal, in the right half of the painting, Mount Hohenstauffen towers 
above the Rechberg, and reaches into the top two fifths of the canvas, otherwise filled with sky. A funnel of 
dark storm clouds rises to the top edge of the painting from a point slightly to the right of the Mount, 
dominating the upper-right corner. The rest of the sky is filled with indirect sunlight, which illuminates the 
plain below the cross and gives Mount Hohenstauffen a mystic aura. The dark, billowing clouds evoke the 
burning of the castle during the Peasant Wars, in 1525; while the aura of sunlight hints at the glory of the 
Stauffers. The Christian cross reaches up from the land into that aura, representing the promise of rebirth of 
Imperial glory from the German soil. The motive of the cross on the mountain as a symbol of romantic 
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who had ruled as German Emperors from 1138 to 1254, presiding over a period of 
cultural and economic bloom in German history. Stauffer Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, 
who had died on crusade in 1190, was the stuff of legend. According to a widely 
disseminated tale, Barbarossa and his army slept in Mount Kyffhäuser, awaiting the day 
when the idea of a German Empire was ready to be revived.620 Leutze’s painting spoke 
directly to the romantic myth of the Stauffers. 
Gustav F. Schwab actively participated in the discourse on the Stauffers when he 
went to Southern Italy. As rulers over a Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation that 
encompassed the entire Italian peninsula and Sicily, the last Stauffer Emperors had taken 
up residence in Naples. After visiting the graves of Frederick II and Henry VI, Schwab 
wrote: "What a strange fate it is, that we should find our great German Emperors resting 
here, but it is understandable that the gentlemen would have neglected their fatherland 
and wasted their powers on Italy."621
Reveling in the romantic sense of failed heroism, Schwab also went on a 
pilgrimage to the place where the last Stauffer, Conradin, had been beheaded after a 
betrayed attempt to regain the German and Sicilian crowns by force. Conradin’s failure 
                                                                                                                                                 
nationalism appears in Andreas Achenbach’s as well as in Carl Friedrich Lessing’s works. Both were 
influential for Leutze. The use of sunlight and clouds to construct a sense of sublimity can be traced back to 
Caspar David Friedrich, who frequently uses a spatial composition that invokes a divine presence by 
directing the view heavenwards along lines of landscape and sky. Leutze combines all these stylistic 
devices in his Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way (Groseclose, Emmanuel Leutze, p. 60 and 96), 
whose 1861 version displays a cross in a similarly prominent place as the one in Hohenstauffen; as well as 
in a similar rendition of a German mediaeval tale by Leutze (Groseclose, Emmanuel Leutze, p. 81). Note 
that the title of an 1850 Bremish pamphlet had expressed in words almost identical to the name of a Leutze 
painting the hope that America fulfill the promise of modernity: Andree, Karl, “Hin nach Westen flieht die 
Weltgeschichte!,” Bremen 1850, cited by Engelsing,“England und die USA,” p. 56. 
620 In his Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen, Gustav B. Schwab’s publicistic nemesis, Heinrich Heine, 
makes fun of nationalists’ hopes for the return of a mediaeval, feudal monarch. See the translation by T. J. 
Reed: Heine, Heinrich, Deutschland. A winter’s tale, London 1986, p. 58-69. 
621 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Palermo 1856/02/09, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, 
folder 32. Schwab’s ‘understanding’ rests on the obvious beauty of the Italian landscape, and the 
pleasantness of the Mediterranean climate. 
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was a tale of lost grandeur, quite to the romantic taste, not unlike that of Boabdil, the last 
Moorish king of Granada. Disappointed not to find a marker on the unimposing market 
square in a run-down part of Naples where Conradin had taken his last breath, Schwab 
had to rely on his historical imagination alone to invest this shabby place with 
significance.622 Thanks to the pervasiveness of the Stauffer myth in German art, literature, 
and education; but even more so, thanks to his ability to adopt the romantic gaze, which 
enables the viewer to see things that are not there, Schwab was amply primed for this 
mental effort.623
Travel literature assisted those who lacked an encyclopedic knowledge of 
romantic, historical tales, by providing readers with abridged accounts of the stories 
popularized by art and literature that were associated with the places they described.624 
While Gustav F. Schwab was well-read, when his memory was in need of being refreshed 
he relied on a travel-guide written by Friedrich Pecht. “I have grown quite fond of 
Pecht’s book,” he wrote to Eliza. “[It] often speaks straight from my soul.”625 Written for 
an educated class, books like Pecht’s drew on the emerging fields of history and art 
history, which helped shape a perception of the world in national terms. Pecht was a 
leading figure among writers who did just that. As an art critic in Imperial Germany, he 
was to become recognized as the guardian of the artistic main-stream of conservative 
modernism.626 Through Pecht, after climbing the cupola of the Milan Cathedral, Schwab 
                                                 
622 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Naples 1856/02/06 and Naples 1856/02/24, MSS 434, Schwab 
Papers, series I, box 1, folder 32. 
623 Flacke, ”Deutschland,” p. 108-111. 
624 Mark Twain, in The Innocents Abroad, parodies these very stories, at the same time as he engages in the 
discourse of travel literature in which they function. 
625 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Livorno/Milan 1856/03/12, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
1, folder 33. Pecht, Friedrich, Südfrüchte. Skizzen eines Malers, 2 vols, Leipzig 1854. 
626 Bringmann, Michael, “Pecht, Friedrich,” in: Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB), vol. 20, Berlin 2000, p. 
156-157. 
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“felt a bit of that pride, that a German architect and German art gave Italy this, her most 
beautiful, cathedral.”627
 
 There is a certain irony in the story of travel literature in the 19th century. The 
improved means of transportation – steamships and railroads – made pleasure travel 
available to an unprecedented number of people. This increased mobility created a mass 
market for travel guides, which, in turn, inspired more tourism. Business promoters and 
writers often worked hand in hand in this process. Thus, Gustav B. Schwab had been 
asked to write his guide to the Lake Constance region by a publisher connected with a 
company that had set up steam-ship service on the lake. In 1840, the opening of railway 
lines in the region prompted a revised edition of the work.628
The prevalent view promoted through the bulk of these guide-books was one of 
romantic nationalism.629 Hence, in an age where the world was shrunk by the collapsing 
of space into time, nationality was reinforced as a category of perception for those who 
crossed national borders for the first time. By giving their vessels names that invoked 
nationality, the directors of the OSNC were following a broader trend. In appealing to 
romantic visions of the nation, they catered to the cultural tastes of the traveling public. 
Yet Hanseats did not simply exploit national sentiment for gain. Qua their ties to 
the larger world of the German educated middle-class (Bildungsbürgertum), and qua their 
presence in the transnational space in which romantic styles in art and literature emerged, 
Hanseats partook in the world-view romantic nationalists put forth. But an aesthetic 
                                                 
627 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Livorno/Milan 1856/03/12, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
1, folder 33. Pecht, Südfrüchte. 
628 Klüpfel, Karl [and Sophie], Gustav Schwab. Sein Leben und Wirken, Leipzig 1858, p. 127, 
629 For example, Gustav B. Schwab’s Wanderungen durch Schwaben appeared in a series of travel guides 
to Germany, Das malerische und romantische Deutschland [Picturesque and Romantic Germany]. 
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sense, or a taste for a particular kind of art or literature, does not immediately entail a 
commitment to a political program. It appears that Hanseats viewed the world through the 
most national glasses, where they dealt with cultural artifacts.630 In social interaction, and 
in politics, they continued to rely on their estatist cosmopolitanism throughout the 1850s. 
Nonetheless, it remains ironic that their transnational activities led Hanseats to help 
promulgate nationalist perceptions. 
 
The nationalist discourse on aesthetics and nature to which the names of the 
OSNC vessels appealed was not the only world-view available to Hanseats. Like others 
in the broader world of educated elites around the Atlantic, Bremish merchants were 
conversant in multiple, often conflicting approaches to the world. An Enlightenment 
tradition that revered the Classical world, and puritan reservations about its rational 
content, competed with each other and with the romantic nationalist view in shaping their 
perceptions of the world. 
Gustav F. Schwab’s letters from Italy displayed the simultaneity of, and the 
conflict between, the different habits of perceiving art and nature that were available to 
him. On visiting a Greek temple to Poseidon, he reveled in its metaphysical properties: 
"There is nothing mysterious there, everything is crystal-clear and yet there is such a 
calm majesty and power [in this building], that it becomes incomprehensible after all, 
                                                 
630 One might also include ‘nature’ among such artifacts, to the extent that the landscape in romanticism 
receives its meaning as the site of particular human activities, be they the reverence for particular places, 
the tilling of the soil, or the general investment of a region with spiritual significance for a people; just as 
the spirit of a people is rooted in the land. Hence, the opposition between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, itself a 
relict of the one-sidedly rational mind for the Romantic, is transcended. Cf. Schiller, Friedrich, On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man. In a Series of Letters, trns. Elizabeth Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, 
Oxford, UK 1967 (1793-1795).  
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what it is that thus animates these colossal stones."631 Is it the rational clarity and 
simplicity of the form that conveys the sense of majesty, or is it an ontological essence – 
divine or otherwise – behind the appearance? Does reason stand on its own merits, or is it 
the mechanism through which God effects his plan? Schwab's view of the temple 
embodies the unresolved tension between his affinities for Christianity and the 
Enlightenment. 
Schwab’s father, the poet, had had a similarly guilty and conflicted love affair 
with antiquity. He confided to a friend: 
When I am with my Ancients and the 'eternal Latin', as Flemming calls it (albeit without 
any sarcasm), I often have feelings of uncanniness. Through the constant contact with 
these ingenious unbelievers, I often feel a strange and uncanny paganizing breeze that 
carries doubts and coldness against that which surely still lives in my innermost self as 
that which is the most holy and the most true [i.e., Christianity].632
 
Gustav F. Schwab’s views were characterized by the same tension. Yet, antique artifacts 
posed a challenge to this Hanseat’s moral views not just because of their philosophical 
and political content, but also because of their sensual form. Philosophically, the 
skeptical and rational spirit that Hanseats admired in antiquity was the same that they 
feared in modern socialism and radical liberalism, especially in its democratic variant. 
Aesthetically, the nudity of ancient statues represented pure humanity, yet invoked an 
image of indecency. The sight of mass-produced antique representations of the human 
body in the former private residences of the city of Pompei troubled Schwab: "There is 
abundant evidence that the Pompeians' morals were not very pure, even though most 
                                                 
631 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Naples/Rome 1856/02/29, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
1, folder 32. 
632 Gustav B. Schwab to Ullmann, n.P. 1819/12/03, quoted in Klüpfel, Gustav Schwab, p. 104. 
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obscene images etc. have been taken to a cabinet at the museum, where they are not 
shown." 
In assessing Pompeians' morality, a general sense of their decadence contributes 
to Schwab's verdict: "A certain degree of luxury is common to all [these houses]. 
Everywhere, one sees painted walls or mosaic floors, and one has to be surprised about 
this waste of labor."633 Whether he judged present Sicilians or past Pompeians, the 
bedrock of Schwab’s convictions was a sound work ethic, geared towards maximum 
productivity. On the foundation of ‘industry’, morality would thrive; just as sufficient 
industry was an indicator of the morality of a person or a people.634
Greek art, and the Renaissance sculptors who strove to imitate it, found a warmer 
reception by Schwab. On visiting the Uffici in Florence, he commented on the statues on 
the gallery: 
First, [I saw] the Venus of Medici(?), about which I had earlier read that she was 
coquettish; hence she couldn't make to deep an impression; I preferred the capitalinian(?) 
Venus, since she is more majestic. (...) Opposite, there is the grinder, a slave and 
barbarian, who lies on one knee, grinding a knife, looking up and listening; here, there is 
wonderful life in the marble and pure nature. (...) Finally, the eye rests on the last and 
probably oldest statue, an apollino, or young Apollo from the school of Praxiteles, who 
radiates the eternal youth of Greece, incarnate; it is impossible to imagine a simpler thing, 
he leans on a tree trunk, one arm above his head, the other hanging, with a beauty and 
grace that is incomparable. (...) Among the painters, Titian deserves the price, who 
painted his maîtresse truly ugly-beautifully, nude.635
 
 
Here, Schwab's struggle to tell the pure and plain from the indecent is evident. To 
tell nudity in the image of sinful Adam and Eve from nudity that represents humanity, 
                                                 
633 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Naples 1856/02/24, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 1, folder 
32. Schwab would have been aware that the labor that built and decorated these houses was slave labor. 
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634 See also chapter 2. 
635 Gustav F. Schwab to Eliza Schwab, Livorno/Milan 1856/03/12, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 
1, folder 33. 
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Schwab's main criteria are the absence of coquettish expression, and the presence of 
simple majesty. His sense of aesthetics allows for sensuality, but not for sexuality. On 
this basis, he can admit to a vivid nocturnal phantasy: "I dreamt until half past nine the 
next morning of all the statues, come to life, and not a single flea dared to disturb me in 
my sleep."636 Pesky nature itself honored his right to these dreams. 
 
While Christianity could conquer inner nature, outer nature required reason to be 
mastered. Hanseats had to rely on reason to ‘improve’ the world with steamships, 
railroads, telegraphs and other technologies that relied on science. Hence, they had to 
expose themselves to the 'uncanny, paganizing breeze' of ancient learning and the 
rationality that came with it. At the same time, they had to safeguard against the lure of 
that culture by erecting a bulwark of deeply ingrained, inner-directed Christian morality. 
As Gustav B. Schwab had put it: "Franklin wrested the lighnting-bolt from the hands of 
Heaven, and the scepter from those of tyrants: believe me, this was one and the same 
business!" Now that Franklin's heirs had power and science in their hands, they had to 
learn to use them wisely – not least to avoid that, in turn, less respectable elements would 
wrest them from their hands.637
For Gustav Schwab, being on the cutting edge of technological advances was a 
value in itself. While he professed his ignorance of industrial technology, he was eager to 
close the gaps in his knowledge, and willing to give these machines the benefit of the 
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637 In: "Unter Vaters Papieren gefunden" (notebook), n.d. (before 1850), MS 434, Schwab Papers, series II, 
box 17, folder 213. 
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doubt.638 At the same time, Schwab bemoaned the loss of the immediate experience of 
nature brought about by modern modes of transportation: "When we stepped from the 
carriage in Marseille at 10 o'clock in the evening, I was surprised to breathe a very mild, 
balmy air; a change that I had not felt in the heated car."639 Like many of his 
contemporaries, Schwab resolved his ambivalent feelings about the industrial revolution 
by selectively embracing some of its benefits, while cognitively separating them from 
most of its less desirable consequences. Art and aesthetics provided venues through 
which virtually to recreate the experience of nature that had been lost, as immediate 
experience, in the process of industrialization.640
Since the Enlightenment, the German educated bourgeoisie (Bildungsbürgertum) 
had felt a special claim to the heritage of Antiquity. In the mind of German 
Enlightenment thinkers, modern Germany could fulfill the promise of a reconciliation of 
beauty and intellect that had been implied in Greek culture, and had been lost in the 
ascent of Roman culture. In this view, the essence of German national particularity was 
that this nation embodied this universal promise, and that it could bring it to fruition for 
the benefit of all humanity. Germans traveling to Italy who looked for traces of universal 
truth and beauty in the ruins of the peninsula could, hence, perceive these strange artifacts 
as part of their own heritage. This German calling, however, had been associated with the 
absence of a strong unitary German state. Political powerlessness became a virtue in that 
it gave Germans a cosmopolitan, philosophical perspective on the world.641
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Hence, major representatives of the German Enlightenment, like Goethe and 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, reacted with disgust to the emergence of romantic nationalism 
during the Napoleonic Wars. Humboldt complained in 1814 about the growing number of 
people who “confuse being German with Christianity and knighthood.” Goethe echoed 
this sentiment in 1829, hoping that “our contemporaries (...) may be cured from their 
pious knightliness.”642 Both Humboldt and Goethe still rested their hopes for such a cure 
on the Classical legacy of reason. As the nineteenth century progressed, Germans were 
increasingly primed to perceive art and nature through glasses tinted with a romantic-
national perspective. This perspective was entirely different from the notion of ‘being 
German’ Humboldt had in mind.643
For Gustav F. Schwab, the cosmopolitan universalist view of Italian art treasures 
was still competing with the romantic nationalist view. The claim to universalism had not 
yet been reconciled with romantic nationalist ideas in a reformulated German 
nationalism. Moreover, both the romantic-nationalist and cosmopolitan universalist views 
were mediated by, and sometimes conflicted with, a Calvinist morality. While Schwab 
may have envisioned the nation as a cultural entity compatible with the idea of a 
Kulturnation, he did not rely on romantic nationalism alone to guide his experience of art 
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1848, Oxford 2000. 
 316
or nature. Instead, he found that reason and faith were often better suited to make sense of 




Turning to ‘great politics’, we find confirmed that a mere taste for the occasional 
indulgence in romantic-nationalist imagery by no means determined Hanseats’ answers to 
questions of policy and affairs of state. When it came to diplomacy and foreign policy, 
even when the counterparts were the governments of other German states, Hanseats were 
singularly uninclined to be guided by fuzzy cultural notions of national character and 
culture. For protecting shipping lanes, ensuring free trade, and building infrastructure, 
they put their commercial interests first. If German state institutions were available to 
meet these interests, they were ready to make use of them. Where they were absent or 
unwilling, however, Hanseats relied on foreign policy and global, mercantile public 
opinion to enlist the help of any state willing to do what was in their best interest. While 
they might have wished for a German central authority to create a unified market and 
legal system in the hinterland, Hanseats also had reasons to be wary of a possible German 
nation-state. Within the national movement in Germany, democracy and protectionism 
enjoyed strong support. Neither the one, nor the other, were palatable to Bremen’s elite. 
In the 1850s, Germany was not the only place where nationalism and 
protectionism were almost synonymous. Internationally, economic policy debate in the 
first half of the nineteenth century was dominated by the conflict between free traders and 
proponents of protective tariffs. The models held up by the opposing camps were, for 
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protectionist, Napoleon’s ‘Continental System’ of European autarky, and for free traders, 
Britain’s liberal reforms of the 1830s. We associate protectionism with a program of 
creating a national market based on indigenous industrial production, and free trade with 
a preference for an Atlantic economy and a reliance on Britain as the workshop of the 
world. The American manifestation of the protectionist school was the “American 
System”. While it went back to Hamilton as a set of policies, it owed its theoretical basis 
to Friedrich List – the Southern German economist who also inspired German 
protectionists.644
 Since the 1830s, the primary tool of protectionists for creating a unified German 
commodity market had been the Prussian-led customs union (Zollverein). Bremen had 
not joined the Zollverein, mostly because a significant share of the city’s trade relied on 
the re-export of commodities to other, non-German markets. The high tariff barriers 
surrounding the Zollverein lands made an inclusion of the Hanseatic city undesirable to 
her merchants. Nationalists, however, regarded the Zollverein as an important step 
towards a nation-state. To them, Bremen’s refusal to join smacked of a lack of 
patriotism.645
Indeed, the creation of a national industry was not a priority for Hanseats. 
Bremen’s merchants took an interest in the economy of the interior only in as far as it 
served as a market for their wares, and as a point of origin for the emigrants they carried. 
For both imports and emigration, Bremen competed with other ports, especially Le Havre 
and Antwerp, which provided shorter routes to the U.S. for most of Southern Germany, 
                                                 
644 List, Friedrich, The National System of Political Economy, trns. Sampson S. Lloyd, London et.al. 1928 
(1841); Etges, Andreas, Wirtschaftsnationalismus. USA und Deutschland im Vergleich (1815-1914), 
Frankfurt a. M. and New York 1999. See also chapter 5 for the Hamiltonian program. 
645 Böhmert, Victor, "Die Stellung der Hansestädte zu Deutschland in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten”, in: 
Vierteljahrsschrift für Volkswirthschaft und Cultur, vol. 1 (1863), p. 73-115. 
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one of the main sources of emigration. Hanseatic agents in Württemberg and Baden 
worked hard to attract emigrants to Bremen. In doing so, they actively played the national 
card. By emphasizing the ill treatment Germans received on French, Belgian, and English 
vessels, Hanseats slowly increased the number of passengers who chose theirs.646
Arnold Duckwitz, who served as Minister of Commerce in the revolutionary 
government of 1848, had had to negotiate the conflicting demands of his home town and 
of the interior interests. In his government role, he had attempted to find a formula for 
satisfying both international trade and national production. He found it in advocating 
modest protective tariffs only on some manufactures, a system of free-trade entrepôts, 
and the use of tariffs against nations who denied free trade. Since the revolutionary 
government and parliament did not last long enough to create a framework of economic 
policy, his ideas were never put to a test. Still, he had learned to represent Bremen’s 
interests to the interior in a sufficiently national light. His publications during the 1850s 
were characterized by the attempt to sell Bremen as the ‘German port’ to Germans who 
held protectionist, if not anti-commercialist leanings.647
Hence, in both trade and emigration, Hanseats engaged in a national rhetoric to 
counter anti-commercialist attacks, and to increase their share of business. Where it really 
counted – in questions of trade treaties and tariffs – Hanseats contested the nationalist 
assertion that an economically unified Germany was preferable under all conditions to a 
                                                 
646 Engelsing, Rolf, Bremen als Auswandererhafen, 1683-1880 (=Karl H. Schwebel (Hg.), 
Veröffentlichungen aus dem Staatsarchiv der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, vol. 29), Bremen 1961. See also 
chapter 1. 
647 Krieger, Arnold Duckwitz; Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden (in Freiburg i. Brsg.), Bremen 
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collection of independent states. Bremen, unlike the Zollverein, enjoyed recognition 
under international law as an entity that could enter into treaties. On that basis, the city 
had built a system of treaties that gave its merchants the benefit of a most favored nation 
status in many countries.648 The Zollverein, not unlike the Germanic Confederation, was a 
loose treaty system between sovereigns. Its existence was contingent on the continued 
support of these sovereigns. Its recognition as an entity capable of entering treaties under 
international law was far from assured. Yet, in establishing and maintaining trade 
relations, what mattered most were stability and continuity. Bremen had demonstrated 
that it could provide for both, whereas the Zollverein offered no guarantees that it could 
do the same. Therefore, giving up Bremen’s established standing in foreign capitals and 
ports for the Zollverein was a step prudent Hanseats resisted.649
In the early 1850s, Arnold Duckwitz, who was increasingly seen as the likely 
successor to the aging Johann Smidt, justified Bremen’s refusal to join the Zollverein 
with the inability of the latter to create lasting foreign trade relations. To hinterland 
Germans, Duckwitz nonetheless held up the prospect of Bremen’s integration into some 
form of a unified German economic space. The conditions he listed under which such an 
integration could take place, however, could not be satisfied by the institutions existing in 
the 1850s. In 1853, he demanded that the German sovereigns yield complete authority to 
an interstate institution that was to set economic and trade policy. Bremen’s ports were to 
be guaranteed entrepôt status by this institution. Eventually, a representative body, 
composed of delegates from state parliaments, was to set the policies of that interstate 
                                                 
648 Fink, Georg, "Diplomatische Vertretungen der Hanse seit dem 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Auflösung der 
Hanseatischen Gesandtschaft in Berlin 1920”, in: Hanseatische Geschichtsblätter, vol. 56, Lübeck 1932, p. 
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649 Krieger, Arnold Duckwitz. 
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institution. It was clear that monarchs who had only just asserted their right not to yield 
any sovereignty, let alone to parliaments, would not agree to such conditions. The payoff, 
and possibly the purpose, of Duckwitz’s statements was purely political: He confirmed 
Bremen’s commitment in principle to German economic unity, thus deflecting criticism 
from the city’s continued existence as a free-trading, mercantile state with a separate 
foreign policy.650
In 1854, after both Hannover and Oldenburg had joined the Zollverein, Bremen 
had become completely surrounded on land by high tariff barriers. Still, the city remained 
outside of the union. The Senat did, however, negotiate the creation of a Zollverein 
customs office in Bremen, where formalities could be settled in one place, thus reducing 
the bureaucratic friction.651 Even if Hanseats, along with a majority of their 
contemporaries, considered the Zollverein as a step on the road towards a nation-state, 
they did not want to be a part of it.652
 
To achieve its foreign policy goals, Bremen continued to look for allies not in 
Germany, but across the sea. Bremen’s reliance on, and commitment to free trade led the 
Senat towards a foreign policy that looked to international mediation and agreements, not 
a strengthened German authority, for creating the rules and regulations that governed the 
Atlantic economy. Building on the strength of its own diplomatic ties, which strongly 
relied on merchants as consuls in foreign ports, Bremen enlisted the help of her 
                                                 
650 Ibid. 
651 Schwarzwälder, Geschichte, 231-233; Krieger, Bremische Politik, p. 21-22, shows that the office opened 
only in 1857. 
652 Etges, Wirtschaftsnationalismus, p. 68-78 and 114-126; Heine, Deutschland, p. 31-32. 
 321
merchants’ foreign peers for influencing the policies of different states in a way that was 
beneficial to the shared interests of a global mercantile class.653
Repeatedly in the late 1850s, Hanseats turned to this multilateral approach. Early 
in 1856, it looked as though Britain and the U.S. might go to war over the recruitment of 
filibusters in the Caribbean by British agents. The Weser-Zeitung echoed the position 
Hanseats took on this conflict: 
The Hanseatic cities have a deep and unquestionable interest to see these two great 
commercial powers reconciled, and have every reason to be concerned when questions 
are brought up which might, if dealt with ineptly, lead to a break between these two 
powers. (...) May it be permitted to remind them of Mr. [Joshua] Bates [who had chaired 
an Anglo-American reparations commission after the War of 1812] and suggest a similar 
procedure? (...) It would be hard to find a more clear-sighted and disinterested man than 
this champion of London’s mercantile world. (...) This way the whole commercial world 
would have the certainty (...) that the honour of both countries, both of which Mr. Bates 
is a part of, in a sense, would be entirely preserved.654
 
The Weser-Zeitung’s commentary suggests that merchants were ideal guardians 
of the common good among states. This point of view reverberated with the Kantian idea 
that increasing commerce would contribute to ‘perpetual peace’. For merchants, every 
armed conflict was a threat to free trade, and thus to local prosperity. The depiction of 
Joshua Bates as a citizen of two states reflects the cosmopolitan orientation of Bremen’s 
mercantile community during the 1850s. Rather than embracing a ‘German’ point of 
view, they identified their interests with a global class of merchants.655
We find that Bremen’s elite had a long memory for significant events in this 
Atlantic World. In Hanseats’ views, apparently this world had not fundamentally changed 
in the decades since Bates first played a role as a merchant-diplomat. A cosmopolitan 
                                                 
653 Graßmann,“Hanse weltweit?” 
654 Weser-Zeitung, 2.12.1856, Abendausgabe, StA HB, Microfilm FB 311. Apparently the U.S. had accused 
the British envoy Crampton of hiring freebooters among the U.S. population. 
655 Kant, Immanuel, Zum ewigen Frieden (1795), in: Akademieausgabe, Werke, vol. 8. 
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reliance on mercantile diplomacy was and continued to be the guiding principle of 
Bremish foreign policy. This policy found its most remarkable expression towards the 
very end of the 1850s. Apparently, Hanseats saw in the enlistment of privateers by the 
British government a particular case of a more fundamental problem: the threat to private 
property at sea represented by war-making states. 
Jan Lemnitzer, in a groundbreaking study, explored a Bremish initiative to 
‘protect private property at sea’. To reach their aim, Hanseats made an extraordinary 
appeal to world public opinion, seeking to mobilize that global class of merchants whom 
they knew through decades of interaction. They proposed an international convention 
guaranteeing the safety of private trading-vessels by prohibiting their seizure by 
belligerent parties. Hanseats circulated their call for a ban on economic warfare in all 
major mercantile centers along the shores of the Atlantic, relying on their private 
connections to foreign merchants. Within a few months, hundreds of signatures in 
support of the proposal had been collected. The Chambers of Commerce of Baltimore 
and New York threw their support behind the measure.656
By the time the campaign for the “protection of private property at sea” had 
reached its furthest extent, the Civil War in the United States had begun. Whereas before, 
the American government seemed willing to take up the cause, Secretary of State Seward 
now explained to Bremen’s minister resident Schleiden that it did not seem wise to 
confront the reluctant British at a time when their intervention in the American conflicted 
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was feared. While this Bremish effort at international politics was unsuccessful, it 
demonstrated not only the reach of Hanseats’ foreign connections, but also their ability to 
build alliance on issues that mattered to the mercantile class of the Atlantic world.657
An appeal to the Germanic Confederation, or to a hypothetical German nation-
state, would have been pointless to achieve Hanseats’ goals. Both in refusing to join the 
customs union, and in pursuing international agreements, Hanseats showed that they did 
not yet consider their interests well-served by creating a German nation-state. Moreover, 
any attempt to create such a German nation-state would almost inevitably have led to war 
– precisely what Hanseats hoped to avoid. Politically and culturally, Hanseats were 
comfortable to fill their niche in the Atlantic space created by the British Empire. 
 Even close to home, in addressing Danish impediments to free trade, Bremen 
relied not on the Germanic Confederation, but on the United States for help. Denmark 
leveled a tariff on vessels passing the Sound, the strait between Denmark and Sweden 
that connects the Baltic with the North Sea. Since the days of the mediaeval Hanseatic 
League, Danish control of this strait had been a point of contention between the 
Scandinavian Kingdom and German traders. In 1855, Hanseats saw a chance to get rid of 
the nuisance once and for all. Their wish to see the Sound Tariff abolished fell on open 
ears in Washington. American foreign policy had long made unimpeded commerce a 
central principle, demanding that rivers, ports, and sea lanes be accessible to vessels from 
all nations.658
American demands for an abolition of the Sound Tariff had a strong ally in 
Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen’s minister resident in Washington. As an official in the Danish 
                                                 
657 Lemnitzer, “’A few burghers,’” p. 107. 
658  Beutin, Ludwig, Bremen und Amerika. Zur Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft und der Beziehungen 
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government bureaucracy in the 1840s, Schleiden had been put in charge of legitimizing 
the Danish position. Hence, in the late 1850s, as the author of the official policy 
documents and legal memoranda that supported the Danish position, and as a man fluent 
in Danish, Schleiden was uniquely qualified to make the case against the tariff in the 
service of his new, Hanseatic employers, and in the interest of his host country, the 
United States. After intense pressure from the U.S., Denmark agreed in 1857 to abolish 
the tariff in exchange for a one-time payment.659
 Even in dealing with its immediate neighbor, Hannover, Bremen used its foreign 
connections to achieve its aims. As business in Bremerhaven boomed over the 1850s, the 
city and port outgrew the size of the initial Hannoverian cession to Bremen. Since Queen 
Victoria’s ascent to the British throne, Hannover had been ruled by the Guelphs. The new 
authorities were increasingly hostile to Bremen, and frustrated most attempts of the city 
to enlarge her possession by the mouth of the Weser. Bremerhaven historian Rita 
Kellner-Stoll found that Hanseats resorted to a decidedly transnational approach to their 
problem. In 1861, as Hannover stalled negotiations over a further expansion of the port, 
Bremen withheld its ratification of a treaty to which Hannover and Britain were also 
parties, and in which the British government took a strong interest. Informed by Bremish 
diplomats that some pressure on Hannover in the territorial dispute over Bremerhaven 
would help speed along Bremen’s signature under that treaty, the Queen’s officials were 
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happy to be of help. Under British pressure, Hannover ceded a substantial area to 
Bremen.660
 The running dispute with Hannover over Bremerhaven was a thorn in the side of 
Bremen. The city’s rulers were not necessarily adverse to the involvement of a central 
German authority in this conflict. In 1849, with Arnold  
 serving as minister of Commerce and of the Navy in the revolutionary government, an 
argument of ‘national defense’ had been Bremen’s strongest trump in gaining more land 
for finishing construction of the new port that was to accommodate the OSNC steamers. 
As government minister, Duckwitz argued that the port was necessary to harbor the new 
German Navy, then under construction. In that case, Hannover had had to yield to Reich 
authority, and had agreed to an expansion of Bremerhaven.661
Duckwitz was pragmatic in switching between local, national, and transnational 
appeals. Until 1848, as chief Bremish negotiator in the talks with Hannover over the 
expansion of Bremerhaven, his main argument had been that Bremen and Hannover 
shared an interest in international trade. In 1848, at the same time that Duckwitz used his 
new national appointment to force concessions from Hannover, he asked President Polk 
to furnish an experienced American officer to command the German navy, with the rank 
of Admiral.662 Bremish historian Rolf Engelsing found that, while Duckwitz saw the 
United States as a natural ally for the new Germany, he, along with “many in Bremen, 
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hoped that the United States would protect the city,” if the new German nation-state was 
to adopt a centralist constitution and threaten Hanseatic independence.663
In the mid-1860s, many Hanseats were to entertain strong hopes that Prussia, in 
unifying Germany by force, would lend its power to settling the border dispute once and 
for all in Bremen’s interest. These hopes were to prove unfounded. After Prussia’s 
annexation of Hannover, it continued the intransigent line of its predecessor. Still, these 
hopes show that Hanseats looked to whichever power seemed most inclined to serve their 
interests when they steered a course between national and international politics. In the 




Nation and Democracy 
Perhaps one of the strongest impediments to Hanseats’ embrace of German 
nationalism were the German nationalists. Political nationalism in 1850s Germany – 
admittedly a small crowd, indeed – was not only predominantly protectionist, but also 
increasingly associated with demands for democracy. Since, as we have seen above 
(chapter 3), no self-respecting member of the Hanseatic elite would advocate popular 
participation in affairs of the state, sound gentlemanly opinion almost by default 
precluded an embrace of German nationalism as a political movement or ideology.665
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Moreover, until the 1850s, Hanseats considered Bremen’s independence as 
indispensable for their business ventures. This independence was guaranteed only by the 
framework of the Germanic Confederation. Hence, business interests gave Hanseats an 
added stake in the reactionary status quo in Central Europe. 
The year 1849 marked the point when the mainstream of the German middle-class 
parted ways with the radicals and democrats. After the Prussian king, Frederick William 
IV, had turned down the crown of the German Empire, offered to him by parliament in 
April 1849, Hanseats, along with the right and center, had withdrawn their support of the 
revolution. The cabinet under Heinrich von Gagern, including Minister of Commerce and 
the Navy, Arnold Duckwitz, had resigned. H. H. Meier had quit his seat in parliament. As 
far as Hanseats were concerned, those who kept their posts in the revolutionary 
institutions were irredeemable radicals, whose defeat by Prussian troops in July 1849 
they welcomed.666
If German unification could not be had within the framework of tradition and 
legitimacy, at most as a constitutional monarchy, Bremen’s elite wanted no part of it. 
Specifically, they rejected any ideas of turning Germany into a republic. After all, the 
Senat based its authority on the power of tradition, just like the sovereign monarchs of the 
other German states. Authority legitimized by tradition was the bulwark against the 
anarchy of democracy. A German republic would have opened the flood-gates of 
democracy by denying the validity and legitimacy of traditional authority.667
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 In the early 1850s, burgomaster Smidt had enlisted the help of the reaction in 
rolling back democracy in Bremen.668 His concern with fighting democracy did not stop 
in Bremen, however. As many liberal and radical activists of 1848 had fled to the United 
States, they remained under observation by Bremish representatives. When the Senat 
dispatched Rudolf Schleiden to Washington in 1853, he was instructed to keep track of 
 
the whereabouts, the conduct, and the tendencies of the political refugees who for some 
years have been migrating from the European states [to the U.S.]; as well as [of] the 
effect their efforts might have, for maintaining a connection with their comrades on this 
side of the ocean, and among the German population of the United States. Where the 
honorable envoy should have occasion to gain detailed intelligence in these matters, it is 
recommended that he report upon it.669
 
Since Schleiden was to rely on the local consuls for the bulk of his information, we can 
assume that he was expected to enlist their help, as well, in spying on German refugees. 
 Rather than supporting those democrats and liberals who had stood by the 
constitution of 1848, and hence by German unity, when Frederick William IV had 
rejected the crown, Bremen’s authorities were actively engaged in their surveillance and, 
where necessary, prosecution. As the national movement had turned democratic, 
Hanseats had turned against the national movement. Thus, not only were they political 
opponents of the main current in 1850s Germany that promoted a nation-state, but they 
also made use of their transnational commercial and diplomatic network to fight it. 
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Conclusion and Outlook 
To call 1850s Hanseats nationalists would do them an injustice. To be sure, they 
were conversant in the idioms of romantic nationalism and racial constructions. 
Whenever they commented and passed judgment on individuals, peoples, works of arts, 
or natural phenomena, they employed these idioms. Nationality and race helped them to 
explain the world, and served them to explain their actions and policies to others. But as 
frameworks of interpretation and as ideologies, nationality and race competed and often 
conflicted in Hanseats’ minds with other ideas. Calvinism and Classical learning stood as 
powerful correctives to nationalist and racist prejudices. In making sense of the world, 
and of their role in it, Hanseats often found God or Greece more relevant than Germany. 
When it came to practical matters, whether in business or in affairs of state, 
mercantile interests overruled cultural notions in guiding Hanseats’ decisions. A 
nationalist view could not help Hanseats judge their business partners in any useful way. 
To assess the credibility of an individual, Hanseats ultimately asked for a person’s 
character and work ethic, not his nationality or skin color. Likewise, they judged treaties, 
policies, and institutions not by their benefit to the nation, but by their usefulness for 
business. The values Hanseats shared with others in a transatlantic mercantile class 
formed the basis of their convictions. The seed of nationalism had taken root in that 
ground, but it was still far from becoming a fully-grown German oak. During the 1850s, 
Hanseats’ reliance on their estatist-cosmopolitan identity served them well, making the 
offer of a national identity less appealing. 
Their elite cosmopolitanism kept Hanseats at a distance from the nationalist 
movement in Germany. Nationalism entails the promise of equality – equality as citizens, 
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for civic nationalism; and equality by virtue of shared blood or culture, for ethno-cultural 
nationalism. Hanseats were not prepared to promise equality to anyone, on either ground. 
They recognized as worthy of making political and economic decisions men of sound 
work ethics and character. By default, they suspected the lower sorts of failing to live up 
to these standards. Consequently, Hanseats were more concerned with directing, 
controlling and uplifting the many, then with giving them a say in public matters. They 
would learn in the future that the masses might vote for their betters, but in the 1850s, 
they were not prepared to offer them that chance. 
For their social interactions and for their business connections, Hanseats relied 
more on the mercantile class of the Anglo-American Atlantic than on their ties to the 
German hinterland.670 The global framework provided by the British Empire was more 
important to Hanseats – economically, culturally, politically, and militarily – than were 
the loose and limp skeletons of the Germanic Confederation and the Zollverein. The 
city’s standing in that Atlantic world was too important to be sacrificed for the uncertain 
prospects of a politically or economically unified Germany. During the 1850s, Hanseats 
found that many of their demands on global trade policy could be met by engaging in 
mercantile diplomacy within the Atlantic world. From the point of view of their trade 
interests, they did not perceive a strong need for a German nation-state. 
In attracting customers, passengers, and cargo, Hanseats consciously appealed to 
nationalist sentiment. In selling-pitches toward hinterland audiences, Hanseats found a 
language of nationalism an effective tool. Christening ships in ways that invoked the 
cultural tastes and habits of the paying public in America and Germany made sense in 
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this context. To take these appeals to national myths at face value, and to interpret them 
as an all-out endorsement of nationalism, would mean to buy into this sales pitch without 
considering the entire product on its merits. 
 
The proliferation of wars that began with the Italian War of 1859 changed things 
for Hanseats. Increasingly, they became convinced that a unified German nation-state 
was necessary to protect their vessels from hostile foreign powers. Advances in military 
technology, especially the development of rifled artillery, but also iron-clad war-
steamers, increased the fiscal threshold for successful military campaigns. The weapons 
that would decide future wars could only be afforded by large states, backed by large 
industry. As a collection of small states, with the exception of Prussia and Austria, the 
Germanic Confederation looked increasingly feeble, and the neighboring countries, 
especially France and Denmark, appeared increasingly dangerous. The specters of French 
occupation (1810-1813) and Danish blockade (1848-1849) began to make more and more 
frequent appearances in Hanseats’ rhetoric.  
Hanseats had often looked for support from beyond the ocean. In 1848, they had 
hoped for American protection against centralizing or nationalist excesses in Germany. 
Unfortunately, Bremen’s sturdiest ally, the United States, was busy fighting a Civil War 
of its own. American foreign policy was occupied with the threat of British intervention. 
This was not a good time for international cooperation. Moreover, the warring parties in 
America likewise demanded that foreigners declared their allegiance, and Hanseats were 
split in their response. 
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Thus, the shift towards embracing nation-states – German or American – was 
anything but painless or voluntary for Hanseats. In becoming national, Hanseats had to 















Chapter 7: The End of Merchant-Capital – 
Crisis and Adaptation in a World of Industrial Capitalism, 1857 – 1890 
 
 
A Changing World 
 By the end of the 1850s, a decade of economic expansion had created a changed 
world.  Across the Atlantic World, the Panic of 1857 had annihilated much speculative 
capital, but the infrastructure created by the industrial boom remained in place. Railroads, 
gasworks, machine-tool plants, and steamship lines returned to profitability within a year, 
and their collective impact was one of changing the way contemporaries perceived and 
experienced the world. 
 The new economic forms that had arisen during this time likewise continued to 
bloom: commodity futures, investment banking, joint-stock firms with wide-spread 
shareholdership, and the corporation, whose elevation to the legal status of a natural 
person was imminent in both Germany and the United States. Once the economy 
recovered from the world-wide economic crisis, these new instruments of financial 
capital were ready to spring back into action and fund further growth.671
                                                 
671 Beckert, Sven, The Monied Metropolis. New York City and the Consolidation of the American 
Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896, Cambridge, Mass. et. al. 2001, p. 145-171. 
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 Improved means of communication and the growth of urban populations, 
increasingly composed of wage-workers, led to the expansion of the public sphere to 
include the mass of the people. In both Germany and the U.S., the masses were speaking 
for themselves with increasing frequency and force. They put on the agenda both the 
inequities created by the rise of industry, and the demand for an increased participation in 
the administration of public affairs. This democratic tendency was particularly 
unwelcome to German elites; while in America, where adult, white males enjoyed the 
suffrage, economic demands and strikes led the middle-class to reevaluate their attitude 
towards the many. For liberals and conservatives alike, the Paris Commune of 1871 only 
confirmed their worst fears of the uncouth urban rabble. The groundwork for the backlash 
against democracy that followed after 1871, however, had been in place since the 
1850s.672
 Technological progress and expanded industrial production also meant that 
weapons technology made great strides. Rifled artillery and the repeater-rifle threatened 
to make warfare much more ferocious and bloody. The high price of this new weaponry 
also meant that states saw themselves compelled to command a much larger share of the 
national wealth, if they wanted to keep up with their competitors. Drawing on the same 
types of financial institutions that had funded the expansion of industry in the preceding 
decade, Prussia, France, and the United States borrowed heavily to ensure their success 
on the battlefield. Higher taxes and, therefore, an increased role of the state in shaping the 
economic fortunes of society, resulted. Nationalism, in turn, helped justify the increased 
burden on the people’s resources as a sacrifice for a higher cause. In Germany, these 
developments rendered the smaller and even medium size states of the Confederation 
                                                 
672 Beckert, Metropolis, p. 140-141. 
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increasingly ineffective as players in the international system of states. Only Prussia and 
Austria had the means to modernize their armies, and even they had to strain their 
finances in doing so.673
Politically, Germany remained characterized by the dualism between these rival 
great powers. While the heartlands of both Prussia and Austria lay within the boundaries 
of the Germanic Confederation, both states ruled over extensive territories that lay 
outside of Germany’s borders. Northern Italy, Hungary, and a variety of smaller Slavic 
regions belonged to the Habsburg Empire, but were not included in Germany. The same 
was true for the regions that had given the Kingdom of Prussia its name, the provinces of 
Western and Eastern Prussia. As a political entity, the Germanic Confederation was made 
ineffectual by the Austro-Prussian rivalry, and by the tenuous connection between their 
respective interests, and those of the Confederation as a whole. Only in terms of 
international law, the Confederation played an important role as the guarantor of the 
independence of the several smaller member states, like Bremen. 
 A new political force appeared on the German scene in 1859, the National 
Association [Nationalverein]. While essentially a club of notables, this organization was 
willing to enlist the general population in support of its political aims. The most 
important of these aims was the creation of a unified German nation-state; but beyond 
that, the National Association’s program remained vague and was only made more 
concrete by a string of resolutions passed towards the mid-1860s. To some German elites, 
the Nationalverein seemed to promise a venue to harness the dangerous force of the 
general populace for a respectable goal, and hopefully to render it inert in the process. 
                                                 
673 Förster, Tig, and Jörg Nagler, eds., On the Road to Total War. The American Civil War and the German 
Wars of Unification, 1861-1871, Washington, D.C. 1997. 
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After ten years, nationalism had once again become a respectable political option, not 
just a cultural attitude, for the better sort. Other members of Germany’s elites, however, 
continued to fear the linkage between nationalism and democracy, and doubted the ability 
of the Nationalverein to sever this connection. These groups thought that their interests 
were better served by the multitude of dynastic and city states that constituted the 
Germanic Confederation.674
 In the U.S., the conflict over slavery escalated by the day. The Compromise of 
1850, in which the South had relinquished sectional parity in the Senate in exchange for 
the Fugitive Slave Act, had not created lasting peace. Slaveholders took an increasingly 
intransigent position, defending the South’s ‘peculiar institution’ as a positive good. 
Federal institutions followed suit. In the Dred Scott decision of 1856, the Supreme Court 
ruled that slaves did not cease to be property even if removed into a free state. The 
resulting stepped-up enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act outraged Northern public 
opinion, and contributed to the rise of the Republican Party. Technological progress and 
economic growth inspired confidence in Northerners in the superiority of their social and 
economic vision, and lent additional vigor to their opposition to slavery. An increasing 
number of people on both sides perceived the conflict over slavery as an unbridgeable 
conflict over fundamentally different visions of American society – a hierarchical society 
based on agriculture and slavery against an egalitarian society based on industry and 
wage labor. In 1859, John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry raised sectional tension to a 
new high, but slaveholders and their allies still seemed firmly in power in Washington, 
                                                 
674 Hamerow, Theodore S., The Social Foundations of German Unification. Ideas and Institutions, 
Princeton, NJ 1969; Biefang, Andreas, Politisches Bürgertum in Deutschland, 1857-1868. Nationale 
Organisationen und Eliten (=Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen 
Parteien, corp. ed., Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, vol. 102), 
Düsseldorf 1994. 
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DC. While the Republicans had captured the House of Representatives in 1858, the 
Senate had remained under Democratic control throughout the decade. But in 1860, there 
were growing demands that the South secede from the union if Lincoln was elected 
president. 
 
 These conflicts and processes in both countries proved impossible for Hanseats to 
ignore, no matter how much they might have wished to do so and to keep going about 
their business as usual. But business itself was changing. The rise of industry created a 
new class of capitalists, whose political outlook did not match that of merchant elites in 
either Germany or the United States. These upstarts made their money not in circulation, 
but in production. To be sure, they still needed merchants to facilitate market exchange; 
but increasingly, this new class of entrepreneurs called the shots economically. 
Industrialists tended to look inland, not overseas. They depended first on the completion 
of national markets, not on ties overseas; and the relative fragility of this new economic 
sector made them look toward strengthened, unitary states for support. States, in turn, 
depended on industry, not only for a stable fiscal base, but even more so, for the 
production of the new weapons that promised to decide future international conflicts. In 
both America and Germany, the creation of national, unitary states was achieved in a 
coalition between political leaders and captains of industry, in which the mercantile 
interest was pushed to the side.675
 These sudden changes shattered Hanseats’ political, social, and economic ties. 
Some Bremish merchants embraced wholeheartedly the new economy of the day, and the 
                                                 
675 Beckert, Metropolis, extensively treats this shift in economic importance, which he describes with 
Marx’ term of the “subsuming of merchant capital under industrial capital” (p. 301). See for example p. 46-
77, 87-90, 131-132, 165, 240-248. 
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political options of strengthened national states that seemed to follow from it. Others 
wished to maintain their accustomed ways while making concessions to changing 
conditions. Still others hoped to succeed by fighting the changes or hoping to modify the 
course of events in a way consistent with their customary practices. The central fact, 
however, is that Hanseats were no longer of one mind when it came to the most important 
political and economic choices of the day. Whether or not the growing disharmony 
among their estate was to blame, by 1867 Bremen would cease to be an independent 
state, and Hanseats’ ability to influence world affairs would be significantly diminished. 
The most important of the choices Hanseats had to make during these years were 
those between opposing parties in wars. The complexities of the developments and 
opinions that we find in both German and American societies, the endless debates of 
those weighing in with suggestions and criticisms, the entire fabric of public debate, was 
reduced to a simple alternative between two mutually exclusive poles the very moment 
that weapons began to speak. The choice was between North and South in America, and 
between Prussia and Austria in Germany. On the western shore of the Atlantic, Lincoln 
played the role as the unifier of the nation; on the eastern end, that role was played by 
Bismarck. As part of the simplification of the conflicts, choosing sides became equivalent 
to supporting or opposing the generally accepted figurehead of unification. Moreover, 
once these conflicts had taken on a military character, discussions appeared moot, and the 
fate of the nation appeared to be in the hand of generals and great statesmen. Like many 
contemporaries, Hanseats found themselves standing on the sidelines, watching passively 
as the forces of history battled it out on the field. The world that resulted from one side’s 
victory was dealt to them ready-made. They had to take it or leave it; and accordingly 
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adjust their ways of doing business, making politics, and forming social bonds. This is 
not to say that Hanseats did not weigh in with their opinions and interests. During the 
years under discussion here, the years that remade the two countries that were most 
important to them, Hanseats did not fail to attempt to shape the world in which they lived 
and did business – they merely failed in the attempt. 
 On both sides of the Atlantic, and across the ocean, economic, political, and social 
developments mutually influenced each other. Nonetheless, these developments must be 
analytically separated, if we are to do justice to their respective logic and their specific 
role. It is, therefore, not to assign a privileged role to economic processes; but to isolate 
their specific effects on Hanseats, that this chapter focuses on political economy, while 
the subsequent one treats political and social developments. Only if understood in 
relation to each other do the political, economic, and social changes of the 1860s add up 
to explain the demise of that transatlantic community Hanseats had built in the first six 
decades of the century. 
 
 
Changes in Business in the 1860s 
By the 1860s, Hanseats had begun to change their business practices. The share of 
their capital that was directly invested in commodities which they traded on their own 
account decreased precipitously. Instead, Hanseats began to expand their trade on 
commission, or even in commodity futures. More and more, Hanseats crossed over into 
the world of finance, handling stocks and bonds, and facilitating financial transactions, in 
general, between Europe and North America. 
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Most importantly, the link between ship-ownership and trade became severed. 
The rise of ocean-going steamships began to siphon off growing numbers of emigrant 
passengers. In 1860, the bulk of emigrants still traveled by sailing-ship. In that year, only 
25.6% of all passengers between Bremen and New York traveled by steamer.676 By 1869, 
the share of passengers embarking in Bremerhaven on steamers had risen to 74.7%. In 
1873, the steamers’ share had climbed further, reaching 85.5% (Table 11 and graph 7).677 
The days in which Hanseats had been able to offer cheap freight rates, because the 
emigrants on their sailing vessels had already paid for the cost of the entire journey by the 
time the ship reached America, were over. 
Improvements in technology that made steamers more efficient meant that for the 
first time, ocean liners could compete with sailing vessels on the price of transportation. 
Screw-propellers replaced side-wheels, compound engines reduced the amount of coal 
burnt, and steel hulls allowed for larger vessels. The combined effect was to increase the 
amount of space available on steamers. Below deck, where once coal had been bunkered 
and machinery hulked, now bales of cotton and steerage passengers generated revenue 
that turned steamers into profitable investments even without heavy government 
subsidies.678
                                                 
676 StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nordamerika. Hanseatische diplomatische Agenten, Konsuln usw. bei den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nordamerika und Korrespondenz mit denselben. In New York, 1815-1868; file no. 15, "Consulat zu 
Newyork, F. W. Keutgen, 1859 Novb. 1 - 1861; Gustav Schwab 1862. - . Enthält No. 1- 89.  1859 Nov. 1 - 
1868 Okt. 28," document no. 15 of 89, " Bericht des Bremischen Consulats zu Newyork für 1860, Juni 
1861," p. 19. Further reference to this document will be as "StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 15, doc. 15," 
followed by page numbers. While dated “June 1861”, it is evident from context that consul Keutgen began 
writing this annual report early in 1861, and finished it only in June. 
677 Handelskammer Bremen, Berichte der Handelskammer in Bremen für die Jahre 1870-1873, erstattet an 
den Kaufmanns-Konvent, Bremen 1874, p. 71. 
678 Gerstenberger, Heide, and Ulrich Welke, Vom Wind zum Dampf. Sozialgeschichte der deutschen 
Handelsschiffahrt im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung, Münster 1996. See also StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 
15, doc. 15, p. 12-16. 
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Sailing vessels were still filling a need in the transportation of bulk cargo and 
hazardous materials. The Bremish firm of Wätjen & Co., for example, became the 
world’s largest sailing-ship owner by initially specializing on petroleum, which was not a 
cargo well-received on vessels driven by fire and steam.679 Still, steamers quickly 
displaced sailing-vessels. In 1860, ten of the sixty-eight Bremish vessels to arrive in New 
York were steamers. These ten steamers, all owned by the Northern German Lloyd, 
accounted for 43.6% of the total tonnage of these sixty-eight vessels.680 By 1869, the 
twenty-six steamers owned by Bremish firms made up 22.1% of the total tonnage of 
Bremen’s merchant marine. By 1873, the fleet of Bremish steamers, now expanded to 
thirty-eight vessels, claimed a third of the total tonnage (Table 11). The number of 
sailing-ships owned by Bremish firms declined to 195 in 1873. In that year, the tonnage 
of the average steamer was 2.5 times as high as that of the average sailing-vessel.681
 
                                                 
679 Beutin, Ludwig, Bremen und Amerika. Zur Geschichte der Weltwirtschaft und der Beziehungen 
Deutschlands zu den Vereinigten Staaten, Bremen 1953, p. 86-87. 
680 StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 15, doc. 15, p. 24. 
681 Handelskammer Bremen, Berichte der Handelskammer in Bremen für die Jahre 1870-1873, erstattet an 
den Kaufmanns-Konvent, Bremen 1874, p. 71. Since the figures for 1869 and 1873 include many small 
sailing-vessels not fit for transatlantic voyages, we can assume that the steamers’ share of Bremish-
American trade had climbed above the mark of 1860. 
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Table 11 
Steamers and Sailing Vessels, 1860-1873 
 
 
1860 – from Bremerhaven 





















Sailing-vessels 32,398 56% 11,480 74%
Steamers 25,000 44% 3,948 26%
Total 57,398  15,428  
 
 
1869 – from Bremerhaven 
to all destinations 
1873 – from Bremerhaven 













































Sailing-vessels 92,884 78% 16,063 25% 78,790 66% 9,171 15%
Steamers 26,351 22% 47,456 75% 39,813 34% 54,070 85%
Total 119,235  63,519  118,603  63,241  
 
 
Sources: For 1860, StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten 
Staaten von Nordamerika. Hanseatische diplomatische Agenten, Konsuln usw. bei den Vereinigten Staaten 
von Nordamerika und Korrespondenz mit denselben. In New York, 1815-1868; file no. 15, "Consulat zu 
Newyork, F. W. Keutgen, 1859 Novb. 1 - 1861; Gustav Schwab 1862. - . Enthält No. 1- 89.  1859 Nov. 1 - 
1868 Okt. 28," document no. 15 of 89, " Bericht des Bremischen Consulats zu Newyork für 1860, Juni 
1861," p. 19 and 24; for 1869 and 1873, Handelskammer Bremen, Berichte der Handelskammer in Bremen 
für die Jahre 1870-1873, erstattet an den Kaufmanns-Konvent, Bremen 1874, p. 71. 
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Graph 7 




































Sources: Bessell, Georg, 1857-1957. Norddeutscher Lloyd. Geschichte einer bremischen Reederei, Bremen 
1957, p. 40; Wätjen, Hermann, Aus der Frühzeit des Nordatlantikverkehrs. Studien zur Geschichte der 
deutschen Schiffahrt und deutschen Auswanderung nach den Vereinigten Staaten bis zum Ende des 
amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges, Leipzig 1932, p. 193; also see preceding table (Table 11).  
 
 
The rise of steam meant a rapid concentration of capital in the Bremish maritime 
industry. All but three Bremish steamers were owned by the Northern German Lloyd. 
Since those steamers not owned by the Lloyd were small vessels, the dominance by the 
Lloyd of transatlantic steamship service amounted to a monopoly in the passengers 
business, and a dominant position even in the cargo business.682 Friedrich Köper recalled 
with bitterness that his dreams of carrying on his father’s business as an owner of sailing-
vessels were squashed: “My dream of becoming a great ship-owner was over when big 
capital, in the shape of joint-stock companies, had taken over steam navigation. It was 
                                                 
682 Twenty-three of twenty-six steamers in 1869, and thirty-five of thirty-eight in 1873, Ibid. For the 
Lloyd’s monopoly in transportation, and public criticism thereof in 1869, see Bessell, Georg, 1857-1957. 
Norddeutscher Lloyd. Geschichte einer bremischen Reederei, Bremen 1957, p. 34-35 and 40. 
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evident that the great amounts of capital needed for the expensive steamers could not be 
brought and kept together by private cooperation.”683
The link between transportation and circulation had been severed, and Hanseats 
were driven to adopt new business practices.684 Bremish merchant houses turned from 
full-scale trading and transportation companies into pure commodity- and money-trading 
capitalist businesses that handled less and less cargo on their own account. As the 
opportunities for extraordinary profits in arbitrage and non-equivalent exchange withered 
(cf. chapter 1), the margin of profit in trade dropped, driving some smaller companies out 
of business. Herman Henrich Graue, for example, quit his mercantile business to join the 
manufacturing concern of Wilhelm Wilkens in Baltimore.685 Other firms stayed in 
business, but sold their sailing vessels. Oelrichs & Co. took this step in 1862. From that 
point on, the company specialized in commissions, commodity trading proper, and ticket 
sales for passenger steamers.686 Lürman & Co. of Baltimore tried to sail against the wind, 
without much success. In 1861, the firm’s ships earned $23,284.82 on their voyages. In 
                                                 
683 Köper, Friedrich, “Köper, Lottmann & Cia., Guatemala, Plaudereien über Handelsmarken, Etiquetten, 
Wappen, etc.,” typescript, 1945/02/01, p. 11, StAHB 7,13, Köper, Friedrich [papers]. 
684 Circulation is not synonymous with the movement of objects in space. “A house which A sells to B 
circulates as a commodity, but it does not take a walk.” Similarly, property titles to commodities in storage 
may change hands repeatedly without the commodities’ ever being moved. All sales and purchases are acts 
of circulation, and become activities exclusive to a capitalist form of society. Transportation, on the other 
hand, is a necessity for any society which does not wholly rely on local self-sufficiency. It is tied to the use-
value of goods. This remains true in capitalism. In order to realize surplus-value, a commodity has to meet 
the need of a solvent consumer, and thus has to be moved to him. While circulation and transportation are 
synonymous when the merchant owns the commodity he ships, they are severed with trade on commission. 
Futures trading is only an extreme form, in which promise to buy or sell commodities at a certain place and 
time appear to take on a live of their own. See Marx, Capital, vol. 2, p. 150-151. 
685 According to Baltimore chronicler J. Thomas Scharf, Graue had been funding Wilkens’ manufacturing 
concern since 1853, and took over his factories after Wilkens’ death in the 1870s. Graue’s correspondence 
with his brother, however, suggests that he remained active primarily as a merchant as late as 1860 (see 
note 18 to chapter 5). This Wilhelm Wilkens, while also from Bremen, had no relation to the merchant 
family of Julius Wilkens and his brothers, discussed in chapter 1. Graue also stepped into Wilkens’ shoes in 
the leadership of the horse-drawn Baltimore and Catonsville Passenger Railroad Company. Wilkens had 
been the director of this railroad after it was founded in 1860. In 1868, Wilkens stepped down, and Graue 
became treasurer of the company. See Scharf, J. Thomas, History of Baltimore City & County, 2 vols., 
Philadelphia 1881, vol. 1, p. 368 and 422-423. 
686 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 39-48. 
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the four years after that, Lürman’s vessels lost money as often as they turned a profit. 
That profit, however, never reached the level seen in 1861 (Table 12). 
The balance sheet of Lurman & Co. of Baltimore for 1861 to 1865 shows that 
commission trade and financial transactions rapidly displaced the trade with commodities 
owned by the firm and transported on its own vessels. ‘Adventures’ – the journeys of the 
company’s sailing vessels – had been the source of two thirds of the firm’s profits in 
1861. In 1862 and 1864, this share dropped to one third. In 1863 and 1865, the company 
even lost money on its adventures. By contrast, the importance of commissions for the 
firm increased. The income from this source, however, could not compensate for the loss 
of the decline in proper trade. Banking, gold, and stock became more important for 
Lurman & Co., but the volatility of financial markets rendered these branches of business 
an unpredictable source of income. In fact, a substantial share of the firm’s profits from 
the preceding years was wiped out by losses in the financial markets in 1865. Some of 
these losses might have represented outstanding debts of Southern planters that had to be 
written off (Table 12). 
Over the course of five years, the firm made a total profit of $33,832.84, just 
$6,766.57 per year, on average. The associates of the firm were able to extract a total of 
only $12,188.29 during this time. For two associates, this makes for an annual income of 
$1,218.82 for each (Table 12) – hardly sufficient to sustain a proper Hanseatic lifestyle. 
In these five years, characterized by the Civil War and the transition of the firm to a 
modern money- and commodity-trading enterprise, the Lürmans must have lived off their 
savings, or possibly their income from real estate. Nonetheless, the firm survived these 
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Lurman & Co., Balance Sheet, 1860-1865 
 1861  1862  
US$ losses profits losses profits 
Payments to 
Associates 6,797.20  2,662.68  
Adventures 766.08 23,284.82  6,444.95
Guarantee  2,695.61   
Tea a/c  121.26  213.98
Tobacco a/c  453.28  619.73
Coffee a/c     
Commissions  8,730.90  1,683.94
Charges a/c 2,125.71  5,667.24  
Exchange a/c  1,592.00  7,310.45
Sales of Scrip    2,707.60
Gold a/c     
Stock a/c     
SUM 9,688.99 36,877.87 8,329.92 18,980.65
 
continued on the next page 
                                                 
687 See chapter 1. 
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Table 12 
Lurman & Co., Balance Sheet, 1860-1865 
(ctd.) 1863  1864  
US$ losses profits losses profits 
Payments to 
Associates 2,728.41    
Adventures 823.13   4,025.88
Guarantee     
Tea a/c  262.35  184.70
Tobacco a/c    462.93
Coffee a/c  9,619.79   
Commissions  2,863.10  5,972.49
Charges a/c 6,016.93  5,207.20  
Exchange a/c  2,272.36  2,544.91
Sales of Scrip  1,569.65  100.00
Gold a/c    452.09
Stock a/c     
SUM 9,568.47 16,587.25 5,207.20 13,743.00
 
(ctd.) 1865 
 1861 to 
1865 
   
US$ losses profits losses share profits share 
Payments to 
Associates   12,188.29 22%  
Adventures 2,677.78 2,447.56 4,266.99 8% 36,203.21 40%
Guarantee   2,695.61 3%
Tea a/c  51.52 833.81 1%
Tobacco a/c  23.97 1,559.91 2%
Coffee a/c   9,619.79 11%
Commissions  1,132.00 20,382.43 23%
Charges a/c 7,984.16  27,001.24 48%  
Exchange a/c 10,363.28  10,363.28 19% 13,719.72 15%
Sales of Scrip   4,377.25 5%
Gold a/c 179.42  179.42 0% 452.09 1%
Stock a/c 2,011.76  2,011.76 4%  
SUM 23,216.40 3,655.05 56,010.98 100% 89,843.82 100%
 
Source: Lurman & Co., Balance Sheet, folder “1830-1867 E.G. Oelrichs and Lurman Company”, box 2, 






The New Economy and the Rise of Friedrich Wilhelm Keutgen 
 One firm in New York looked like a particularly promising example of Hanseatic 
adaptation to the changing times. Friedrich Wilhelm Keutgen was the front-runner in a 
large field of men who hoped to become Bremish consul in New York, after Edwin A. 
Oelrichs' resignation from that post in 1859. The nature and geographical reach of 
Keutgen's references, as well as the arguments he and his supporters marshaled in his 
favor, betray his involvement in the 'new economy' of the day.688
Keutgen and his non-Hanseatic associates, Messrs. Gelpcke and Reichelt, were 
active in banking, both on their own account, and as the American agents for the 
Dessauer Creditanstalt für Industrie und Handel. Founded in 1856, and modeled after the 
French Crédit Mobilier, this institution was in the business of providing long-term credit 
for capital investment, as well as short-term credits for circulation and operation, to 
manufacturing and transportation concerns.689 Among these concerns was the Northern 
German Lloyd. The Creditanstalt controlled 37.5% of the steamer line, and by some 
accounts, it had been for this reason that Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt had been given the 
Lloyd's agency for New York.690
                                                 
688 StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nordamerika. Hanseatische diplomatische Agenten, Konsuln usw. bei den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nordamerika und Korrespondenz mit denselben. In New York, 1815-1868; file no. 7, "Acta betr. die 
Resignation des bisherigen bremischen Consuls Edw. A. Oelrichs zu Newyork und die Ernennung des 
Kaufmanns Friedr. Wilh. Keutgen dortselbst zu seinem Nachfolger, 1859 April 4. – 1860 Jan 14." Further 
reference to this file will be as "StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 7," followed by page numbers. Keutgen’s, 
unlike other firms, left a paper trail that allows to reconstruct its activities much more extensively than is 
true for any other Hanseatic concern. Since Keutgen’s story is instructive for the economic challenges 
Hanseats faced in the 1860s, a significant part of this account will be devoted to his activities. 
689 Rosenberg, Hans, “Der Weltwirtschaftliche Struktur- und Konjunkturwandel von 1848 bis 1857,“ in: 
Böhme, Helmut (ed.), Probleme der Reichsgründungszeit 1848-1879, Cologne and Berlin 1972, p. 159-
192, p. 181 for the Dessauer Creditanstalt. While originally published in 1934, Rosenberg’s essay still 
provides a definitive overview of the world economy in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and of 
Germany’s role in it. 
690 See chapter 1; Vagts, Alfred, “Gustav Schwab 1822-1880. Ein deutschamerikanischer Unternehmer,” in: 
1000 Jahre Bremer Kaufmann. Aufsätze zur Geschichte bremischen Kaufmannstums, des Bremer Handels 
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As agents for the Creditanstalt, and on their own account, Keutgen and his 
associates facilitated the investment of German capital in U.S. land, mineral ressources, 
and especially railroads.691 Keutgen had initially made his name in traditional Hanseatic 
ventures, trading cotton, sugar, and tobacco from the South. In the 1850s, Gelpcke, 
Keutgen & Reichelt had heavily extended their interests to include Midwestern grain, not 
a commodity usually dealt in by Hanseats at that time.692 With his associates from the 
German hinterland, Keutgen had become heavily involved in the continental expansion of 
the American economy, and had largely exited the business of trading on his own account 
those staples of slave-labor that formed the backbone of other Hanseats’ trade interests.693
The degree of the firm’s involvement with the opening of the American West is 
demonstrated by Herman Gelpcke’s election in December 1860 to the board of the New 
York Central Railroad.694 Cornelius Vanderbilt’s latest venture, the railroad had been 
founded to establish a trunk line from New York to Chicago with a view to drawing the 
exports from the American bread-basket to New York.695 A relative of Gelpcke’s was a 
                                                                                                                                                 
und der Bremer Schiffahrt aus Anlaß des tausendjährigen Gedenkens der Marktgründung durch Bischof 
Adaldag 965 (=Bremisches Jahrbuch, vol. 50), Bremen 1965, p. 337-360. 
691 C. Winters (sic) Oeder v. Herman Gelpcke, Consul of the Principality of Dessau, Frederick W. Keutgen, 
Consul of the City of Bremen at the Port of New York, and Adolphus Reichelt, Case File A-16-387, 
Admiralty Case Files, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Records of the 
District Courts of the United States, Record Group 21, National Archives – Northeast Region, New York, 
NY. 
692 See Keutgen’s annual report for 1860. Written in June 1861, this document can be read as an attempt to 
vindicate himself in the eyes of the Senat. StAHB, 2,B,13,b,3, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte 
mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika. Hanseatische diplomatische Agenten, Konsuln usw. bei den 
vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika und Korrespondenz mit denselben. In New York, 1815-1868, file 15, 
“Consulat zu Newyork, F. W. Keutgen, 1859 Novb. 1 - 1861; Gustav Schwab 1862. - . Enthält No. 1- 89.  
1859 Nov. 1 - 1868 Okt. 28,“ document 15, “Bericht des Bremischen Consulats zu Newyork für 1860, Juni 
1861.“  
693 This shift in Keutgen’s interests mirrors that made by increasing numbers of non-Hanseatic New York 
merchants. See, for example, Beckert, Metropolis, p. 131-137, 144; Adler, Jeffrey S., Yankee Merchants 
and the Making of the Urban West. The Rise and Fall of Antebellum St. Louis, Cambridge, UK and New 
York 1991. 
694 “Monetary Affairs,” New York Times, Dec. 8, 1860, p. 3. 
695 Cronon, William, Nature’s Metropolis. Chicago and the Great West, New York and London 1991. 
According to Hermann Wätjen, the leading Bremish representatives on the U.S. East Coast, Rudolf 
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banker in Chicago, the center of the Midwestern commodity markets.696 Apparently, 
Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt had a hand in all stages of the export business from the 
newly opened West.  
Transatlantically, the firm remained tied to Bremen’s interests. As agents for the 
Northern German Lloyd, the three businessmen represented the transportation concern 
that was the life-line for Hanseatic-American commercial relations. Rather than buying or 
selling commodities themselves, however, Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt were 
increasingly involved in facilitating commerce in a role as pure merchant-bankers. For 
example, between 1858 and 1860, Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt kept an account for 
Wilhelm E. Quentell of Bremen, a cotton importer, with Henry Rodewald & Co. of New 
Orleans, a Hanseatic cotton exporter. Relying on the customary trust among Hanseats, 
Quentell instructed Keutgen’s firm to honor Rodewald’s drafts up to a line of credit of 
$50,000 even when not accompanied by a bill of lading for a cotton shipment. The cotton 
would be shipped directly to Bremen, but the account between the exporter and the 
importer would be settled by their intermediary in New York. Essentially, Gelpcke, 
Keutgen & Reichelt were giving long-term circulation credit to Hanseatic merchants.697
Its manifold ties to Bremish commerce made Keutgen’s firm a part of the 
Hanseatic network. But the reach of the firm's connections on the German side extended 
beyond Bremen, as witnessed not only by its connection with the Dessauer Creditanstalt, 
but also by the number of consulships the partners held. Keutgen already represented the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Schleiden, Edwin A. Oelrichs, and Albert Schumacher, “did not hold Vanderbilt in high esteem. They 
considered him the typical self-made man, whose chief character traits were a desire for profit, egotism, 
brutal recklessness, and untrustworthiness.” See Wätjen, Frühzeit, p. 60-61. Apparently, Keutgen and his 
associates did not share this appraisal of Vanderbilt with the minister-resident and the two consuls. 
696 “Law Reports. Rights of Consuls,” New York Times, Aug. 21, 1861, p. 3. 
697 “A Long-Litigated Case,” New York Times, Oct. 23, 1879, p. 2. Keutgen’s name is misspelled in the 
article. 
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Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt,698 while Gelpcke was consul for Saxe-Anhalt, the principality 
in which the city of Dessau was located.699 These small German states contained some of 
the most aggressive new investment-banks in Germany.700 Adding the representation of 
Bremen, the German state most important in transatlantic trade relations, would have 
rounded off what amounted to a small consular empire. 
With this impressive portfolio alone, Keutgen could have become the poster-child 
for the successful transition of Hanseatic merchants to the new economy of banking, 
stocks, commodity-trading and industrial transportation concerns. But Keutgen also had 
the requisite, customary background shared by most Hanseatic merchants in the U.S.. He 
came from an old Hanseatic family, and maintained connections with his relatives who 
remained active in Bremen. Like other American Hanseats, Keutgen had been an 
apprentice in a merchant firm in Bremen. Since coming to the U.S. in 1849, he had 
acquired American citizenship. Keutgen’s connection with Bremish interests had been 
reaffirmed when his firm had received the New York agency for the Northern German 
Lloyd.701
Since the inauguration of its New York line, the Lloyd had managed to capture a 
growing, yet far from overwhelming, market share. The return on the expensive 
                                                 
698 StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 7, p. 29-30. 
699 Brief by the attorneys of C. Wintgens Oeder, 1861/8/6, in the case of C. Winters (sic) Oeder v. Herman 
Gelpcke, Consul of the Principality of Dessau, Frederick W. Keutgen, Consul of the City of Bremen at the 
Port of New York, and Adolphus Reichelt, Case File A-16-387, Admiralty Case Files, United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, Records of the District Courts of the United States, 
Record Group 21, National Archives – Northeast Region, New York, NY. 
700 Cf. p. 359. 
701 StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 7, p. 25-26 and G. W. Krüger to Senat der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, New 
York 1861/09/27, StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten 
Staaten von Nordamerika. Hanseatische diplomatische Agenten, Konsuln usw. bei den Vereinigten Staaten 
von Nordamerika und Korrespondenz mit denselben. In New York, 1815-1868; file no. 10, "Acta betr. die 
Resignation des Consuls Keutgen zu Newyork und Ernennung des Kaufmanns Gustav Schwab daselbst zu 
seinem Nachfolger, 1861 Mai 27. - Decbr. 18;" p. 35. See also the advertisement by Gelpcke, Keutgen & 
Reichelt in the New York Evening Post, 1861/03/04, p. 1. 
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investments, however, was catastrophic. The share price had plummeted from 90 to 28 
between 1857 and 1859. Since the inception of trans-Atlantic service, share-holders had 
not seen a single Thaler of dividends. Wrecks of the steamers Hudson, Weser, and 
Bremen between August 1858 and January 1859 had made investors understandably 
nervous, and had not helped the company's reputation. On the Weser and the Bremen, the 
machinery had failed during storms on the high seas. Their passengers had been 
extremely lucky to survive the experience, and their stories were a public relations 
disaster for the Lloyd.702
In 1856, the Dessauer Creditanstalt had been the only banking institution in 
Germany willing to extend the considerable funds needed to set up a steam-ship 
enterprise. The bank now saw its fortune tied to the success of the Lloyd, and the 
directors of the bank were openly discussing the liquidation of Lloyd assets. The 
Damrstädter Bank had already dumped its shares on the market at a loss. While the latter 
institutions had held only a small share of stock, the sale had sent a message of non-
confidence to financiers.703 Since the Lloyd was the only Bremish player in the field of 
steam-ship travel, its success was increasingly considered coterminous with that of 
Bremish commerce at large. Hence, Bremen’s mercantile elite rallied around the battered 
steamer line.704
                                                 
702 [North German Lloyd Steamship Company, Bremen,] 70 Years North German Lloyd Bremen, 1857-
1927, Berlin 1927, p. 31-32. 
703 Ibid, p. 25-32. 
704 The Bremish Handelskammer, for instance, referred to the Lloyd as a "company which serves the 
common good." StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten Staaten 
von Nordamerika. Hanseatische diplomatische Agenten, Konsuln usw. bei den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nordamerika und Korrespondenz mit denselben. In New York, 1815-1868; file no. 7, "Acta betr. die 
Resignation des bisherigen bremischen Consuls Edw. A. Oelrichs zu Newyork und die Ernennung des 
Kaufmanns Friedr. Wilh. Keutgen dortselbst zu seinem Nachfolger, 1859 April 4. – 1860 Jan 14;" p. 33-34. 
Further reference to this file will be as "StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 7," followed by page numbers. The 
phrase “gemeinnütziges Unternehmen,” which the Handelskammer used, if taken in its meaning as a legal 
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In 1859, New York was still the only North American destination for the 
struggling steamship company, and the line from Bremerhaven to New York was of 
central importance to its long-term success. The Lloyd trusted Keutgen with an 
assignment crucial for the company’s survival. Keutgen’s enthusiasm for Bremen’s 
shipping interests suggests that this trust was well-deserved. In early 1861, he 
admonished the Senat to “suitably support an institution [the Lloyd] which is more than 
any other bound to Bremish blood, and which every Bremish burgher should eagerly 
support, even if every Thaler he gave to this institution was lost.”705
In early 1861, it appeared that investors might indeed lose their every last Thaler 
to the steamer line. Both the Lloyd, and the Bremer Bank – Bremen’s contribution to the 
flurry of bank-foundings in the years preceding the Panic of 1857 – were joint-stock 
companies, and H. H. Meier had been the driving force behind their creation. In 1856, H. 
H. Meier had managed to overcome traditional Hanseatic hostility to joint-stock 
enterprises, convincing many of his peers to invest in these companies. After five years of 
faring miserably, the continued trust of Hanseatic investors in the Lloyd was by no means 
assured. External stockholders, especially the Dessauer Creditanstalt, were pressing for a 
liquidation of the company. This bank was only 13.6% short of a majority of shares. The 
Lloyd could not afford losing the support of individual Bremish investors. Fortunately, 
the overwhelming majority of them seem to have shared Keutgen’s point of view.706
                                                                                                                                                 
term, translates as “non-profit corporation.” Here, it is used in its literal meaning, as a “company that 
benefits the public.” 
705 StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 15, doc. 15, p. 18. 
706 Bessell, 1857-1957. Norddeutscher Lloyd, p. 17-20, shows, among other things, that Meier explicitly 
emulated the business model of the French Crédit Mobilier in his founding of the Northern German Lloyd 
and the Bremer Bank. 
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Keutgen and Meier were kindred spirits in their business practices. They 
enthusiastically embraced the new economic forms that had arisen during the boom of the 
1850s; putting them to work for Bremen’s trade interest, but expanding its reach and 
nature in the process. Like Keutgen, Meier had expanded his interests inland. In a 
strategy of vertical integration, he acquired coal and iron mines and a foundry, as well as 
a brewery, to serve as suppliers to the Lloyd.707 To finance their endeavors, both men 
made use of financial instruments like joint-stock companies, which constituted a radical 
departure from the traditional reliance of Hanseats on the family fortune and the 
resources of their own house. In the enterprises of both men, stockholder value 
supplanted the welfare of the family as the raison d’être of the business. Keutgen and 
Meier thus no longer functioned as traditional merchant-capitalists; they were becoming 
agents of money-trading and commodity-trading capital in an industrial world market.708
H. H. Meier’s words on the occasion of the first trans-Atlantic trip of a Lloyd 
steamer show his ability to speak with the voice of a national bourgeoisie, as well as with 
that of a Hanseat: 
We are quite aware of the greatness of our mission and the great difficulties of our task – 
for it is not enough to get the capital together, to build the ships and to start the service, 
we must also secure a reasonable interest for our capital, otherwise our institution has no 
raison d’être and cannot, in the long run, work with any benefit (…). In our flag – an 
anchor crossed by the Bremen key [the heraldic symbol of the city] and surrounded by an 
oak wreath – you see our motto. The anchor is a sign of our hope that the key will open 
for us the traffic roads which we will hold with German perseverance, loyalty, and manly 
vigor.709
 
                                                 
707 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 152-154, for Meier’s strategy of vertical integration. Oelrichs & 
Co. began in the 1870s to sell directly to manufacturers in the United States. See Oelrichs & Co., Caspar 
Meier and his Successors, New York 1898, p. 41. 
708 See Introduction. 
709 [North German Lloyd Steamship Company, Bremen,] 70 Years, p. 30, English in the original, emphasis 
in the original. 
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 With the example of men like Meier and Keutgen, Hanseats might well have been 
led to accept the need for change in the way they did business. If Bremen merchants had 
overcome their dislike of banking and stock-trading for the purpose of founding the 
Lloyd, maybe they could be brought to accept a banker and stock-trader as their consul in 
New York, especially since he represented the very bank which had made possible the 
founding of the steamship line. Hence, Keutgen looked like the most promising candidate 
for the consulship. 
 
 
Families or Stockholders? 
We can only imagine that H. H. Meier must have been torn in his preferences. 
After Edwin Oelrichs had stepped down as consul, Rudolf Schleiden had appointed 
another associate of Oelrichs & Co., Gustav F. Schwab, as consul pro tempore. Family 
ties would have suggested to Meier convincing Schwab to apply for the job in 
permanence.710 Keutgen, on the other hand, represented Meier's most important business 
venture. Meier would not have lacked the leverage to promote Schwab at the expense of 
Keutgen. He played a leading role in the Bürgerschaft. We do not know whether Meier 
voiced any opinion at all on the succession in the consulate. We can know, however, that 
as director of the Lloyd, Meier could no longer bring the will of the private individual 
and that of the agent of capital into congruence. 
The record suggests that the tensions between traditional forms of family-based, 
political and personal loyalty on the one hand, and the demands the new economy and its 
representatives made of the state on the other hand, necessitated a discussion process 
                                                 
710 See chapter 1. 
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more drawn out than one might have expected in the light of the importance of the 
consulate. Keutgen’s competitors paraded in their applications long lists of references 
that, combined, read like a Who’s Who of the Hanseatic elite.711
In the end, Bremen’s mercantile establishment was convinced by Keutgen's 
references. On June 18th, 1859, the Handelskammer, responding to the Senat's request to 
give its opinion on the candidates, recommended appointing Keutgen, "who is 
particularly qualified for the post in question." The Chamber's statement specifically 
endorsed a view Keutgen's supporters from the German hinterland had advanced: "The 
agency for the Northern German Lloyd, bestowed on [Keutgen's] house, is to be taken 
into account; in that a closer connection between that company, which serves the common 
good, and the consulate, can be expected to have manifold advantages."712
The Commission on Foreign Affairs took another two weeks after receiving the 
Kammer’s vote, before it presented the Senat with its recommendation. Only after 
"manifold interviews and after taking into consideration all circumstances," did the 
Commission come out in favor of Keutgen. The somewhat Byzantine nature of a process 
that is most of all carried on orally makes it impossible to know what was discussed. Yet, 
it remains significant that it took the Senatoren in charge of Foreign Affairs until July 1st 
to come to a conclusive vote.713
 The imperative of the new economy won out over the politics of personal 
acquaintance, and the ties established by stockholdership proved stronger than those 
                                                 
711 The other applicants were Carl Lüling (firm of D. H. Wätjen & Co.), Georg Mosle (Pavenstedt & Co.), 
and John A. Pauli (Caesar & Pauli). See StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 7, p. 9-21. 
712 StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 7, p. 33-34, my emphasis. The phrase “gemeinnütziges Unternehmen,” 
which the Handelskammer used, if taken in its meaning as a legal term, translates as “non-profit 
corporation.” Here, it is used in its literal meaning, as a “company that benefits the public.” See p. 29-31 of 
the same file for letters by Adolf Reichelt and Dessau Mayor Aukemann (?), a board member of the 
Creditanstalt, who supported Keutgen. 
713 StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 7, p. 35. 
 358
between families, when the Senate finally appointed Keutgen as Bremish consul for New 
York. None of the competing claims to political office that were based primarily on 
family ties and personal acquaintance were successful, and the consul's seal was handed 
over to a man representing a capitalist enterprise of industrial transportation and its 
financiers.714
We can read in the appointment of Keutgen the signs of a spreading general crisis 
of the mercantile world, of the “subsumption of merchant capital under industrial capital” 
(MARX). Instead of the old mercantile nexus of family, business, and local political 
power, we see at work in Keutgen's successful application, and in the lobbying effort of 
his friends, the formation of a German national bourgeoisie. Unlike his fellow applicants 
for the consulship, Keutgen's business partners were not part of the Hanseatic trading 
network. They did not owe their wealth to the traditional staples of Hanseatic trade, and 
they had only ex post factum established the Bremen connection through their partnership 
with Keutgen. 
The mobilization of political support for Keutgen, likewise, centrally involved 
men from outside the Hanseatic network. The mayor of Dessau, who wrote to Duckwitz 
on Keutgen's behalf, was the director of a classical type of venture for this phase of 
industrialization, the German Continental Gas Company of Dessau, as well as a board 
member of the Creditanstalt.715  That bank, in turn, was among the few independent 
sources of 'venture capital' in the German states.  Chartered by the Grand Duchy of 
Saxony-Anhalt, the Creditanstalt owed its existence to an attempt by a state that lacked 
the resources to play a military-diplomatic role equal to even Bavaria and Württemberg, 
                                                 
714 Ibid., p. 13, 17, and 21 (applications by Messr. Lüling, Mosle, and Pauli). 
715 [Illegible] for Directorium der Deutschen Continental-Gas-Gesellschaft in Dessau to Senat der Freien 
Hansestadt Bremen, 1859/05/23, in: StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 7, p. 31. 
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let alone Prussia or Austria, to gain political leverage through the fields of industry and 
finance. 
Hesse-Darmstadt – represented by Keutgen in New York –, shared the strategic 
concerns of Saxe-Anhalt. Like the Creditanstalt, the Darmstädter Bank differed from the 
older, private banks of Germany in that it was specifically designed to fund daring 
industrial enterprises. The new Prussian banks that had emerged during the 1850s were 
too heavily regulated heavily to engage in investment-banking. Moreover, whereas the 
banks in the smaller states were left to leave their business decisions based purely on 
free-market considerations, Prussia pressured its banks to serve the military and political 
aims of the monarchy. When the liberal majority in the Prussian Diet refused funding for 
a modernization of the army, Bismarck bought new arms with extra-budgetary funds lent 
to the state by Prussian bankers.716
Keutgen and his partners were associated with the increasingly dense network of 
German bankers and industrialists who had begun to build a nation in the interstices of 
the morbid framework of the Germanic Confederation. The material wealth, institutions, 
and infrastructure they created might have rested on the legal framework provided by 
dynastic states. There was, however, no doubt in the minds of these protagonist of 
economic change that they were building a new, modern Germany which would 
eventually sweep away the vestiges of feudal power and replace them with a nation-
state.717
The cooperation of businessmen cultivated by tradition-minded Hanseats was 
based on estate-consciousness and personal credibility; that among the emergent national 
                                                 
716 Rosenberg, “Struktur- und Konjunkturwandel.“ 
717 Etges, Andreas, Wirtschaftsnationalismus. USA und Deutschland im Vergleich (1815-1914), Frankfurt a. 
M. and New York 1999. 
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bourgeoisie was unfolding along the lines of increasingly impersonal financial ties that 
underwrote the fast-growing industrial sector. Hanseats traditionally did business as 
cosmopolitans in an Atlantic economy, while men like Keutgen were invested in an 
industrial world-market. The former traded in the produce harvested by slave labor, the 
latter in the products of wage-labor. In Marx’s terms, Hanseats represented merchant 
capital, while Keutgen’s firm had made the transition to commodity-trading and money-
trading capital. The former economic role was increasingly outdated, while that of the 
latter would expand along with industrial production.718
 
 
Crises and the Fall of Friedrich Wilhelm Keutgen 
H. H. Meier and Friedrich Wilhelm Keutgen may well have been the Hanseats 
who had ventured furthest down the road towards the 'new economy' when the Panic of 
1857 struck. Both men survived that crisis, which annihilated much of the venture capital 
that had been pumped into the new, industrial economy since 1848. Perhaps they owed 
the ease with which they had weathered this storm to their location at the center of the 
Hanseatic network, which, as a whole, had done better in 1857 than many other groups. 
The persistence of personal credit and trust among one’s peers, which Meier and Keutgen 
also enjoyed, had buffered Hanseats’ losses in that crisis, and had prevented numerous 
firms from failing.719
 In 1860-1861, in the economic crisis touched off by the political uncertainty and 
increasing sectional animosity after Lincoln's election, Keutgen was no longer that lucky. 
                                                 
718 Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 315-316. 
719 Beutin, Bremen und Amerika, p. 112-116. 
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His embrace of new ways of doing business had made him more vulnerable to changes in 
the market. With inescapable certainty, this market caught up with him in the Spring of 
1861. The downfall began slowly, and would end with Keutgen's expulsion from 
Hanseatic circles. Why did this happen? 
The more intertwined the world-market became, both with regard to the flow of 
commodities, and the links established by bills of exchange, the faster and further such 
crises spread. In the commercial crisis of 1798, Bremen merchants still managed to avoid 
a complete crash by treating the unsellable stock of commodities in the city’s warehouses 
as a form of money. Backed by the state, a so-called “commodity bank” (Warenbank) 
was established. Merchants received bills from the bank after commissioners took stock 
of their commodities. The value of these bills equaled the pre-crisis price of the 
commodities, and was redeemable in specie supplied by the state. Restraint on the part of 
the merchants within the city, who did not insist on redemption, saved that system, which 
enabled foreign merchants to call in their outstanding payments, thus saving Bremen’s 
credit at large.720
The Panic of 1857, by distinction, took place at a time when Bremen was 
interlinked with international financial- and commodity-markets to a much greater extent. 
This crisis spread further and involved larger sums. The idea of a commodity bank was 
again considered, but discarded as inpracticable. Instead, H. H. Meier’s Bremer Bank 
successfully assumed the role of a guarantor against external demands, while mediating 
                                                 
720 Beutin, “Bremisches Banken- und Börsenwesen,” p. 23-25. To an extent, conceits of this sort can work 
even in a more fully developed capitalist economy. For example, in December 1860 New York banks 
restored liquidity by circulating $5Mio worth of notes backed by deposits in scrip, and accepted by the 
city’s merchants for gold. Unlike in the Bremish case, where commodities represented money, here capital 
stands in for a means of circulation. See StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 15, doc. 15, p. 44. 
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the demands between Bremish firms.721 In 1798, the commodities stored could be treated 
as capital, because they were part of the mercantile circuit of capital, exclusively. In 
1857, however, capitalist production had already become the general form of social 
reproduction to such an extent, that the stored goods were commodity capital as part of a 
larger circuit of capital circulation, involving more parties than just Bremen’s merchants. 
A gentlemen’s’ agreement of the sort practiced in 1798 was not easily duplicable under 
these conditions. Effectively, by treating the stored and unsellable commodities as if they 
had an ‘internal value’ independent of their finding a buyer, Hanseats had been able in 
1798 to pretend among themselves that there really was no crisis. In 1857, they would 
have had to convince a lot more people than just themselves to make this conceit work. A 
capitalist crisis required a capitalist answer, and Meier stood ready to provide one. 
Crises such as the Panic of 1857 still appeared as crises of trade, not production, 
because the connection between trade and production is obscured, among other things, by 
the fact that the merchant deals in the commodities of many different manufacturers, 
often located in various different, far-away places. The „external independence“ of 
merchant capital in relation to industrial capital veils the ‘squeeze’ the merchant actually 
finds himself in, even to himself: „The two limits of the sales price are, on the one hand, 
the price of production of the commodity, which he [the merchant] does not control; on 
the other hand, the average rate of profit, which he does not control either.“722
 
                                                 
721 Entholt, Hermann, “Bremens Handel, Schiffahrt und Industrie im 19. Jahrhundert (1815-1914),“ in: 
Mathies, O., H. Entholt, and L. Lichtweiss, eds., Die Hansestädte Hamburg / Bremen / Lübeck (=Die 
Deutsche Wirtschaft und Ihre Führer, vol. 5), Gotha 1928, p. 131-244, here p. 167. 
722 Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 318. 
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In 1861, driven by a loss of investor confidence, this ‘squeeze’ was even more 
pronounced, especially for firms like Keutgen’s, which was invested in both commodities 
and securities. At first, Keutgen hoped to contain the impact of the crisis on his firm. On 
May 4, 1861, Keutgen wrote to the Senat: 
 
The price-wise conditions at this place have taken such a turn that my house felt itself 
compelled to suspend payments. This was done with the intention to liquidate accrued 
assets; even a minimal improvement in the conditions will make this possible, and will 
enable [my house] to meet all its obligations in full, since these accrued assets are located 
mainly in the northwestern states, and have lost almost none of their internal value by the 
present crisis.723
 
Informing Rudolf Schleiden of his misfortune, Keutgen elaborated on the same 
theme. He hoped that in the long run, the company’s assets would serve to pay all 
obligations, and leave the associates with a “decent fortune.” Keutgen claimed that he 
had been meaning for some time to dissolve the partnership, when “after the fall of Fort 
Sumter, commercial conditions here took such a sad turn, that all and every resources 
were cut off, and that it was made impossible for me to pay off our liabilities at their due 
dates.”724
Convinced that Keutgen would emerge from the firm’s troubles with his 
Hanseatic honor intact, Schleiden rejected Keutgen’s resignation as consul. Writing to the 
                                                 
723 F. W. Keutgen to Senats-Kommission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, New York, 1861/5/4, 
StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nordamerika. Hanseatische diplomatische Agenten, Konsuln usw. bei den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nordamerika und Korrespondenz mit denselben. In New York, 1815-1868; file no. 10, "Acta betr. die 
Resignation des Consuls Keutgen zu Newyork und Ernennung des Kaufmanns Gustav Schwab daselbst zu 
seinem Nachfolger, 1861 Mai 27. - Decbr. 18;" p. 5-6. Further reference to this file will be as "StAHB 
2,B,13,b,3, file no. 10," followed by page numbers. Whether viewed as caused by over-production or 
under-consumption, the merchant will be the first to feel a crisis. Marx wrote that “the crisis takes place, as 
soon as the flow [of sales proceeds] from merchants who sell abroad (or whose stocks have accumulated at 
home, also), become so slow and spare, that banks urge repayments, or bills of exchange drawn on 
purchased goods become due, before a sale has taken place. Then foreclosures begin, sales in order to pay.” 
This appears to be what happened to Keutgen. See Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 317. 
724 F. W. Keutgen to Rudolf Schleiden, New York 1861/5/6, manuscript copy, in: StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file 
no. 10, p. 7-8. 
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Senat, Schleiden asserted that “several private communications by respected New York 
merchants convince me that this failure was brought about by the political circumstances 
and the interruption of commerce they caused, and that [this failure] was generally 
regarded with surprise.” In the light of Keutgen’s “accomplishments … diligence, 
prudence, and competence,” Schleiden recommended leaving him in office, and giving 
him a chance to restore his credit.725
 Schleiden would find his hopes disappointed. Apparently, the three associates had 
borrowed heavily to meet their obligations during the slump in business. They received 
funds from the house of J. & J. Stuart & Co. of New York, whom they gave promissory 
notes due after thirty days to six months. Between February 7th and April 10th, they had 
borrowed a total of $123,000 from the Stuarts. As the notes became due, starting with one 
over $5,000 on May 10th, Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt were unable to pay.726
 On June 12, confronted with a rising tide of 90-day promissory notes to the 
Stuarts becoming due, Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt filed for bankruptcy. The court 
followed their request to appoint the firm’s clerk, Wilhelm Vogel, as trustee. When asked 
to post a bond of $120,000, however, Vogel refused and withdrew his consent to acting 
as trustee. Apparently, the clerk knew what Keutgen was not ready to admit; that the firm 
would not be able to meet its obligations. Another forty days passed before the court 
replaced Vogel with the lawyers Morris K. Jessup and Joseph Herzfeld.727
                                                 
725 Extract aus dem Senatsprotokoll de 1861 - Mai 27 - p. 489, Min. Res. Schleiden, No. 58 Washington 9. 
Mai; no. 1842., StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 10, p. 3-4. 
726 Joseph Stuart v Herman Gelpcke, 27 Nov 1861, case 1861#916, Superior Court; John Stuart v Herman 
Gelpcke, 27 Nov 1861, case 1861#1327, Court of Common Pleas; Joseph Stuart v Herman Gelpcke, 27 
Nov 1861, case 1861#1327, Court of Common Pleas; and James Stuart v Gelpcke, 27 Nov 1861, case 
1861#851, Superior Court; all in: County Clerk, New York County, County Court House. 
727 Bill of Complaint, 1861/8/30; and Answer of Defendants Gelpcke and Keutgen, 1861/12/24, in the case 
of Albert Erhard v. Herman Gelpcke and others [Frederick W. Keutgen, Adolphus Reichelt, William (sic) 
Vogel, Morris K. Jessup and Joseph Herzfeld], Case File A-16-393, Admiralty Case Files, United States 
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During June and July, Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt began liquidating assets. 
Apparently, they did not stop at their own. Once word of the firm’s bankruptcy reached 
Germany, their clients began to ask for a settlement of accounts. C. Wintgens Oeder of 
Aachen, an old acquaintance of Reichelt’s, asked that he be sent the 361 shares of 
railroad stock that Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt had bought in trust for him. The firm 
answered him that they had sold the stock to meet their own obligations, when their value 
had been around 52, and that they were no longer able to produce the money.728
The same happened to one Albert Erhard. When his attorney, Louis A. von 
Hoffmann, demanded that Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt hand over stocks and bonds they 
held in trust for Erhard, Keutgen told him that they had sold them, and that they no longer 
had the money. When Erhard sued, his complaint implicated not just Keutgen’s firm, but 
also the Dessau Creditanstalt. Apparently, many of the German accounts Gelpcke, 
Keutgen & Reichelt handled were with German customers of that bank.729
Rudolf Schleiden received word of the developing scandal on August 9. He had 
heard from his acquaintances in New York that Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt had 
embezzled up to $40,000 in scrip held for Germans. Nonetheless, the letter Schleiden 
wrote to Keutgen on the same day betrays Schleiden’s assumption that both men still 
operated under the same code of mercantile honor: 
 
Even if you, personally, may be uninvolved in the [embezzlement], I still fear that you 
will be held co-responsible for the actions of your house; and even though I do not doubt 
                                                                                                                                                 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, Records of the District Courts of the United States, 
Record Group 21, National Archives – Northeast Region, New York, NY. 
728 Brief by the attorneys of C. Wintgens Oeder, 1861/8/6, in the case of C. Winters (sic) Oeder v. Herman 
Gelpcke, Consul of the Principality of Dessau, Frederick W. Keutgen, Consul of the City of Bremen at the 
Port of New York, and Adolphus Reichelt, Case File A-16-387, Admiralty Case Files, United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, Records of the District Courts of the United States, 
Record Group 21, National Archives – Northeast Region, New York, NY. 
729 Bill of Complaint, 1861/8/30, in the case of Albert Erhard v. Herman Gelpcke and others, see note 727. 
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in the least that the alleged misappropriation of the trust funds managed by your house 
was caused, in the worst case, by a hardly excusable disarray [of your records]; that even 
this would not be a sufficient excuse. Under these circumstances, I believe I may not 
hesitate to ask you to inform me without delay of the true facts of the matter with the 
same candor, with which I, in your own interest, have addressed you.730
 
A betrayal of investors’ trust seemed inconceivable, but the mere rumor of such a 
betrayal threatened the merchant’s honor. Keutgen agreed: “the mere fact, that such a 
rumor is spreading here, suffices to make impossible the continuation of my functions as 
Bremish consul.”731 Hence, on August 16th, Schleiden relieved Keutgen from his post, 
and appointed Gustav F. Schwab in his stead.732
While Keutgen had to admit to Schleiden that “the rumor is not entirely 
unfounded,” he claimed attenuating circumstances in that he had been, “deliberately or 
inadvertently, most severely deceived by a certain party.” Apparently, Keutgen still 
hoped that he could emerge from the scandal with his honor and credit intact. He pleaded 
with Schleiden: “Do not judge me too severely, (…) and be assured that even in the 
absence [of such judgment] I am paying a high penalty for that for which I may have to 
blame myself.”733
The ripples from Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt’s failure spread West as well as 
East from New York. Not just German investors had been defrauded. In Chicago, the 
Rock River Bank brought suit against the house of Hoffmann & Gelpcke for a total of 
$11,800. Hoffmann, like Gelpcke and Keutgen, tried in vain to claim immunity as a 
                                                 
730 Rudolf Schleiden to F. W. Keutgen, Washington, DC 1861/8/9, manuscript copy, StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, 
file no. 10, p. 15. 
731 F. W. Keutgen to Rudolf Schleiden, New York 1861/8/10, manuscript copy, StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 
10, p. 16. 
732 Rudolf Schleiden to Senatskommission für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, n.p. [New York?] 1861/8/16, 
manuscript copy, StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, file no. 10, p. 17. 
733 Ibid.. 
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consul.734 Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt, in turn, attempted to collect funds from their own 
banking costumers. Rodewald & Co. of New Orleans had failed in February 1860, and 
their trading partner Quentell in Bremen refused to honor a draft over $33,000 Rodewald 
had made on Quentell’s account with Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt. Now, the latter took 
Quentell to court in New York.735
On November 27, the Superior Court ordered Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt to pay 
$64,089.92 to the Stuarts. On the same day, the three merchants offered the Stuarts 
another $53,000 plus interest in settling a separate case before the Court of Common 
Pleas.736 After these payments, Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt were all the less able to 
repay their defrauded German customers. By their own estimate, their total liabilities 
amounted to $400,000. Keutgen and Gelpcke owned up to their responsibility, but argued 
that the German owners of stock should be paid pro rata along with the firm’s other 
creditors. Reichelt summarily denied all charges, as well as the Admiralty Court’s 
jurisdiction in the case.737 The verdict of the Admiralty Court in Erhard’s case against 
Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt has not been preserved. Perhaps the court found that it did 
not have jurisdiction.738  
                                                 
734 “Law Reports. Rights of Consuls,” New York Times, 1861/8/21, p. 3. 
735 By 1879, the case had gone through three appeals. I was unable to ascertain whether the 1879 decision 
in Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt’s favor stood up to appeal. The court’s ruled that Quentell had to pay 
nearly $70,000. If he did, Gelpcke, Keutgen & Reichelt might have been able, after all, to meet many of 
their obligations. See “A Long-Litigated Case,” New York Times, 1879/10/23, p. 2. 
736 Joseph Stuart v Herman Gelpcke, 27 Nov 1861, case 1861#916, Superior Court; John Stuart v Herman 
Gelpcke, 27 Nov 1861, case 1861#1327, Court of Common Pleas; Joseph Stuart v Herman Gelpcke, 27 
Nov 1861, case 1861#1327, Court of Common Pleas, see note 726. 
737 Answer of Defendants Gelpcke and Keutgen, 1861/12/24; and Demurrer by Adolphus Reed, 1862/1/8, 
in the case of Albert Erhard v. Herman Gelpcke and others [Frederick W. Keutgen, Adolphus Reichelt, 
William (sic) Vogel, Morris K. Jessup and Joseph Herzfeld], Case File A-16-393, see note 727. 
738 In the case against Gelpcke & Hoffmann of Chicago, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Gelpcke did not 
enjoy immunity as a consul, since his exequatur had been revoked (“Law Reports. Rights of Consuls,” New 
York Times, 1861/8/21, p. 3). Hence, Hermann Gelpcke and F. W. Keutgen would have been unlikely to 
have enjoyed immunity. 
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No matter the legal resolution of their situation, the reputations of Gelpcke, 
Keutgen, and Reichelt were ruined. They had had to admit that they had embezzled stock 
they had held in trust, which sufficed to exclude them from the ranks of the respectable. 
After Schleiden had taken the consul’s seal from Keutgen, there was no further mention 
of the disgraced merchant in the correspondence. 
 
 
Excursus: Anti-Commercialism and Hanseatic Ideology 
Hanseatic chroniclers have followed their ancestors’ lead in erasing Keutgen’s 
name from the record. Friedrich Hardegen and Käthi Smidt, in their biography of Smidt’s 
father, H. H. Meier, mention in passing that the first Lloyd agency in New York was the 
“branch of the Dessauer Creditanstalt,” whose unnamed owner “failed in 1861.”739 The 
economic historian Alfred Vagts, having fled to the United States from the National 
Socialist regime in Germany, called the Lloyd’s agents “an American firm,” whose 
failure in 1861 logically resulted from the absence of Hanseatic business ethics from their 
conduct. In Vagts’s account, too, the owners of that firm remain nameless.740
Considering the immediate identification of these Hanseatic historians with their 
subjects, the blind spot suggests a continuous attempt to erase the ‘speculator’ from the 
record. Hanseatic capital, in their narrative, is dedicated to honestly providing useful 
                                                 
739 Hardegen, Friedrich and Käthi Smidt, H. H. Meier, der Gründer des Norddeutschen Lloyd. Lebensbild 
eines Bremer Kaufmanns 1809-1898, Berlin and Leipzig 1920, p. 133. The first instance of this practice of 
omitting the name of the failed firm seems to have been Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, 
New York 1898, p. 42. 
740 Vagts, Alfred, “Gustav Schwab 1822-1880. Ein deutschamerikanischer Unternehmer,” in: 1000 Jahre 
Bremer Kaufmann. Aufsätze zur Geschichte bremischen Kaufmannstums, des Bremer Handels und der 
Bremer Schiffahrt aus Anlaß des tausendjährigen Gedenkens der Marktgründung durch Bischof Adaldag 
965 (=Bremisches Jahrbuch, vol. 50), Bremen 1965, p. 337-360. The index catalog of the Staatsarchiv 
Bremen does not contain an entry for Keutgen, either. 
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services.741 By definition, the merchant who fails to live up to the standard is not, and has 
never been, a Hanseat. As an embarrassment to Bremen, Keutgen lost his good name, and 
the historians who have ignored him conform to the custom of the estate in making his 
name disappear altogether. 
But Keutgen’s eradication from memory is not merely a function of conformity to 
traditional sensibilities. The merchant whose failure drags into the light the dark 
underbelly of exchange relations, their foundation on dirty self-interest, is the merchant 
who most unabashedly functions as a subject in a capitalist market. Under attack from 
conservative, and eventually National Socialist propaganda, the subject participating in 
the market out of self-interest was othered as an Anglo-American or Jewish type, the 
counter-image to the German Unternehmer and his commercial counterpart, the ‘royal 
merchant.’ In the anti-commercialist imagination, the latter are normatively defined as 
productive servants of concrete needs; the former as exploiters and hucksters who 
deceive the honest, hard-working majority with arcane legal and financial sophistry. The 
former are of one blood with ‘the people’ whose fate they share, the latter are outsiders 
who hide their dealings from plain view. As this anti-commercialist view became the 
centerpiece of National Socialist economic thought, counting-house and temple fused 
into one image of a command central of exploitation.742
                                                 
741 See note 22 to chapter 1. 
742 Adorno, Theodor W., and Horkheimer, Max, Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente, 
Frankfurt a. M. 1969 (New York 1944), p. 177-217; Postone, Moishe, "Anti-Semitism and National 
Socialism", in: Anson Rabinbach and Jack Zipes, eds., Germans and the Jews since the Holcaust. The 
Changing Situation in West Germany, New York et. al. 1986, p. 302-314. For the similarities between this 
type of anti-commercialism and a producerist ideology common in the United States, see Beckert, 
Metropolis, p. 63, 148, 168-169. For an anti-Semitic pamphlet by a Hanseat born in the 1860s, see Achelis, 
Eduard, Meine Lebenserinnerungen aus 50jähriger Arbeit (photocopy of typescript), Bremen 1935/1936, 
StAHB, call number 135.Ai, especially p. 30-31, 41, 54-56, and 62. Achelis considered the World 
Economic Crisis of the 1930s as the result of a Jewish conspiracy (p. 30-31). 
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It is ironic that the silent verdict which placed Keutgen outside of the community, 
and inside the recesses of the commercial temple, should have been executed against the 
one Hanseatic merchant in the United States who more than any of his colleagues 
represented the new, capitalist commercial enterprise. Hanseats engaged in the new forms 
of commerce that define a modern, industrial world-market, but they were in denial about 
the fundamental nature of the change in their customary ways this engagement 
represented. To themselves and to others, they continued to present their activities as 
emanations of an unbroken tradition reaching back to the Middle Ages. 
 
 
Bremen’s Integration into the Industrial-Capitalist World Market 
The man who replaced Keutgen as Bremish consul and Lloyd agent in New York 
was Gustav Schwab. Schwab's consular reports were much more detailed, and covered 
more ground, than those of any of his predecessors, or of consuls in other ports. Wilhelm 
de Voß in Richmond listed in hand-written annual reports broad trends in commodity 
prices, state bonds, and some railroad stock. Schwab, by contrast, submitted reports of 
over twenty pages, some of which were hand-written, but most containing statistics 
clipped from newspapers. These clippings covered in ample detail the entire range of the 
New York markets for bonds, stocks, and commodities. Evidently, by the 1860s, 
Hanseats could no longer afford to ignore those kinds of investments that they would 
have avoided a decade earlier, and which they continued to scorn as 'speculation' even as 
they derived a larger and larger share of their income from them.743
                                                 
743 StAHB 2,B,13,b,3, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nordamerika. Hanseatische diplomatische Agenten, Konsuln usw. bei den Vereinigten Staaten von 
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 The 1860s were still a period of transition, in which many older Hanseats may 
well have continued to trade in commodities exclusively on their own account. By the 
1870s, however, it was evident that Hanseats had embraced their new economic function 
as commodity-trading capitalists. Ludwig Beuting offers two revealing examples in his 
accounts of the post-1860s history of Bremish trade in cotton and petroleum. 
The clearest sign of the changed times was the opening of the Bremen Cotton 
Exchange (Baumwollbörse) in 1872. Serving as a clearing-house for the trade in cotton 
futures, the Cotton Exchange was modeled after similar institutions in New York and 
Liverpool.744 The Cotton Exchange was complemented by the Bremer 
Lagerhausgesellschaft (BLG; Bremen Warehouse Company), a state-run institution that 
stores commodities, founded in 1876. The storage receipts issued by the BLG serve as the 
foundation for the futures trade at the Stock- and Cotton-Exchanges.745  The Cotton 
Exchange and Warehouse Company are continuing success stories for Bremish trade. 
Both institutions still exist today, and Bremen has remained the largest continental cotton 
market for decades.746
                                                                                                                                                 
Nordamerika und Korrespondenz mit denselben. In New York, 1815-1868; file no. 15, “Consulat zu 
Newyork, F. W. Keutgen, 1859 Novb. 1 - 1861; Gustav Schwab 1862. - . Enthält No. 1- 89.  1859 Nov. 1 - 
1868 Okt. 28.;” StAHB 2,B,13,b,10, Hanseatica. Verhältnisse der Hansestädte mit den Vereinigten Staaten 
von Nordamerika. Hanseatische diplomatische Agenten, Konsuln usw. bei den Vereinigten Staaten von 
Nordamerika und Korrespondenz mit denselben. Richmond, Norfolk und Petersburgh 1842-1867, files 12 
(annual report for 1854), 16 (1855), 20 (1856), 23 (1857), 27 (1859), 29 (1860), 31 (1861). By 1861, for 
example, Schwab had also begun to act as an insurance agent. See Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, 
Stuttgart 1861/04/09, MSS 434, Schwab Papers, series I, box 2, folder 37. 
744 Schildknecht, Karl-Heinz, Bremen und Baumwolle im Wandel der Zeiten, Bremen 1999; Beutin, 
Bremen, p. 99-102; Engelsing, Rolf, “England und die USA in der bremischen Sicht des 19. Jahrhunderts,” 
in: Jahrbuch der Wittheit zu Bremen, vol. 1, 1957, p. 33-65, here p. 38. Between 1872 and 1877, the 
institution was formally called ‘Komité für den Bremer Baumwollhandel’, but already served the same 
purpose. See also Cronon, William, Nature’s Metropolis. Chicago and the Great West, New York and 
London 1991. 
745 Beutin, Bremen, p. 101 and p. 296, note to p. 101. Here, Beutin cites the 1877 Bürgerschaft speech of a 
master-stevedore who complained that “the main reason [for founding the BLG] was to facilitate 
speculation in commodities,” and adds: “He was quite right.” The stevedores’ guild-like control of the port 
was broken by an 1878 law that put the BLG in charge of quayside operations. 
746 See http://www.baumwollboerse.de and Schildknecht, Bremen und Baumwolle. 
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 For a while, it looked as if Bremen was going to become the dominant continental 
market for petroleum, as well. The activities of Wätjen & Co. (above, p. 343) had made 
Bremerhaven and the neighbouring Prussian ports of Geestemünde and Nordenham the 
centers of petroleum importation in Europe. From the beginning, trade in this commodity 
was characterized by futures trading and the dominance of transportation and retail sale 
by only a few companies. In 1890, an attempted take-over by Standard Oil of the four 
German firms trading in petroleum resulted in the creation of the Deutsch-Amerikanische 
Petroleum-Actiengesellschaft (D.A.P.G., German-American Petroleum Joint-Stock 
Company) in which Standard Oil held more than a third of stock, while the rest was 
shared among Bremish merchants. It is hard to imagine a more telling example of the 
integration of Hanseatic capital into a global framework of finance and commodity-
trading than their involvement with this epitome of the trust.747
 Some Hanseats were successful in making the transition to the new economy, 
with its increased risks for entrepreneurs. In fact, those Bremish merchants who had 
survived the 1860s continued to improve their competitive position on the world market. 
In the process of capital concentration, however, many Hanseats found themselves 
compelled to abandon trade. A mediaeval Hanseat might have found familiar much of 
what he would have seen in Bremen in 1850. In 1870, he would have been bewildered. 
This was no longer the same mercantile world whose sons had first set out to trade with 
America. 
But business was not the only field in which Hanseats’ customary practices 
proved increasingly unsustainable. In international politics, the actions of the great 
powers undermined Bremen’s ability to pursue an independent foreign policy that strove 
                                                 
747 Beutin, Bremen, p. 102-105. See also Kellner-Stoll, Bremerhaven, p. 129-131. 
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to avoid wars, or at least the city’s participation in wars. In domestic politics – both 
Bremish and American – Hanseats no longer spoke with one voice. The conflicting 
political options that presented themselves as nations went to war pitted members of 
Bremen’s elite against each other. 
Customarily, Hanseats had responded to economic strains by falling back on their 
dense network of ties between firms and families. This same network had ensured their 
political unanimity on the most important questions. Now, as the heads of merchant 
houses and their sons began to quarrel over ‘great politics’, and as business ties no longer 
automatically meant family ties, domestic harmony turned increasingly sour; shattering 





Chapter 8: Decisions and Divisions – 
Hanseatic Responses to Nation-Making Wars, 1859 – 1867 
 
 
Bremen and the International Situation, 1859 
 In international politics, the year 1859 brought a shock to the European system of 
states. With French support, the Kingdom of Piedmont – under its prime minister, the 
Count Cavour – set out to conquer the Austrian parts of northern Italy in a first step 
towards an Italian nation-state. After a defeat at Solferino, Austria ceded its Italian 
possessions, with the exception of Tirol and the port town of Trieste, to Piedmont. The 
Italian state that resulted was a Kingdom of Piedmont extended to Rome, but short of a 
nation-state. Southern Italy remained under the rule of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 
In exchange for French support, Piedmont had also ceded its province of Savoy – almost 
a third of its initial territory – to France. 
 German nationalists were outraged. The Bremen Handelsblatt had recently come 
under the editorship of Victor Böhmert, who was to play a central role as publicist and 
secretary of the Handelskammer in scrapping Bremen’s guilds.748 In the pages of his 
paper, Böhmert fumed: 
                                                 
748 For Böhmert, see chapter 3 and Biefang, Andreas, Politisches Bürgertum in Deutschland, 1857-1868. 
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One of the oldest and most powerful European dynasties [the Habsburgs] (…) gives up, 
not only one of its richest and most beautiful provinces, but also, and more importantly, 
the principle of the life of its state, historical right. And this happens at a time when 
Prussia and Germany advance their armies to the Rhine to divert the enemy’s forces. 
Rather than trusting in its own strength and paying the price that Germany asked [i.e., 
Prussian command over the joint German forces] for its participation in the struggle 
against the national enemy and the disturber of world peace [i.e., Napoleon III or France], 
Austria has readily succumbed to Napoleonism. (…) 
Napoleon cunningly conjured up this war, not for the sake of liberty, but for power and 
for the breach of that international law, on which order and peace in Europe are 
predicated. (…) In our view, the results of the war are a repeated warning against 
neutrality and non-activity in the great European questions. (…) 
The lofty goal Napoleon talked about [i.e., national unification] was meant to justify the 
means, but the solution the Italian question found in the peace treaty appears to make a 
mockery of the wishes and needs of Italian patriots. (…) 
For the sake of business, we should be glad about the armistice; but the result of the war 
is too paltry, when measured against the high stakes and the losses suffered because of 
the interruption of peace.749
 
 The incoherence of Böhmert’s argument was characteristic of the confusion in 
German nationalist circles. On the one hand, they envied Italy for having taken a step 
towards unification; on the other hand, they resented that it had been achieved with the 
help of France. Böhmert’s editorial remained obscure on the point of who, exactly, was 
meant by the ‘national enemy and disturber of world peace’, France or its ruler. Napoleon 
III was associated with dictatorial rule, based on popular acclamation. Hence, as a 
monarch, he was tainted with the formally democratic mode of his ascent to power; and 
as a man of the people, he was insufficiently democratic in his exercise of power. With 
this mix of absolutism and popular sovereignty, Napoleon combined two principles 
equally detested by German elites. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nationale Organisationen und Eliten (=Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der 
politischen Parteien, corp. ed., Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, 
vol. 102), Düsseldorf 1994, especially p. 53-65, for Böhmert’s leading role in the founding of the Kongreß 
deutscher Volkswirte (Congress of German Economists), an organization with a strong national orientation, 
p. 437 for a brief vita, and throughout for his role in the German nationalist movement, including the 
Nationalverein. 
749 Bremen Handelsblatt, 16. Jul. 1859, p. 1-2. 
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 Moreover, while Böhmert accused Napoleon of insincerely claiming to have 
fought the war over the principle of nationality, sacred to German nationalists, the editor 
also found the Emperor guilty of violating the opposite principle of legitimacy. On a 
continent where states and nations were not congruent, national sovereignty750 and the 
sovereignty of states were evidently incompatible. Any German attempt at national 
unification was sure to violate one or the other principle, as well. Men like Böhmert were 
ready to embrace national/popular sovereignty at the expense of violating the rights of 
smaller German states and their sovereigns. In accusing Napoleon of ‘disturbing world 
peace’ for doing the same in the Italian case, Böhmert was nourishing the illusion that 
German unity could be had any other way. 
 As a newspaper editor dependent for his salary on mercantile subscriptions and 
advertisement, Böhmert might have been led to this incoherent editorial line by his 
attempt to satisfy his readers’ interests along with their wishes to see the ‘national’ 
argument made. The practical interest of Hanseats at this time, as we have seen, was 
indeed to do what was best ‘for the sake of business’; and the sovereignty of little 
Bremen, founded not on popular acclaim but on ‘historical right’, was what made 
possible an independent foreign policy in the interest of business.751
 Böhmert was an outsider in Bremen. As a new type of professional politician, he 
led the city’s Nationalverein. German historians point to men like Böhmert when arguing 
that Bremen’s elite supported national unification under Prussian leadership. Even 
                                                 
750 In German, Volkssouveränität implies both the sovereignty of the ethnically homogeneous populace, or 
Volk; and the sovereignty of the people, as opposed to the monarch. 
751 Cf. the Senat’s rebuttal in 1872 of the demand by Bremerhaven’s representative to increase the size of 
the port city’s delegation in the Bürgerschaft, in which the executive argued that, first, the parliament was 
based on estates, not numbers, and second, that all subjects of Bremen enjoyed virtual representation in the 
legislature. Kellner-Stoll, Rita, Bremerhaven, 1827-1888. Politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Probleme 
einer Stadtgründung (=Burchard Scheper, ed., Veröffentlichungen des Stadtarchivs Bremerhaven, vol. 4), 
Bremerhaven 1982, p. 184. 
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leading members of the Nationalverein among that elite, however, were not willing to 
give up the benefits of Bremen’s independence. The activities of Bremish merchants 
suggest that they envisioned a strengthened German Federation that could ensure the 
security of trade, while leaving extensive leeway to individual member states in most 
fields of policy, including foreign relations. This German state might be ruled by an 
Emperor, and would have a parliament, albeit not necessarily one elected by universal 
suffrage. But it would not be a unitary, centralized state, thus allowing Bremen to 
continue its special relations to foreign countries.752
The brand of nationalism embraced by the Nationalverein could thus be attractive 
to Hanseats. In the view of many German nationalists, centralism was what characterized 
the French polity, while the German national character was shot through with the 
attachment to local particularism. Prussia was the German state most likely to lead the 
other German states into a firmer union.  
Unfortunately, Prussia was also the most ‘French’ among the German states; that 
is, the most centralized and bureaucratic among the members of the Germanic 
Confederation.753 When nationalists in the early 1860s said that Prussia had to become 
German, not Germany Prussian, they expressed the hope that Prussia would abandon its 
bureaucratic centralism in the process of unifying Germany. In this vision of Germany, 
Hanseats could imagine that there would be a place for Bremish foreign trade relations 
independent of, and separate from the central government.754
                                                 
752 Cf. Biefang, Bürgertum. 
753 See Kießelbach’s arguments, chapter 3. 
754 Biefang, Bürgertum; Krieger, Adolf, Bremische Politik im Jahrzehnt vor der Reichsgründung 
(=Schriften der Bremer Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, Reihe F (früher A*), Friedrich Prüser (ed.), 
Veröffentlichungen des Archivs der Hansestadt Bremen, vol. 15), Bremen 1939, p. 26-27, relates that the 
association had five hundred members in Bremen already in 1860. Remarkably, for a book based on a PhD 
dissertation written under National Socialist rule (University of Kiel, 1939), Krieger’s text avoids a 
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Plotting a Course towards Prussia 
 In 1861, leading Hanseats began to perceive the need for a German navy that 
could protect Bremen’s trade in the case that France should once more act out of the 
bounds of international law and legitimacy. Danish-German relations lent additional 
arguments to supporters of a navy. While the conflict over control of Schleswig-Holstein 
had been settled in favor of Denmark in 1851, renewed German-Danish hostilities, which 
would have brought the risk of another blockade of German trade by the Danish fleet, 
were a distinct possibility. 
 Two men became the main promoters of a German navy among Hanseats, H. H. 
Meier and Arnold Duckwitz. Meier joined the Nationalverein partly to gain a platform 
for this project, but also lent his support to the association’s other policy initiatives in the 
Bürgerschaft.755 Burgomaster Duckwitz was not a friend of the Nationalverein. He feared 
that the association’s activities would empower the democratic movement. In a letter to 
Rudolf Schleiden, written in May 1861, Duckwitz complained that 
 
the old democrats of 1848 make every effort to excite the lower classes and to demand a 
reinstatement of the 1849 constitution, with universal suffrage and all that, so that the 
higher estates will be pushed aside, and the lower estates will capture government. These 
people hope that the so-called Nationalverein will get going a political movement, to 
which they then can hitch their cart, just like they did in 1848.756
 
Duckwitz had been the German minister of the navy in 1848-49, and still 
bemoaned the “shameful” auctioning of that fleet in 1852. Meier, too, had kept in touch 
with his acquaintances from the revolutionary days when he had been a member of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
nationalist teleology and acknowledges discontent in the process of German unification. 
755 Krieger, Politik, p. 27. 
756 Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen 1861/5/4, StAHB 7,116 [Rudolf Schleiden Papers], 
folder “Briefwechsel Rudolf Schleiden mit Senator Arnold Duckwitz, 1854-1879,” third of five 
unnumbered and unlabeled boxes. See also Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen 1861/11/22, 
Ibid, for additional examples of Duckwitz’s animosity towards the Nationalverein. 
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national parliament in Frankfurt.757 Their differing attitudes towards the Nationalverein 
suggest that the two men had drawn different lessons from 1848. In spite of their 
disagreement, however, Duckwitz and Meier worked together for a German navy. 
Meier envisioned a small flotilla of steam-boats for coastal defense as the nucleus 
of a revived German navy.758 Duckwitz doubted that it would suffice in case of war, when 
the protection of vessels on the high seas was as important as the defense of coasts and 
ports. Nevertheless, he was willing to support Meier’s plans, which represented a first 
step in the right direction.759 This initial fleet was to be built and maintained jointly by the 
coastal German states. Due to its size and financial resources, Prussia would have to play 
an especially important role. Convincing the Hohenzollern monarchy to fill that role was 
key to the success of this plan.  
While the plan of building a German fleet appears as a departure from the 
internationalist foreign policy Bremen had pursued in the 1850s, Hanseats promoted this 
project with the same means that had been at the core of that foreign policy. Meier and 
Duckwitz hoped that the tried and true Hanseatic practice of building broad public 
support to back up a concerted diplomatic effort by mercantile envoys dispatched to 
foreign capitals would achieve their aims. This approach had worked well in 1846, when 
it had led to the establishment of the OSNC. As late as 1859, their campaign for the 
protection of private property at sea had demonstrated that Hanseats could amplify their 
voice on the international stage by enlisting the support of like-minded elites abroad. 
Now, Meier and Duckwitz hoped that a similar approach would move Prussia to take up 
                                                 
757 Bessell, Georg, 1857-1957. Norddeutscher Lloyd. Geschichte einer bremischen Reederei, Bremen 1957, 
p. 18, notes that Meier’s ties to former members of the Casino faction of the Frankfurt Assembly combined 
political and business interests. 
758 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 173-179. 
759 Krieger, Politik, p. 56, note 1. 
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their plan for a German navy.760 Together, they were to find out about the limits of 
Prussian statecraft. It was to be a sobering experience, indeed. 
 Laying the groundwork for the publicity campaign for a German navy, 
Nationalverein members introduced a resolution “Concerning Coastal Defense” into the 
Bürgerschaft. Similar resolutions were brought before other German parliaments.761 The 
resolution claimed that “the present fragmentation of Germany (…) prevents the 
protection of the maritime interests of our fatherland,” and “urgently” demanded of the 
Senat to build “steam gun-boats” in cooperation with the other German governments.762
 When the resolution came to a vote on June 19th, 1861, it passed with a 
comfortable majority of sixty-six against eleven votes. While only slightly less than half 
of all Bürgerschaft members were present for the roll-call, two-thirds of the mercantile 
delegation (Class II) took part in the vote. Every single one of them cast their vote in 
favor. The only class that surpassed the merchants in its enthusiasm for a German navy 
was the scholarly estate. Three quarters of its delegates were present for the vote, and all 
but one supported the resolution. Opposition to the measure was clustered in the lower 
rungs of the social order, especially the classes IV.b. and IV.c., representing residents of 
the City of Bremen with an annual taxable income below 500 Thaler (Table 9, chapter 3, 
and table 13, below).763
 The Hanseatic elite’s support for a German navy, however, does not indicate that 
it supported German nationalism, nor that it endorsed the program of the Nationalverein. 
                                                 
760 Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen 1861/8/30, StAHB 7,116 [Rudolf Schleiden Papers], 
folder “Briefwechsel Rudolf Schleiden mit Senator Arnold Duckwitz, 1854-1879,” third of five 
unnumbered and unlabeled boxes. 
761 VdBBü 1861/14, 1861/6/5, p. 230-231 (Dr. Pfeiffer), Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 174. 
762 VdBBü 1861, p. 208. 
763 VdBBü 1861/15, 1861/6/19, p. 267-268. 
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A separate resolution, signed by roughly the same Bürgerschaft members who had 
introduced the motion for a navy, and submitted at the same time, called for the creation 
of a “German central authority, including a parliament.” While the latter resolution made 
a concession to the “independence and self-government of the individual states, which to 
hold in high importance Bremen’s happy commonwealth is particularly entitled,” those 
who suspected the spirit of 1848 in the motion could not be fooled. After all, the central 
demand set forth in the document was the creation of a “universal popular representation” 
(Volksvertretung, or parliament). Other than that, the resolution was replete with empty 
catchwords: power, security, liberty, respect, and welfare; all of which, it claimed, hinged 
on the creation of a central authority.764
 When the resolution for a German central authority came to a vote, a majority of 
Bürgerschaft members had already left for the night – many of them at the beginning of 
the debate, in a show of disinterest. Of the remaining ones, the slimmest majority of 
thirty-six against thirty-five votes supported it. Proponents of the measure considered the 
outcome a defeat, since nothing short of an unanimous endorsement was going to send a 
powerful message to the German people. There was no possible way of reconciling the 
rhetoric of the resolution, which claimed that a strengthened nation was in the interest of 
all social groups, with the obvious disagreement between those very groups about this 
claim.765
 Across all classes of Bürgerschaft members – with the exception of class VI, 
representing Bremerhaven, whose delegation was absent for the vote on the navy – the 
resolution for a central authority received less support than that for a navy. Half of the 
                                                 
764 VdBBü 1861, p. 207. 
765 VdBBü 1861/14, 1861/6/5, p. 229-238. 
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mercantile delegation was absent for the vote on the central authority. Of those who had 
cared to take part in the roll-call vote, fifteen voted aye, and nine voted nay. Of the total 
number of mercantile Bürgerschaft members, only thirty-one percent supported the 
resolution for a central authority. Only among the scholars did the resolution receive the 





Roll-Call Votes on Nationalverein Resolutions in the Bremische Bürgerschaft, June 
1861 
Navy Central Authority CLASS 
Aye Nay Absent Aye Nay Absent
Total 
in class 
1 Scholars 11 1 4 8 3 5 16 
2 Merchants 31 17 15 9 24 48 
3 Artisans 8 2 14 3 5 16 24 
4.a Bremen, 
>500 Th 
4 1 5 3 3 4 10 
4.b Bremen, 
>250 Th 
2 3 5 1 7 2 10 
4.c Bremen, 
 <250 Th 
4 3 3 2 2 6 10 
5 Vegesack 1 4 5 5 
6 Bremerhaven  5 2 1 2 5 
7 Agriculture 2 8 2 1 7 10 
8 Other rural 3 1 6 4 6 10 
ALL  66 11 71 36 35 77 148 
 
Sources: Verhandlungen der Bremischen Bürgerschaft im Jahre 1861, 14. Sitzung, June 5, 1861, p. 237-
238; 15. Sitzung, June 19, 1861, p. 267-268; Staats-Calender der freien Hansestadt Bremen auf das Jahr 
1861, Bremen 1861, p. 5-7. Two seats in the Bürgerschaft were vacant (one in class 5.c., one in class 6.c.) 
and were not included in the calculations. Cf. Chapter 3, Table 9.  
                                                 
766 VdBBü 1861/14, 1861/6/5, p. 237-238. 
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A closer comparison between the two votes reveals a consistent pattern (Table 
14). The merchants in the Bürgerschaft were split into three main groups: Supporters, 
conditional supporters, and non-supporters of the Nationalverein initiatives. There was a 
core of strong supporters of the Nationalverein (NV) among the Hanseatic mercantile 
elite at this point; but this cadre remained in a majority among its estate. Eight of the 
forty-eight members of class II had voted for both resolutions, and had signed either one 
or the other. These can be considered the nationalist hard core (Table 14, category 1). 
Another seven merchants in the Bürgerschaft qualify as moderate supporters of the NV. 
They voted for both resolutions, without having signed either of them (category 2). 
The fifteen merchants who were strong or moderate nationalists stood alone 
among their peers in their support for a central authority. Fourteen merchants joined the 
supporters of the NV when it came to the navy resolution. These can be considered 
conditional supporters of the NV (3). Of the remaining nineteen merchants, ten were 
absent for both votes, and nine voted against a central authority. Of these nine, only three 
also voted for a navy. Since support for a navy was not coterminous with support for the 
NV, as burgomaster Duckwitz’s case shows, we can regard the three mercantile 
Bürgerschaft members who opposed a central authority, but supported a navy, as weak 
opponents of the NV (category 5), while those six who voted against a central authority 
without supporting a navy can be considered strong opponents of the NV (category 6).767
 
                                                 
767 VdBBü 1861/14, 1861/6/5, p. 237-238; and 1861/15, 1861/6/19, p. 267-268. 
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Table 14 
Categorization of Bürgerschaft members 
by their response to Nationalverein initiatives 













































































1 Scholars 5 3 3 3 1 1
2 Merchants 8 7 14 10 3 6
3 Artisans 1 2 6 11 2 2
4.a Bremen, 
>500 Th 3 1  3 2 1
4.b Bremen, 
250-500 Th  2 3 2 3
4.c Bremen, 
<250 Th 2  2 3 1 2
5 Vegesack  1 4   
6 Bremerhaven  2 2 1  
7 Agriculture 1  1 8   
8 Other rural   8 2  
ALL  20 13 31 55 14 15
 
Sources: Verhandlungen der Bremischen Bürgerschaft im Jahre 1861, p. 207, 208; 14. Sitzung, June 5, 
1861, p. 237-238; 15. Sitzung, June 19, 1861, p. 267-268; Staats-Calender der freien Hansestadt Bremen 
auf das Jahr 1861, Bremen 1861, p. 5-7.  
 
Criteria for the categorization: 
Criterion / Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Signed one or both of the resolutions X      
Voted for both resolutions X X (1)     
Voted for navy   X  X  
Voted against central authority     X X (2) 
Absent from both votes    X   
(1) Includes one member who was absent for the vote on the navy, but signed and voted for the resolution 
for a central authority. 
(2) Includes one member who signed the resolution for a central authority, but voted against it; and who did 
not vote on the navy resolution. 
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 The difference of opinion between Meier and Duckwitz was thus mirrored by the 
split among the mercantile delegation in the Bürgerschaft. The two men represented 
conflicting options for dealing with the nation. Meier was willing to join the 
Nationalverein, and considered a democratically elected national parliament as an evil 
that could be controlled; while Duckwitz stayed away from the association because he 
saw a greater danger in any expansion of democratic, popular participation in the affairs 
of the state. They could, however, find common ground in support of a German navy. For 
some merchants, even that project was unpalatable, however. Johann Friedrich Philippi 
spoke for this group of mercantile anti-nationalists in the Bürgerschaft. 
 To Philippi, the resolutions amounted to a request for an “endorsement of the 
program of some association [the Nationalverein].” By upsetting the status quo in the 
European concert, this program amounted to a call for revolution, and hence, Philippi 
found that the resolutions implicitly “denigrate, mock, and debase all governmental 
authority.” Present nationalist activities directly resembled the democratic movement of 
1848: “We have already had something like this some ten years ago, (…) and in the end 
we were glad to have the Germanic Confederation, so that we had at least something to 
hold on to.” Instead of the association’s nationalist vision, Philippi advocated an 
undiluted continuation of the independent and neutral course Bremen had steered in the 
1850s. A small republic must keep a low profile, and must “avoid the field of great 
politics,” where it could run afoul of more powerful states. Advocating measures that 
challenged the authority of foreign sovereigns could do “more harm … than good … 
because our [state] is too unimportant,” Philippi argued. The consequence of the 
Nationalverein’s goals would be Prussian dominance over Germany, a prospect Philippi 
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abhorred. With this sentiment, he believed to be in unison with a majority of Germans. In 
essence, this Hanseat saw the specter of centralism and democracy in the 
Nationalverein’s initiatives, and he was not going to have any of that.768
 
When it came to national politics, Bremen’s elite was deeply divided. In 1861, 
those who endorsed all-out a program of national unification, as represented by the 
Nationalverein, constituted a minority among mercantile elected officials. Significantly, 
however, this minority was disciplined and committed. They showed up for the votes that 
mattered, and they were able to gain the support not only of members of the Bürgerschaft 
from other voter classes, but also, and more importantly, the conditional support of the 
Senat and burgomaster for one of their policy initiatives, the creation of a German navy. 
The only other group in the Bürgerschaft that had a higher share of nationalists among its 
members at this point was the scholarly estate. The democrats, and especially their leader, 
Johannes Rösing [Sr.], however, stayed at a distance from this new brand of respectable, 
mercantile nationalism.769 Whatever Philippi’s fears about a democratic nationalist 
movement may have been, the actual democrats were not about to make them come true. 
                                                 
768 VdBBü 1861/14, 1861/6/5, p. 232. 
769 Rösing spoke and voted against both measures, because he found that only a democratic mass 
movement, not legislative resolutions, was going to effect change in Germany. See VdBBü 1861/14, 
1861/6/5, p. 233-234. 
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Cosmopolitans and Confederates 
 Affairs in the United States looked not much better for Hanseats than they did in 
Bremen. On the western shore of the Atlantic, as in the city on the Weser, the questions 
of ‘big politics’ drove a wedge between Bremish merchants. In the biggest political 
question of the day, slavery, different interests pulled Hanseats in different directions. 
Their religion might have drawn Bremish merchants towards abolitionism, while the 
dependence of their trade on slave-economy staples, such as cotton and tobacco, gave 
them a stake in defending the ‘peculiar institution.’770 Hanseats’ strong involvement in the 
transportation of immigrants suggested an alliance with the North, the section of the 
country that attracted an overwhelming share of new Americans; while Hanseats shared 
with Southerners a commitment to a hierarchically ordered society.771 Individual Hanseats 
differed in picking their priorities among these conflicting interests, diminishing their 
chance to influence the American political process as a group. In the past, they had 
sometimes succeeded in mobilizing American elite opinion in favor of their interests. 
Now, Hanseats no longer spoke with one voice. 
 Moreover, the preferred mode of political activities among Hanseatic Americans 
had been to talk to people who mattered in Washington, New York, or Baltimore. These 
people were the very merchants and notables whose own influence diminished, the more 
the sectional conflict drew the mass of the population onto the political stage.772 With a 
                                                 
770 This dilemma Hanseats shared with their American counterparts. See Abbott, Richard H., Cotton and 
Capital. Boston Businessmen and Antislavery Reform, 1854-1868, Amherst, Mass. 1991; McKay, Ernest 
A., The Civil War and New York City, Syracuse 1990. 
771 Wright, Gavin, The Political Economy of the Cotton South. Households, Markets, and Wealth in the 
Nineteenth Century, New York 1978, especially p. 128-157. 
772 For the reaction of the larger mercantile class of New York to the Civil War, see Foner, Philip, Business 
and Slavery. The New York Merchants and the Irrepressible Conflict, Chapel Hill 1941; McKay, Ernest A., 
The Civil War and New York City, Syracuse 1990; and Beckert, Sven, The Monied Metropolis. New York 
City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896, Cambridge, Mass. et. al. 2001, p. 111-
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certain sense of fatalism, Rudolf Schleiden thought in late 1860 that war could only be 
prevented “by the people itself, if the Dear Lord has mercy,” since “there is a complete 
lack of leaders who could bring the affair [the threat of secession] to a good ending.”773 
Hence, Hanseats not only had to make a choice between conflicting political affiliations. 
They also had to decide whether to engage in popular politics, themselves. While some of 
them made this step, others continued to rely on political influence through personal ties. 
Hence, Hanseats’ political paths diverged, not just in the choices they made, but also in 
the ways the worked for their conflicting aims. 
  
 In Baltimore, senior Hanseat and Bremish Consul Albert Schumacher decided in 
1859 that it was time to leave the counting- and the club-house and side with the general 
German population. Nativist violence in the port city had peaked since the election in 
1856 of American Party majorities to the state legislature and the city council. Thanks to 
the strong ties between Baltimore and Bremen that Hanseats had established, one third of 
Baltimore’s population was German.774 Reports of nativist attacks on immigrants were 
certain to harm Bremen’s business interests. Traditionally, Hanseats had relied on charity 
in American cities, and a careful screening of emigrants in Bremerhaven, to ensure the 
respectability and economic independence of those they brought to the United States. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
144. Beckert sees the beginnings of the diminishment of mercantile influence in the 1850s. 
773 Rudolf Schleiden to Gustav F. Schwab (in NY), Washington, D.C., 1860/12/16, MSS 434, John 
Christopher Schwab Family Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, series I, box 2, 
folder 38. 
774 774 Baker, Jean H., Ambivalent Americans. The Know-Nothing Party in Maryland, Baltimore 1977, p. 
17-19, 38-39; Browne, Baltimore, p. 196-215; Evitts, William J., A Matter of Allegiances. Maryland from 
1850 to 1861  (=The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 2nd series, vol. 
1), Baltimore and London 1974; Brugger, Robert J., Maryland, a Middle Temperament, 1634-1980, 
Baltimore 1988; Fields, Barbara Jeanne, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground. Maryland during the 
Nineteenth Century, New Haven and London 1985, p. 59-89. 
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the 1850s, in the face of an anti-immigrant movement of growing strength, this passive 
strategy of preempting American hostility towards Germans no longer worked. 
Together with Pastor Scheib of Zion church, frequented by elite Germans, Albert 
Schumacher devised a way of making a more active case for Germans’ patriotism. 
Schumacher organized and presided over a parade in honor of Baron von Steuben. In the 
recollection of an old Hanseat, the parade was an “imposing demonstration (...) of the 
patriotism (...) of the German-American element[, and] satisfied all the intelligent native 
born (...) of the sincerity of their political allegiance to their adopted country.”775
 While nativism in the North drew on the same intellectual fount as abolitionism – 
the Evangelical churches –, Baltimore nativism resembled that of the South in that it 
represented a generically racist movement. Baltimore Know-Nothings viewed the 
numerous free blacks in the city as part of the “vagrant, vicious, and violent element of 
the population,” along with immigrants. Maryland Democrats, who defended the rights of 
immigrants, went even further in their hostility towards African-Americans: their 
platform in the 1859 election proposed the re-enslavement of all free blacks.776 The only 
organization that opposed Nativism as well as slavery was the German socialist Turner 
(gymnasts) movement. Armed and militant, they provided immediate self-defense at 
picnics and other community events. The Turner were a tiny minority, however. In 1860, 
                                                 
775 Louis P. Hennighausen, “Reminiscences of the Political Life of the German-Americans in Baltimore 
during 1850—1860”, in: Seventh Annual Report of the Society for the History of the Germans in Maryland, 
1892-1893, pp. 53-59 (part I.), and Eleventh and Twelfth Annual Report of the Society for the History of the 
Germans in Maryland, 1897-1898, pp. 3-18 (part II.); quote from part II., p. 17-18. Hennighausen was 
president of the Society for the History of the Germans in Maryland, and had served as a Union volunteer. 
See also the webpage of Zion Church at http://www.zionbaltimore.org. 
776 Browne, Baltimore; Fields, Slavery, quote p. 61. 
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they were the sole political force in Baltimore to support Abraham Lincoln, who received 
only a few thousand votes in the entire state of Maryland.777
Hanseats would not have found the Turner suitable political allies. Most 
Hanseatic merchants subscribed to the Democratic newspaper, Der Deutsche 
Correspondent, which defended slavery.778 At the end of the century, Louis 
Hennighausen recalled that their vote, “in common defense against the Know-Nothing 
Party, was solid for the Democratic Party.”779 In 1859, one second-generation Hanseat, 
John C. Brune, was elected to the state legislature on the Democratic ticket. This election 
resulted in a landslide victory for the Democrats, leaving only the governor’s office to the 
Know-Nothings. Comprehensive measures of repression against blacks considered by 
that legislature were on their way to being implemented when the Civil War began.780
Brune must have felt that his peers supported his political course. The tone in 
Baltimore’s German elite clubs was overwhelmingly pro-Confederate. When a member 
of the Concordia choral society expressed an antislavery viewpoint among his fellow 
singers in 1861, all others left the room in protest. The membership of the Germania Club 
was equally dedicated to the Confederate cause. The authorities closed the institution in 
1862 because, according to the German-American Historian, Dieter Cunz, “the president, 
Frederick Schepeler, a tobacco merchant (...) had been a bit too free in his expression of 
                                                 
777 Hennighausen, “Reminiscences”; Cunz, Maryland Germans. A History, pp. 304-309. 
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sympathy for the South.” Only when the club elected Schepeler’s business partner, Albert 
Schumacher, as his successor, was the clubhouse allowed to open again.781
Some elements of Hanseatic political ideology better lent themselves to an 
alliance with Confederates than others.  On one hand, a cosmopolitan, commercial calling 
to create world peace did not go well with Confederate politics.782 On the other hand, 
Hanseats could understand the idea of States Rights in terms of their own particularism. 
They could, furthermore, relate to the ideology of slaveholders who defended a 
hierarchically ordered society, and criticized the foundations of liberalism. Bremen and 
the South could be perceived of as commonwealths whose way of life was threatened by 
demands to submit to a larger political entity that threatened to level customary social 
distinction, and to uproot traditional practices. The South argued its case as the defense of 
the true, traditional constitutional and social order against the fanaticism of a popular 
movement, not unlike the nationalist movement in Germany that threatened Bremen’s 
independence.783
Some Hanseats were even willing to make a sacrifice, if not of their life, then at 
least of their money and of the lives of their children, for the cause of the Confederacy. 
One of the staunchest supporters of the South among Baltimore Hanseats was Gustav 
Wilhelm Lürman. His son, also named Gustav, joined the Confederate army, and fought 
until after the surrender of Lee. Gustav W. Lürman, the older, “gave and lost largely his 
fortune” for the South. He extracted almost $75,000 from his business during the war 
                                                 
781 Cunz, “Maryland Germans in the Civil War”, pp. 414-416. 
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Political Economy of the Cotton South. Households, Markets, and Wealth in the Nineteenth Century, New 
York 1978, especially pp. 128-157. 
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years. While no use for these amounts is given in the records, it can be assumed that he 
invested much of that sum in Confederate war bonds.784
The decisions Hanseats made as the Civil War approached split decade-long 
alliances between firms and families. Gustav W. Lürman was the son of Sophie Charlotte 
Oelrichs, an aunt of his business partners.785 Yet blood and money were no longer able to 
ensure political harmony. Lürman’s associate of twenty-two years, Heinrich Oelrichs, 
could not have disagreed more with the pro-Confederate course of his senior partner. On 
January 1st, 1861, Oelrichs ended his involvement in Oelrichs & Lurman, and relocated to 
New York. There, he joined his brother Edwin and Gustav F. Schwab in the firm of 
Oelrichs & Co..786
Relations between the Oelrichs and the Lürmans became outright nasty over the 
next few years. E. G. Oelrichs, another brother of Heinrich’s, and a former associate of 
Lürman’s in Baltimore, had already died in 1857. In 1865, however, the executors of E. 
G. Oelrichs’ will sued Lürman in a British court over payments on Maryland bonds that 
had been bought by E.G. Oelrichs & Lurman in the 1830s, but had been depreciated in 
1842. Lürman argued that the losses had been amicably settled in 1842, but that no record 
had been kept, because of the confidence and friendship between the partners. Heinrich 
Oelrichs had already been an associate in Oelrichs & Lurman of Baltimore in 1842, and 
                                                 
784 Heiser, Elinor S., Days Gone By, Baltimore 1940, p. 90, quoted in Cunz, “Maryland Germans in the 
Civil War”, p. 416; “Recapitulation of the Business for Statements from 1861 to 1867”, folder “1830-1867 
E.G. Oelrichs and Lurman Company”, box 2, MdHS MS.541. This collection also contains some 
Confederate war bonds. 
785 Hirschfeld, George W., genealogical overview to “Stephan Lürman, Brief an meine Kinder aus 2. Ehe 
(1813),“ typescript 1977, unmarked, orange binder, StAHB 7,128, Lürman [family papers], box 3. 
Hirschfeld erroneously dates Stephan Lürman’s marriage to Sophie Charlotte Oelrichs in 1818. Stephan 
Lürman died in 1816, and married Ms. Oelrichs in 1806. 
786 Lürman, Gustav Wilhelm, ‘History of Oelrichs & Lurman,’ manuscript 1866, and Lurman & Co., notice 
of change in partnership, 1861/1/1, both in: MdHS MS.541, Lurman, Gustavus W., 1809-66, Papers and 
genealogy, 1833-1945, box 2, folder “1830-1867 E.G. Oelrichs and Lurman Company.” 
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would have been aware of such a settlement. Since no-one had raised the question of the 
bonds between 1842 and 1865, the Oelrichs’ lawsuit against Lürman looks suspiciously 
like an act of spite. While ably represented by Severn Teackle Wallis, a Baltimore lawyer 
associated with the pro-Confederate Maryland elite, Lürman could not prove his 
innocence, while his opponents had the bonds that suggested his guilt. In 1866, a British 
court ordered him to pay.787
 
For a while, Gustav W. Lürman left the U.S. to escape the possible consequences 
of his politics. In a letter to his niece, Augusta, written in Baltimore on May 2nd, 1865, he 
referred to an extensive stay in London and Paris, and visits to Switzerland. Lürman 
returned to Baltimore on March 22nd, 1865, where he found his son, Gustav, who had 
“fought to the last”, yet was already paroled. Lürman showed clear signs of despair at the 
new political situation. While still in Europe, he had found “the news from home so 
depressing that I fell into a certain lethargy.” Back in the U.S., Lürman thought that “I 
will find it hard to adapt to the changed conditions but thank God in my house we are all 
of one opinion.” In spite of the consolation this unanimity within his own family offered, 
Lürman still felt that “I have suffered a bitter disappointment of all the hopes I 
harbored.”788 Among the casualties of the war was the community of Hanseats on which 
                                                 
787 S[evern]. T[eackle]. Wallis to Gustav W. Lürman, 1866/4/3; Maynard Sons & Co, London, to G.W. 
Lurman, 1865/2/6 and 1865/12/21; G.W. Lürman to Maynard & Sons Co., London, 1866/1/21, folder 
“1830-1867 E.G. Oelrichs and Lurman Company”, box 2, MdHS MS.541. Wallis’ correspondence with 
Lürman suggests that the latter had relied on the customary trust between Hanseats, and was now caught 
off guard by its revocation. Thus, Wallis wrote to Lürman: “I think prudence should have suggested to you 
both, to have had some written minute of your respective rights and obligations prepared at the time when 
the partnership was dissolved. As between Mr. Oelrichs and yourself, your confidence in each other and 
your long personal friendship of course rendered no such precaution necessary, and I presume it was on this 
account that nothing of the sort was thought of” (Wallis to Lürman, 1866/4/3). 
788 Gustav W. Lürman to Augusta [Lürman?], 5.2.1865, folder “1817-1865; n.d. Gustav[us] [W.] Lürman – 
Correspondence”, box 1, MdHS MS.541. 
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Lürman had relied in the ante-bellum years. No longer could he be secure in the 
knowledge that he was ‘of one opinion’ with a larger group of his peers. Instead, he had 
to rely for that comfort on his immediate family. 
Lürman was not the only Confederate-Hanseat to prefer the safety of foreign 
countries to an active, personal involvement in the war. John C. Brune, who had been a 
member of the pro-slavery legislature of 1860, also went abroad, where he died in 
1864.789  It appears that most Hanseats who sided with the South did so cautiously, even if 
they were firm enough in their convictions to take the defeat of the Confederacy 
personally.790
 
 While most Baltimore Hanseats were pro-Confederate, Heinrich Oelrichs was by 
no means alone in his Northern sympathies. Julius Wilkens never went on record with 
any strong statement in support of either side, but he did make sure he was not drafted 
into military service. In August 1862, and again in July 1863, he obtained legal 
documents confirming his exemption on the ground that he was not a citizen of the U.S.. 
While in Bremen in the Summer of 1865, Julius Wilkens became a citizen of Bremen.791 
His brother, Wilhelm Wilkens, was openly in support of the Union. In March 1865, he 
wrote to Julius, then in Bremen: “Jeff Davis is in discord with his Congress, Richmond 
will be evacuated and all in the South are at the end of their tether (...), in short matters 
                                                 
789 Howard, Monumental City, pp. 208-210. 
790 There was a strong minority of Northern merchants who continued to support a peace agreement that 
left slavery intact. See Beckert, Metropolis, p. 127-128. 
791 Passport issued by the Office of the Provost Marshal General, State of Maryland, 1862/8/28; Letter by 
Justice of the Peace, 1863/7/14; Heinrich to Julius Wilkens, Baltimore 1865/6/9, MdHS MS.439. 
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look very favorable here at present.”792 He might not have been that frank if he had 
considered his brother a Confederate. 
The firm of Stellmann & Hinrichs took a conspicuous position on the side of the 
Union. During the parade celebrating the fall of Richmond and Petersburg, they greeted 
the celebrators with a patriotic display on the front of their three-story building on 
Baltimore Street, on the parade route. A clerk employed by Geyer & Wilkens wrote,  
Last night was again a night of excitement the whole city was illuminated. Balto street 
was one blaze of light. (...) Stellmann Hinrichs & Co. made as fine a display as any; they 
had the front of their store lit up bottom to top. (600 candles.) in every window an am. 
flag, and several foreign flags strung across the street; in the doors they had the following 
transparencies, One country, 1 flag, 1 Constitution, 1 Destiny. the balance of houses were 
illuminated with candles.793
 
Other businesses in downtown Baltimore apparently showed a high degree of patriotism, 
too, making Baltimore Street that “blaze of light”, fueled by gas candles. 
Geyer & Wilkens, located on 22 S. Calvert Street, just around the corner from the 
route of the parade, decided to show only token support for the celebration. Wilhelm 
Middendorf, another of Geyer & Wilkens’ clerks, wrote that “We had (Geyer & Wilkens) 
a ten cent flag stuck out the 2nd story window.”794 Eventually, even this small amount of 
adaptation was too much to bear for Eduard Geyer: “Mr. Geyer was so disgusted with the 
news [of the Confederate defeat] that he would [not] allow the 10 cent rag to hang out the 
window any longer he put went up and took it down (sic!).”795 Middendorf apparently had 
feelings similar to those of his employer. Having reported the burning of Richmond and 
Petersburg, which destroyed all of the tobacco stored there, he was pleased that “the 
                                                 
792 Wilhelm to Julius Wilkens, 3.24.1865, MdHS MS.439. The last part of the sentence English in the 
original. 
793 H. C. Roglmann to Julius Wilkens, 4.7.1865, MdHS MS.439. English in the original. If a German author 
used English in the source, I will mark the citation with the letters ‘E.o.’ from hereon. 
794 Wilhelm Middendorf to Julius Wilkens, 4.7.1865, MdHS MS.439, E.o.; for shop location: Ferslew, 
Baltimore City Directory, for 1859-60. 
795 H. C. Roglmann to Julius Wilkens, 4.7.1865, MdHS MS.439, E.o.. 
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Yanks did not get that much after all.” And after citing the above-mentioned banners on 
Stellmann & Hinrichs’ store front, Middendorf quipped, “something they forgot and that 
was, two camps [Zwei Lager].”796
Eduard Geyer’s business partner, Heinrich Wilkens, had little sympathy for the 
Northern cause, either. When he wrote to his brother, Julius, about Lincoln’s 
assassination, he displayed an attitude characteristic for Confederates at that time. He was 
appalled at the cowardice of the assassin, and thought the attempt on the president’s life 
politically inexpedient: 
 
If the murder had been accomplished a year ago, it might have benefited the Southern 
Cause, but now it is only spite [Bosheit] and revenge. What is worst for the southern 
states, the new president Johnson will not deal so leniently and conciliatory with the rebel 
leaders.797
 
 Between the Wilkens brothers, disagreement over the Civil War did not lead to 
the kind of venom that tore apart the Oelrichs and the Lürmans. Still, fraternal harmony 
was ruined. In a letter to Julius Wilkens, then in Bremen, Wilhelm Wilkens gave an 
uncharitable account of a Sunday visit to their brother Heinrich’s: 
 
Heinrich is still his old self, how else could it be, ‘cool to the heart.’ I was there the past 
Sunday, [it was] even more boring then usually, as the pure genius of Mr. Roeholl, Esq., 
increased the boredom by his presence (…). I also had the unspeakable pleasure to see his 
Highness, Mr. Geyer, with consort. (…) The next two Sundays I will enjoy in blissful 
freedom, since I have had it with these charming family suppers and dinners and will eat 
there at most every three weeks.798
 
                                                 
796 Wilhelm Middendorf to Julius Wilkens, 4.7.1865, MdHS MS.439, E.o.. 
797 Heinrich to Julius Wilkens (in Bremen), Baltimore 1865/4/20, MdHS MS.439. 
798 Wilhelm to Julius Wilkens (in Bremen), Baltimore 1865/3/24, MdHS MS.439. Wilhelm Wilkens cites 
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 Personal dislike may well have been to blame for the spoiled family harmony 
among the Wilkens, but their disagreement about the war will not have helped for 
keeping the brothers on good terms. 
Perhaps the most ardent Hanseatic supporter of the Republican Party was Gustav 
F. Schwab. He made his strong opinions on Christian morality the foundation of his 
politics. A week after Lincoln’s inauguration, Schwab lectured a largely hostile audience 
of German commoners in New York on the benefits of temperance and the evils of 
slavery. In a letter to his mother, he praised Lincoln’s politics, and by the fall of 1861, he 
was playing a leading role in the “German Union League.” Between Schwab and 
Lürman, Hanseats embraced the full range of conflicting positions found at the beginning 
of the Civil War.799
 Strong opinions on the War were not limited to American Hanseats. In Bremen, 
the Meier and Noltenius families enthusiastically supported Schwab’s politics. Christoph 
Theodor Schwab and his wife, Emily, neé von Post, happened to be staying with the 
Meiers in Bremen when Hermann and Amalie Noltenius visited the Meier villa. They 
brought a fresh letter from Gustav F. Schwab, who had enclosed newspaper clippings 
reporting on his speech. Christoph Theodor reported to his brother that ”we discussed the 
speech you made in front of the great assembly, and its style and good purpose found 
applause and universal support.”800
                                                 
799 Sophie Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1861/04/09 and 1861/05/09, MSS 434, John Christopher 
Schwab Family Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, series I, box 2, folder 37; New 
York Times, „The Sunday Question,“ 1861/3/11, p. 8; and “The German Union League,” 1861/10/26, p. 3. 
The latter article mentions the participation of a Dr. Dulon, possibly pastor Rudolf Dulon, the exiled leader 
of the 1848 revolution in Bremen. 
800 Christoph Theodor Schwab to Gustav F. Schwab, Stuttgart 1861/04/09, MSS 434, John Christopher 
Schwab Family Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, series I, box 2, folder 37. 
Christoph Theodor Schwab attached his letter to that by Sophie Schwab of the same date, cited in the 
previous note. Apparently, on April 9, he had just returned to his home in Stuttgart from his visit to the 
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 While not sympathetic to the Southern cause, other Hanseats in Bremen remained 
highly skeptical of the prospects of the North. Burgomaster Arnold Duckwitz did not 
have much trust in the Republicans and their followers. Commenting on a loan by 
American banks’ to the federal government for financing the war, Duckwitz wrote to 
Rudolf Schleiden: “These 50 Million $ (…) will soon be distilled away, and the raucous 
rabble that will enlist in the army will run home shortly.” Schleiden shared Duckwitz’s 
doubts. Nonetheless, these leading players in Bremish foreign policy cast their lot with 
the Northern side, refusing to recognize the Confederate States.801
 
 The rifts among Hanseats in Bremen, Baltimore, and New York meant that they 
no longer functioned as a group, politically. Political disagreement even led to the 
dissolution of more fundamental ties, those between, and even within, families and firms. 
The basis of this transatlantic community was rapidly giving way under the outside 
political pressures. The economic crisis, precipitated by the lack of confidence of 
businessman in the face of the looming division between the sections, added more strains 
to the already fraying Hanseatic network. The most prominent Hanseatic casualty of the 
economic crisis that began after Lincoln’s election had been Consul Keutgen in New 
York. 
 
 Keutgen’s shameful departure from office did not bode well for Hanseatic 
diplomacy. The episode was emblematic for the ineffectiveness of Hanseats’ attempts in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Meiers in Bremen. 
801 Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen 1861/8/30, StAHB 7,116 [Rudolf Schleiden Papers], 
folder “Briefwechsel Rudolf Schleiden mit Senator Arnold Duckwitz, 1854-1879,” third of five 
unnumbered and unlabeled boxes; Rudolf Schleiden to Gustav F. Schwab (in NY), Washington, D.C., 
1860/12/14, MSS 434, John Christopher Schwab Family Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale 
University Library, series I, box 2, folder 38. 
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1861 to shape “great politics” through their accustomed channels of influencing decision-
makers. Two episodes illustrate this failure of the mechanisms of Bremish foreign policy. 
In Washington, Rudolf Schleiden convinced Lincoln to send him on a peace mission to 
Richmond. In Bremen, burgomaster Arnold Duckwitz and Senator Otto Gildemeister 
went on a mission to Berlin to convince the Prussian government to build a joint navy 
with the other German coastal states. Both ended in failure and disappointment. From 
that point on, Bremen increasingly found itself on the side of the dance-floor, as others 
set the tune of the concert of powers. 
 
 
A Dinner with Lincoln and a Mission to Richmond  
 Rudolf Schleiden’s attempt single-handedly to avoid a civil war that would break 
up the American union began promisingly. On the evening of March 2nd, two days before 
the inauguration, Lincoln accepted a dinner invitation to Schleiden’s residence. The 
diplomatic guests at the event included Johannes Rösing, the freshly-minted attaché to 
Schleiden, Albert Schumacher, the Baltimore Consul, and the ministers for Great Britain, 
the Netherlands, and Austria. Besides the president-elect, the American guests were 
General Winfield Scott and seven other American politicians, whose selection, according 
to a newspaper correspondent, “showed the host’s understanding of the varying 
constituents of the incoming administration.” Indeed, the Republican politicians in 
attendance represented half of Lincoln’s future cabinet: William H. Seward (State), 
Samuel P. Chase (Treasury), Simon Cameron (War), and Montgomery Blair (Postmaster 
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General). Also present were David Davis, an old ally of Lincoln’s from his native Illinois 
whom he placed on the Supreme Court in 1862, and Senator Charles Sumner.802
 Arguably, Schleiden was quite adept at the game of identifying influential figures 
and getting them to listen to Hanseatic concerns. Considering his recently professed 
unfamiliarity with the leaders of the Republican Party, the diplomat’s ability to assemble 
them at his house was all the more remarkable.803 The minister-resident drew all registers 
of diplomatic glamour. The correspondent of the Evening Post was duly impressed: 
 
The dinner was worthy of the guests and the reputation of the entertainer. Mr. Schleiden 
has quite a name for the age and excellence of his wines. One of the wines on his list, 
served in diminutive glasses, (…) dates but four years after the landing of the pilgrims; 
and the value of a single bottle at compound interest would more than defray our national 
debt. (…) This dinner has become the town topic of the capital.804
 
Evidently, Lincoln was taken with Schleiden’s diplomatic skills and knowledge; 
enough so to send him on a secret mission to Richmond, to sound out the possibilities of 
a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Schleiden set out on his errand in the last week of 
April. While little is known about the content of the talks he conducted with the 
Confederacy, the mission obviously ended in failure. Schleiden returned to Washington 
on April 27th, where he informed Lincoln and Seward that “the leading men of the South 
are determined to leave the Union.”805
For Bremish diplomacy in America, Schleiden’s failed attempt at reconciling the 
sections represents both a last hurrah and the first coffin-nail. That he believed he might 
                                                 
802 „The State of the Nation,“ New York Evening Post, 1861/3/4, p. 2. Baron von Gerolt, the Prussian 
minister, and a personal friend of Schleiden’s late father, had canceled at the last minute to observe the 
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Bremisches Jahrbuch, vol. 34 (1933), p. 262-276, here p. 271. 
804 „The State of the Nation,“ New York Evening Post, 1861/3/4, p. 2. 
805 Lutz, Ralph Haswell, Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten während des 
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be successful shows that he was used to being heard and being taken seriously by 
American leaders. At the same time, this belief appears as a grandiose delusion. The 
forces of popular conviction and sectional competition were not to be contained in deals 
that reasonable leaders made in secret negotiations. The kind of genteel politics that 
Schleiden and his Hanseatic allies had conducted so successfully in the preceding 
decades had reached its limits, and its main representative in the United States had failed 
to grasp the magnitude of the change, and the insufficiency of the means at his disposal. 
Schleiden’s acquired reputation as a skilled and knowledgeable diplomat still 
received some recognition during the war, but from the point of view of his American 
counterparts, his role was strictly that of a consultant, no longer that of a lobbyist. 
Between 1861 and 1865, the Lincoln administration occasionally asked Schleiden’s 
advice on questions of international law, and he was glad to share it.806
Schleiden suggested in his autobiography that he had an input in the making of 
the Emancipation Proclamation. Already at his first meeting with Lincoln, Schleiden had 
established his antislavery credentials, based on his involvement with the emancipation of 
Danish slaves on the Virgin Islands in the 1840s. As a Danish bureaucrat, Schleiden had 
studied international precedent and legal options for laws that ended slavery in 
preparation for the Danish decree of 1847. His experience would have made him a 
valuable advisor on questions like compensation and the integration of freedmen into 
society, both of which were on the mind of Lincoln’s administration. While Lincoln may 
well have asked Schleiden’s help or opinion on emancipation, there is nothing in the 
literature on the Emancipation Proclamation that suggests the Hanseat’s involvement in 
the political decision process that led to this document. While it is true that Schleiden and 
                                                 
806 Lutz, Beziehungen, p. 31-40. 
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Lincoln have in common that they signed proclamations for the emancipation of slaves, 
Schleiden had done so in a subordinate way; as a bureaucrat who had to countersign a 
royal decree before it went into effect.807
The sporadic activity as an advisor to the cabinet did not fill Schleiden’s time. He 
felt that there was little left for him to do in the American capital. As early as in May of 
1861, under the immediate impression of his failed peace mission, he asked for 
permission to go on a vacation in Europe. While acknowledging the envoy’s 
powerlessness under war-time conditions, Burgomaster Duckwitz still asked him to stay 
on his post, since “the [Bremish] merchants will at least be mollified, if they can be 
assured by your continued presence in the belief that all that can be done [for their 
interests], will be done.”808 The remaining function of Bremen’s minister-resident was 
now officially one of merely psychological value. The occasional intervention in disputes 
over contraband or smuggle still required the involvement of a Bremish representative, 
but attaché Rösing alone was able to handle such cases. After several prolonged 
absences, in 1865 Schleiden left Washington for good to take on the post of Hanseatic 
minister-resident to the United Kingdom.809
  
 
                                                 
807 Schleiden, Rudolph, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners. Neue Folge, 1841-1848, Wiesbaden 
1890, p. 227-232. 
808 Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen n.D. [recieved 1861/5/16], StAHB 7,116 [Rudolf 
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809 In 1862, Schleiden had become Hanseatic, rather than Bremish, minister-resident in Washington; 
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Dealing with Prussia 
 Meanwhile, in Germany, Senatoren Arnold Duckwitz and Otto Gildemeister, 
backed by the Bürgerschaft’s vote in favor of a German navy, traveled to Berlin to 
negotiate the terms of such a fleet. They had high hopes, since Prussia had been sending 
encouraging signals. Count Roon, Prussian minister of the navy, had even come to 
Bremen to talk in private to members of the Hanseatic leadership.810
 In keeping with the Bürgerschaft resolution, Bremen’s delegates hoped to 
convince the Prussians to create a navy based on a treaty between those German states 
who wished to participate, run jointly by the coastal states, and commanded by Prussian 
admirals. The city was willing to contribute 50,000 Thaler. As Duckwitz and 
Gildemeister found out, Prussia had different ideas. The kingdom envisioned a naval 
convention between the German states as a means of making others pay for an expanded 
Prussian fleet, in exchange for the promise of protection of all German traders.811
Prussia wanted to see financing of the navy apportioned according to the tonnage 
of the states’ merchant navies, rather than by population, as Bremen had proposed. Under 
Prussia’s plan, Bremen would have paid half as much as the kingdom, which had one 
hundred and eighty times as many inhabitants as the city, but only twice as strong a 
merchant marine. Evidently, Prussia overestimated the fiscal capabilities of the Hanseatic 
city. While the population of the latter commanded significant fortunes and incomes, the 
ability of the Bremish state to marshal these resources for public purposes was much 
more limited than that of the Prussian state.812
                                                 
810 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 177-178. 
811 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 178-179; Krieger, Politik, p. 27. 
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Negotiations were never formally ended, and fizzled out in the spring of 1862.813 
It had been a thoroughly sobering experience for Arnold Duckwitz. In a letter to Rudolf 
Schleiden, the burgomaster summed up his disillusionment: 
 
Conditions in Berlin are disconsolate. The gentlemen mean well, are charming and 
intelligent, but [do not have] a trace of creative genius, [instead they show] an 
inflexibility reminiscent of the old-Prussian general staff; so that it is indeed not at all 
surprising, if the middling states [of Germany] have no respect for Prussia and do not 
want to subject themselves to it. It is a sad state of affairs, but this is how it is. (…) The 
impression of Prussia which I gained in 1848/1849, that the future of a unified Germany 
with maritime strength will not grow on the sands of the March, has remained the same. 
(…) At least now we will not put ourselves into a dangerous dependency [on Prussia].814
 
 These private words explain the tone of Duckwitz’s public address on New Years 
Day, 1862: 
 
The right policy for Bremen is to keep a free hand in political questions, and not to do 
anything that might loosen the band of international law of the Germanic Confederation. 
As long as the greatest Protestant power [Prussia] moves on the basis of the Germanic 
Confederation, we will prefer her company over others; but, beyond that [basis], to put 
ourselves into a dependency on her, and to gain the enmity of other Confederates as a 
result, is something I cannot condone, and against which I must most earnestly caution.815
 
 Duckwitz had seen that the hope in a federal nation-state under Prussian 
leadership was vain. The kingdom’s bureaucracy had a strong centralistic agenda, and 
was not about to share responsibility with others, nor to consider points of view beyond 
the limits of the dynastic interests of the Hohenzollern. Weak though it may be, the state 
of Bremen was still better off alone. 
 
                                                 
813 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 179. 
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 H. H. Meier, however, was undeterred by the experience of the failure of his pet 
project, the fleet of gun-boats. He continued to cast his lot with Prussia, even taking his 
activities to the ‘national’ level. Prussia’s new-found enthusiasm for free trade 
particularly appealed to Meier. After an offer made in 1861 by Napoleon III., Prussia had 
secretly negotiated a free-trade agreement with France, and presented it to the 
governments of the German Customs Union for its adoption in 1862. The German 
bourgeoisie was divided about the merits of this agreement. The German Chamber of 
Commerce (Deutscher Handelstag, DHT), founded only the previous year as one of the 
interest-groups in the orbit of the Nationalverein, split over a motion to voice support for 
the treaty.816
 Austria, like Bremen, was not a member of the Zollverein, but for opposite 
reasons. The Habsburg monarchy maintained a stiff protective tariff, while Bremen 
wished to uphold free trade. Bringing the Zollverein into the free-trade camp via the 
treaty with France would have weakened the ties between Austria and the other German 
states. The Prussian trade policy was thus a brilliant diplomatic move: it gave the German 
bourgeoisie an incentive for siding with Prussia, and isolated Austria, Prussia’s main 
rival.817
 It was evident to the delegates of the 1862 DHT convention that support of the 
Franco-Prussian treaty meant taking sides in the dualism between the two German Great 
Powers. DHT president David Hansemann, a liberal industrialist and railroad promoter 
from the Prussian Rhineland, opposed an endorsement for this very reason. H. H. Meier 
                                                 
816 Biefang, Bürgertum, p. 207-220. 
817 Biefang, Bürgertum, p. 259-272. 
 406
spoke in favor of an endorsement. Meier’s side won by four votes, and Hansemann 
resigned.818
 In 1864, the DHT recognized the importance of Meier’s role in bringing the 
organization in line with Prussian policy, and elected him president. Ten days after his 
election, he responded to a letter by Count Itzenplitz, Prussia’s minister of commerce, 
who had congratulated him on his election, but had cited concerns that a DHT leader 
from a state that did not belong to the Zollverein might be adverse to Prussian interests. 
Meier wrote: 
 
I would have to reply [to such concerns] that I have never in my public life been led by 
my private interests. If needed, however, I do not lack the private interest [to connect me 
with the Zollverein], since I am a Zollverein industrialist, having a coal mine and an iron 
mill on my estate in Brunswick. As a non-Prussian, I deem, if His Excellency will grant 
me His trust, that I can make felt the presidential influence over non-Prussian members 
[of the DHT] much more firmly in the interest of a good cause, which His Excellency 
wishes to see promoted, than I could if I had the honor to be a Prussian.819
 
 With this record of ingratiation, Meier might well have been ennobled, if ever 
Prussia had annexed Bremen, which outlawed titles of nobility.820
 
 
                                                 
818 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 168-169. Biefang, Bürgertum, p. 269-271 and note 43, gives a 
contradictory account, whereby Meier took a pro-Austrian position and spoke in support of Hansemann. 
Hardegen and Smidt specifically cite Meier as supporting the claims of the Prussian delegation that pacta 
sunt servanda, directed against Hansemann. The present account follows Hardegen and Smidt, who had at 
their disposal Meier’s personal papers. – While himself Prussian, Hansemann was a leader of the liberal 
opposition to the monarchy, and for that reason did not identify with the policy of its ministers. 
819 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 170. 
820 Biefang, Bürgertum, p. 376, notes that Meier was approached in 1865 by other members of the 
Nationalverein who wished to create a “specifically pro-Prussian party” within that organization, and who 
considered Meier a potential ally for that cause. It should be noted, however, that even Meier’s enthusiasm 
for the German nation and Prussian leadership had its limits. During the Seven Weeks’ War of 1866, as 
soon as it became clear that Prussia had defeated Austrian ally Hannover, Meier had large amounts of 
specie, deposited at the mint of Hannover for the Bremer Bank, brought back to Bremen ”at the last hour,” 
rather than have them fall into Prussian hands. See Beutin, Ludwig, Bremisches Bank- und Börsenwesen 
seit dem 17. Jahrhundert. Von der Wirtschaftsgesinnung einer Hansestadt (=Abhandlungen und Vorträge 
herausgegeben von der Bremer Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, vol. 10, no. 4, December 1937, p. 48. 
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Doubts about the Nation 
 While Duckwitz had the Senat and the Bremish consular network to amplify his 
opinions, and Meier had the nationalist associations like the Nationalverein and the DHT 
to work for his aims, anti-nationalists among Hanseats lacked similar organizational 
means. That is not to say that there was not plenty of disagreement with the idea of 
national unification. Some of this disagreement was merely directed against a united 
Germany under Prussian leadership, but some was opposed to any abandonment of 
Bremish independence. For lack of organization, these voices are more difficult to hear. 
We can, however, assume that those we can still discern did not stand alone. 
 
Rudolf Schleiden strongly disagreed with Prussian policy in Germany. At the 
center of this disagreement stood the question of Schleswig-Holstein, by all accounts one 
of the most tangled messes in European history. Hence, a brief overview of the issue may 
be in place. The Danish King ruled as Duke in Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg. The 
latter two had been parts of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, and had 
become parts of the Germanic Confederation in 1815. Based on a fourteenth-century 
treaty, Schleswig and Holstein were considered “forever indivisible” under international 
law. While Schleswig had a mixed German and Danish population, Holstein and 
Lauenburg had overwhelming majorities of ethnic Germans. Ascendant Danish 
nationalism demanded a unitary, liberal constitution for all parts of the monarchy, and 
promoted a Danization of its ethnically German parts. The majority of the German 
population in the Duchies were royalists, and opposed a liberal constitution on that 
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ground, whereas urban Germans opposed Danization, but often favored liberal reforms 
within the Duchies.821
From the point of view of Schleswig-Holstein’s mediaeval constitution, this was a 
breach of right, since the new king had come to the throne in a female line of succession. 
Since the 1848 revolution, Denmark had had a liberal constitution. While its king had had 
to give up his position as absolute ruler, an extension of this constitution to the Duchies’ 
would have served his dynastic interest, since it would have done away with the feudal 
laws that barred him from ruling there. For these reasons, demands for independence 
from Denmark by Germans in Schleswig-Holstein took the form of a revolt for legitimate 
succession, against a liberal constitution, and, only secondarily, against Danization. 
German nationalists outside of Schleswig-Holstein, however, read the struggle as a 
defense of German soil and nationality against a foreign oppressor.822
After the death of Danish King Frederick VII in 1863, his successor, Christian IX, 
declared Schleswig-Holstein to be under a unitary constitution for the entire Danish state. 
In 1863, Prince Frederick of Augustenburg declared his claim to the title of Duke of 
Schleswig and Holstein, as the legitimate heir in a male line of succession. The Germanic 
Confederation supported this claim, but Austria and Prussia did not. Jointly, the two great 
powers went to war with Denmark without the sanction of the Confederation, in order to 
deny Danish rule over the duchies. After their victory over the Danish in 1864, Austria 
                                                 
821 Schleiden, Rudolph, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners. Neue Folge, 1841-1848, Wiesbaden 
1890, p. 54-76. 
822 Schleiden, Rudolph, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners. Neue Folge, 1841-1848, Wiesbaden 
1890, p. 54-76. Biefang, Bürgertum, p.  
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and Prussia ruled jointly over both Schleswig and Holstein, and denied Frederick his 
claim.823
As an adherent of legitimate succession in Schleswig-Holstein, and as a man who, 
rumor had it, had entertained hopes of becoming foreign minister in the government of 
the Duke of Augustenburg, Schleiden was incensed. His outbursts against the Prussian 
minister in London created a diplomatic scandal that led him to ask for his resignation. 
Schleiden had hoped that Bremen would take the side of the Augustenburger, and was 
disappointed when he learned that the Senat had decided to accept the status quo that 
resulted from the war.824 While Schleiden made his peace with the German Empire 
created in 1871, he never quite reconciled with Prussia or those German nationalists who 
had disregarded the question of legitimacy in 1864. 
In his memoirs, published in the 1880s, Schleiden took great pains to emphasize 
that legitimate succession, not nationalism, had driven German discontent in Schleswig-
Holstein at Danish policy. By the time he wrote these memoirs, Schleiden had embraced 
the German Empire. He would have had an incentive to cast his earlier role as that of a 
nationalist martyr, but chose not to. Instead, he had nothing but kind words and 
admiration for the Danish monarchs, while he scorned the Danish nationalist 
intellectuals. The latter, to him, were the main culprits in the strife that had destroyed the 
Danish state. Indeed, Schleiden’s parents had not only been royalists, but close friends of 
the Danish royal family. The son partook in this connection, and when Schleiden was 
incarcerated for dueling, the crown prince in person – the later king Frederick VII – went 
                                                 
823 Before the Borusso-Austrian intervention, the German nationalist movement had predominantly 
supported the Augustenburger. H. H. Meier, acting for the Nationalverein, had attempted to secure a bank 
loan for the pretender’s government at low interest. See Biefang, Bürgertum, p. 311-356, especially p. 340-
341 (for Meier). 
824 Wätjen, “Schleiden,” p. 275; Krieger, Politik, p. 56 and note 3. 
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to Nyborg to bring Schleiden his pardon. This is not a story an ardent German nationalist 
would tell.825
 
The Danish war led at least some Hanseats to oppose German nationalism. At the 
height of enthusiasm for a war against Denmark, Wilhelm Knoche, the friend of 
Baltimore Hanseat Julius Wilkens, voiced derision of the growing nationalist, popular 
movement: 
The Bavarian beer halls multiply daily, that hurts [our] tavern. – Also, our business in the 
city suffers from the spreading consumption of Mosel- and Rhinewines. (...) It seems to 
me that this fad has become an epidemic through the many German rifle-clubs’ fairs 
[Schützenfeste], where German humanity works up German courage with German wine, 
while they really should have that courage when they are sober.826
 
The kind of nationalist festivities Knoche described, most of which were 
organized by the Nationalverein, were a favorite organizational tool for the nationalist 
movement. In the masses congregated on these occasions, nationalist orators saw a 
microcosm of the German people, and an embodiment of the high ideals to which it 
subscribed.827 Knoche just saw a mass of silly drunks. 
In spite of his main article of trade, French wine, Knoche subjected nationalism to 
the gaze of the sober businessman. It hurt his tavern, and the rhetoric that promised that 
the nation and its unitary state would serve to benefit everyone’s interests did not make 
for sufficient compensation. The language of the ‘fad’ and the ‘epidemic’ suggest that he 
sees the participants in nationalist spectacles as intoxicated not just by the cheap national 
                                                 
825 Schleiden, Rudolph, Jugenderinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners, Wiesbaden 1886, p. 86, 294; and 
Idem, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners. Neue Folge, 1841-1848, Wiesbaden 1890, p. 54-76. See 
also chapter 5. 
826 Wilhelm Knoche to Julius Wilkens, 2.27.1864, MdHS MS.439. 
827 Langewiesche, Dieter, Nation, Nationalismus, Nationalstaat in Deutschland und Europa (=Beck’sche 
Reihe, vol. 1399), Munich 2000, especially p. 82-102 and 132-169; and Hettling, Manfred and Paul Nolte 
(eds.), Bürgerliche Feste. Symbolische Formen politischen Handelns im 19. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1993. 
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beverages, but also by a questionable ideology that overrules even such an inherently 
individual judgment as that of taste with a collective commitment to the fatherland. 
 
 Johannes Rösing, Jr., was a successful young lawyer in Bremen. When Arnold 
Duckwitz called him into the burgomaster’s office in early October of 1860 and offered 
him the post of attaché to Rudolf Schleiden in Washington, Rösing was elated. Duckwitz 
related to Schleiden, that 
I told Rösing I could not make a firm promise, and that he had to accept that he will be 
fired after a year, if we should come to the opinion that he was unsuitable. He became 
pale and then red with surprise, the news hit him like lightning from a clear sky. When he 
came to, he said that this was precisely what he had desired for a long time, without ever 
stating it openly.828
 
 Rösing came from a well-established Hanseatic family, although his father had 
fallen from grace after a bankruptcy and his subsequent conversion to the cause of 
democracy, which he championed as a representative for Bremen’s lower middle-class in 
the Bürgerschaft. Duckwitz did not hold the father’s sins against the son. The 
burgomaster knew that a person could redeem himself for political missteps. After all, he 
had advocated revolution himself, in 1830, and had soon after been co-opted by Johann 
Smidt into the Senat. Now Duckwitz was playing the role of the political patriarch, and 
Rösing was honored by the offer of joining the establishment. 
 No doubt, Rösing’s desire to play a part in the glamorous world of diplomacy was 
shared by many of his peers. Whether or not he regarded the appointment as a stepping-
stone to future honors, in 1860, Rösing was willing to give up a successful law practice 
for an uncertain future in the foreign service of an independent Hanseatic city. If he had 
                                                 
828 Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden, Bremen 1860/12/15, StAHB 7,116 [Rudolf Schleiden Papers], 
folder “Briefwechsel Rudolf Schleiden mit Senator Arnold Duckwitz, 1854-1879,” third of five 
unnumbered and unlabeled boxes. 
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considered the future of that independence in danger, he might have been less 
enthusiastic about the job. At this point, however, Rösing felt that he could bank on 
Bremen’s continued independence.  
Moreover, Rösing must have felt confident that his conscience allowed him to 
represent Bremen’s foreign policy abroad. Had he entertained doubts about the Senat’s 
Atlantic orientation, he would not have been as eager to take on this task. The 
commitment to the traditional Bremish approach to international relations, in which 
Germany played a subordinate role, was apparently not limited to the generation of 
patriarchs like Arnold Duckwitz or Heinrich Smidt. 
 
 To be sure, principled opposition to the idea of the nation was a rare matter in 
Hanseatic circles. Many Bremish merchants felt attached to ‘Germany’ in some way or 
the other, even if just as a matter of shared culture. Nonetheless, only a minority of them 
was willing to give up Bremish independence for the promise of a bright new future in a 
unitary German state. This independent role, however, was to come to an end sooner than 
many of them had expected or wished. 
 
 
The End of Independence, 1866/67 
 The failure of Schleiden’s attempt to make peace between the sections in the 
United States, and of Duckwitz’s and Gildemeister’s mission to Berlin, were signs of the 
diminished effectiveness of the customary venues of Hanseatic foreign policy in the face 
of self-assured political leaders who pursued programs of national unification in which 
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there was little space for a small, independent city of free traders. In Otto von Bismarck, 
Bremen was faced with just such a leader. Appointed Prussian Chancellor in 1862 by 
King Wilhelm I, just over a year after the monarch’s ascent to the throne, the ‘Iron 
Junker’ pursued a policy centered on the interests of the Hohenzollern dynasty. In 
extending his king’s rule over all of Germany, to the exclusion of Austria, Bismarck 
mobilized public opinion, in the guise of the nationalist movement, against the 
particularistic interests of the rulers of minor German states. Without ever intending to let 
executive power slip from monarchical control, he offered German liberals a national 
parliament in a nation-state under a Prussian monarch. By 1871, he had won the struggles 
for Prussian hegemony, both on the battlefield, and in the ‘hearts and minds’ of most 
middle-class Germans. The end result was a new German Empire. For Hanseats, 
however, independence came to an end before that. 
  
 In 1866, Hanseats found out just how untenable their independence had become. 
The joint administration of Schleswig and Holstein by Prussia and Austria had been 
ridden with conflict from the beginning. In 1866, Prussia announced the intention of 
annexing the duchies. Austria declared war against the rival, and both sides worked 
feverishly to get the other German states on their side. Prussia countered the Austrian 
declaration of war with a comprehensive plan for a German Union that would exclude the 
Habsburg monarchy, headed by the Prussian King, and granting a national parliament, 
elected by universal suffrage. 
Most middling states – Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, the Grand Duchy of Hesse, 
Saxony, and Bremen’s neighbor Hannover – joined Austria. Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, 
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and Hesse-Darmstadt sided with Prussia. Bremen had remained silent on the issue, but 
did withdraw its representative from the seat of the Germanic Confederation in Frankfurt 
on the Main. Prussia exerted pressure on the Hanseatic cities to take its side. In two notes, 
dated June 16th and June 20th, the Prussian envoy in Hamburg, von Richthofen, had asked 
Bremen to respond to the offer of an alliance. 
Previously, the Senat had often tried to sidestep entreaties from either German 
great power by ignoring them for as long as politely possible.829 Under the impression of 
the growing urgency of von Richthofen’s letters, the head of the Senat’s Foreign Affairs 
Commission, Heinrich Smidt, finally replied on June 25th: 
 
The Senat is willing (…) to collaborate with Prussia’s intended reorganization of 
Germany; it views in [the] outlines of a federal reform a suitable point of departure for 
negotiations that will have to be conducted with a German parliament; it will work 
towards convening [such a parliament], as soon as Prussia will convey an invitation 
thereto. While [the Senat] will have to speak on the condition of the constitutionally 
required consent of the Bürgerschaft, it does not doubt in any way that the Bürgerschaft 
will gladly grant its assent. 
The content of the reform draft submitted [by you], does, however, give rise to 
concerns and to wishes for changes, in points specifically relating to Hanseatic interests. 
The provisions concerning a German navy, specifically, appear impossible to implement 
without significant modifications. (…) The Senat believes (...) that it will remain its 
prerogative in a future stage of negotiations to see to it that Bremen’s interests in these 
specific questions will be maintained. 
 In regard to the war that broke out in Germany, Bremen finds itself in a position 
that makes it the Senat’s duty to abstain from a participation in it as long as at all 
possible. Bremen’s situation as a Hanseatic City, its extensive relations with all seafaring 
nations and to the great industrial districts in Germany, require a restraint, which to 
explain in more detail to the royal Prussian government will certainly be unnecessary. 
Therefore, not merely in its own interest, but also in that of German trade and industry, 
the Senat does not doubt that the [Prussian government] (…) will make it possible [for 
the Senat] to maintain the neutral position it has taken, and which so far has not been 
threatened by another party, either.830
 
                                                 
829 Krieger, Politik, p. 42-43. 
830 For the Senat Commission on Foreign Affairs, J[ohan]. H[einrich]. W[ilhelm?]. Smidt to Freiherrn von 
Richthofen (in Hamburg), Bremen 1866/6/25, manuscript copy of the original, in StAHB 7,116 [Rudolf 
Schleiden Papers], folder “Verschiedenes, 1844-1866,“ third of five unnumbered and unlabeled boxes. 
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Smidt further pointed to the departure of Bremen’s representative from Frankfurt as proof 
of Bremen’s willingness to confirm to Prussian demands, albeit short of joining the war. 
 This was a less than enthusiastic response to Prussia’s offer of an alliance. 
Bremen was not willing to subscribe wholesale to the proposed changes in Germany’s 
institutions, but wished to negotiate them further. If past attempts at reforming the 
Germanic Confederation were any guide, Prussia’s initiatives might well die in such 
negotiations. Hence, buying time meant banking on eventually avoiding the proposed 
reforms, altogether.831
 Bremen’s response to the proposed military alliance reflects that the Senat was 
still in the hands of men who wished to continue the independent foreign policy the city 
had pursued in the 1850s. Prussia knew that in a war, Bremen’s merchant marine was 
defenseless without a navy. The city was located between two warring parties, Oldenburg 
and Hannover. Bremerhaven was entirely surrounded by the latter, Prussia’s strongest 
opponent in Northern Germany. The Senat hoped that out of consideration for this 
precarious position, Prussia would recognize Bremen’s neutrality. Besides, the outcome 
of the war was by no means assured, and Bremen wished to avoid picking the losing side. 
 The Senat almost immediately learned that it had entirely misjudged Bismarck’s 
intentions and resolve. The proposed reforms were intended as-is, and ‘a future stage of 
negotiations’ was not part of the plan. The Prussian request for an active Bremish role in 
the war, likewise, constituted an ‘offer’ much in the same way as that of a mugger 
offering his client a choice voluntarily to hand over his wallet in exchange for sparing his 
life. Unlike Austria, Prussia was in a position to back up such an offer with force. 
                                                 
831 Duckwitz, Arnold, Denkwürdigkeiten aus meinem öffentlichen Leben von 1841 – 1866. Ein Beitrag zur 
bremischen und deutschen Geschichte, Bremen 1877, especially p. 150-163. 
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Unbeknownst to Smidt, von Richthofen had written yet another, even sharper note, to 
Bremen on the same day that the Senator had penned the above letter. Under the 
impression of the thinly veiled threat of Prussian aggression contained in von 
Richthofen’s most recent note, the Senat immediately reversed its position. On June 27th, 
Smidt wrote a terse response to von Richthofen stating that, considering the given 
conditions and Prussian demands, Bremen would follow the “invitation” to mobilize its 
troops in a joint brigade with Oldenburg, “post haste express”.832
  
 Following Prussian victory over Austria at Königgrätz on July 3, 1866, Bismarck 
quickly moved to replace the defunct Germanic Confederation with a new union under 
Prussian leadership, and excluding Austria. Since the three German states below the Main 
River – Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria – refused to join, the new state came to be 
known as the Northern German Union.833
 The King of Prussia became head of state of the Union, and a parliament, referred 
to as the ‘Reichstag’, was elected by universal male suffrage in single-member, winner-
takes-all constituencies. The Prussian cabinet served as the Union government. As the 
spoils of victory, Prussia had annexed Hannover, Hesse-Kassel, the city of Frankfurt, the 
Duchy of Nassau, the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, and significant 
                                                 
832 Freiherr von Richthofen to J. H. W. Smidt, Hamburg 1866/6/25, and For the Senat Commission on 
Foreign Affairs, J. H. W. Smidt to Freiherrn von Richthofen (in Hamburg), Bremen 1866/6/27, manuscript 
copies of the originals, ibid. As a leading member of the Bürgerschaft, H. H. Meier was aware of the 
Prussian conduct. Perhaps this explains why he had the gold stored in the city of Hannover, which belonged 
to his Bremer Bank, expedited to Bremen before Prussian troops reached Hannover. See Beutin, Ludwig, 
Bremisches Bank- und Börsenwesen seit dem 17. Jahrhundert. Von der Wirtschaftsgesinnung einer 
Hansestadt (=Abhandlungen und Vorträge herausgegeben von der Bremer Wissenschaftlichen 
Gesellschaft, vol. 10, no. 4, December 1937), Bremen 1937, p. 48. 
833 Siemann, Wolfram, Gesellschaft im Aufbruch. Deutschland 1849-1871 (=edition suhrkamp, Neue Folge, 
vol. 537; as such: Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, ed., Neue Historische Bibliothek, unnumbered vol.), 
Frankfurt/Main 1990, p. 276-279. 
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parts of Saxony. The governments of the remaining member states of the Union were 
represented in an upper house of parliament. In this house, however, Prussia had an 
overwhelming majority. In nuclei, this was the form of state of the future German 
Empire. Constitutionally, all it took in 1871 was for the three southern German holdouts 
to join the existing framework of the Northern German Union, and to acclaim Prussian 
king Wilhelm German Emperor.834
 All essential functions of sovereignty devolved upon the Northern German Union. 
Trade policy, consular matters, foreign relations, shipping regulations, and questions of 
war and peace were no longer decided in Bremen, but in Berlin. The only field in which 
Bremen maintained a measure of control was tariffs. Bremen and Hamburg remained, for 
the time being, outside of the German Customs Union.835 In America, consulates were 
transferred into the responsibility of the Northern German Union as of January 1st, 1867. 
Baron von Gerolt, the Prussian envoy in Washington, DC, was put in charge of 
representing the new German state. Bremen’s existence as an independent entity had 
come to an unceremonious end. 
 Privately, burgomaster Arnold Duckwitz did not conceal his despair. In a letter to 
Rudolf Schleiden, he wrote: 
I hope that, in the end, the reorganization of Germany will benefit the common good, and 
will refresh the life of our nation, but for Bremen the happy times of the past 50 years 
will hardly return, because all that is essential for the statehood of a small trading-state 
will come under the authority of [the national] parliament, or will become subject to 
Prussian ‘guidance’. Few [fields of policy] will be left to the jurisdiction of the Hanseatic 
Cities. A relation of suzerainty is not the most disgusting one, but it is a source of endless 
humiliations. If this is what [Prussia] is after, I would consider as preferable a total 
annexation [of Bremen]. I do not gaze into Bremen’s future calmly, even if I expect some 
                                                 
834 Ibid, p. 284-289. 
835 Ibid, p. 289-291. Bremen joined the Zollverein only in 1888, again under pressure from Bismarck. See 
Beutin, Bremen und Amerika, p. 134-137. It is a similar historical curiosity, that the Grand Duchy of 
Luxemburg, which did not become part of the German Empire, nonetheless remained part of the German 
Customs Union until 1918. 
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things to become easier by the attenuation of Hannoverian idiocy [i.e., the obstruction of 
Bremerhaven’s expansion]. Even if Germany will be strengthened and uplifted by 
removing or softening certain state-entities, and even if Bremen shares in these 
advantages, nevertheless many things that were our pride will undoubtedly be buried.836
 
The Wars that created strengthened, unitary nation-states in America and 
Germany had divided Hanseats, politically. The rise of that industry which financed and 
outfitted the armies that fought these wars had forever changed the conditions under 
which Hanseats did business. Under the stress of a hostile political and economic climate, 
the Hanseatic family network had become threadbare, and showed rips in many places. 
Blank spots, like the expulsion of Friedrich Wilhelm Keutgen from the historical memory 
of his peers, covered up the damage. Many Bremish firms had fallen on the wayside in 
this process, ruined by economic failure or personal strife. Where there once had been a 
vibrant network of independent firms, there now lumbered the dominant Lloyd. The 
losers of the process of change, like Friedrich Köper, saw more clearly, and certainly 
most resentfully, what received Hanseatic opinion would not admit: The golden days of 
this transatlantic community were over, and the age of nation-states and industrial 
capitalism had begun. 
                                                 
836 Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden, Bad Nenndorf 1866/7/22, StAHB 7,116 [Rudolf Schleiden 
Papers], folder “Briefwechsel Rudolf Schleiden mit Senator Arnold Duckwitz, 1854-1879,” third of five 
unnumbered and unlabeled boxes.  Five days after Königgrätz, Duckwitz had left Bremen to visit the spa of 
Bad Nenndorf, his health affected by the events he deplored. After a brief period of confusion, Prussia, 
having annexed Hannover, continued the hostile policy towards an expansion of Bremerhaven (see 
chapter 9). Consider Wilhelm von Bippen’s characterization of Duckwitz’ position in 1866: “in the years 
1866 and 1870, [Duckwitz] enthusiastically welcomed the fulfillment of the German hopes, for whose 
realization he had worked in 1848 and 1849.” Bippen, Wilhelm von, "Duckwitz, Arnold", in: (Historische 
Gesellschaft des Künstlervereins, ed.) Bremische Biographie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Bremen 1912, 
p. 115-117. The historical record does not support the nationalist teleology Bippen offered, and which has 





Chapter 9: Three Endings –  




 Too often in social history, the world market just somehow happens, and it 
usually happens to people.837 The experience of Hanseats in the nineteenth century shows 
that the world market was being made. It was made by people with the help of the state. 
Then, it “happened to,” not just other people, but to the very people who helped make it. 
 This study is an argument against anti-commercialism, against reifying the 
market, and especially the world market, as an agens without actors. But it is also an 
argument against a certain voluntarism that explains market relations as completely 
reduceable to the intentions – interests and strategies – of actors. The whole of the market 
and its logic adds up to more than the sum of its parts. 
 This study, then, is an argument for taking seriously the dialectic of modern 
capitalist society: the things actors make take on a life of their own as structures, and they 
can, and often will, turn against their creators. 
                                                 
837 Cf. Braudel, Fernand, Civilization and Capitalism, fifteenth – eighteenth Century, 3 vols., Berkeley, CA 
1992 (1982-1984). 
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The experience of Hanseats in their interactions with America is evidence for this 
argument in several ways: 
First, the driving force behind the modernization of German and American 
societies was a conservative political current. Government had a necessary role to play in 
creating the legal and technological infrastructure that created the conditions of the 
possibility of the full development of capitalist social relations, specifically of industrial-
capitalist commodity production on a large scale. The sense of improvement that 
animated conservatives provided the political motive for giving government the power it 
needed to fill this role. 
Second, conservatives were motivated by a wish to uphold a good social order. 
The foil for their project was the French Revolution. In their view, this event had shown 
the dangers of democracy and of the moral decay it engendered. Advocating firm 
Christian values and social hierarchy was a response to these perceived dangers. This 
response was made all the more urgent by the continuous boost democratic aspirations 
among the masses received from the disruption caused by the industrial revolution. 
Third, conservatives realized that the industrial revolution in Britain changed the 
conditions of social production everywhere. In Germany and America, the introduction 
by world trade of industrially manufactured commodities destroyed less efficient modes 
of production. Conservatives responded to this challenge by emulating the British 
example. This meant the spread of wage-labor relations, industrial technology, and new 
forms of business organization. Nonetheless, the conservative project was not a 
revolution of all social relations. It was the attempt to preserve hierarchy, tradition, and 
particularity by appropriating the main leveling agent – equality on the market – and, in 
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the process, to defuse its socially disruptive properties. Not, in the words of Charles 
Sellers, “to make democracy safe for capitalism,” but to make capitalism safe for 
tradition, was the essence of conservative politics.838
Fourth, by combining technological progress with firm values and an insistence 
on social hierarchy in an ideology of improvement, conservatives hoped to change the 
world in ways that preserved essential elements of the early modern order that was 
quickly disappearing in the nineteenth century. The most important of these elements 
was, not the embeddedness of production and exchange, but the shared, binding morality 
that rested on tight social control. Aware that morality was no longer made binding as a 
function of immediate personal ties among the members of a community, these modern 
conservatives put government in charge of exerting social control over the members of a 
society. 
Fifth, in responding to events in Britain and France, and in cooperating between 
Europe and America, conservatism was a transnational political current. Just as the dual 
challenges of democracy and industrialization were potentially universal in their 
implications, so was the conservative response to them. International cooperation, and 
even internationalism, was not the exclusive domain of liberals or democrats. In fact, 
between Bremen and America, it long remained the exclusive domain of conservative 
elites. 
 
The claim that the radical transformation of political and social relations in 1860s 
Germany and America was an unintentional consequence of conservative politics might 
provoke disagreement. Could not Hanseatic moral politics have been a mere rationale for 
                                                 
838 Sellers, Charles, The Market Revolution. Jacksonian America. 1815-1846, New York and Oxford 1991. 
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their business interests? Did Hanseatic politics not expose the majority of the Bremish 
population to market relations dominated by cold self-interest, while the Bremish elite 
preached the values of deference, morality, and community? Was not the shift from 
paternalism to social control – both in Bremen and America – a clear indicator that elites 
had given up the hope that the lower orders of society could improve themselves? 
The historical record contradicts this idea of a trahison des clerc. The network 
described in part I of this study was the actual, social basis for the Hansetic belief in the 
ideals of community. In the experience of Bremish merchants, their way of life was 
perfectly consistent with the time-honored traditions of their estate, no matter how much 
innovation they brought to the world of international commerce or to the life of the lower 
classes in Bremen. They were secure in the knowledge that the old Roland still stood on 
the market square.  
The resilience they brought to encounters with others, and the reluctance they 
showed as late as the 1860s to abandon the traditions of their estate – the gender 
arrangements and the barriers to membership in the mercantile estate – demonstrate that 
Hanseats were not liberals in sheep’s skin. Fundamentally, they remained convinced that 
society was more than an amassment of equal individuals. They held to the belief that the 
proper order of the world was one that allowed for distinctions, and they knew that 
democracy and completely unfettered market relations were leveling agents. It took 
massive challenges from the outside to uproot this transnational community, and to cast 
its members into the forming national bourgeoisies of Germany and the United States. 
War-making nation states, industrial production, and the growing support of democratic 
popular participation extended by newly-empowered, unitary states, were the main agents 
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of Hanseats’ downfall. These were forces beyond their control. If left to their own 
devices, they would have lacked a motive to embrace the fundamental social 
transformation carried out by these nation-states. 
Contrary to the anti-commercialist imagination that sees merchants as the 
conscious agents of exploitation and dissolution, these champions of global commerce 
were at the same time among the most ardent supporters of preserving traditional values 
and a communal ethos. Not classical merchant capital, represented by Hanseats, but 
modern industrial capital and its commodity-trading and money-trading branches, 
together with its political complement, the nation-state, were the main agents of the 
dissolution and subversion of community. Hence, in the last third of the nineteenth-
century, the wish of anti-commercialists in both America and Germany to use monetary 
and trade policies to end exploitative economic relations by subjecting merchants and 
other agents of the market to the discipline of a national economy, enforced by the 
nation-state, did not come true. Capital and the state continue to play their role as 
‘levelers’, in spite of their fundamentalist and anti-commercialist fans. 
 
Stubborn Hanseatic traditionalism was not a matter of provinciality. Both in 
formulating their ideals, and in shaping their responses to social changes, Hanseats 
incorporated what they learned abroad. France, Britain, and America made appearances 
in Bremish thought not just as abstract examples. Hanseatic merchants had experienced 
first-hand political and social life in these countries, especially in the United States. 
Hence, their ideas differed from the mainstream of German political life. Before the 
diffuse political currents of the German middle-class had congealed into clearly delimited 
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parties, Bremen’s elite had found its voice in a Western conservatism. It had thus found a 
response to the dual challenges of industrialization and democracy that allowed for a 
supercession of home town traditions in a political ideology open to trans-local alliances. 
Like Hanseats, Whigs were engaged in the project of paving the way for capitalist 
social relations, while attempting to shore up the moral foundations of community eroded 
by the rise of capitalism. In this approach to modernization, they were located in 
opposition to democrats on both sides of the ocean; and they were aware that they had a 
common adversary. Based on this commonality, Hanseats and Whigs embraced 
steamship technology, which revolutionized international commerce. Unlike Whigs, 
Hanseats did not promote steamships as a step towards building an industrial-capitalist 
society. Like their American friends, however, they perceived technological and 
institutional change as ‘improvements’ upon a fundamentally good social order. 
The American Civil War and the German wars of unification of the 1860s 
rendered Hanseats’ multilateral approach to international politics increasingly ineffective. 
Guns and warships made by modern industry, not mercantile diplomacy, decided the 
domestic conflicts in the two societies that were most important to Hanseats. The search 
for a response to their loss of political leeway divided Hanseats. In America, Hanseats-
turned-Unionists and their Confederate counterparts dissolved partnerships that had 
rested on decade-long ties between old families. In Germany, some Hanseats became 
enthusiastic supporters of a Prussian-led unification of the country, while others 
continued to detest both the authoritarian Prussian state and the democratic national 
movement with which it was allying itself. As the masses mobilized themselves to decide 
political questions with guns and ballots, a fractured elite that faced existential economic 
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changes on top of these political challenges found it increasingly impossible politically to 
shape its own destiny. Within a few years, Hanseatic politics had ceased to be what 
Bremen’s long-time Burgomaster, Johann Smidt, had described as “an extended family 
life.” The hope for an improved society under the careful guardianship of local elites had 
failed.839
In the 1870s and 1880s, many Hanseats continued to do well in business. Yet 
those who, with more or less enthusiasm, had adjusted to the changed political and 
economic conditions were no longer linked to each other by the same kind of 
transnational family network that had existed in the previous decades. Ties to the 
emergent national bourgeoisie in America and Germany, respectively, became more 
important than those to one’s peers on the opposite shores of the Atlantic. Although 
Hanseats continued to maintain strong trading ties between Germany and America, they 
relied less and less on their family networks to do so. By the end of the century, as the 
generation that had built the mid-nineteenth-century Hanseatic world had passed away, 
the memory of a transnational community replaced the reality. 
In becoming agents of a specialized, commodity-trading branch of industrial 
capital, Hanseats lost much of what had made them cosmopolitan, or even transnational, 
in the past. Their ability to maintain a separate community across the Atlantic had run up 
against powerful obstacles: the modern nation-state with its armed forces and its reliance 
on popular politics, and the dynamism of industrial capitalism. Hanseats’ traditionalism 
had been resilient enough to allow them to continue far into the nineteenth century a way 
of life more typical of the eighteenth. To continue this way of life, with its insistence on a 
                                                 
839 Smidt, Johann, Denkschrift über die Judenfrage in Bremen, as paraphrased by Baron, Salo W., Die 
Judenfrage auf dem Wiener Kongreß, Vienna and Berlin 1920, p. 105. 
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limited scale of business, antiquated economic practices, and a reliance on the household 
and the family as the end and starting point of profit, would have meant certain ruin in the 
global economy of the last third of the nineteenth century.  
Hanseats’ aloofness from popular politics likewise proved increasingly 
unsustainable. In Bremen and New York, they had to contend with an invigorated 
population who insisted on their say in matters of big politics, and who enjoyed the 
support of central governments in many of their claims. If Hanseats wanted their voice to 
be heard under these conditions, they had to ask for the trust of the public. The currency 
of the club and the counting-house, character and reputation, were no longer sufficient for 
political purchase. The discourse of popular politics in the new nation-states was 
increasingly characterized by nationalism and geopolitics. The days when a global class 
of merchants could believe – with some reason – that they were building a cosmopolitan 
world beyond war-making states were over. 
As a community that would have held up to Tönnies’ criteria for this term, 
Hanseats did not survive the 1860s. What was left of them after that decade was a 
rudimentary family network, stripped of the essential economic and political functions it 
had fulfilled in the past, and reduced by those who had dropped out over political 
differences or under economic duress. Many old Hanseatic families still exist today, but 
the essential features of what had made them a community, the organic intertwining of 
their economic, domestic, and political existence, based on a shared moral economy, does 
not. The memory of the golden age of Hanseatic, transatlantic trade of the 1830s through 
1850s survives but as an ideology in the self-image of present descendants of the great 
merchant-capitalists of the nineteenth century. 
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In following interests that arose from within their existence as a community, 
Hanseats helped transform Germany and the United States into industrial capitalist 
societies. The new economy of industrial capitalism undermined the economic 
independence of classical merchant-capital. In the transition to this new economy, 
Hanseatic merchant-capital appears, not as an exploiter preying upon local communities, 




 After the credits of many a Hollywood movie, we will see biographical snippets 
that satisfy the viewers’ curiosity as to what became of the main characters of the story. 
These snapshots of future happenings are no longer part of the main narrative, and yet 
they seem to round it off. The same holds true for the post-1867 biographies of the 
merchants who populated the preceding pages. For lack of a communal nexus that ties 
their stories together, these endings are but the biographies of individuals. Their fate in 
the last third of the century might matter for a different story – bourgeois politics in 
America or the German Empire, Colonialism, or even international trade. Nonetheless, 
the story told here would seem incomplete for their omission. 
 
In the local boosterist literature of late nineteenth-century Baltimore, ALBERT 
SCHUMACHER was celebrated as an important businessman. In 1865, he was elected 
president of the Baltimore Chamber of Commerce. His particular achievement for charm 
city was to convince the Northern German Lloyd steamship company to open a line from 
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Bremerhaven to Baltimore in 1868, which put Baltimore on the map of modern 
transatlantic travel. Schumacher had negotiated an agreement between the Lloyd and the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad to sell through tickets from Bremerhaven to points on the 
railway line. Local notables regarded this agreement as an important victory against New 
York, in the continuing competition for shares of passenger and commodity traffic. In the 
same year, Schumacher became the Baltimore agent for the Lloyd. He died in 1871, still 
a bachelor. His tomb is one of the more imposing structures on Greenmount Cemetery.840
 
After the Civil War, GUSTAV F. SCHWAB and his son, Gustav H. Schwab, acquired 
some degree of prominence through their active roles in the various Committees formed 
by members of the New York elite in response to corruption in urban politics; and even 
more, in an effort to curb the increasing influence of the mass of the urban population on 
city politics. In the 1880s, perhaps as a reward for his political activities, Gustav F. 
Schwab was appointed commissioner on the New York City Board of Education.841
His firm, Oelrichs & Co., continued to be successful. In 1871, it relocated its 
offices to an address in the heart of Lower Manhattan, 2 Bowling Green. The passenger 
business of the Lloyd grew to such an extent, that one of the associates of the firm now 
exclusively focused on this branch of business.842 While Schwab had not held a consular 
post since Bremen had lost its independence to the Northern German Union in 1867, an 
                                                 
840 Addresses of Albert Schumacher, S. Teackle Wallis, John W. Garrett, W. T. McClintock, of Ohio, E.H. 
Webster, and others: made on the 26th of March, 1868, at the complimentary banquet by the merchants of 
Baltimore to the officers of the pioneer steamship of the Baltimore and Bremen line, Baltimore 1868; 
Mayer, Baltimore; Howard, George W., The Monumental City, its Past History and Present Resources, 
Baltimore 1873; Scharf, J. Thomas, History of Baltimore City & County, 2 vols., Philadelphia 1881, vol. I, 
p. 306-307. 
841 Board of Education of the City of New York, memorial address for Gustav F. Schwab, Sept 12th, 1888, 
MSS 434, John Christopher Schwab Family Papers. Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, 
series II, box 20, folder 220. 
842 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 37 and 42. 
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1898 photograph of the offices of Oelrichs & Co. shows that the Consulate-General of 
the German Empire was a tenant there. Perhaps, another of the firm's associates had 
become the Reich's consul in New York.843
At his death in 1888, Gustav F. Schwab was considered the leading figure among 
the German merchants in New York, and perhaps even a leader among the merchants of 
New York, in general - his seat on the Board of Managers of the Produce Exchange 
seems to suggest as much. Schwab had been a member of the board of the Merchants 
National Bank since 1858, and had risen to the post of director and vice-president by the 
time of his death. In addition, he held posts on the boards of various insurance 
companies.844
 
In 1871, RUDOLF SCHLEIDEN was elected to the German Reichstag from Altona, 
then still a city in Prussian Schleswig-Holstein. He was a member of the parliamentary 
delegation present at the coronation of William I. as German Emperor, in the Hall of 
Mirrors in Versaille. After losing a bid for reelection in 1874, Schleiden moved to 
Freiburg i. Brsg., where he lived with his sister and aged mother. He returned to the 
United States in 1873 for a railroad trip through the West. The account of this journey 
was first published in the Augsburger Zeitung, to whose pages Schleiden contributed on 
occasion.845
 
                                                 
843 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, New York 1898, opposite p. 48. 
844 Merchants National Bank, obituary for Gustav F, Schwab, New York, Aug 23rd, 1888, MSS 434, John 
Christopher Schwab Family Papers. Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, series II, box 20, 
folder 220. 
845 Schleiden, Rudolf, Reise-Erinnerungen aus den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, New York 1873. 
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ARNOLD DUCKWITZ never fully recovered from the illness that had gripped him in 
1866. His handwriting became visibly shaky. He lived out his life in comfort, in his 
family estate on the Lesmona River, close to the Bremish town of Vegesack on the 
Weser. The death of his wife in December 1877 greatly troubled him. He followed her 
home in 1878.846
 
Like Gustav F. Schwab, H. H. MEIER answered the challenge of popular 
participation in politics by becoming a popular politician himself. Still firmly opposed to 
democracy, Meier learned to contend with the masses, newly enfranchised for Reichstag 
elections under the constitution of the Northern German Union in 1867. In a speech he 
gave in 1874, Meier explained to “the workers” that their interests were best served by 
electing a man of standing, a man who had given them work: 
The best representative for the workers is the man who gives much work to many. (…) 
Every industrious and respectable worker, the one who feels the just pride of the 
workman, will agree with me in this. (…) In Bremen, it is the trade and shipping interest 
that provides most work. (…) When [this interest] flourishes, the employer cannot find 
workers, and he becomes dependent on the worker. A flourishing trade and shipping 
interest, therefore, is what we in Bremen have to promote, because the welfare of all of 
us, not just that of the merchants, is most intimately dependent on it. (…) I honor the 
independence of the worker, and I give him his due as much as any man who might 
promise them mountains of gold that he cannot deliver. (…) This it has been my wish to 
make known to the workers, so that they know how I think about these things, and I feel 
justified in declaring that I am a friend of the workers.847
 
For the next two decades, more often than not, a sufficient number of Bremish 
voters felt that a merchant was indeed the best representative for them. When a mob 
attacked Meier in 1867, after his victory in the election had become known, “a cooper, 
                                                 
846 Arnold Duckwitz to Rudolf Schleiden, Bad Nenndorf 1878/01/15, StAHB 7,116 [Rudolf Schleiden 
Papers], folder “Briefwechsel Rudolf Schleiden mit Senator Arnold Duckwitz, 1854-1879,” third of five 
unnumbered and unlabeled boxes; Bippen, Wilhelm von, "Duckwitz, Arnold", in: (Historische Gesellschaft 
des Künstlervereins, ed.) Bremische Biographie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Bremen 1912, p. 115-117.  
847 [Anon.], “Die Wahrheit über H. H. Meier. Von einem Wähler,” Bremen 1874. 
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tall as an oak” served as his personal body guard. What better image could there be for 
harmony between the classes, based on patronage and protection?848
H. H. Meier’s exit from public life was a short and painful process. On March 15, 
1888, he quit his post as chairman of the board of the Northern German Lloyd, after he 
had stood alone with his objection to abandoning freight service on Lloyd vessels. 
Following a brief interregnum, Dr. Heinrich Wiegand, a lawyer, succeeded him. No 
longer a merchant, but a manager now stood at the helm of the Lloyd. A year later, an 
attempt to corner the world market in cinchona bark left Meier largely ruined. He died in 
1898.849
 
In 1898, OELRICHS & CO. commissioned an official company history. Its 
otherwise sober, anonymous author was moved to enthusiasm by the following example 
of the stability and continuity of Hanseatic trade relations: 
 
In 1819, the first mention is made of Joh. Bernhard Hasenclever & Sons in Remscheid, 
manufacturers of a certain grade of steel used chiefly by scythe makers, which they 
shipped to New York firms regularly until 1886, when they discontinued its production. 
The last lot was sold to the old scythe manufacturing firm, David Wadsworth & Sons, 
Auburn, N.Y., the father of whose senior, Jospeh Wadsworth, had begun the business in 
1817, and who had used this same German steel from the earliest times. Thus, for sixty-
five years or more, this article passed from the same foreign producers through the hands 
of the same importing merchants into those of the same manufacturing consumers, all 
three firms in existence to-day, a record which is perhaps unique in the mercantile history 
of this country.850
 
In his effort to stress continuity, the corporate biographer missed the key point: in all 
likelihood, hand-crafted steel ceased to be competitive in the 1880s, because the 
                                                 
848 Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 196 (quote), 196-198, and 224-229. A similar scene was repeated 
in 1874, after an election Meier lost. That time, police and fire-fighters were needed to disperse the crowd. 
849 Bessell, Lloyd, p. 60, 65-66; Hardegen and Smidt, H. H. Meier, p. 251-256. 
850 Oelrichs & Co., Caspar Meier and his Successors, p. 28. 
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commonly available Bessemer process made high-quality steel available for much lower 
prices. Precisely because industrialization changed beyond recognition the way Hanseats 
did business, the owners of old firms felt a need for historical accounts like that of 




As British and American bombs rained down on Bremen in the winter nights of 
early 1945, FRIEDRICH KÖPER hunkered down in a basement with a type-writer, 
hammering away at his memoir with an increasing sense of embitterment. He had 
intended to give an account of old tobacco labels, or so the title of the typescript suggests. 
Yet he never said a word on this subject, as his mind reconnected with his life as a youth 
in Bremerhaven, and his struggle as a young adult to establish himself in Guatemala, and 
carried him down a stream of consciousness that gave away a resentment that had had 
eighty years to grow. 
Köper called up the ghosts of past adversaries and long-gone slights, compressed 
into a hate-filled image of an overbearing and ever-present other by the pounding of the 
firebombs, the latest incarnation of the incapacitating power of this evil that had never let 
him enjoy the fruits of what had been, at its height, a quite successful career as an import-
export merchant in Central America. 
Köper had different names for this evil. Sometimes it was the American, 
sometimes it was Big Capital, but mostly it was simply the Jew, whom he perceived as 
the true driving force behind it all. Köper had been the head of the largest German trading 
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house in Tegucigalpa, and they had taken that away from him, too. He had been a 
respectable citizen in his new home. He had even become president of the NSDAP/AO 
(National Socialist Workers Party of Germany – Overseas Organization) for Guatemala. 
Now, in this basement, it all willed out: 
 
The German colony in Guat[ema]la was the largest and most respectable, there were few 
Americans at that time [1887], some French, English, Dutch, and Belgians. But there 
were already a number of German Jews who had taken the usual route: Galicia, Breslau, 
Berlin, Hamburg, New York. In USA they acquired citizenship, back then this was 
possible after a short residency, and further shortened by Jewish tricks, and then they 
came to Guatemala and Central America (especially Salvador is completely Jewified 
these days) in steady proliferation. After they expelled the Germans from Guatemala, 
they will, with U.S. help, step into the German place, at least in trade. That will be all the 
easier for them with their German names, and since the Indios and Guatemaltecos cannot 
tell the difference between the various white European races. For them, it is the same as 
with us and the colored. The Chinese, for instance, all look the same to us, in spite of 
their quite different tribes.851
 
The bombing nights of the Second World War brought to light the completion of 
the process of nationalization that had remade the Hanseatic merchant class. National 
Socialism promised to recapture the organic, exclusive, harmonious conditions of the lost 
community of German home towns.852 It wedded this false promise to the anti-
commercialism that had become the standard feature of any reactionary critique of 
capitalism. Nineteenth-century Hanseats had played a role both in the making of the 
modern world-market, and of its false critique. 
                                                 
851 Köper, Friedrich, “Köper, Lottmann & Cia., Guatemala, Plaudereien über Handelsmarken, Etiquetten, 
Wappen, etc.,” typescript, 1945/02/01, p. 16, StAHB 7,13, Köper, Friedrich [papers]. 
852 This is the main argument of Walker, Mack, German Home Towns: Community, State, and General 
Estate, 1648-1871, Ithaca, NY and London 1971. 
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As the spirit of Bremish cosmopolitanism took its last breath, its most visible 
symbol vanished. When the Bremen Art Museum was hit by a stray bomb on September 
5th, 1942, the centerpiece of its collection hung deserted in the main hall. Its companions 
had been evacuated, but Leutze's monumental canvas was too large to be taken to a safer 
place. The original version of Washington Crossing the Delaware burned in that night. 
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